Religious Fundamentalism in the Age of Pandemic by Käsehage, Nina

Nina Käsehage (ed.)
Religious Fundamentalism in the Age of Pandemic
Religious Studies | Volume 21
Acknowledgement: A special thank goes to Donja ben Mcharek with regard to her
intensive proofreading, my husband for his precise support in terms of the finish-
ing process and to Annika Linnemann for being a wonderful project coordinator. 
In addition, I would like to thank all of the contributors in view of their trust in my 
idea regarding this project and for their great contributions. 
Nina Käsehage, born in 1978, is an historian and religious scholar. Since 2017, she 
is a senior lecturer at the Department for Religious Studies and Intercultural The-
ology (Faculty of Theology) at the University of Rostock. In 2018, she received her 
Ph.D. for her basic research about the contemporary Salafist and Jihadist milieu 
in Germany from the Department of Religious Studies (Faculty of Philosophy) at 
the Georg-August-University of Göttingen. Her main research interests are Islam-
ic Radicalization, New Religious Movements, Qualitative Religious Research, Re-
ligious Fundamentalism, Psychology and Sociology of Religion.
Nina Käsehage (ed.)
Religious Fundamentalism in the Age of Pandemic
Funding: The Open Access publication of this volume was supported by Rostock 
University Library. 
Bibliographic information published by the Deutsche Nationalbibliothek
The Deutsche Nationalbibliothek lists this publication in the Deutsche Nation-
albibliografie; detailed bibliographic data are available in the Internet at http://
dnb.d-nb.de 
This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoD-
erivatives 4.0 (BY-NC-ND) which means that the text may be used for non-commercial 
purposes, provided credit is given to the author. For details go to http://creativecommons.
org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ 
To create an adaptation, translation, or derivative of the original work and for commer-
cial use, further permission is required and can be obtained by contacting rights@tran-
script-publishing.com
Creative Commons license terms for re-use do not apply to any content (such as graphs, 
figures, photos, excerpts, etc.) not original to the Open Access publication and further 
permission may be required from the rights holder. The obligation to research and clear 
permission lies solely with the party re-using the material.  
© 2021 transcript Verlag, Bielefeld
Cover layout: Maria Arndt, Bielefeld 
Copy-editing: Nina Käsehage 
Proofread by: Donja ben Mcharek and Anna P. Korula (Nina Käsehageʼs chapters)




Printed on permanent acid-free text paper.
Contents
Introduction
Nina Käsehage ............................................................................ 7
Cultural Wars and Communal Perseverance:
Jewish Fundamentalism in Our Time
Yaakov Ariel ............................................................................. 25
The Impact of Covid-19 on Orthodox Groups
and Believers in Russia
Anastasia V. Mitrofanova ................................................................. 47
Towards a Covid-Jihad – Millennialism in the field
of Jihadism
Nina Käsehage ............................................................................81
How Central Asian Salafi-Jihadi Groups
are Exploiting the Covid-19 Pandemic:
New Opportunities and Challenges
Uran Botobekov ......................................................................... 107
Islamic Fundamentalism Framing Politics in Mali:
From the Middle Ages to the Age of Pandemic
Olga Torres Díaz......................................................................... 149
Global Virus, International Lamas: Tibetan Religious Leaders in the
Face of the Covid-19 Crisis
Miguel Álvarez Ortega ................................................................... 179
Dismantling Prejudices on Muslim Communities
in Italy in Times of Pandemic:
not just Religious Fundamentalism
Barbara Lucini .......................................................................... 221
Religious Fundamentalism – A Misleading Concept?
Peter Antes ............................................................................. 251
List of figures ....................................................................... 263
List of authors ...................................................................... 273
Introduction
Nina Käsehage
Since the Coronavirus (Covid-19) was first identified in 2019 in the Chinese province
of Hubei its impact around the world has been unprecedented. Apart from the
millions of infections and several thousand deaths worldwide, the continuing un-
certainty about its mutations and transmission modes, and in the absence of an
effective vaccine, there is persistent fear of this poorly understood and invisible
‘enemy’.
Fear often causes mistrust of the unknown and what is alien or foreign, and
when it is an undefinable, ever-present, persistent or enduring fear, it can lead
to a climate of insecurity, resultant injustices, and – in the end – to misguided
decisions that could have far-reaching impacts on societies.
Secondly, and not less adversely, the effects of Covid-19 on social life are evident,
where normal, everyday activities and interactions have changed drastically and
fundamentally: Yesterday’s daily life is inconceivable today.
Despite the innumerable negative impacts of Covid-19 on health, social, polit-
ical and the private sphere, such as the loss of well-being, social contacts, individ-
ual deprivation, poverty, financial insecurity and fear of the future, several groups
have become more vulnerable in terms of the pandemic than others. According
to a report of UN Women, women and children around the world have suffered
physical, psychological and other forms of (domestic) violence that increased as
a consequence of the lockdown.1 Working female employees with children “were
relieved of their professional duties to care for their children, reinforcing gender
stereotypes that expect women to be caregivers and men to be breadwinners.”2The
1 Cf. UNWomen (2020). ‘New report fromUNWomenbrings forth voices of Palestinianwomen
under COVID-19 lockdown’. June 9. See: https://www.unwomen.org/en/news/stories/2020/6/f
eature-voices-of-palestinian-women-under-covid-19-lockdown, accessed on June 17, 2020.; In
April 2020 “France 24 reported a 30% increase in domestic violence, with abused partners
unable to escape their abusers during quarantine.” In: The Soufan Center (2020): Intelbrief:
The Plague of Domestic Violence during Covid-19. April 17. See: https://thesoufancenter.org/intel
brief-the-plague-of-domestic-violence-during-covid-19/, accessed on April 17.
2 Cf. UNWomen (2020). ; Cf. UN Nations (2020). Policy Brief: The Impact of COVID-19 onWomen,
pp. 1-21.
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confinement measures illustrated the fact that the “burden of domestic work and
childcare” in emergency situations still remains with women.3
Beside this gender-lens perspective,4 another group that is specifically vulner-
able towards the consequences of the pandemic are people at risk of various forms
of radicalization or radical mindsets. According to Counter Terrorism Policing (CTP)
“the impact of Covid-19 and social isolation could make some of society’s most vul-
nerable people more susceptible to radicalization and other forms of grooming.”5
With respect to a report of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), “the
coronavirus pandemic and its social repercussions are fueling violence by both
frustrated individuals and domestic terrorists.”6 Some cases are well known, such
as the one of a white supremacist extremist in Missouri who wanted – beside other
plans – to blow up a local hospital, a mosque, a synagogue and a school with a high
population of black students, and was killed after a failed arrest.7 The reasons for
politically motivated radicalization of individuals in the Covid-19 context are iden-
tifiable in social distancing as a consequence of “the pandemic [that therefore] has
created a new source of anger and frustration for some individuals. As a result,
violent extremist plots will likely involve individuals seeking targets symbolic to
their personal grievances.”8
According to the The Council conclusions on EU External Action on Preventing and
Countering Terrorism and Violent Extremism of June 2020, the threat of terrorism and
the prevention of radicalization remain high on the European Union’s Agenda de-
spite the pandemic.9
Various authors and researchers have constructed a link or rather similarities
between Covid-19 and terrorism, by marking it as a new actor in the theatre of
3 Ib. ; Cf. UN Nations (2020).
4 Cf. CGDEV (2020). Approaching Covid-19. Risk and response through gender-lens. See: https://
www.cgdev.org/event/approaching-covid-19-risk-and-response-through-gender-lens#.Xoc_
3hXaQx0.linkedin, accessed on April 3rd, 2020.
5 Cf. Police UK (2020). Counter Terrorism Police highlight support services as COVID-19 pandemic is
linked to greater risk of radicalization. April, 22nd. See: https://www.counterterrorism.police.uk/
ctp-look-to-bolster-prevent-referrals-during-lockdown/, accessed on April 23rd.
6 Cf. Ken Dilanian (2020). ‘The coronavirus pandemic and its social repercussions are fueling
violence by both frustrated individuals and domestic terrorists, according to a new intelli-
gence report by DHS’. NBC News. April 23. See: https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/national-
security/coronavirus-its-social-effects-fueling-extremist-violence-says-government-report-
n1190921, accessed on April 24, 2020.
7 Cf. Dilanian (2020).
8 Ib.
9 See General Secretariat of the Council (2020). Council Conclusions on EU External Action on Pre-
venting and Countering Terrorism and Violent Extremism. In Council of the European Union (Ed.).
No. prev. doc.: 8742/20 + COR 1. Brussels, June 16, pp. 1-16.
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global terrorism.10 Others underline the difference11 between terrorism as a man-
made strategy with specific purposes on individual actors or certain states in com-
parison to Covid-19 as “a natural threat” and “an infectious disease [that] does not
occur in separate individual actions, but rather more in waves of propagation.”12
Marone points out that
“Terrorism is visible by definition. Still, the fear of COVID-19 is fueled precisely by
invisibility: the pathogen is undetectable to the naked eye and for this reason con-
tagion is, at this stage, practically not avoidable, except through social distancing.
This aspect of the epidemic could lead to the risk of a state of fear that is even
deeper compared to terrorism because it is invisible, faceless, without references,
close to unfocused anguish.”13
In this sense, the speech of the French President Emanuel Macron on March 16,
2020 “Nous sommes en guerres” [‘We are at war.’] can be seen as a bad example
of warfare related rhetoric that doesn’t impart the public an enhanced feeling of
security, but fuels the fear and anger towards a more readily identifiable enemy:
“Nous sommes en guerre, toute l’action du gouvernement et du parlament doit
être tournée désormais vers le combat contre l’épidémié, de jour comme de nuit,
rien ne doit nous en diverter. […] Nous sommes en guerre. Et la Nation soutien-
dra ses enfants qui […] se trouvent en première ligne dans un combat qui va leur
demander énergie, détermination, solidarité.”14
In the video, just six minutes and 8 seconds long Macron uses the sentence “Nous
sommes en guerre” (‘We are at war’) four times and calls on French inhabitants to
battle against the so-called ‘enemy’, Covid-19. His demand for the solidarity of the
whole “Nation” in terms of the fight (“combat”) ends with the ‘assurance’ that “nous
gagnerons” (‘we will win’). The warfare-related rhetoric that the French President
10 Cf. Bruce Magnusson and Zahi Zalloua (Eds.) (2012). Contagion: Health, Fear, Sovereignty. Seat-
tle, WA: University of Washington Press.
11 Cf. D. Pratt (2007). Religious Fundamentalism: A Paradigm for Terrorism? Australian Religion
Studies Review 20(2), 195-215.
12 Cf. FrancescoMarone (2020). ‘A Tale of Two Fears: Comparing Terrorism and the Coronavirus’.
Eeradicalization. May 29. See: https://eeradicalization.com/a-tale-of-two-fears-comparing-terr
orism-and-the-coronavirus/, accessed on May 29, 2020.
13 Cf. Marone (2020).
14 Le Monde (2020). “Nous sommes en guerre”. Le discours de Macron face au coronavirus. Élysée,
March 16. See: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=N5IcM0qA1XYMinute 1:13-2:06; 2:24-2:42.
This is the author’s English translation of the French original: “We are at war. All governmen-
tal and parliamentary actions must now concentrate on the fight against the pandemic, day
and night, nothing can stop us. […] We are at war. And the Nation will support its children,
who will find themselves at the frontline of a fight that will demand their energy, determi-
nation and solidarity.”
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used in his speech reminds the audience of the call of religious fundamentalist
groups for a battle against the non-believers and for the values of ‘true’ Islam. The
military jargon creates a war scenario that should empower the French population
to join this ‘fight’ towards a national opponent and impart a feeling of action pos-
sibilities towards a virus whose therapies or vaccines have not been developed yet.
Macron’s speech indicates the attempt to give a faceless fear a name and to fake
the fight against it, by assuring the French that the government and the individuals
aren’t helpless towards this unknown ‘enemy’.
With respect to Marone, “Terrorism is defined by definition”,15 but it does not
assess its origins nor provide appropriate methods for how best to combat it – or
in case of Covid-19 – how to develop a suitable cure for a disease that will infect all
individuals, regardless of nationality or borders.
Against this background, itmight bemuchwiser to search for appropriatemea-
sures of healing the infected and finding an effective vaccine against the virus in
order to avoid an increase of the pandemic, instead of constructing a new (national)
‘enemy’.
Nevertheless, the individual’s powerlessness in the face of Covid-19 leads polit-
ical leaders such as the U.S. President Donald Trump16 or the President of Brazil
Jair Bolsonaro17 to impulsive activism instead of long-term, carefully evaluated so-
lutions for the inhabitants of the countries they control.18 Brazil has been hit the
hardest after the USA by the pandemic. Nevertheless, both presidents refused to
wear protection masks until recently. Because of his refusal to wear a protection
mask in one Brazilian district where specific hygienic regulations such as the wear-
ing of protection masks had to be observed, President Bolsonaro was sentenced by
a regional court to wear a mask, before stepping further into this area. Bolsonaro,
who called Covid-19 a ‘little cold’, fell ill himself from the virus, but recovered in the
meantime.
History appears to repeat itself, as specific prejudices against religious minori-
ties such as Jews or Muslims are in evidence in Western countries such as Great
15 Cf. Marone (2020).
16 Cf. Steffen Schwarzkopf (2020). ,ZahlreicheNotrufe bei der US-Giftzentrale und ein beleidig-
ter Präsident‘. Die Welt. April 26. See: https://www.welt.de/politik/ausland/article207529489
/Corona-USA-Mehr-Notrufe-nach-Trumps-wirrer-Idee-bei-US-Giftzentrale.html, accessed on
August 9, 2020. - This article was closed before the end of August 2020, when Donald Trump
was the official President of the United States of America.
17 Cf. Ivo Marusczyk (2020). ,Bolsonaro und die „Coronagrippe“. Ein Rechtspopulist stürzt
Brasilien ins Verderben‘. Deutschlandfunk Kultur. July 16. See: https://www.deutschland
funkkultur.de/bolsonaro-und-die-coronagrippe-ein-rechtspopulist-stuerzt.979.de.html?
dram:article_id=480606, accessed on August, 9 2020.
18 Cf. BR (2020). ,Bolsonaro: Ein Populist stürzt Brasilien ins Verderben‘. July 17.
See: https://www.br.de/nachrichten/deutschland-welt/bolsonaro-hat-grippe-ein-populis
t-stuerzt-brasilien-ins-verderben,S4thfGl, accessed on August, 9 2020.
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Britain since the current pandemic.19 Sometimes these prejudices are fueled by
specific political or ideological movements and even heads of State and Govern-
ment.20 President Trump called Covid-19 ‘Kung Flu’ and noted that 99 percent of
the cases related to Covid-19 were ‘completely harmless’.21The Indian PrimeMinis-
ter NarendraModi launched a political programme of Hindu primacy since the rise
of the pandemic. In February 2020, New Delhi has witnessed large violent conflicts
betweenMuslims andHindus where 50 people were killed.These riots were a result
of the scapegoating of the Muslimminority practised by the Hindu-majority.Many
Hindus blamed the Muslim communities in India as Covid-19-superspreaders be-
cause of the celebration of Islamic holidays.22
According to Meyer, the “impulse to associate the outbreak and spread of the
virus with supposedly less advanced Others (be they Chinese eating wild animals or
religious fundamentalists) and to close the endangered “body” of the nation – or
Europe as a whole – is a symptom of the will to keep such a narrative alive.”23
The idea of the nation being threatened “by intruders from outside” is defined
as a “breeding ground for conspiracy ideas that attribute the spread of the Sars-
CoV-2-to the new 5G-wireless network, going viral” in violent extremist networks.
Therefore, it is noteworthy, “to deconstruct the use of bodymetaphors in discourses
around Corona that naturalize a sense of the “body social” as endangered by out-
19 Cf. Lizzie Dearden (2020). ‘Neo-Nazis telling followers to deliberately infect Jews andMuslim
with coronavirus, report warns.’ The Independent. July 9. See: https://www.independent.co.uk./
news/uk/home-news/neo-nazis-coronavirus-muslims-racism-antisemitism-islamophobia.
a96608851.html; Cf. Arab News (2020). ‘British Asians fear blame for rise in COVID-19 cases,
racial abuse during Eid Al-Adha’. July 30. See: https://www.arabnews.com/mode/1712281/
world
20 Cf. JoannaSlater and NihaMasih (2020). ‘As the world looks for coronavirus scapegoats,
Muslims are blamed in India.’ The Washington Post. April 23. See: https://www.washingtonp
ost.com/world/asia_pacific/as-world-looks-for-coronavirus-scapegoats-india-pins-blame-on-
muslims/2020/04/22/3cb43430-7f3f-11ea-84c2-0792d8591911_story.html, accessed on August
9, 2020.
21 Cf. Patrick Mayer and Andreas Schmid (2020). ,Corona in den USA: Trump bezeichnet Virus
als ,Kung Flu‘ - Publikum feiert ihn dafür‘. Merkur. July 9. See: https://www.merkur.de/welt/
coronavirus-usa-donald-trump-twitter-schwarzenegger-lockerungen-new-york-tote-zahlen-
tests/covid-19-zr-13803461.html, accessed on August 9, 2020.; Cf. Tagesspiegel (2020). ‘Trump
erklärt 99 Prozent der Covid-19-Fälle für „komplett harmlos“. July 7. See: https://www.tag
esspiegel.de/politik/coronakrise-in-den-usa-trump-erklärt-99-prozent-der-covid-19-faelle-
fuer-komplett-harmlos-25976986.html
22 Cf. Slater & Masih (2020).
23 Birgit Meyer (2020). Religious matters. ‘Dossier Corona’. Religious Matters in an Entangled World
research project. April 21. URL: https://religiousmatters.nl/dossier-corona/, accessed onMay 16,
2020.
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side, malevolent intruders.” 24 Though “the virus is real; it cannot be deconstructed
away, but […] challenge us to re-think well-trodden assumptions and biases.”25
In this sense, the anthology Religious Fundamentalism in the Age of Pandemic tries
to provide an objective approach towards the impact of the pandemic in religious
environments with a fundamental notion of religion. Eight well-known scholars
from the field of Buddhist, Islamic, Jewish, Christian, Religious and Political Stud-
ies and Sociology discuss the influence of Covid-19 on (militant) Buddhist, Chris-
tian, Jewish and Islamic movements in Central Asia, Europe, Israel, Mali, Russia,
Syria and Tibet.
The results of their investigations of the possible impact of Covid-19 on the
religious groups examined vary widely: While for instance Uran Botobekov could
identify an instrumentalization of the pandemic in the field of radical Islam by
Salafi and Jihadi groups in Central Asia, Miguel Álvarez Ortega underlines the pos-
itive impact of teachers within the Tibetan Buddhism tradition who support their
adherents in terms of balanced and peaceful reactions towards the challenges that
occur due to the spread of Covid-19.
The present anthology focusses on Religious Fundamentalism in the Age of Pandemic
and is based on the terminological understanding that
“Fundamentalism […] refers to adiscernible pattern of religiousmilitancebywhich
self-styled “true believers” attempt to arrest the erosion of religious identity, for-
tify the borders of the religious community, and create viable alternatives to sec-
ular institutions and behaviors.”26
It aims to examine and to describe, why and how certain groups and actors could
make use of individual fears of Covid-19 and frame these worries for their religious
purposes. Although different religions are discussed in this book, their shared (and
sometimes fundamentalist) notion of the criteria that should be essential for a
‘strong religion’ – as the opposite of a “mainstream religious establishment” with
“conventional religious authorities” – is designed by their unified claim for “purity”
characterized by “uniformity of belief and practice.”27
Religious fundamentalist movements distinguish themselves from other reli-
giousmovements in terms of their actions, because “they are inherently interactive,
reactive, and oppositional [and] are inexorably drawn to some form of antagonistic
engagement with the world outside the enclave.”28
The religious dimension of fundamentalism occurs in its various forms such as
24 Meyer (2020).
25 Ib.
26 G. A. Almond, R. Scott Appleby and E. Sivan (2003) (Eds.).Strong Religion. The Rise of Funda-
mentalism around the World. Chicago; London: The University of Chicago Press, p. 17.
27 Almond et al., 2003, p. 17.
28 Ib., p. 218.
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“…the charismatic leader whose authoritative interpretations of the religious tra-
dition legitimates his religiopolitical diagnoses and prescriptions and guides his
associates and assistants in setting and implementing policy. Militance, coalition
building, “diplomacy” – all of the “ordinary” pursuits of minority political move-
ments – take on unique rhythms and patterns in fundamentalisms due to their
religious character.”29
While some experts suggest that the term ‘fundamentalism’ should solely be applied
to the three monotheistic religions Judaism, Islam or Christianity30 because of the
aforementioned definition of its elements and its origin in the field of an alliance of
an orthodox Protestant group who strongly adhere to the five fundamentals,31 others
such as Almond et al. point out that religious entities are constrained by both, “the
boundaries of the host religion and by their own antitraditional character.”32
In his chapter CulturalWars and Communal Perseverance: Jewish Fundamentalism in
Our Time, Yaakov Ariel points out, that Jewish fundamentalists could be defined “as
those taking affirmative religious stands in face of secularization and liberalization
of Jewish life; those upholding and strengthening tradition in face of other options
in Jewish culture.” In view of Zionist-Orthodox and ultra-Orthodox groups, Ariel
describes how “Jewish fundamentalists insist on the validity and authority of the
Jewish sacred scriptures, see special merits in studying the texts as central to Jewish
life and identity, and are protective of the narratives the texts offer” with regard to
the pandemic. Similar to some reactions of Islamic fundamentalists, “a number of
Haredi, ultra-Orthodox, leaders expressed their opinion that the pandemic came
as a punishment, a retribution for the lax morality of women and other members
of the community”.
Ariel discusses the development of “movements within a larger social, cultural
and religious context in which they have evolved and to which they have reacted”,
for instance with regard to their support of Right-wing governments and various
reactions according to Covid-19.
Though Zionist- and ultra-Orthodox groups both “believe in the need to main-
tain the Halacha, and observe Jewish law and Jewish rituals”, their approaches to
29 Ib., p. 219.
30 See the discussion of this position for instance in: Martin Riesebrodt (2001). Die Rückkehr der
Religionen. Fundamentalismus und der ,Kampf der Kulturen‘. 2. Aufl., München: Beck Verlag, p. 52.
31 Martin Riesebrodt (2004). Was ist “religiöser Fundamentalismus”? In Clemens Six, Martin
Riesebrodt und Siegfried Haas (Eds.). Religiöser Fundamentalismus. VomKolonialismus zur Glob-
alisierung. Wien: StudienVerlag, p. 16. The five fundamentals are the absolute inerrancy of the
Scripture, the virgin birth, the representative sin offering, the physical resurrection and the
return of Christ in terms of establishing of his millennial reign before the Last Judgement. In:
Klaus Kienzler (2007). Der Religiöse Fundamentalismus. Christentum, Judentum, Islam. 5. Aufl.,
München, p. 30.
32 Almond et al., 2003, p. 219.
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achieve these aims varied widely since the rise of the virus and the need for mod-
ifying religious rituals in order to care for their adherents and to protect their
private from public spheres arose. High numbers of sick and dying in the ultra-
Orthodox communities have been a result of the refusal to follow governmental
rules in the first time since Covid-19 occurred.This development fueled the anger of
groups such as the Orthodox and the Zionist Orthodox towards the ultra-Orthodox
communities. For Ariel, “the Corona pandemic created a dramatic rift between the
Zionist Orthodox and the ultra-Orthodox”, in terms of separatism and modernity
and highlighted “the character of the Orthodox communities as well as altered it
in some measures”. This development will have deep impacts on the future cohab-
itation and “the inner life of the communities”.
Almond et al. describe the “willingness [of religious fundamentalists] to ma-
nipulate the religious tradition and [to] introduce innovation for political rather
than strictly spiritual purposes”33 as one reason for the loss of reputation of the
self-declared ‘true believers’. By doing so, they delegitimize their ‘religious’ claims
in the eyes of other believers.34 As a consequence, the term fundamentalism was
applied on religious movements of other religions such as Buddhism as well, be-
cause some Buddhists have been involved in bloody conflicts with individuals of
other religious heritage, for instance the Tamils in Sri Lanka.35
In his chapter Global virus, international lamas: Tibetan religious leaders in the face
of the Covid-19 crisis Miguel Álvarez Ortega discusses the question if the extension
of the term fundamentalism in view of Tibetan Buddhism might be appropriate.
Álvarez Ortega “attempts to analyze how the Covid-19 crisis has been treated by
leading Tibetan teachers in the global media”. He examines the Buddhist concepts
in terms of sickness that contains “a depiction of time cycles in which the notion of
degenerate times or decline of the Dharma” is essential and sets them in relation
to public statements of well-known Tibetan Buddhist teachers such as Dzongsar
Jamyang Khyentse who sees “our present time as “kaliyuga” (theHindu Age of Quar-
rel) and “dark age”.
33 Ib.
34 Ib.
35 Riesebrodt, 2004, p. 17.; Cf. Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby (Eds.) (1991). Fundamen-
talisms Observed. (The Fundamentalism Project), Vol. I. Chicago [et al.]: University of Chicago
Press.; Cf. Martin E. Marty. and R. Scott Appleby (Eds.) (1993/1). Fundamentalisms and Society:
Reclaiming the Sciences, the Family and Education (The Fundamentalism Project), Vol. II. Chicago
[et al.]: University of Chicago Press.; Cf. Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby (Eds.) (1993/2).
Fundamentalisms and the State: Remaking Polities, Economies, and Militance (The Fundamentalism
Project), Vol. III. Chicago [et al.]: University of Chicago Press.; Cf. Martin E. Marty and R. Scott
Appleby (Eds.) (1994). FundamentalismsObserved. Chicago [et al.]: University of Chicago Press.;
Cf.Martin E.Marty andR. Scott Appleby (Eds.) (1995). FundamentalismsComprehended. Chicago
[et al.]: University of Chicago Press.
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Álvarez Ortega’s conclusion of the Tibetan Buddhists’ response to Covid-19 is
defined by “an appeal to an external compliance with the authorities, and an inter-
nal plural interpretation that reflects a common tension between a symbolic and
a transcendental construal of religious categories.” In addition, he tries to enable
the reader to comprehend why Tibetan Buddhism lacks “successful fundamentalist
or millennialist reaction” but offers a “particular suitability of Buddhism to accom-
modate to the crisis.” In this context, he underlines the dichotomy of Buddhist
discourses in view of the pandemic that tries to respond to this demanding situa-
tion appropriately in terms of “a native and an international audience in a context
where Science arguably tends to hold, so far, the epistemological monopoly.” This
balancing act is characterized by Álvarez Ortega as follows: “On the one hand, there
is this idea that practice helps us be calm and focused, and also gives us courage,
but that prayer is no counterfeit to the virus and the “mamos” are but a metaphor
for our relationship with nature; on the other hand, there is this call for rituals, for
specific prayers that can tame the virus and appease real evil forces unleashed by
humans.”
In contrast to Álvarez Ortega, Uran Botobekov’s contribution How Central Asian
Salafi-Jihadi Groups are Exploiting the Covid-19 Pandemic: New Opportunities and Chal-
lenges deals with the misuse of the crisis in the field of Islam by global Salafi-
Jihadi-Movements. Botobekov analyses the impact of the virus on Central Asian
Salafi-Jihadi groups such the Uighur jihadists of the Turkestan Islamist Party (TIP)
and on its “parent organizations such as the Taliban, al Qaeda and Hayat Tahrir
al-Sham”. He points out that the motives to use Covid-19 as a propaganda tool of
“the Uighur and Uzbek Islamist extremist groups from Chinese Xinjiang region
and post-Soviet Central Asia are affiliated precisely with these major players of the
Sunni jihadist world, such as ISIS and al Qaeda, which are their military patron[s]
and ideological banner[s].”
Botobekov aims to underline the strategy of various Salafi-Jihadi groups in
Afghanistan, the five former post-Soviet republics of Central Asia, and the Mid-
dle East to make use of the pandemic, e.g. as an “invisible soldier of Allah” sent to
weaken the enemies of Islam and punish the disbelievers” in the sense of Al Qaeda,
with regard to their specific political goals towards the Afghan government, the
suppression by the Chinese government and their opponent Bashar al-Assad in
Syria as well as his main allies from Russia and Iran.
The mutual goal of these religious fundamentalists is to establish a strict form
“of Islamic rule in their controlled areas” by drawing a picture of themselves “as
the only military and religious-political force in the region, caring for the health of
Muslims in “Islamic territories”.
The focus of Botobekov’s examination lies on the role of Central Asian Salafist
communities whose influence in the region is still unbroken, but had currently
been overtaken by the threat of Covid-19. He assumes that they aim to gather their
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strength by using the pandemic for their “violent extremism and terrorism, associ-
ated with Salafi-Takfiri ideologies”, is a strategy that might “have huge implications
and effects on the security of the world in the medium and long term.”
The need for the distinction between traditional and fundamentalist ap-
proaches to religion is crucial in the field of religious studies, though fundamen-
talism is often taken as a strike against modernity or the return to the Middle
Ages. According to Riesebrodt, these definitions are misleading, because fun-
damentalism is neither anti-modernistic nor purely traditional but represents a
process of a conscious revitalization of the tradition that arises from the tension
between tradition and modernity and tries to incorporate both aspects.36
Olga Torres Díaz describes in her chapter Islamic FundamentalismFramingPolitics
inMali: From theMiddle Ages to the Age of Pandemic the amalgamation of tradition and
fundaments in Mali in terms of “the imported and the purely local beliefs of the
country.” She points out that “alternating between periods of peaceful cohabitation
and others of open confrontation, has not concealed a basic distinction between
what is foreign and what is indigenous, what is revolutionary – in the sense of
bringing a major change – and what is traditional.”
Torres Díaz draws a picture of “the centuries-long path of the mutualistic re-
lationship between political power and Islam represented by two fundamentalist
tendencies clearly discernible in Mali until today.” One of these two types of Malian
fundamentalism is “a textual and Arabic fundamentalism while the other is an oral
and vernacular fundamentalism, but both remain attached to what is settled as
original and essential in their respective realms.”Though the first one has been re-
lated “historically as at present, to educated and Arabised minority elites; the other
[one is associated with] the less favoured majority of common people.” Against this
background, the impact of “Frenchification and later Arabisation” concerning the
Malian society and its roots of religious fundamentalism are discussed by Torres
Díaz in order to facilitate a “comprehension of current [Islamic] movements – per-
sonified by imams and preachers such as Muḥammad Dicko and Sheikh Madani
Haïdara – now that the emergence of the Wahhabi trend has begun to compete
again with the prevalent traditional Malian Islam in modulating the orientation of
the government.”
In her conclusion, she calls for a more differentiated approach to the term ‘Is-
lamic fundamentalism’ in view of Mali, based on the differences of Islamic terrorist
extremism and Wahabi fundamentalism that can be observed currently37 and will
pose challenges for the area in the long-term.
36 Riesebrodt, 2004, p.19.




The possible interlinking between jihadism and millenialism in terms of the
current pandemic is discussed by Nina Käsehage in her contribution Towards
a Covid-Jihad – Millenialism in the field of Jihadism. Käsehage selected two groups
that might be specifically vulnerable towards jihadist narratives since Covid-19
occurred: former Foreign Terrorist Fighters (FTFs) who have already returned to
their countries of origin as well as female inhabitants of detention camps in Syria
and their children who (still) cannot return to their ‘home’ countries. For different
reasons, both groups join the jihadistic narratives regarding an end time battle
between the ‘good’ and the ‘evil’ that is supposed to be announced by the rise of
the pandemic. Mobilizing supporters in terms of ‘the end of all days’ is explained
by Käsehage as also “a well-known tradition in the field of millennialism” that
helps to convince adherents to fight for a particular purpose. With respect to the
concerned groups, it assures both, adults and children, a bright future in paradise,
if they will join the fight.
By observing the use of “elements of religious fundamentalism, especially in
view of its millennialist and apocalyptic elements” with regard to jihadist narrative
of groups such as AQ and IS, Käsehage points out that “[w]hereas IS could be de-
fined as a religious movement that strives to obtain the world domination with the
support of its adherents, the female detainees who have unsuccessfully tried to es-
cape the camps in reality, abandoned their plans and escaped symbolically within the
camps by remaining among their religious peer group, the other female IS mem-
bers.”
For Käsehage, the strategy of AQ and IS to misuse the pandemic for a ‘Covid-
Jihad’ towards their self-declared ‘enemies’ is accompanied by “the increased at-
tempts of the use of biological weapons for terrorist attacks by jihadist groups and
actors [and] seems to mark just the beginning of an era of bio-warfare that will be
fought by various fundamentalist and extremist groups in the upcoming years.”
In her contributionThe impact of Covid-19 onOrthodoxGroups andBelievers inRussia
Anastasia V.Mitrofanova concentrates on the reactions of various Orthodox groups
and individuals from the field of the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) in view of
the pandemic. Apart from the responses of the fundamentalist milieus to Covid-19,
who assume for instance that the origin of the virus might be a “special operation”
against Russia” and spread the conspiracy of the 5G-wireless network as the ‘real’
source of the pandemic, other ROC voices arose that sympathized with the fun-
damentalist approaches towards an ecclesiastical lockdown, that were subsumed
by Mitrofanova under the name of the “so called “corona-dissidents” within the
Church.” This group includes moderate traditionalists, liberals and other believers
that usually corresponded with the official ecclesiastical opinion.
Themutual starting point of these groups’ refusal of the national and ecclesias-
tical lockdown is their collective remembrance of the religious suppression in Rus-
sia within the 20th century.During this period, the conditions within churches have
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been blamed as harmful in view of the individual health. The current resistance of
different Orthodox believers and groups towards the solidarity of the Patriarch in
terms of the ecclesiastical lockdown and his call for the disinfection of sacred ob-
jects reflect their traumatic experiences with the Soviet anti-religious strategy in
the past.
Another reason for inner-church resistances is located in the transfer of the
communion in the virtual room. Beside formal aspects such as the necessity of
technological skills, the presence of technical equipment and the money to buy
such in order to participate in the digital communion, Mitrofanova explains that
“for the first time in the post-Soviet history of the ROC, its speakers officially de-
clared that the communion and the church attendance in general were not neces-
sary conditions with regard to the salvation.” Therefore, the term «self-isolation»
became popular within Russia instead of the term ‘lockdown’, “because this ap-
proach implies a voluntary subjugation to the antichrist.”
The major content-related difference between the live and videoconference is
located in the Liturgy: since the attendees of a videoconference Liturgy remain
observers of the performance of the sacrament, the assembly of the live Liturgy be-
comes a part of it.
In the eyes of the fundamentalists, the compliance to the lockdown indicates
a return to former political times. They associated the virus with a “corona-poses-
sion” (koronabesie) accompanied by worldwide lockdowns and “safety measures as
an analogy to being possessed by evil spirits.” In addition, they doubt the need of
the governmental measurements that “represent the real threat in their eyes […] a
pandemic of fear created with the help of the mass media.”
Furthermore, the rise of the pandemic and its appropriate handling visualized
the inner-church problems between canonical and non-canonical voices and be-
tween an ‘official’ and a ‘folk’ religion and religious practice.
Against the background of “Soviet policy of state-imposed atheism” the mis-
trust within the Russian Orthodox community seems to be a major factor for the
interlinking between various religious groups that are commonly not represent-
ing the same religious position, unified in terms of their fear that contemporary
Russia has become “a godless state” such as the Soviet Union was. Mitrofanova’s
contribution with regard to the Impact of Covid-19 on Orthodox Groups and Believers
in Russia could therefore been seen more as an attempt to dismantle the deeper
societal problems within former (religiously) ‘suppressed’ societies that will occur
whenever a possible relapse into governmental old habits, for instance in the con-
text of nationwide lockdowns with regard to the pandemic, might appear rather
than just the description of the impact of Covid-19 on specific Orthodox believers
in Russia.
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The present anthology aims to deconstruct the stereotyping of all adherents
of certain religions for instance such as Islam as religious fundamentalists as a
consequence of selected reactions towards Covid-19 of some believers.
The rise of the virus caused most of the losses within Europe in Italy and had
a deep impact on Italian society. As we can see in Barbara Lucini’s contribution
Dismantling prejudices on Muslim Communities in Italy in Times of Pandemic: not just Re-
ligious Fundamentalism, it is important to examine “the role that perceptions and
cultural aspects of a crisis, such as that cause from Covid-19 virus can generate in
ethnic communities such as the Muslim one.”
Therefore, Lucini explores the interaction “of perception and interpretation [...]
between [a] possible exploitation of the pandemic by Islamic extremism and the
way in which the Muslim community in Italy is facing the crisis from Covid-19.”
During this process she observed that “the sense of identity of the Muslim commu-
nity in Italy” is “complex and fragmented” and varies between the call for respect
towards the nation-state as a “religious duty for Muslims” and their perception as
a “threat” linked with the prejudices that all Muslims are terrorists and sympathiz-
ers of Daesh which is often fueled by (social) media. One of her findings is the
result that “the characteristics of the context before the pandemic caused by the
Covid-19 virus affected not only the perceptions of such crises, but also the inter-
pretations, thus going to better delineate the specific fragmentary and complexity
of the Islamic experience in Italy.” That shows the “lack of explicit reference to Is-
lamic fundamentalism” that is primarily linkedwith 9/11 and not in view of Covid-19
in Italy.
In addition, Lucini observed an increased solidarity “during the emergency and
in the first months of the pandemic: at the local level among Muslims, while at the
national level the offers have also spread to Italian institutions and organizations.”
The use of the term religious fundamentalism is discussed controversially
within scientific discourses. Though a detailed debate on the various pros and
cons of the systematic use of this term would lead too far (in this context) and can
be found in the work of other authors,38 the two major critical aspects regarding
the term fundamentalism are mentioned in the following. The first critique of
this term deals with its misuse within political debates where ideological ‘ene-
mies’ make use of the term fundamentalism in order to destroy the political and
individual reputation of their opponents.39 The second critical aspect concerning
the word fundamentalism is found for instance in authoritarian countries that
discriminate against religious minorities and are willing to blame these groups
38 Cf. Marty & Appleby (1991).; Cf. Marty & Appleby (1993/1).; Cf. Marty & Appleby (1993/2).; Cf.
Marty & Appleby (1995).; Cf. Almond et al.(2003).
39 Riesebrodt, 2004, p. 17.
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as ‘fundamentalists’ in order to delegitimize their role and weaken their position
within society.40
In his contribution Peter Antes discusses the question, if Religious Fundamen-
talism could be seen as a misleading concept in itself, in the sense of a category that
itself becomes an actor. Starting by the description of the religious roots of funda-
mentalism, Antes explains the various (mis-)uses of this term that might lead to “at
least fourmajor consequences of such general interpretative terms: the addressees,
protest as a moral claim against the economy worldwide, the local differences, and
the historicity and ambiguity of terms and texts.” With the help of examples of dif-
ferent religious developments e.g. in Iran, Algeria and Chechnya, Antes underlines
the importance of “a close look at local problems and reasons for protest, in order
to avoid thinking that all is embedded in the interpretative framework of global
protest as a general trend typical of each of the great religions in the world”.
Antes’ approach is seen as very important in terms of the need for a mul-
tifaceted understanding of religions and religious practices, especially in the age
of pandemic when discrimination against and othering of religious groups are en
vogue (again) in certain societal and political circles.
Therefore and with regard to Riesebrodt, the term religious fundamentalism
should not be avoided in scientific discourses but should go through continuous
specification and become a part of systematic further development.41
This edited volume offers a selection of multidisciplinary approaches towards
the questions, if religious fundamentalism is conceptually and semantically appli-
cable to the concerned religions and religious groups and how these groups’ reac-
tions in view of Covid-19 might differ from each other and could be shaped by both
societal and political impacts.42
Though ‘the rise of the pandemic’ has just begun, we do not know at present
if and how other forms of this or other types of viruses might occur in the future
and jeopardize world health, but we can imagine how much our lives could change
in comparison to the status quo. As far as the future development of the global
health crises is not predictable, the responses from religious groups or individuals
in terms of this development are not estimable either.The misuse of the pandemic
– coming from political, religious or other types of ideological groups – is nothing
new, but appeared before as a negative accompaniment of global catastrophes.
Another positive side effect of the pandemicmight be the growing solidarity for
people at risk or in need and the increased care for each other within the crisis, as
40 Cf. Mark Jürgensmeyer (1993). The New Cold War? Religious Nationalism Confronts the Secular
State.Berkeley.; This strategy is also followed in terms of the blaming of individual or political
opponents as ‘terrorists’.
41 Riesebrodt, 2004, pp. 18-31.
42 The present anthology provides no uniformitywith regard to the diacritical characters in view
of the Arabic terms.
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described by Lucini.This could also underline the calming and harmonizing effects
of religions in terms of their adherents to face the pandemic together, peacefully,
and to receive positive energy through faith as Álvarez Ortega points out.
In this sense, the discussion about the development of religious fundamentalism
in the age of pandemicmight become our constant companion in the future, although
it is not possible at present to predict if the violent or the peaceful intentions of
religious groups or actors will gain the upper hand.
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Cultural Wars and Communal Perseverance:
Jewish Fundamentalism in Our Time
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Abstract
TheCorona epidemic highlighted the position of the Orthodox communities within
the larger Jewish, and non-Jewish, populations. It exacerbated Jewish cultural wars,
and the divisions between the ultra-Orthodox and other groups, including the
other fundamentalist Jewish camp, the Nationalist Orthodox. The article explores
the rise of the fundamentalist movements, their developments, beliefs, and char-
acteristics, and places the reaction of the different camps to the pandemic within
larger cultural contexts.
 
Keywords: Judaism, Orthodoxy, Haredim, Ultra-Orthodoxy, Zionism, National-
ism.
1. Introduction
As the Corona epidemic began unfolding in March 2020, a number ofHaredi, ultra-
Orthodox, leaders expressed their opinion that the pandemic came as a punish-
ment, a retribution for the lax morality of women and other members of the com-
munity. “TheCorona Pandemic-Measure forMeasure” announced posters inHaredi
neighborhoods in Jerusalem. “You have taken your crowns of your heads and re-
placed them with wigs, and retribution came swiftly – measure for measure. You
have walked the streets exposed, instead of wearing dresses that fully cover your
entire bodies…”1 To those who read the ultra-Orthodox pashkvils,wall posters, such
public chastising does not seem out of line. They fit well with the language and
content of public discourses in ultra-Orthodox neighborhoods, where the writers
1 Cf. Anshel Pfeffer (2020).Haaretz. April 28. See: https://www.haaretz.co.il/health/corona/.pre
mium-MAGAZINE-1.8803930
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refrain from using electronic means of communications and often air their con-
cerns and arguments via wall posters.With the appearance and proliferation of the
Corona virus, the posters made use of Covid-19 to promote a message of austerity
and modesty, in line with the values of the community.
The epidemic highlighted the position of the ultra-Orthodox communities
within the larger Jewish population, the cultural wars among Jews and the divi-
sions between the ultra-Orthodox and other groups in the Orthodox community,
including the other fundamentalist Jewish camp, the Nationalist Orthodox. The
chastising and arguments that developed have drawn on a long history of Jewish
fundamentalism that started in the early nineteenth century.
This article will explore the two Jewish fundamentalist communities: the sep-
aratist ultra-Orthodox, and the more culturally acculturated but politically radical
Nationalist Orthodox groups. Those segments of Judaism have been on the rise in
the last generation, demographically, institutionally and politically. They have at-
tracted much media attention as well as made their way, in fictionalized forms to
popular Jewish literature, TV series and movies.
Jewish fundamentalists are currently prominent on the Israeli political scene,
supporting Right Wing governments and affecting national policies. Declarations
and actions of somemembers of the groups in relation to Israeli society and policies
have gone even beyond the Jewish community, affecting the image of Israel on a
global level. Likewise, the ultra-Orthodox reaction to Corona public regulations has
reinforced their image as separatist group among Jews and non-Jews alike.
While many have paid attention to Jewish fundamentalism, especially in its
depiction in popular TV series, movies, and novels,2 few have been aware of the
history and development of the Jewish fundamentalist movements and the varied
characteristics of the many groups that make up these camps. This paper aims
to place the movements within a larger social, cultural and religious context in
which they have evolved and to which they have reacted.The paper will point to two
major camps of contemporary Jewish fundamentalists that differ from each other
in their theologies, communal structures, lifestyles, and political choices. This has
been evident, perhaps as never before, in their different reactions to the Covid-19
epidemic.
One can define Jewish fundamentalists as those taking affirmative religious
stands in face of secularization and liberalization of Jewish life: those upholding
and strengthening tradition in face of other options in Jewish culture. Jewish fun-
damentalists insist on the validity and authority of the Jewish sacred scriptures,
see special merits in studying the texts as central to Jewish life and identity, and
2 See, for example, the global success of the mini-series Unorthodox,which aired on Netflix, in
2020, during the Corona epidemic: https://www.imdb.com/title/tt9815454/
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are protective of the narratives the texts offer. Both groups are eschatologically ori-
ented, but while the Zionist-Orthodox believe in taking an active role in history, the
ultra-Orthodox have often objected to such attempts.3 While the ultra-Orthodox
take their model from the alter heim, Eastern European Jewish society before Com-
munism, Nazism and emigration brought it to an end, Zionist Orthodox groups
have come instead to promote the Land of Israel as a focal point of their political
vision.4
2. Fundamentalist Ultra-Orthodoxy
The demographically largest of the religious fundamentalist movements within
contemporary Judaism is ultra-Orthodoxy.5This diverse fundamentalistmovement
started in Central Europe, in the nineteenth century, in reaction to movements of
acculturation and liberalization.6 It spread to Jewish communities in other parts of
the world, changing and evolving in response to new environments and challenges.
Until the turn of the nineteenth century, Jews did not define themselves as ‘or-
thodox.’ Matters changed in the early nineteenth century when leaders of more
militant forms of reactive traditional Judaism appeared on the scene and declared
themselves ‘orthodox’ in contrast to what they considered to be the erring reform-
ers. Until secular and liberal alternatives appeared in Jewish society, Jews could
move away from the faith by converting to another religion, but they could not
choose, on an individual basis, how they defined their tradition and in what forms
they observed it. Now, such choices became possible. In Western and Central Eu-
rope, as well as in the New World, many Jews liberalized, easing up or giving up
completely on daily observance of their tradition. A number of rabbis and layperson
made deliberate efforts to bring Judaism to par with the cultural norms of urban
Christian European societies.7 Those deciding to uphold traditional Jewish forms
considered such liberal reformers misguided, if not outright traitors. They set out
to create a more stern and uncompromising version of traditional Judaism that
would save the Jewish community from disintegration.
3 Cf. Aviezer Ravitzky (1996). Messianism, Zionism, and Jewish Religious Radicalism. Chicago:
Chicago University Press, chapter 4.
4 On the ethos of ultra-Orthodox society, see Menachem Friedman (1991). The Haredi (ultra-
Orthodox) Society. Jerusalem: Jerusalem Institute.
5 Cf. Friedman (1991).
6 Cf. Jacob Katz (1973). Out of the Ghetto: the Social Background of Jewish Emancipation. Syracuse:
Syracuse University Press.
7 Cf. Michael Mayer (1995). Response to Modernity: A History of the Reform Movement in Judaism.
Detroit: Wayne State University Press.
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The term ultra-Orthodoxy has not been a self-designation. Most members of
this camp prefer instead terms that express their understanding of themselves
as the most loyal followers of the Jewish faith, using at times ‘Torah Camp,’ or
Haredim, Eager to Follow God, to emphasize their zealous commitment to the high-
est standards of Jewish observance. Michael Silber has pointed out that the ultra-
Orthodox reacted not only to the rise of Reform or secular forms of Jewish life,
but also to the appearance of acculturated forms of Orthodoxy whose holders had
wished to make observant forms of Judaism compatible with modern life.8 The
ultra-Orthodox believe that even minor attempts at acculturation or reform could
be the beginning of a slippery slope, decline in commitment and deterioration in
the standards of observing the faith that would eventually lead to the complete dis-
integration of the tradition.The first ultra-Orthodox leaders lashed out at early Or-
thodox thinkers, such as Moses Mendelssohn, and even at Samson Raphael Hirsch
and Azriel Hildesheimer, who were, in fact, founders of firm forms of Judaism and
militated against reforms of the faith.9
If Moses Mendelssohn was the thinker most associated with the beginning of a
moderate, acculturated formof JewishOrthodoxy,Moses Sofer (Schreiber) of Press-
burg (Bratislava), known as the Hatam Sofer (1762-1839), was the early founder of
ultra-Orthodoxy. Spiritual leader of the utmost Eastern urban center of the Habs-
burg Empire, Sofer established a yeshiva that became a bastion of anti-modernism
in Central and Eastern Europe. The Hatam Sofer pun on a Talmudic ruling, “Kol
hadash asur min ha Torah,” the Torah forbids all new things, became a battle cry
of ultra-Orthodoxy. It has reflected the dialectics of the new movement, which has
come about within the context of modernity yet carried a banner of opposition
to modernism and acculturation, and while thoroughly opposing reforms, made
profound theological and practical changes in the tradition. It was perhaps not
surprising that the Hatam Sofer held expectations for the imminent arrival of the
Messiah to usher in a global righteous age and bring about the redemption of Is-
rael. It stood in contrast to the views and hopes of newly emerging circles of liberal
Jews, who adopted progressive millennial views and hoped to build the Kingdom
of God on Earth through education, the spreading of the values of the Enlighten-
ment, technological advancement, and political reforms.The Hatam Sofer believed
that the Messianic era would not be ushered in through human efforts, but rather
8 Michael Silber (1992). The Invention of Ultra-Orthodoxy: the Emergence of a Tradition. In
edited by JackWertheimer (Ed.) The Uses of Tradition: Jewish Community in theModern Era.New
York: Jewish Theological Seminary, pp. 23-82.
9 Cf. Maoz Kahana (2015). From the Noda BeYehuda to the Hatam Sofer: Halacha and Thought in
Response to the Challenges of the Time. Jerusalem: Zalman Shazar.; On Hirsch, Hildsheimer and
the rise of German Jewish neo-Orthodoxy, seeMordechai Breuer (1992).Modernity within Tra-
dition. New York: Columbia University Press.
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through divine intervention and busied himself in trying to calculate the exact date
of its arrival.
In that, ultra-Orthodoxy has been similar to the ideologies and attitudes of fun-
damentalist movements that have come about in other religious traditions in the
late Modern era. Like other such movements, ultra-Orthodoxy should be under-
stood as a reaction to modernism, liberalism, and pluralism. If in previous gener-
ations, there was more leeway for rabbis, and laypersons, to balance the demands
of day to day life with those of tradition and the halakha, now regulations and stan-
dards have become more stringent and greater emphasize put on separation from
outside cultures including other groups of Jews.10
In their declared ideology as well as in their own minds, the ultra-Orthodox
created nothing new.They have seen themselves as merely preserving the customs
and faith of their fathers and forefathers, which, they have asserted, had remained
unaltered throughout the ages. Religious traditions, however, are dynamic by na-
ture and fundamentalist groups, such as the ultra-Orthodox, tend to be particu-
larly active in re-designing their traditions in order to make them more insular
and immune to outside influences. While opposing innovations, ultra-Orthodox
leaders and groups have implemented huge changes in Jewish customs and stan-
dards of observance as well as in the relation between different groups of Jews.11
For example, the ultra-Orthodox unwillingness to recognize more acculturated or
accommodating rabbis as legitimate has brought the older concept of,More deAtra,
local rabbis as the authoritative halachic figures in their own territories, to an end.
The dynamic nature of fundamentalism is also evident in the significant develop-
ments that have taken place as new generations of ultra-Orthodox have come on
the scene. As a generalization, the movement has become increasingly stricter and
demanding throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Its leaders have
militated against, and partially withstood, within their communities, the influence
of a number of central ideological movements of the late modern era, such as na-
tionalism, or equality for women. In July 2020, the Israeli Institute for Democracy
released the findings of a survey it has taken among ultra-Orthodox Jews in Israel.
A vast majority among the 863 members of the community, who participated in the
survey, expressed, in different degrees, separatist and non-egalitarian views on the
roles of women and men in the community.12
10 For similar attitudes among Christian fundamentalists, see George Marsden (1982). Funda-
mentalism and American Culture: the Shaping of Twentieth Century Evangelicalism, 1870-1925.
NewYork: OxfordUniversity Press.; Cf. TimothyWeber (1983). Living in the Shadowof the Second
Coming: American Premillennialism. Grand Rapids: Zondervan
11 Cf. Jacob Katz (1998). A House Divided: Orthodoxy and Schism in Nineteenth Century Judaism.
Waltham: Brandeis University Press.
12 Cf. Or Kashti (2020). Haaretz. See: https://www.haaretz.co.il/news/education/.premium-1.899
9355
30 Yaakov Ariel
At the same time, the movement also manifests enormous inner diversity.
While for many observers ultra-Orthodoxy seem, from the outside, like a homoge-
neous camp, it is in fact a large and diverse religious-cultural movement.Divisions
have to do with the areas from which the ultra-Orthodox have arrived from, as well
as between Hasidic and non-Hasidic forms of leadership, authority and worship.
The camp is composed of numerous communities that share the basic cultural
values and adhere to the same narratives on the course of Jewish history, yet differ
in the leaders they follow, as well as small details of appearance and customs.There
are also varying shades of separatism from the outside culture. These communal
divisions often result in inner struggles, the building and dissolving of coalitions
and public institutions, and even verbal and physical skirmishes. For example,
most ultra-Orthodox Jews in Israel lend their support to political parties that
represent their interests vis a vis the Israeli government. However, a minority
group considers such political maneuvers to be in violation of the community’s
values and boycotts the elections.13
While positioning themselves in opposition to modernity and the general cul-
ture, the ultra-Orthodox have chosen, especially since World War II, to live their
lives in large cities. They have made extensive usage of modern technology and
international transportation. This has allowed them to build global networks and
unite over common causes.Most ultra-Orthodox Jews are of Eastern-European ori-
gins, and many of them consider traditional Eastern-European customs to repre-
sent normative Judaism. The separatist communities in Germany were more ac-
culturated than the ultra-Orthodox groups in Eastern-Europe, and they encour-
aged their male members to obtain general education and professional training,
alongside Jewish traditional schooling, a reality that made some Eastern European
leaders treat them with suspicion.
By the turn of the twentieth century, the Germans and Eastern-Europeans co-
operated in establishing political bodies that came to represent the conservative
elements of Orthodox Judaism in the public and political spheres. By that time, the
ultra-Orthodox were reacting strongly to the rise of the Zionist movement, and
especially to its Orthodox wing,Hamizrahi.14 Leaders of ultra-Orthodox communi-
ties, such as the Munkatcher Rebbe, Chaim Elazar Spira (1868-1937) and the Satmar
Rebbe, Joel Teitelbaum (1887-1979) shared the conviction that the Jews were forbid-
den ‘La’alot Bahoma,’ to re-enter history as active agents. They therefore opposed
the Zionist agenda vehemently, viewing it as a futile and dangerous attempt. The
13 Cf. Friedman (1991).
14 Michael Silber (1992). See also Motti Inbari (2016). Jewish Radical ultra-Orthodoxy Confronts
Modernity. NewYork: CambridgeUniversity Press. Onultra-Orthodox life and institutions, see
Samuel Heilman (2000).Defenders of the Faith: Inside Ultra-Orthodox Jewry.Berkley: University
of California Press.
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founding of an ultra-Orthodox party, Agudat Israel, came to present a political al-
ternative to Zionist voices.15 While inner divisions, such as between Hasidic Jews
and ‘opponents,’ non-Hasidic ultra-Orthodox did not disappear, Eastern and Cen-
tral European traditionalists were nowwilling to put aside some of their differences
and cooperate in order to fight the modernists and strengthen the ideological and
spiritual walls around their communities.
After World War I, Agudat-Israel became active in a number of Eastern and
Central European countries and in Palestine, expressing opposition to the Zion-
ist movement in international forums. Still, in the mid-1920s, the ultra-Orthodox
party begun, on a pragmatic basis, to cooperate with the Zionist establishment.
Its leaders wished to get their share of certificates for immigration to Palestine, as
well as budgets and allocations of land.16 This created a backlash among the more
radical elements of the ultra-Orthodox in Jerusalem. In 1937, Amram Blau (1894-
1974) and others, established Neturei Karta, Defenders of the City, a group that in
the 1950s-1960s galvanized ultra-Orthodox antagonists of the newly created State
of Israel and organized demonstrations in Jerusalem against the desecration of the
Sabbath.This group gave voice to aminority within the ultra-Orthodox.Most chose
to operate within the system in order to protect their community’s interests, in-
cluding its growing separatist educational institutions. Avraham Yishaya Karelitz
(1878-1953), known as the Hazon Ish, emerged as a spiritual leader, giving voice to
ultra-Orthodoxy at large, in opposing the conscription of women, as well as of male
yeshiva students, to the Israeli military.
The deferment from conscription of yeshiva students and young women, which
the Israeli governments granted to its ultra-Orthodox coalition partners, proved
crucial to the educational, occupational, and economic development of the com-
munity. Since the 1950s, studies in yeshivot, rabbinical academies, previously a priv-
ilege of a small elite, became routine for all young men. While Zionist Orthodox
also engage in some rabbinical studies, for the ultra-Orthodox it has become a
way of life. Men continue their studies after marriage, while their wives work for
a living.17 As a rule, the ultra-Orthodox remain in coalition governments, whoever
heads them, to ensure the continuation of this arrangement and the integrity of
their communities.
Many observers thought, in the aftermath of WWII, and the Holocaust, that
ultra-Orthodoxy would not be able to overcome the deadly blows that the Nazi
death machine and the Communist regimes have dealt the traditionalist Jewish
15 On Agudat Israel, see Gershon Bacon (1996). The Politics of Tradition: Agudat Yisrael in Poland.
Jerusalem: Magness Press.
16 On Agudat Israel, see Gershon Bacon (1996). The Politics of Tradition: Agudat Yisrael in Poland.
Jerusalem: Magness Press.
17 On ultra-Orthodox life and institutions, see Samuel Heilman (2000). Defenders of the Faith:
Inside Ultra-Orthodox Jewry. Berkley: University of California Press.
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communities in Eastern Europe. However, to the amazement of many, including
the ultra-Orthodox themselves, the community has risen up, like a phoenix, from
the ashes of destruction and suppression, showing signs of vitality and growth.
Contrary to warnings, America, Israel and centers in Australia, Canada, England
and Belgium, proved to be congenial to the reconstruction and thriving of ultra-
Orthodox communities. While previously traditionalist Jews, who settled in the
New World, saw a need to acculturate quickly in order to accommodate success-
fully to their new environments, the post-Holocaust ultra-Orthodox migrants saw
matters differently.Theywished tomaintainmany of their customs, including their
distinctive attire, and build an independent educational infrastructure that has en-
hanced the community’s ability to retain most of its children within the fold.18
The separatist, seemingly archaic, character of ultra-Orthodox societies
brought sociologists and anthropologists, as well as journalists, writers, and film
producers, to take special interest in the various aspects of their lives.19 Some are
fascinated by the arranged marriages that are the norm in the community, while
renegade female writers, such as Yochi Brandeis or Judith Rotem, point to the
sometimes difficult position of women, who are married of young, and who carry
most of the burden of raising large families.20 Ultra-Orthodox women give birth
to averagely five and a half children in the United States and seven children in
Israel, about three times more than liberal Jewish women in these countries. Es-
pecially in Israel, most ultra-Orthodox live economically frugal existence. In spite
of an impressive network of mutual aid and extensive government support, many
in community live in poverty, depriving themselves of the luxuries of Western
consumer societies.21
Relationships between the ultra-Orthodox community and the liberal segments
of Israeli society have become strenuous. Many secular Jews resent the separatist
nature of the ultra-Orthodox community, and the refraining from economic ac-
tivity of so many ultra-Orthodox men. Likewise, the ultra-Orthodox have not cel-
ebrated Israeli civil holidays and have not recited prayers for the safety and well-
18 Cf. Friedman; Heilman There is an extensive literature from the perspective of women on the
division of labor in the ultra-Orthodox community.
19 Cf. Janet Belcove-Shalin (Ed.) (1995). New World Hasidism. Albany: SUNY Press.; Cf. Deborah
Feldman (2012). Unorthodox: the Scandalous Rejection of my Hasidic Roots. New York: Si-
mon and Schuster.; Cf. Lis Harris (1995). Holy Days: TheWorld of a Hasidic Family. New York:
Touchstone.; Cf. Samuel Heilman (1992). Defenders of the Faith: Inside Ultra-Orthodox Judaism.
New York: Schocken Books.
20 There is an extensive literature from the perspective of women on the division of labor in the
ultra-Orthodox community. For example, Judith Rotem (1992). Distant Sister: theWomen I Left
Behind. Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society.
21 See Life Apart: Hasidism in America, Documentary, by Menachem Daum and Oren Rudovsky,
New York, 1997.
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being of the state. The exempt from military service has been a huge source of
contention in a country that has had ongoing conscription since its inception.22
Still, the community has been on the growth. In addition to a remarkable demo-
graphic growth, since the late 1960s, it received unexpected reinforcements from
a post-modernist movement of return to tradition that has brought tens of thou-
sands of youngmen andwomen to abandon open liberal societies and join themore
conservative ultra-Orthodox.23 Rejecting much of the modernist worldview, which
their grandparents’ generation had embraced, the new adherents included artists,
soldiers, former Kibbutz members, and children of the veteran Israeli elites and,
in America, also academicians and professionals. The growing trend has boosted
the morale of the ultra-Orthodox. Here are liberal Jews turning their backs on the
freedoms and opportunities embodied in the open, secular society, ‘coming back’
into the fold. A number of ultra-Orthodox groups and leaders decided to create
venues of outreach in order to further enlarge the community’s ranks. Their mode
of evangelism is based on the understanding that becoming observant and joining
ultra-Orthodox life is a long process involving extensive studies. For that purpose,
they have created a large number of yeshivot for beginners, a novelty in Jewish life.
The growth of the ultra-Orthodox community and the self-understanding of
its members, who see themselves as representatives of the true and authentic tra-
dition, has affected the more acculturated Zionist Orthodox. The trend since the
1960s has been towards more rigid observance and greater acceptance of ultra-
Orthodox norms. By the 1980s, Zionist Orthodox have attempted to combine both
sets of values and standards.24 The Hardalim, ultra-Orthodox Zionists, coupled
ultra-Orthodox norms of piety and observance with a messianic nationalist faith.
Many in the Settlers movement have promoted this combination.
In the 1980s-2010s, the veteran, almost exclusively Ashkenazi, ultra-Orthodox
community, was both strengthened and challenged by a large movement of reli-
gious revival and return to the roots of Mizrahi Jews in Israel. Previously, most
Jews from Middle Eastern and North African countries were mildly traditional,
with only a minority choosing secular outlooks or adhering to Orthodox norms.
The new movement changed that reality and brought tens of thousands ofMizrahi
Jews to adopt both ultra-Orthodox standards of piety and anti-modernist stands.25
22 On Israeli liberal resentment of Haredi society, see Shahar Ilan (2001). Haredin LTD.
Jerusalem: Keter.
23 Cf. Lynn Davidman (1993). Tradition in a Rootless: Women Turn to Orthodox Judaism. Berkley:
University of California Press.
24 On the background to this trend, see Gideon Aran (1991). Jewish Zionist Fundamentalism:
Gush Emunim, the Bloc of the Faithful in Israel. InMartin E.Marty and R. Scott Appleby (Eds.).
Fundamentalisms Observed. Chicago: Chicago University Press, pp. 62-128.
25 Cf. Nissim Leon (2009). Gentle Ultra-Orthodoxy: Religious Renewal in Oriental Jewry in Israel.
Jerusalem: Yad Yitzhak Ben-Zvi.
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The movement also promoted ethnic pride and the preservation ofMizrahi culture
and tradition. It created parallel political, educational, rabbinical and welfare in-
stitutions similar to those of the veteran ultra-Orthodox community and used its
new political power to obtain extensive government support.26
The political influence of the ultra-Orthodox has been on the rise in Israel. As a
rule, the ultra-Orthodox parties offer the government backing in matters that re-
late to security, foreign-policy, and the economy, in exchange for allowing them
exemption from military service, cultural autonomy and financing for separate
educational and housing systems. Ultra-Orthodox parties often became essential
members of the coalition, and the budgets allocated for their community’s educa-
tional and housing projects have grown considerably. Similar developments have
taken place on the local level, such as in Jerusalem’s municipal politics, where the
ultra-Orthodox have successfully demanded, in return for their support, to have
their neighborhoods closed to traffic on the Sabbath and holidays. This has af-
fected the character of Jerusalem, where many neighborhoods and schools have
become ultra-Orthodox. Outside of Israel, the ultra-Orthodox as a rule do not run
for offices but lend their support to those candidates that respect their cultural
separatism and educational autonomy. The Zionist Orthodox have also been ac-
tive on the political front and have promoted an educational network for culturally
acculturated, modernist Orthodox Jews.
3. The Nationalist Zionist Orthodox
Zionist Orthodoxy has come on the scene a short while after the rise of politi-
cal Zionism.The group represented a minority voice within both Jewish Orthodoxy
and Zionism. Its proponents establishedHaMizrahi, amoderate political party that
saw its mission in carving a niche for observant Jews who supported the Zionist
agenda. HaPoel Hamizrahi, which combined Labor Zionism with moderate obser-
vance, became a larger political party, although the two parties united after the
birth of the state of Israel. This Moderate stand on politics and piety ended after
the June 1967 war.While many Jews reacted with joy to the Israeli victory, seeing in
it a triumph of the Zionist project at large, formany in the Zionist Orthodox camp it
signified a messianic development. Already during the war, the chief military rabbi
who was known for his accommodating rulings, Shlomo Goren, appeared near the
Wailing Wall blowing a shofar, ram’s horn, as if to announce the beginning of Mes-
sianic times. About a year after the war, a group of a few dozen Zionist Orthodox,
26 OnMizrahi ultra-Orthodox, seeDavid Lehmann andBatia Siebzehner (2006).Remaking Israeli
Judaism: the challenge of Shas. New York: Oxford University Press.
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headed by Rabbi Moshe Levinger (1935-2015), settled in Hebron, disregarding gov-
ernment regulations. In October 1974, this early attempt turned into a large move-
ment. Thousands marched, and hundreds settled, in newly established posts in
what had been the West Bank of Jordan, and for the settlers has become Judea and
Samaria.27 For the Zionist Orthodox enthusiasts, building their homes in these ar-
eas embodied a messianic purpose.They were taking steps towards the building of
David’s Messianic kingdom. The Settlers adopted Rabbi Zvi Yehuda Kook as their
spiritual leader and source of inspiration. The son of a chief rabbi and a mystic,
Abraham Isaac Hacohen Kook, Zvi Yehuda took his father’s teachings a few steps
further.28 The Land of Israel has become a central component and a focal point of
his and his disciples’ theology.
The Settlers’ Movement received an enormous boost with the rise of the Likud
to power in 1977, moving from a handful of small caravan towns to nicely built
neighborhoods subsidized by government funding.The Zionist Orthodox havemo-
bilized politically to defend their settlements from possible restrictions that the
Israeli government might impose and to ensure government support for the en-
largement of the settlements project. In spite of the Israeli withdrawal from Gaza,
the settlers’ community has grown considerably, reaching hundreds of thousands
of people. It has created its own subculture, complete with its own dress code, a
mixture of countercultural attire and ultra-Orthodox norms, and independent me-
dia ventures.
While the settlers’ community is devoted to Israel and its sons play a growing
role in its military, members of the community have at times taken the law into
their hands. In 1983, the Israeli security services discovered cells of underground
militants among the Settlers that were stocking arms and ammunition in prepara-
tion for a possible clash with the Israeli state and its security forces, in case of an
Israeli attempt to withdraw from the occupied territories and evacuate the settle-
ments.29There have also been at times incidents of violence directed against Pales-
tinians, allegedly in retaliation against terrorist acts directed against Jews. These
have included the destruction of trees, injuring mayors of Palestinian towns, and
even incidents that resulted in fatalities. While most settlers have not resorted to
underground activities or to sabotage or harassment of Palestinians, the settlers’
27 On the gradual up hazard building of a large infrastructure of settlements, see Gershom
Gorenberg (2007). The Accidental Empire: Israel and the Birth of the Settlements, 1967-1977. Lon-
don: Macmillan.
28 Cf. Gideon Aran (1997). The Father, the Son and the Holy Land. In R. Scott Appleby (Ed.).
Spokesmen for the Despised: Fundamentalist Leaders of the Middle East. Chicago: Chicago Univer-
sity Press, pp. 294-327.
29 Cf. Ehud Sprinzak (1991). The Ascendance of Israel’s Radical Right. New York: Oxford University
Press.; Cf. Robert I. Friedman (1992). Zealots for Zion: Inside Israel’s West Bank Settlement Move-
ment. New York: Random House.
36 Yaakov Ariel
camp as a whole has stood on the radical side of the Israeli political and ideological
spectrum andmany have come to see it as a potential obstacle to a peace agreement
and to an atmosphere of reconciliation between Arabs and Jews.
4. Preparing to Build the Temple
Of special concern for peace-hopefuls, in Israel and other countries, as well as secu-
rity services, has been the possibility that Messianic oriented radical Jews or Chris-
tians might heart the Muslim mosques on the Temple Mount and bring about a
regional doomsday.30 In order to appreciate this fear, one has to examine the role
of the Temple and the Land of Israel in Jewish, as well as Christian and Muslim
thought.
The Temple in Jerusalem had been a central institution in Israelite religion,
as well as in the Judaism of the Second Temple period. For Jews of that period,
the Temple served as the ultimate spiritual point on earth, a place where it was
possible for them to atone for their sins and reconcile with God in a definite man-
ner. Pilgrimages to the Temple in Jerusalem were essential rites.The Temple devel-
oped into a unifying symbol for a growingly diverse Jewish community around the
Mediterranean world.31 The destruction of the Temple in 70 CE created therefore a
serious vacuum in Jewish communal and spiritual life. Instead of a physical tem-
ple, rabbinical Judaism put its premium on sacred texts, and promoted a “temple
in time,” as the weekly Sabbath had become a holy day, similar in sanctity to a holy
place. Jews purified themselves in honor of the Sabbath and entered the holy day
in the same manner they would enter a holy place, cleaning their bodies, wearing
special cloths, preparing festive meals, lighting candles and recite special prayers.
Synagogues, “houses of gatherings” inHebrew, came about during the Second Tem-
ple period and developed, after the Temple’s destruction, into houses of worship
and learning, where Jews prayed and read sacred texts.
Still, Jews prayed to God to gather them back to Zion, rebuild Jerusalem, recre-
ate the Temple and enable them to atone for their sins and reconcile with God.The
Temple came to symbolize redemption. Rabbis have spent time on issues relating
to the Temple, its measures, sacrificial system, and the alms and donations pre-
sented to it. Most rabbinical authorities throughout the Middle Ages and Modern
Era have viewed the Temple Mount as being as sacred as it was when the Temple
30 Yaakov Ariel (2001). Doomsday in Jerusalem? ChristianMessianic Groups and the Rebuilding
of the Temple. Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 13, No. 1. Spring, 1-14.
31 Yaakov Ariel (2016). Tempel. In Dan Diner (Ed.). Enzyklopädie jüdischer Geschichte und Kultur.
Bd. 6, pp. 62-65.
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was standing.32 The Mishnah, the post-Biblical compilation of lore and law, out-
lined the various degrees of sanctity of areas on the Temple Mount and the rituals
of purification people needed to perform in order to enter these areas. Jews have
been required to purify themselves with the ashes of a Red Heifer before entering
the Mount, although there are no longer red heifers to be found. Rabbis have also
feared that Jewsmight step on restricted sacred ground, such as the Holy of Holies,
onto which ordinary Jews, and even ordinary priests, are not allowed to enter.Most
Jews have accepted the rabbinical ban and saw entrance to the Temple Mount as
taboo. However, Jews had not much to say about the manner in which the Temple
Mount was governed. Between the destruction of the Temple in 70 CE and 1967, the
Temple Mount had been ruled by Pagans, Christians and Muslims. In the seventh
and eighth century C.E., the new rulers of the city have turned the mountain into
a sacred Muslim site, building a number of mosques and chapels.33
In June 1967, when Israel conquered East Jerusalem, including the Temple
Mount, the results of the war symbolized to many Israelis an historical victory,
the realization of an old dream. However most Israelis did not wish to rebuild
the Temple. By this time, the Temple Mount was a Muslim site, administered by
a Muslim Waqf (religious endowment) and both secular and observant Jews had
no interest anymore in building the Temple. The Israeli government proclaimed
its wish to maintain the status quo ante bellum on the Temple Mount as well as in
other Muslim and Christian holy sites.The chief Israeli rabbis of that time, Yitzhak
Nissim and Issar Unterman, even issued a declaration that Jews were forbidden to
enter the Temple Mount. In 1967, voices, such as that of Shlomo Goren, who wished
to establish a synagogue on the Temple Mount, were in the minority. The mood
in Israel changed after the war of 1973. Paradoxically, external threats to Israel’s
territorial gains, whether through war or peace negotiations, have inspired Jewish
religious nationalists to take a proactive stand, including their determination to
see the Temple rebuilt.34
Not all Jewish settlers in the West Bank have been interested in building the
Temple in an immediate way. Similarly, not all Jewish Temple Builders are settlers.
However, the Temple Builders’ Movement has shared a great deal in its theology,
ideology, and community with the Settlers’ Movement. Since the 1980s, both move-
ments have been part of Israel’s Radical Right and currently many of the would-be
Temple Builders live in settlements.
32 Cf.Mishnah, TractateMiddot.Measures. Translated by JaconNeusner (1988). NewHaven: Yale
University Press, pp. 873-882.
33 On the Temple Mount, see Yitzhak Reiter (2001). Sovereignty of God and Men: Sanctity and Po-
litical Centrality on the Temple Mount. Jerusalem: Jerusalem Institute.
34 Cf. Motti Inbari (2012).Messianic Religious Zionism Confronts Israeli Territorial Compromises.New
York: Cambridge University Press.
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Groups of Temple-Builders reinterpreted Jewish texts, placing greater empha-
size on sacred space than most Jews had done in the Middle Ages and Modern Era.
Rejecting the understanding that the building of the Temple should be left for the
Messiah to accomplish at the Fullness of Time, radical Zionist Orthodox thinkers
have declared the traditional rabbinical ban on entering the Temple Mount to be
erroneous and null.
The first organization of Temple-Builders was the Temple Mount and Land of
Israel Faithful. Led by Gershon Solomon, a disabled IDF veteran and a lawyer, the
Temple Mount Faithful gave voice at its inception, in the 1970s, to a large variety
of Jews interested in the building of the Temple. Its periodic attempts to enter the
Temple Mount, and organize prayers there, have enjoyed much media coverage.
In the 1980s, Rabbi Joel Bin Nun, a leader of the now defunct Gush Emunim, the
Settlers’ major organization in the 1970s, established an institute for the halachic
study of the building of the Temple. In a series of publications he pointed to what
he considered to be the merits of the Temple and the sacrifices therein, which he
believed would help reconcile God and humanity, and would therefore help bring
about a messianic age. Other groups that formed during the 1980s-2010s, have
included, among others: Reshit-Yerushaliim, Jerusalem First, an Academy for Study-
ing Jerusalem and the Temple; Ha Tnuaa Lekinun ha Mikdash, the Movement for
the Building of the Temple; Yeshivat Torat HaBayit, The Temple-Laws Yeshiva; El
Har Adonai, Unto the Mountain of the Lord; Ha Tnuaa LeShihrur Har HaBayit, the
Movement for the Liberation of the Temple Mount; and Yeshivat Ateret CohanimThe
Priest’s Crown Yeshiva.35
Jewish movements that have strived to build the Temple would not have carried
their activities the way they did if it were not for evangelical Christians providing
encouragement and assistance. Christian thinkers had traditionally seen the Tem-
ple as redundant after Jesus’ sacrifice on the Cross and interpreted the destruction
of the Temple in 70 CE as resulting from the Jewish unwillingness to acknowledge
Jesus’ role and mission. The idea that the Jews should go back to Palestine and re-
build Jerusalem and the Temple became predominant among Christian Messianic
groups, especially pietist and evangelical Protestants. After the 1967 war, evangeli-
cals with messianic yearnings have come more than before to expect the building
of the Temple at the end of the current era, in preparation for the return of the
Messiah to earth. In such scenarios, they often expect Antichrist, an imposter of
the Messiah, to achieve global power and initiate the building of the Temple. The
Temple, or rather its rebuilding, seemed to evangelical Christians to be the one
event standing between this era and the next.
In the late 1970s and the 1980s, premillennialist Christians and groups of Ortho-
dox Jews, holding to an expansionist and messianic visions, including the building
35 Cf. Motti Inbari (2009). Jewish Fundamentalists and the Temple Mount. Albany: SUNY Press.
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of the Temple, discovered each other. Such Christians have received reassurance
for their messianic faith from Jews who were studying the Temple rituals, and
manufactured utensils for sacrificial purposes according to biblical or Talmudic
measures. Similarly, Orthodox Jews received reassurances from interest and sup-
port, which Christians demonstrated. Initially, Jewish proponents of the building
of the Temple did not appreciate the Christian faith more than Christian messianic
groups appreciated the intrinsic value of the Jewish faith, but they saw such details
as being beside the point. The important thing for them has been the Christian
willingness to support their work.36
Christian proponents of building the Temple have made efforts to discover the
exact site of the Temple. Some have searched for the lost Ark of the Covenant,
adding a touch of adventure andmystery to a potentially explosive topic.The search
for the “Lost Ark” has inspired a number of novels and a movie based in part on a
real life figure. Some premillennialist evangelicals have also searched for the ashes
of the Red Heifer, which are necessary, according to Jewish law, in order to allow
Jews to enter the Temple Mount, while others have supported Jewish attempts at
breeding red heifers or began breeding such heifers on their own.
Pat Robertson, the renowned leader of the 700 Club and a one-time presiden-
tial hopeful, offered his support and hospitality to Gershon Solomon. In August
1991, the 700 Club aired an interviewwith Solomon.Robertson described Solomon’s
group as struggling to gain a rightful place for Jews on the Temple Mount. “We
will never have peace,” Robertson declared, “until the Mount of the House of the
Lord is restored.”37 Solomon, for his part, described his mission as embodying the
promise for a universal redemption. “It’s not just a struggle for the Temple Mount,
it’s a struggle for the . . . redemption of the world,” he declared.38
Examination of the mutual enchantment between evangelical Christians
and Orthodox Jews, such as Robertson and Solomon, shows mutual influences.
Solomon, for example, claimed to have divine revelations, not unlike those among
evangelical charismatic Christians. Jewish would-be builders of the Temple have
also changed their opinion on Christians, impressed by the keen Christian interest
and support.39 Those Christians, they discovered, were more enthusiastic about
the prospect of building the Temple than most Jews. The theology and message of
people, such as Gershon Solomon, has come to include Christians as important
participants in the divine drama of salvation. Resurfacing the traditional Jewish
idea that since the days of Noah all of humanity is in covenant with God, Jewish
36 Yaakov Ariel (2013). An Unusual Relationship: Evangelical Christians and Jews. New York: New
York University Press, pp. 198-213.
37 Cf. Robert I. Friedman (1982). Zealots for Zion. New York: Random House, pp.144-145.
38 Ib.
39 Cf. Ariel (2013).
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radical thinkers of the Settlers Movement are claiming that Christians too have to
strive and make an effort towards the advancement of the messianic times.
In assessing the tensions embodied in the struggle for the Temple Mount,
one needs to take into consideration also the strong feelings of the local Muslim
community and the support and sympathy of Muslims worldwide. An adversarial
symbiosis has developed between Muslims and the Jewish and Christian Temple
Builders. The agenda of some Jewish and Christian groups that wish to change
the status quo on the Temple Mount, has served to fuel and enhance Palestinian
territorial claims.Throughout the 1970s-2010s, the Temple Mount, or the Haram al
Sharif, became a symbol of national liberation for PalestinianMuslims and their re-
gard for theMount has become evenmore pronounced. Sovereignty over theMount
played a prominent part in the peace talks that took place between Palestinians and
Israelis in the late 1990s, and Ariel Sharon’s visit to the Temple Mount in Septem-
ber 2000 served as a starting point of the Second Intifada. Protecting the Temple
Mount mosques became a priority for the Israeli security services. Even symbolic
attempts to claim the Temple Mount as a Jewish site have had explosive conse-
quences. On Sukkot, the Feast of the Tabernacles, October 1990, the Temple Mount
Faithful planned to enter the Temple Mount, and this time to lay a corner stone for
the future Temple.The police, however, refused to allow them entrance and they left
the place. But Muslim worshipers on the Mount felt threatened, and threw rocks
at Jewish worshipers in the Wailing Wall.The atmosphere became volatile, as Mus-
lim demonstrators chased the small police unit out of the Mountain, and Israeli
anti-riot police stormed the area a short while later. Dozens of demonstrators and
police officers were killed or wounded. The possibility that acts inspired by groups
holding to messianic hopes would bring about a mini-apocalypse therefore became
a concern for those taking interest in the developments in the Middle East. Should
the mosques be seriously damaged, all hell will break loose.
Laboring towards the rebuilding the Temple concerns groups of nationalist Or-
thodox and represents their larger religious nationalist agenda.This is not the case
formostmembers of the ultra-Orthodox communities.The differences between the
two camps reached a crescendo during the first months of the Corona epidemic.
5. Ultra-Orthodox and Nationalist Orthodox in Corona Times
During the first months of the Corona epidemic, the differences between National-
ist ‘modern’ Orthodoxy, and the more separatist ultra-Orthodox became evident as
never before. Both Orthodox streams are committed to preserving Jewish identity
and tradition. Both believe in the need to maintain the Halacha and observe Jew-
ish law and Jewish rituals. The movements differ, however, in the means to achieve
that goal and over their understanding of the place of observant Jews vis a vis the
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open non-observant, or non-Jewish society. The Corona pandemic sharpened the
different paths the two communities have taken, enhancing rift and animosity.
As the Corona pandemic unfolded the Zionist Orthodox, in Israel, America, and
other countries, reacted in a manner not much different from non-Orthodox Jews
and non-Jews in the communities around them.This was true both in themeasures
they took in the private sphere as well as the public. The realities of the Corona
Pandemic forced almost all Jewish groups to modify their religious rituals.40 To
the ultra-Orthodox, it took longer to realize the scope and danger of the plague
and to adapt to the newly introduced rules and regulations of keeping distance,
covering faces and avoiding gatherings. Leading rabbis were initially reluctant to
permit their followers to follow the Corona prevention guidelines, which meant
closing synagogues, or altering modes of prayer. Likewise, yeshivot remained open
even as other academies and schools shut their doors. Some rabbis changed their
minds and asked communitymembers to comply with the regulations,whichmany
of them did, even if belatedly and reluctantly.
This resulted in particularly high numbers of sick and dying in the ultra-
Orthodox communities. It did not help that members of the community have
lived in poor and crowded homes and neighborhoods, and that the celebrations
of religious rituals, which are important to members of the community, are often
marked by physical proximity of multiple participants. Many in the more liberal
Jewish communities chastised the ultra-Orthodox. So did the national Orthodox.
They pointed a finger at the ultra-Orthodox as betraying the Jewish dictum of
putting safety of life above all. Zionist Orthodox clearly cast their vote in the
modernist ballot, and felt morally superior to, as well as more sophisticated than
the separatist ultra-Orthodox.
Coming to the defense of the ultra-Orthodox, ShaulMagidwrote: “TheHaredim
are certainly aware of avoiding danger.The question is more about authority –who
gets to determine danger and who gets to dictate what activities need to cease in
light of it.”41
Conclusion
The Corona epidemic has highlighted the differences between the Haredim, ultra-
Orthodox and the Zionist national Orthodox as never before. Granted, there are
40 Cf. Ejewish Philantrophy (2020). Preserving thesemoments. A call to action for the American
Jewish Community. July 24, 2020. See: https://ejewishphilanthropy.com/preserving-these-m
oments-a-call-to-action-for-the-american-jewish-community/
41 Shaul Magid (2020). Covid19, Haredi Judaism, and Magical Thinking. Tablet. April 30, p. 2.
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strong similarities between the worldviews of the ultra-Orthodox and Zionist Or-
thodox. Both groups relate with owe to the Jewish sacred texts as the foundation of
their religious tradition. Both view the biblical narratives as the basis of what they
consider the special relationship between God, the people of Israel, and, especially
in the case of the Zionist Orthodox, the Land of Israel. Both communities are mes-
sianic in their theologies and yearnings, directing their lives towards the arrival of
the Messianic times.
However, the two groups have promoted different paths to achieve that goal.
National Orthodox have participated in the Zionist endeavor, at first as minor
participants. Since 1967, the Zionist Orthodox have become more nationalist and
right wing than most other segments of the Jewish population.The ultra-Orthodox
have traditionally resented the politically pro-active expansionist Zionist agenda,
although they too see themselves as troopers in God’s army, struggling, through
prayers, studies and righteous lives to bring in the Messianic age. A number of
ultra-Orthodox groups, most notably the Hasidic group Chabad, have become en-
gaged in outreach, wishing to bring more people to fulfil the commandments as a
means of ushering in the Messianic times.
While in the last decades the Zionist Orthodox have strengthened their stan-
dards of daily observance and commitment to studying rabbinical texts, the two
communities are far removed from each other in their life choices, lifestyles, and
areas of residency. The two streams of Judaism have different sources of authority
and relate very differently to the non-Orthodox world. The Zionist Orthodox have
embraced Modern science, incorporated liberal education alongside the study of
sacred texts, and have allowed women a growing amount of traditional education.
While Zionist Orthodox women also cover their hair and body, they study, obtain
degrees, and build secular careers. Women of both communities are committed to
pro-creation with the aim of enlarging the community and ensure the continuity of
the Jewish people. Except that the growth of the number of Zionist Orthodox chil-
dren has been motivated in no small measure by nationalist concerns over Israel’s
demographic strength.
The Corona pandemic created a dramatic rift between the Zionist Orthodox
and the ultra-Orthodox. The dangers of the disease forced both groups to show
their colors and identify as either: a separatist community that has its own norms,
sources of authority and priorities; or as a modernist community, part of a larger
civic society, abiding by the standards and laws of the land. Already in middle
months of 2020, as the Corona epidemic spread globally, it become apparent that
the pandemic and its devastating effects highlight the character of the Orthodox
communities as well as altered it in some measures.
Only when the plague is over will we be able to assess the full scope of the
challenges that the communities have faced and examine the long-range effects of
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the pandemic to the inner life of the community, as well as to its relationship with
the Zionist Orthodox and with non-Orthodox Jews.
Bibliography
Aran, Gideon (1991). Jewish Zionist Fundamentalism: Gush Emunim, the Bloc of
the Faithful in Israel. In Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby (Eds.). Funda-
mentalisms Observed. Chicago: Chicago University Press, pp. 62-128.
Aran, Gideon (1997). The Father, the Son and the Holy Land. In R. Scott Ap-
pleby (Ed.). Spokesmen for the Despised: Fundamentalist Leaders of the Middle East.
Chicago: Chicago University Press, pp. 294-327.
Ariel, Yaakov (2016). Tempel. In Dan Diner (Ed.). Enzyklopädie jüdischer Geschichte
und Kultur. Bd. 6, pp. 62-65.
Ariel, Yaakov (2001). ‘Doomsday in Jerusalem? Christian Messianic Groups and the
Rebuilding of the Temple’. Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 13, No. 1. Spring,
1-14.
Ariel, Yaakov (2013). An Unusual Relationship: Evangelical Christians and Jews. New
York: New York University Press. pp. 198-213.
Bacon, Gershon (1996). The Politics of Tradition: Agudat Yisrael in Poland. Jerusalem:
Magness Press.
Belcove-Shalin, Janet (Ed.) (1995). NewWorld Hasidism. Albany: SUNY Press.
Breuer,Mordechai (1992).Modernitywithin Tradition.NewYork: ColumbiaUniversity
Press.
Daum, Menachem, and Rudovsky, Oren (1997). Life Apart: Hasidism in America. Doc-
umentary. New York.
Davidman, Lynn (1993). Tradition in a Rootless: Women Turn to Orthodox Judaism.
Berkley: University of California Press.
Feldman, Deborah (2012). Unorthodox: the Scandalous Rejection of my Hasidic
Roots. New York: Simon and Schuster.
Friedman, Menachem (1991). The Haredi (ultra-Orthodox) Society. Jerusalem:
Jerusalem Institute.
Friedman, Robert I. (1992). Zealots for Zion: Inside Israel’s West Bank Settlement Move-
ment.New York: Random House.
Friedman, Robert I. (1982). Zealots for Zion.New York: Random House.
Gorenberg, Gershom (2007). The Accidental Empire: Israel and the Birth of the Settle-
ments, 1967-1977. London: Macmillan.
Harris, Lis (1995). Holy Days:TheWorld of a Hasidic Family. New York: Touchstone.
Heilman, Samuel (1992). Defenders of the Faith: Inside Ultra-Orthodox Judaism. New
York: Schocken Books.
Heilman, Samuel (2000). Defenders of the Faith: Inside Ultra-Orthodox Jewry. Berkley:
University of California Press.
44 Yaakov Ariel
Shahar Ilan (2001). Haredin LTD. Jerusalem: Keter.
Inbari, Motti (2009). Jewish Fundamentalists and the Temple Mount. Albany: SUNY
Press.
Inbari, Motti (2012). Messianic Religious Zionism Confronts Israeli Territorial Compro-
mises.New York: Cambridge University Press.
Inbari, Motti (2016). Jewish Radical ultra-Orthodoxy Confronts Modernity. New York:
Cambridge University Press.
Kahana, Maoz (2015). From the Noda BeYehuda to the Hatam Sofer: Halacha andThought
in Response to the Challenges of the Time. Jerusalem: Zalman Shazar.
Katz, Jacob (1973).Out of the Ghetto: the Social Background of Jewish Emancipation. Syra-
cuse: Syracuse University Press.
Lehmann, David, and Siebzehner, Batia (2006). Remaking Israeli Judaism: the chal-
lenge of Shas. New York: Oxford University Press.
Leon, Nissim (2009). Gentle Ultra-Orthodoxy: Religious Renewal in Oriental Jewry in Is-
rael. Jerusalem: Yad Yitzhak Ben-Zvi.
Magid, Shaul (2020). ‘Covid19, Haredi Judaism, and Magical Thinking’. Tablet. April
30, p. 2.
Marsden, George (1982). Fundamentalism and American Culture: the Shaping of Twenti-
eth Century Evangelicalism, 1870-1925. New York: Oxford University Press.
Mayer, Michael (1995). Response to Modernity: A History of the Reform Movement in Ju-
daism. Detroit: Wayne State University Press.
Mishna. Translated by Jacon Neusner (1988). New Haven: Yale University Press.
Ravitzky, Aviezer (1996). Messianism, Zionism, and Jewish Religious Radicalism.
Chicago: Chicago University Press.
Reiter, Yitzhak (2001). Sovereignty of God and Men: Sanctity and Political Centrality on
the Temple Mount. Jerusalem: Jerusalem Institute.
Rotem, Judith (1992).Distant Sister: theWomen I Left Behind.Philadelphia: Jewish Pub-
lication Society.
Silber, Michael (1992). The Invention of Ultra-Orthodoxy: the Emergence of a Tra-
dition. In Jack Wertheimer (Ed.). The Uses of Tradition: Jewish Community in the
Modern Era. New York: Jewish Theological Seminary, pp. 23-82.
Sprinzak, Ehud (1991).The Ascendance of Israel’s Radical Right. New York: Oxford Uni-
versity Press.
Weber, Timothy (1983). Living in the Shadow of the Second Coming: American Premillen-
nialism. Grand Rapids: Zondervan.
Online Open Sources
Ejewish Philantrophy (2020). ‘Preserving these moments. A call to action for the
American Jewish Community’. July 24, 2020. URL: https://ejewishphilanthrop
Cultural Wars and Communal Perseverance: Jewish Fundamentalism in Our Time 45
y.com/preserving-these-moments-a-call-to-action-for-the-american-jewish-
community/
Kashti, Or (2020).Haaretz. URL: https://www.haaretz.co.il/news/education/.prem
ium-1.8999355
Pfeffer, Anshel (2020). Haaretz. April 28. URL: https://www.haaretz.co.il/health/co
rona/.premium-MAGAZINE-1.8803930
Netflix (2020).Unorthodox. URL: https://www.imdb.com/title/tt9815454/

The Impact of Covid-19 on Orthodox Groups
and Believers in Russia
Anastasia V. Mitrofanova
Abstract
This chapter intends to discover how Orthodox groups and believers of different
ideological orientations in Russia reacted to the 2020 world health crisis. Its fo-
cus lies on the groups and individual believers from the field of Russian Ortho-
doxy who could be labelled as ‘fundamentalists’. Therefore, an analysis of the offi-
cial ecclesiastical reaction to the pandemic will be provided, that underlines how
some contradictory messages from above caused significant numbers of believers
to sympathize with the so called “corona-dissidents” within the Church. Under the
topic ‘dissidents’, various other groups apart from the fundamentalists such as the
moderate traditionalists, liberals, or individuals who usually follow themainstream
ecclesiastical opinion, can be subsumed.
Furthermore, it could be observed that fundamentalists mostly discuss themes
that might be common for all “dissidents”, although they are more open towards
their criticism in view of the mainstream reactions. They stick to the assumption
that bothmundane and ecclesiastical leaders have discredited themselves and need
to be replaced.
 
Keywords: Orthodox Christianity, Covid-19, Ecclesiastical Lockdown, Corona-
Dissidents, Fundamentalist Networks, Traditionalism, Russian Orthodox Church
1. Introduction
This chapter intends to discover how Orthodox groups and believers of different
ideological orientations in Russia reacted to the 2020world health crisis. It focusses
on groups and individuals who are labelled as “fundamentalists”, because they be-
lieve for instance that the entire socio-political life should be changed in terms of
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collective religious salvation.1 Apart from the official position of the Moscow Pa-
triarchate («the patriarchal platform»), Irina Papkova distinguishes three informal
political ideologies within the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC): liberal (associated
with intra-church movements initiated by late Fr. Aleksandr Men’ and Fr. Georgii
Kochetkov), traditionalist, and fundamentalist. Traditionalists are more conserva-
tive than the patriarchal platform, and, unlike fundamentalists, willing to work
constructively with the post-Soviet regime; their position is prevalent among the
majority of clergy and active believers.2 The situation with Covid-19 confirms that
it should not be automatically associated with the official position.
There is no strict border between the traditionalist and fundamentalist plat-
forms and sometimes they share each other’s ideologies; but the former remain
loyal to mundane and ecclesiastical authorities, while the latter are in the opposi-
tion to both hierarchies.3 Fundamentalists are not ultra-traditionalists; paradoxi-
cally, they have many things in common with liberals: both platforms show distrust
towards the church hierarchy and the mundane authorities, because both groups
refuse the current administration of the church and want to expand the role of
laity.
According to Papkova, liberals are reformists, while fundamentalists follow in-
vented traditions.4 In fact, the latter are no less reformist than the former: funda-
mentalists often appear as the most radical reformists with revolutionary inten-
tions in comparison to the liberals who seem to be more interested in «restoring
traditions» in view of an ecclesiastical reform.5
Though the ROC’s jurisdiction covers many countries, the present chapter con-
centrates on the discussion of the various positions of believers and groups who are
operating on the territory of the Russian Federation. Because of this focus, opin-
ions of the other Orthodox Churches will not be considered. In addition, other
opinions don’t represent a common position in view of the pandemic, whereas the
policy of ROC mostly bases on the decisions of Russian authorities.
1 Anastasia V.Mitrofanova (2014). Orthodox Fundamentalism: Intersection ofModernity, Post-
modernity and Tradition. In K. Tolstaya (Ed.).Orthodox Paradoxes: Heterogeneities and Complex-
ities in Contemporary Russian Orthodoxy. Leiden, Boston: Brill, p. 101.
2 Irina Papkova (2011). The Orthodox Church and Russian Politics. New York: Oxford UP and
WoodrowWilson Center Press, pp. 47, 51-53.
3 Some scholars use both terms to characterize social movements like Sorok Sorokov,
e.g. Roman Lunkin (2017). Dvizhenie «Sorok Sorokov»: pravoslavnyi fundamentalizm
vo vrazhdebnom okruzhenii. Religiya i pravo. September 18. See: http://www.sclj.ru
/news/detail.php?SECTION_ID =484&ELEMENT_ID =7677&fbclid= IwAR12Bz_ Pb81 f
SwLtki8NKrpQ8YOs0efMe7jnYiNt3P0DDmem2lHBZJpkO5A
4 Lunkin, 2017, pp. 53, 61.
5 For instance, liberals promote a restored Liturgy of Saint James as a more laity-centered but
also the oldest known form of liturgy.
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Apart from a loose network of communities and individuals known as «non-
commemorating» believers, who e.g. insist on remaining part of the ROC, while
refusing to commemorate Patriarch Kirill and/or other bishops liturgically, alter-
native Orthodox groups in Russia will neither be analysed. Many fundamentalists,
although not all of them, are part of this network. It exists no single ecclesiastical
community nor a “church” solely for the fundamentalists. Some of the not so radi-
cal believers often attend mainstream, “commemorating” communities. Generally
speaking, fundamentalists are less interested in the formal relationship between a
priest and the hierarchy, but in terms of his decisions in view of sensitive religious-
political issues.
The chapter’s methodology is based on the analysis of open access materials
produced by Orthodox groups and individuals responding to the emerging chal-
lenge of the global pandemic. With regard to immediate reactions of people and
groups to that topic, video blogs (mostly YouTube-hosted) and social media (Face-
book, Telegram, Vkontakte) are extensively examined. Last years’ most important
speakers issuedmore videos than texts, althoughmost of themwere “talking heads
videos”. The fact that people present most of their ideas rather visually than ver-
bally can be partly explained by the general popularity of social media that hardly
overran traditional blogging. Furthermore, videos are less likely to be monitored
and removed from the Internet than texts. With respect to some of the aforemen-
tioned points, the author refers to her own observations according to the national
lockdown in Russia.
The analysis of the official patriarchal position is based on documents that have
been issued by the Patriarch’s Office, theWorking group for the coordination of the
activities of ecclesiastical bodies according the circumstances of the transmission
of the infection with the coronavirus, or by separate bishoprics. Further sources
are the Patriarch’s public speeches and sermons, statements released by Vladimir
Legoyda, the Chairman of the Synodal Department for the Church’s Relations with
Society and Mass Media and official spokesperson for the Church in view of mass
media, and Legoyda’s official Telegram-account. To demonstrate that the Patri-
arch’s policy of ecclesiastical lockdown has provoked mixed reactions, the author
turns to diverse public figures representing positions from total support of the
patriarchal platform to critical evaluations but without invectives against ecclesi-
astical or mundane authorities. Generally speaking, people who distrust official
information about the pandemic have become known in Russia as “corona-dis-
sidents”, or “corona-sceptics”. Conspiracy theories, propagated by some of them,
such as the idea that the disease is being caused by 5G wireless technologies, are
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loaned from Western anti-Covid discourses, because in Russia 5G is not in use so
far.6
Finally the author analyses various positions within fundamentalist networks
by showing a broad spectrum of their opinions. Therefore, she firstly discusses
the position of these individuals who balance between traditionalism and funda-
mentalism such as Andrei Kormoukhin, the leader of Sorok Sorokov, a social move-
ment, Schemahegumen Sergii Romanov, the founder and former spiritual father
of a convent in the Urals and Sergii (Ruslan) Aliev, a sportsman, philanthropist
and entrepreneur from Yekaterinburg. In a second step, the ideas of non-com-
memorating believers such as Schemahegumen Daniil (Filippov), a spiritual leader
of a non-commemorating community that hides in a remote abandoned village
and spreads its ideas via YouTube7 will be discussed. Furthermore, the concept of
militant, highly politicized activists such as Andrei Saveliev, the leader of an un-
registered party called “Great Russia”, as well as the ideas of Colonel Ret. Vladimir
Kvachkov, the informal leader of the most radical fundamentalists and Russian na-
tionalists, who developed a specific ideology of “Russian Christian Socialism”,8 are
debated. In this context it is noteworthy, that thewebsite “Moscow theThird Rome”,
owned by Aleksei Dobychin, provides an aggregator of the news from around the
world and has become an important source of various opinions.
2. The Patriarchal Stay-at-home Policy and its vulnerabilities
Ecclesiastical leaders in Russia were aware of the approaching challenges well be-
forehand: already in the midst of March 2020 divine services were suspended in
the ROC’s parishes located in Europe.9 For instance the Diocese of the Russian Or-
thodox Church in Spain and Portugal discontinued public worships on March 14th,
6 Russian corona-dissidents developed this theory quickly: it was reported that at least one
mobile mast had been set on fire in the region of North Ossetia. The perpetrators were, most
likely, not religiously motivated. Participants of a major anti-lockdown meeting that took
place in the same region and was organized by the neo-Communist Vadim Chaldiev were
also not religiously motivated.
7 Viktor Shnirelman (2017). Koleno Danovo. Eskhatologiya i antisemitizm v sovremennoi Rossii.
Moscow: BBI, pp. 523-524.
8 Colonel Kvachkov spent twelve years in detention in total: The first time he was arrested for
preparing an assasination on Anatolii Chubais in the year 2005 (vindicated by a jury), the
second time he went to prison because of an attempt to initialize an armed revolt in the year
2010, and the third time hewas imprisoned for public extremist declarations in the year 2017.
Kvachkov was released in early February 2019 because hate speech had been decriminalized
and reclassified as minor offence in Russia.
9 Roman Lunkin (2020). Mekhanizmy religioznoi reaktsii na pandemiyu koronavirusa. In
Nauchno-analiticheskii verstnik IE RAN, No. 2, pp. 104-109.
The Impact of Covid-19 on Orthodox Groups and Believers in Russia 51
the Latvian Orthodox Church (autonomous within the ROC) did so on March 15th.
At that moment, the number of confirmed coronavirus cases in Russia were offi-
cially estimated by only 48; no severe lockdown measures had been discussed so
far within Russia.
Nevertheless, some monasteries, such as Sretensky in Moscow, started online
video streaming of their divine services. On March 18th, all spiritual schools of the
ROC went online, following the example of the secular universities. OnMarch 23rd,
the Patriarch’s Office established aWorking group for the activities of ecclesiastical
bodies according the circumstances of the transmission of the infection with the
coronavirus under the leadership of theMetropolitanDionisii (Porubai), Chancellor
of the Moscow Patriarchy.
From the very beginning, the official position of the ROC assumed demonstrat-
ing its loyalty to the state and its willingness to obey the public health regulations.
Potentially it was a source of misunderstandings, because Orthodox Christian rit-
uals and daily practices imply multiple physical contacts between people, as well
as between people and sacred objects. Believers usually kiss icons, relics, hands of
priests; priests kiss each other in the altar during the Divine Liturgy and in consol-
idated parish communities existed also the exchange of the “kiss of peace”. Church
buildings are often overcrowded (especially in big cities) and poorly ventilated.Usu-
ally, all of the believers share glasses of water mixed with wine as well as cups for
holy water that they drink separately after they have received the communion. In
view of the pandemic, the tradition to receive the communion from one chalice and
the use of one liturgical spoon, pose a specific threat to the believers. To prevent
the Blood of Christ from spilling all lips after Communion are wiped with a single
piece of red cloth. Some parishes, well before Covid-19, introduced the practices
of using disposable post-communion cups, or wet-wiping icons after each wor-
shiper’s kiss. Still, the practice of using shared spoons and clothes with regard to
the communion remained inviolable and non-discussible, at least in public.
Coronavirus abruptly changed everything. On March 17th, the Patriarch issued
instructions for all parishes and monasteries in Moscow that demanded sterilizing
liturgical spoons with ethanol after each communion and the use of disposable
paper napkins for wiping lips that must be burned subsequently.10This order, later
reproduced by most bishops in their dioceses, has led to many troubles that will be
discussed in the following.
In early April 2020, special rules were introduced for giving communion to
people presumably infected with Covid-19; priests had to wear disposable personal
10 Cf. Russkaya Pravoslavnaya Tserkov. (2020). Instruktsiya nastoyatelyam prikhodov i podvorii,
igumenam i igumeniyammonastyreiMoskovskoi eparkhii v svyazi s ugrozoi rasprostraneniya
koronavirusnoi infektsii. Russkaya Pravoslavnaya Tserkov. Official web site of the Moscow Patri-
archy. March 17. See: http://www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/5608418.html
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protection equipment (PPEs) and the communion was allowed to be given only
in the form of the Presanctified Gifts11. In addition, the Patriarch announced that
penalties would be given to clerics who have not been following these hygienic rules
of procedure by the Ecclesiastical court.12
In June, when the lockdown in Moscow was close to the end, the Metropolitan
Dionicii additionally issued a letter, demanding all priest to wear face masks, also
during the confessions.13
More troubles for the Church were ahead as the national epidemic situation
worsened and state officials were leaning towards introducing the lockdown that
was commonly called “self-isolation regime”14 in Russia.
Due to the fact that Russia is a federation, epidemic situations in its regions
varied.Therefore, on April 2nd the President granted additional rights to the heads
of federal subjects and enabled them with a right to establish protective measures
they might find appropriate in terms of their territories. As a result, the national
lockdown was established in March 30th, but in some parts of Russia regional au-
thorities suspended public divine services earlier, for instance in the Republic of
Karelia, where it was established on March 27th or in St.-Petersburg where it has
been established on March 28th. Local bishops had to make their decisions about
ecclesiastical lockdowns depending on their personal relations with regional offi-
cials. In some bishoprics public worships continued – either with the permission of
regional authorities, e.g. in Novosibirsk oblast, or without it, in Sverdlovsk oblast.15
Moscow, the capital city, inhabited by 13 million people and constituting a sep-
arate federal subject, was affected increasingly and earlier by Covid-19 than other
11 Cf. Russkaya Pravoslavnaya Tserkov (2020). Pravila dlya soversheniya treb na domu i v lecheb-
nykh uchrezhdeniyakh pri poseshchenii lyudei, nakhodyashchikhsya v rezhime izolyatsii,
svyazannoi s opasnostiyu zarazheniya, ili zarazhennykh koronavirusnoi infektsiei. Russkaya
Pravoslavnaya Tserkov. Official web site of the Moscow Patriarchy. April 6. See: http://www.patria
rchia.ru/db/text/5618000.html
12 Cf. Russkaya Pravoslavnaya Tserkov (2020). Rasporyazhenie Svyateishego Patriarcha Kirilla
ob otvetstvennosti za nesoblyudenie ukazanii, napravlennykh na ogranichenie rasprostra-
neniya koronavirusnoi infektsii. Russkaya Pravoslavnaya Tserkov. Official web site of the Moscow
Patriarchy. April 27. See: http://www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/5629099.html
13 Cf. Russkaya Pravoslavnaya Tserkov (2020). Tsirkulyarnoe pismoMitropolita Voskresenskogo
Dionisiya.RusskayaPravoslavnaya Tserkov.Officialweb site of theMoscowPatriarchy. June 1st. See:
http://www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/5645698.html
14 This term was also in use in Great Britain, but its meaning was different; in Russia the whole
lockdown became known as self-isolation.
15 The impact of these local ecclesiastical lockdowns, their peculiarities and consequences on
the believers are currently the subject of various sociological and ethnographical examina-
tion. See, e.g. Irina Kuznetsova (2020). Traditions and Technologies: a Change in the Practice
of OrthodoxWorship During COVID-Pandemic: The Case of the St. Elias Church of Krasnodar
(Russia). Virtual presentation within the 7th LUMEN online conference NASHS. June 25-26.
Editura Lumen. June 24. See: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eHOmzuwSumY
The Impact of Covid-19 on Orthodox Groups and Believers in Russia 53
Image 1: Priest, wearing PPE, gives communion to a sick woman.
Photo from the public Facebook page of Fr. Vasilii Gelevan. URL:
https://www.facebook.com/padrebasilio/posts/3513566135325185
regions. A city lockdown was established on March 30th and initially implied no
public church service restrictions. Nevertheless, on March 29th, the Fourth Sunday
of Great Lent, the Patriarch, addressing a small number of worshippers (some of
them used face coverings) in the Cathedral of Christ the Saviour. In this context, he
emphasises the story of St. Mary of Egypt in order to testify that a believer could
be saved without attending churches or public divine services. The Patriarch even
compared St. Mary’s life with the present situation by pointing out that she went
on “full isolation”16. The necessity to address the need for believers to stay away
from the Church in order to protect themselves, by simultaneously expressing that
the believers will receive salvation despite of the receiving of the communion, was
extremely challenging the for ROC.
On April 11th, the Chief Sanitary Officer of Moscow ordered to suspend pub-
lic divine services in the city starting on April 13th – this ban was only lifted only
16 Cf. Telekanal Spas (2020). Patriarkh prizval veruiushchikh molitsya doma, sleduya podvigu
Marii Egipetskoi. Telekanal Spas. March 29. See: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8uztpNf
Gvco
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on June 6th. Thus, Palm Sunday of April 12th, the last Sunday before Easter, be-
came also the last day of unrestricted church attendance for ordinary believers in
Moscow. The Patriarch’s Office issued a circular letter, signed by the Metropoli-
tan Dionisii (Porubai), and demanding all services from now on to be conducted
without parishioners, only in the presence of clergy and needful “co-workers and
volunteers”17. Above all, the co-workers and volunteers were needed to organize
video streams of the altar. Since this moment the parishes of Moscow went online
– at least, officially. Bishoprics located in some other federal subjects, e.g., the Re-
public of Udmurtia, Kemerovo oblast, managed to keep churches open nearly until
Easter (April 19th), or even to celebrate Easter with public divine services that had
not been formally suspended.
On April 12th –when the number of the infected people in Moscow had reached
ten thousand – Patriarch Kirill celebrated the Divine Liturgy in a nearly empty
cathedral and once again repeated his call to the believers to stay at home. It was
evident that the Patriarch not just took public health concerns seriously, but per-
sonally perceived Covid-19 as a severe danger. It was also clear that this year in
Moscow, as well as in most of the federal regions, Easter would be celebrated at
home.
On April 15th, the Patriarch allowed to bless Paschal foods at home and intro-
duced a special prayer to be accompanied by holy water sprinkling, “if one has it”18.
This decision contradicted all the previous experiences of believers, including the
late Soviet practices, because the Easter blessing of the ritual food such as cakes,
eggs and sweetened cottage cheese, was a longstanding tradition observed even by
some non-believers, as a popular custom.
Therefore, the Easter Sunday of 2020 was painful for most of the Orthodox
in the federal subjects of Russia who have been affected by the lockdown. Wor-
shipers were not allowed to visit the Patriarchal Liturgy at the Cathedral of Christ
the Saviour, although the event was, as usual, televised and commented. At some
point the commentator mentioned that the Patriarch proceeded “surrounded by
hypodeacons”; however, everyone was able to notice that he walked surrounded by
empty space that reflected the policy of social distancing.19 A tiny group of priests
17 Cf. Russkaya Pravoslavnaya Tserkov (2020). Tsirkulyarnoe pismoMitropolita Voskresenskogo
Dionisiya.RusskayaPravoslavnaya Tserkov.Officialweb site of theMoscowPatriarchy. June 1st. See:
http://www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/5645698.html Many believers understood the fact that the
letter was signed not by the Patriarch himself, but by his First Vicar, as a sign of distress.
18 Cf. Russkaya Pravoslavnaya Tserkov (2020). O blagoslovenii kulichei i paskh v domashnikh
usloviyakh. Russkaya Pravoslavnaya Tserkov. Official web site of the Moscow Patriarchy. April 14.
See: http://www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/5621930.html
19 Cf. NTV (2020). Paskha Khristova. Bogosluzhenie v Khrame Khrista Spasitelya. NTV. April 18.
See: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Himz9wrsUwg
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and nuns who have been standing in the huge cathedral, watched only by the Patri-
arch’s bodyguards from the Federal Protective Service, looked as if the Doomsday
was approaching.The Ambassador Vladimir Yakunin, who delivers every Easter the
Holy Light from Jerusalem toMoscow and hands it over to the Patriarch, stood near
the Patriarch and wearing a face mask and blue rubber gloves posed a surrealis-
tic picture. Even people working at Patriarchy-sponsored organizations could not
help expressing their distress. For example, Elena Zhosul, a popular broadcaster
from the ecclesiastical TV-channel Spas (Saviour), shared the indignation against
a Paschal service without parishioners on her Facebook page: “That empty church
floor was beautifully tiled. We will not forget these tiles for the rest of our lives”20.
Image 2: Naked floor of the Cathedral of Christ the Saviour during the
2020 Paschal Liturgy
Source: Paskha Khristova. Bogosluzhenie v Khrame Khrista Spasitelya. NTV.
18 April 2020. URL: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Himz9wrsUwg
The digitalization of the Easter service was shocking but it also engendered
some previously unknown opportunities, such as “jumping” from one liturgical
stream to another to attend virtually remote churches, dear to one’s heart. But
even having this in mind, the patriarchal position on church attendance was, in-
deed, very vulnerable. In the post-Soviet period, the liturgical attendance and Eu-
charist celebrated at least once per month, became the cornerstone of the mission-
ary philosophy of the Church. Fr. Georgii Breev, one of themost respected clerics in
Moscow, said in an interview in the year 2013: “One cannot be a Christian without
Eucharist […] A community, not built around Eucharist, is hardly an ecclesiastical
20 Cf. Elena Zhosul (2020). Facebook. 18 April. See: https://www.facebook.com/ezhosul
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community”21. Physical access to churches for everyone was behind an ambitious
“Program-200” initiated by Patriarch Kirill in 2010. This program implies build-
ing at least two hundreds new “walking distance churches” in the remote districts
of Moscow. Vladimir Legoyda explained that they should make attendance eas-
ier for “senior parishioners, the disabled, people with health problems, and new
mothers”22. The same idea of church attendance as a necessity was an argument in
favour of the restitution of the church property, nationalized after the revolution,
and other projects, such as constructing a magnificent Orthodox complex in Paris.
Not only clerics, but also scholars often considered church attendance as one of
the main parameters of religiosity, while what was happening outside the church
walls was frequently labelled as vernacular, popular, or folk religion.23 This way
of practicing faith was assumed to be somehow “simpler” than institutionalised
religious behaviour.
In contrary to this established vision of what is right andwrong for anOrthodox
Christian, Patriarch Kirill suggested rethinking self-isolation as a God’s blessing:
“this virus has destroyed a sinful human idea of our full mightiness, of our cen-
tral place in the whole civilization […] It is really a chance for the human race to
change itself in order to regain God’s grace”24. Some speakers were fully support-
ive of this patriarchal position. Aleksei Osipov, professor of the Moscow Spiritual
Academy and one of the leading secular theologians in Russia, said that the coron-
avirus is a God-given epitemia (Greek: penance), which believers need because they
“got used” to receive the communion and therefore lost the awe towards this mys-
tery25. The same ideas were articulated by Bishop Pitirim (Tvorogov), rector of the
21 Cf. Aleksandra Kuzmicheva & Georgii Breev (2013). Fr. Protoierei Georgii Breev ob anatomii
tserkovnoi obshchiny, nastoyashchei druzhbe i glavnom interese v zhizni. December
3. See: https://www.pravmir.ru/protoierej-georgij-breev-ob-anatomii-cerkovnoj-obshhiny-na
stoyashhej-druzhbe-i-glavnom-interese-v-zhizni/#ixzz3clJI7kRb ; Fr. Georgii Breev, 83, died
from double pneumonia on April 29, 2020.
22 Cf. Vladimir V Legoida (2010). Moskve stroyat tserkvi shagovoi dostupnosti. September 15.
See: http://www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/1275696.html
23 Critical reception of this approachmay be found in: Yulia Sinelina (2001). O kriteriyakh opre-
deleniya religioznosti naseleniya. Sotsiologicheskie issledovaniya, No. 7, 95-96.; Olga Kazmina
(2009). Russkaia Pravoslavnaia Tserkov i novaia religioznaia situatsia v Rossii. Moscow: Izda-
telstvoMGU, pp. 130-133; Svetlana Riazanova (2018). Vot lyudi-to tam stoyat, a ty nemozhesh:
poseshchenie tserkvi v sovremennom permskom pravoslavnom soobshchestve. Perm: PGIK,
pp. 29-31.
24 Cf. Patriarch Kirill (2020). Slovo Svyateishego Patriarcha Kirilla v den pamayti prepodobnogo
Sergiya Radonezhskogo posle Liturgii v Troitse-Sergievoi lavre. Russkaya Pravoslavnaya
Tserkov. Official web site of the Moscow Patriarchy. July 18. See: http://www.patriarchia.ru/db/t
ext/5665266.html
25 Cf. Telekanal Spas (2020). Reaktsiya professora Alekseya Osipova. May 20. See: https://www.
youtube.com/watch?v=H1SYxOJCxYM&feature=youtu.be&fbclid=IwAR28wK0-tZ_yZGlIlPP
XD4TETJzQzPISV9z1ADPIbM8dRB9PsWTjN-fpy6U
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Academy, initially a corona-dissident, who changed his position after his own hos-
pitalization with Covid-inflicted pneumonia. “We have forgotten about living God,
having replaced him with the continuous communion” – he wrote in his Telegram-
account.26
3. From dissidents to reformers:
reactions to the ecclesiastical lockdown
For the first time in the post-Soviet history of the ROC, its speakers officially de-
clared that the communion and the church attendance in general were not neces-
sary conditions with regard to the salvation. It was no surprise that many bishops,
clerics and lay, normally supportive of the patriarchal platform, openly stated that
the ecclesiastical lockdownwas, in their eyes, an exaggeratedmeasure.These inner-
church related Covid-dissidents embraced people of different ideological orienta-
tions, who remained basically loyal to ecclesiastical and mundane authorities, but
reserved their right to be sceptical towards these measures. Some of the dissidents
did not believe in the pandemic at all, considering it a cloak for a global conspir-
acy; the majority admitted the existence of the virus, but viewed measures taken
against it as redundant. Some limited their objections to verbal polemics; some,
despite the prohibition, continued public church services.
Expressing formal loyalty to the patriarchal policy, some bishops and ordinary
priests, spoke, in fact, against it. Hieromonk Feodorit Senchukov, medical doctor,
openly claimed: “we have not a coronavirus pandemic, but a pandemic of fear”27.
Just before the ecclesiastical lockdownDaniil (Dorovskikh),Metropolitan of Kurgan
and Belozerskoe, said:
“This thought that we can avoid sickness only hiding in our homes and, vice versa,
that it is more likely that we will fall ill after attending the churches is not the
thought of the Holy Fathers […] the coronavirus is the consequence of our sins,
God’s punishment for our people. It reminds us to trust not in ethanol and other
disinfecting solutions, but first of all in God”.28
26 Cf. Episkop Pitirim (2020). Official channel of the rector of the Moscow Spiritual Academy,
24-25 April. See: https://t.me/pitirimtvorogov
27 Cf. Pyotr Selinov (n.d.). Pandemiya strakha. COVID-19 glazami svyashchennika-vracha. Inter-
vyu s Feodoritom Senchukovym. Prikhozhanin. See: https://prihozhanin.msdm.ru/home/pogo
vorit/2733-pandemiya-strakha-covid-19-glazami-svyashchennika-vracha.html
28 Cf. Mikhail Tyurenkov andDaniil Metropolitan (Dorovskikh) (2020). Koronavirus – nakazanie
Bozhie nashemu narodu. Tsargrad TV. April 7. See: https://tsargrad.tv/articles/mitropolit-dani
il-dorovskih-koronavirus-nakazanie-bozhie-nashemu-narodu_246712
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Some priests were reported to renounce lockdowns in their dioceses in spite of
the perspective to be examined by ecclesiastical courts. Fr. Nikolai Boldyrev from
Nizhegorodskaya oblast, where public worship services were suspended since April
15th, refused to close the church and to wipe the liturgical spoon with ethanol,
calling the patriarchal recommendations “blasphemous”.29 Fr. Aleksandr Zakharov
from Tikhvin diocese issued a video where he said that “never and not for anything”
he would take two of the prescribed anti-Covid measures: to sterilize the liturgical
spoon with ethanol and to keep church doors closed for worshippers.30
A specific form of dissidence was offered by Andrei Kormoukhin, the head of
a para-ecclesiastical social movement Sorok sorokov (Forty of Forties – a reference
to the number of churches in pre-revolutionary Moscow). The organization’s ide-
ological position sways from traditionalism to fundamentalism, but in this case
Kormoukhin spoke not on behalf of the movement, but as a private citizen. In this
capacity he, first of all, expressed his respect and obedience to the patriarchal in-
structions. Then, Kormoukhin explained that his personal choice is, nevertheless,
to go to the church for the Paschal service, even risking not to gain access to it:
“Christ my Lord will wait for me on Easter Sunday at the church, not online, or
at the TV-set. That is why I will go to the church […] The church is more of vital
necessity for me than a grocery store or a pharmacy”31.
On April 14th, a couple of days before Easter, Kormoukhin initiated a flash mob
consisting of postings from social media, one photo portrayed himself holding a
placard that reads: “Christ will help” (with a hashtag).
There were at least two reasons why so many believers, who usually were obe-
dient to the Patriarch, refused to accept his policy in view of the ecclesiastical lock-
down.
First of all, the idea to receive the salvation at home, promoted as a strategy
against the pandemic, contrasted historical experiences of anti-faith persecutions
of the 20th century, when even a simple opportunity to gather in public for the di-
vine service in a church building was priceless.The presence of venerated icons that
could have been kept in the same building for centuries, or continuity of clerics and
parishioners of this particular church,was even of greater value. Suspending public
services, especially Paschal Liturgy, was painful for most believers, because “anti-
29 Cf. Volga. MBKh Media. (2020). Eto khula na Boga». Svyashcenniku iz Nizhegorod-
skoi oblasti zapretili sluzhenie posle otkaza zakryt khram dlya prikhozhan. Volga. MBKh
Media. April 16. See: https://vk.com/@volgambk.media-eto-hula-na-boga-svyaschenniku-iz-
nizhegorodskoi-oblasti-zap
30 Cf. Aleksandr Zakharov (2020). Batyushka Aleksandr o koronaviruse. June 7. See: https://ww
w.youtube.com/watch?v=juYj-vRvhR0
31 Cf. Andrei Kormoukhin (2020). Pochemu ya poidu v khramnaPaskhu. April 14. See: https://vk.
com/wall209290103_3657
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Image 3: Andrei Kormoukhin’s flash mob.
URL: https://sun1-88.userapi.com/mzbupVvj1Xs_AbiYYO954oWF9E
8rPPlvt-dYSw/W84mc4bJN9o.jpg
sanitary” conditions in churches were a noticeable part of Soviet anti-religious pro-
paganda. Stories were invented about microbes found in baptism bowls, or about
outbreaks of infectious diseases during pilgrimages32. Fr. Vladimir Rozhkov, who
served in Orenburg bishopric, recalled how in 1964 a sanitary commission came to
the city cathedral: “They took ‘smears’ from the icons, most venerated and kissed
by believers, from the altar crosses, chalices, spoons.They demanded Presanctified
32 Cf. Liubov Soskovets (2005). Fenomen sovetskogo antireligioznogo Agitpropa. Vestnik Tom-
skogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta, No. 288, p. 190.; Cf. Daria Makarova (2013). Ateisticheska-
ya propaganda v SSSR v 1954–1964 godakh (na materialakh Kurskoi oblasti). Izvestiya Sarato-
vskogo gosuniversiteta. Seriya Istoriya. Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya 13, No. 3, p. 36.
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Gifts for analysis, but Fr. Aleksandr… refused”33. Fr. Vladimir cites sanitary regula-
tions issued by the former bishop: they included disinfecting crosses and liturgical
vessels with eau-de-cologne after each use.
Apart from direct references to anti-sanitary conditions in churches, Soviet
anti-religious propaganda utilized some clichés, portraying religion (not neces-
sarily Orthodoxy) as “poison”, “deadly breath”; “infection”; believers and clergy –
as “parasites” (i.e. insects or mice), inflicting “harm”34. This discourse is a result of
the famous statement coined by Karl Marx that religion is the opium of the people
(Opium des Volkes), later repeated by Lenin35. Soviet clichés about “religious infec-
tion” are parodied and summarized by a Russian rock-band “Elysium” that issued
in 2018 a composition “Religion is poison” with the following verses, repeating an-
tireligious slogans:
“Protect kids from the claws of priests! [from a 1962 poster]
Faith is harmful, more harmful than wine. [from a 1933 brochure]
Religion is poison. Protect kids! [from a 1930 poster]”36
Many corona-dissidents draw parallels between suspending public divine services
because of the pandemic and closing churches by the Soviet government in the
period of persecutions. The aforementioned Fr. Aleksandr Zakharov stated:
“All this totalitarianism, when someone, somewhere decided for us where we
should go, and where not; what we should want and what we shouldn’t; how we
are allowed to think and how we arenʼt allowed at all – we have been fed up with
it in the Soviet Union”37.
Andrei Kormoukhin also referred to the «satanic terror» of the early 20th century
and reminded that the New Martyrs and Confessors of Russia “were afraid nei-
33 Cf. Ahilla (2020). «Sanitarnyi terror»: tserkvi kak «rassadniki epidemicheskikh zabolevanii».
Iz knigi protoiereya Vladimira Rozhkova «Zapiski svyashchennika». Ahilla. Feburary 27. See:
https://ahilla.ru/sanitarnyj-terror-tserkvi-kak-rassadniki-epidemicheskih-zabolevanij/
34 Aleksei Gorbatov (2014). Propaganda i SMI v period khrushchovskoi antireligioznoi kampa-
nii (1954 1964 gg.). Vestnik Kemerovskogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta 2, No 3, 157f.; Aleksan-
dr Panchenko (2013). «Religioznye infektsii» i «dukhovnye kaleki»: tema detstva v sovetskoi
ateisticheskoi propagande 1960-kh gg. M. Balina (Ed.). «Ubit Charskuyu…»: paradoksy sovetskoi
literatury dlya detei (1920-е – 1930-е gg.). St. Petersburg: Aleteiya, pp. 310–329.; Kseniya Kol-
kunova (2013). Ateisticheskaya propaganda v khudozhestvennoi literature 1950–1960-Х gg.
Vestnik PSTGU. Seriya 1: Bogoslovie. Filosofiya. No. 5, pp. 113-132.
35 In the age of Marx opium was seen as a basically harmless pain-relief; in the 1920s, however,
this label associated religion with a dangerous, or even lethal, narcotic drug.
36 The composition may be found at the band's Youtube channel: Elysium (2018). ‘Religion is
poison.’ YouTube. See: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WPiOCM3orpw
37 Cf. Zakharov (2020).
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ther of a virus, nor of the real terrorists killing them for their Christian faith.”38.
Conservative journalist Mikhail Tyurenkov39, belonging to a community of Old Be-
lievers within the jurisdiction of the ROC, reminded the others of the fact that
public divine services continued even in the 1930s, in the period of the “godless five
year plans”40, and that the victims of abortion, which is not restricted in Russia,
outnumbered the victims of the virus. Encouraging believers to obey the hierarchy,
Tyurenkov, nevertheless, wrote:
“No one can forbid a believer to meet… [Easter] in a church of the Lord. Neither a
policeman nor an official or a priest. And if you (yes, I mean you personally) strive
to come to church in the Easter night, I cannot imagine who is able to deter a
believer”41.
Official ecclesiastical speakers tried to prevent the tracing of parallels between the
Soviet persecutions and the lockdown. Instead, they stressed that believers who
strived to be in a church were unsocial and rampant. Vladimir Legoyda declared
that comparing contemporary believers, staying comfortably at home, with the
New Martyrs would be forged or even “slightly indecent”42. Fr. Aleksandr Volkov,
the former Head of the Moscow Patriarchate’s Press Service, said on his Facebook
page that believers who do not follow the regulations should not compare them-
selves neither with the first Christians in the catacombs nor with those persecuted
in the 20th century. Accusing such people of pride and blasphemy, he questioned
the purity of their intentions: “Can anyone really say about himself that one actually
needs to meet Christ that strongly and that this person cannot wait for a couple
of weeks to do so?”43. Bishop Pitirim (Tvorogov) emphasized savagery of believers
who did not observe sanitary regulations, blaming them for the spread of Covid-19
in his monastery:
38 Cf. Kormoukhin (2020).
39 Tyurenkov is not in the opposition either to the ecclesiastical hierarchy nor to mundane au-
thorities; nevertheless, on his Facebook page he writes that «It is not at all embarassing for
me, when someone labels me as 'Orthodox fundamentalist'...». See Tyurenkov (2020). Face-
book. May 25. See: https://www.facebook.com/tyurenkov/posts/3197908793592950).
40 A godless five year plan was announced by the Union of the Militant Godless in 1932 with a
purpose to exterminate religion in the Soviet Union by 1937.
41 Cf. Mikhail Tyurenkov (2020). Paskha bez prikhozan": kak perezhit koronavirusnoe ispytanie,
Tsargrad TV. April 13. See: https://tsargrad.tv/articles/pasha-bez-prihozhan-kak-perezhit-
koronavirusnoe-ispytanie_247838?fbclid=IwAR1CdyqLc_BCl5GOHTtBJFciv_ocVWjHEAMPDle
bF3Bx0Y8jLwJ34ZMIyxc
42 Cf. Legoyda (2020). Neumestno sravnivat situatsiyu v Tserkvi seichas i v nachale 20 veka. April
17. See: https://ria.ru/20200417/1570191862.html
43 Cf. Aleksandr Volkov (2020). O bogosluzhebnoi partizanshchine. Facebook. April 5. See: https
://www.facebook.com/permalink.php?story_fbid=3932984456742489&id=100000-929212448
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“Holy Monday. Morning. The gates of the Trinity – St. Sergius Lavra44 are closed.
There is an exited mob in front of them, demanding to open the Lavra. The
protesters behave very aggressively; they use obscene words. [Vicar] Vladyka
Paramon opens the Lavra for the whole Passion Week and Easter. On Good Friday
the plague has begun”45.
The second reason why some believers and priests considered ecclesiastical lock-
down harmful was the problem conceptualized by sociologist Ivan Zabaev as “sacral
individualism”. This concept implies that contemporary believers in Russia see the
Church primarily as individual communicating with God, not a community of peo-
ple.46
Many people attend public worships on an individual basis whenever they need
them and join no steady ecclesiastical communities. This type of congregation is
known as «the temple model», fully acceptable for other faiths, for example Hin-
duism, but not for Christianity.47 This absence of a shared parish life has been
noticed by many researchers, such as Jeanne Kormina with her concept of “the Or-
thodox nomads” who “carefully avoid the very chance to become a community”48.
Aleksandr Agajanian theorizes that an average Orthodox parish consists of an ac-
tive core of constant attendees, whom local priests mostly know personally, and
a scattered periphery consisting of people, who attend the parish from time to
time and basically remain anonymous for priests and steady parishioners.49 Both
priests and scholars suggest that lack of solidarity between the believer dates back
to the anti-church policies of the past: “the whole life of a parish in the Soviet pe-
riod was aimed at admitting one, separately attending […] parishioner. One comes,
confesses, takes the communion and leaves – no contacts”50. Eventually, the very
idea of a «parish community» became suspicious in terms of them probably being
44 Lavra is an ancient title of honour for the most respected Orthodox monasteries.
45 Cf. Episkop Pitirim (2020).
46 Ivan Zabaev (2011). “Sakralnyi individualizm” i obshchina v sovremennom russkom
pravoslavii [“The sacral individualism” and community in today’s RussianOrthodoxy]. In Alek-
sandr Agajanian and Kathy Rousselet (Eds.). Prikhod i Obshchina v Sovremennom Pravoslavii.
Moscow: Ves mir, p. 347.
47 R. A. Cnaan and D. W. Curtis (2012). Religious Congregations as Voluntary Associations: An
Overview. Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly 42, No. 1, pp. 16-17.
48 Jeanne Kormina (2012). Nomadicheskoe pravoslavie: o novykh formakh religioznoi zhizni v
sovremennoi Rossii. Ab Imperio, No. 2, p. 217.
49 Aleksandr Agadjanian (2011). Prikhod i obshchina v russkom pravoslavii: sovremennye prot-
sessy v retrospektive poslednego stoletiya. Aleksandr Agajanian and Kathy Rousselet (Eds.).
Prikhod i obshchina v sovremennom pravoslavii. Moscow: Ves mir, p. 33.
50 Oksana Golovko and Fr. Fyodor Borodin (2019). «Esli svyashchennik ne umeet druzhit, ob-
shchiny ne poluchitsya». I pochemu inogda v khrame ne gotovy prinyat postoronnikh.
Pravmir. September 26. See: https://www.pravmir.ru/esli-svyashhennik-ne-umeet-druzhit-ob
shhiny-ne-poluchitsya-i-pochemu-inogda-v-hrame-ne-gotovy-prinyat-postoronnih/
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a «sect»51. This situation is far from the Christian norm, especially in the light of
the Patriarch’s repeating calls to involve the newcomers into communities.52
Vladimir Legoyda renounced this argumentation by saying that believers do
not lose the connection with their parishes, and that they continue communicating
with priests and practice common prayers from a distance.53 This position seems
overly optimistic, because suspending a church attendance can potentially destroy
the existing fragile ties between at least some believers. At the same time, the digi-
talization of parishes could as well be constitutive formore consolidated communi-
ties: people who are involved in new practices, such as studying the Bible on Zoom,
get to know each other’s names, backgrounds and experiences. Unfortunately, dig-
ital communication leaves too many people on the side simply because they are not
Internet users, and this is particularly true with regard to senior parishioners.
Apart from Covid-dissidence, there emerged another inner-church reaction in
view of the lockdown that is a source of ambivalent potential. Introducing new
techniques of the communion provoked a discussion about the possibility of trans-
mitting diseases through sacred objects. This discussion had been long overdue;
some believers and even priests did raise the topic of church practices (including
the communion) being inconsistent with modern sanitary rules.54 A standard re-
action was that communion bread and wine are safe55. Actually, priests answered
not the questions, because for Orthodox Christians it is out of the question that
an infection could be transmitted via the Blood and Body of Christ; there were,
however, material mediators (spoons, clothes, and chalices) to which no attention
had been paid until the pandemic began. Discussions about the holy water, icons,
and the like were not fierce, because the Church never denied that such objects
can transmit infections, and some parishes took measures in order to prevent in-
fections. Latent hygienic concerns became visible when the ecclesiastical hierarchy,
by suspending Eucharist nationwide, legitimated them in a way. Unfortunately, the
51 Fr. Fyodor Kotrelev (2012). Chto delayet prikhod obshchinoi? Opyt pastyrei i prikhozhan.
Neskuchnyi sad. January 7. See: http://www.nsad.ru/articles/chto-delaet-prihod-obshhinoj;
Agadjanian, 2011, p. 31.
52 Patriarch Kirill (2014). Na prikhodakh dolzhna byt pravilno postavlena rabota po priob-
shcheniyu k obshchine tekh, kto tolko vkhodit v khram. December 23. See: http://www.pat
riarchia.ru/db/text/3888293.html
53 Cf. Legoyda (2020). Paskhu prazdnovali i vo vremya chumy – otprazdnuem i seichas. Ria. April
4. See: https://ria.ru/20200404/1569577073.html
54 Cf. Sergii Fr Adodin (2017). Mikrobiologiya. Pravoslavie.March 15. See: https://pravoslavie.ru/
101843.html
55 Cf. Anna Utkina and Evgeniya Nun (Senchikova) (2020). Kak prichashchatsya vo vremya epi-
demii grippa? Pravmir. February 2nd. See: https://www.pravmir.ru/prichashhenie-vo-vremya-
epidemii-est-li-risk-1/; Fr. Andrei Efanov (2020). Kak prichashchatsya vo vremya epidemii ko-
ronavirusa? Foma. March 7. See: https://foma.ru/kak-prichashhatsya-vo-vremya-epidemii.html
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Patriarchy has not yet provided any clear answers for the believers that would rec-
oncile the new normality of the pandemic with “if they drink any deadly thing, it
shall not hurt them” (Marcus 16.18).
In the absence of official clarifications, discussions about liturgical techniques
soon took an unexpected turn: streaming liturgies together with social distancing
brought into the surface the idea of a digital communion. On May 11th two clerics
from the Orthodox Church of Ukraine56, Dmitrii Vaisburd and Igor Savva, who had
to stay at home, provided the communion remotely by using Hangouts, a platform
for video-conferences. Lay, also staying in their homes, positioned bread and wine
in front of their cameras to be distantly transfigured into the Blood and Body of
Christ. Then each of them consumed the Holy Gifts individually.
Explanations given later by Igor Savva show that his reasons were much
more profound than providing the communion in emergency. The discussion
about sacramental techniques was actually a template of the discussion about the
communities as opposed to the individualism of believers. Savva emphasized that
off-line Divine Liturgy is attended, but not participated by lay, who observe it
distantly, while priests are celebrating in the altar:
“Themain diverge for a real community regarding a solemn Liturgy in a full church
and in a videoconference is not based on the use of the Internet, but that in the
case of an real Liturgy most of the attendees, although faithful and reverent, re-
main observers of how the sacrament is performed, while in the online Liturgy,
the assembly, faithful and reverent, becomes a direct part of the sacrament”.57
Dmitrii Vaisburd added that, in his opinion, iconostasis that divides the altar from
the nave of the church “is a much more substantial barrier for full value commu-
nication than the Internet”58.
Some people obviously prefer being a digital community rather than being a
collection of atomized church-attendees.Their choice, however, is at odds with the
whole Orthodox tradition, and has a potential of undermining the foundations of
56 The Orthodox Church of Ukraine splitted from the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (autonomous
within the ROC) in 2018; it is at the moment recoginized as an autocephalous Orthodox
Church by several other sister-Churches, but not by the ROC (see: Jeanne Kormina and Vlad
Naumescu (2020). A new ‘Great Schism’? Theopolitics of communion and canonical territory
in the Orthodox Church. Anthropology Today 36, No. 1, 7-11).
57 Fr. Igor Savva (2020). Gospod otvechaet na Evkharisticheskuyu molitvu distantsionno na
kazhdoi liturgii.Cerkvarium.May 16. See: https://cerkvarium.org/ru/spetstemy/tserkov-i-koron
avirus/otets-igor-savva-gospod-otvechaet-na-evkharistich eskuyu-molitvu-distantsionno-na-
kazhdoj-liturgii
58 Dmitrii Vaisburd (2020). Evkharistiya onlain: predvaritelnye itogi. Ahilla. June 10. See:
https://ahilla.ru/evharistiya-onlajn-predvaritelnye-itogi/?fbclid=IwAR0XV-E84fQ-pjeW3-
MRzG5F74kd8 doZM 25GTZljiQPQXFK2AM_9DyeSKQs8
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the Church. Unfortunately, Vaisburd and Savva, the two clerics who are involved
in the digital communion case, belonged to a non-canonical (at least, for the ROC)
jurisdiction. As a result, the ROC simply refused to continue serious theological
discussions on this issue. Vladimir Legoyda made an ironical statement about a
liturgical “breakthrough”59; Metropolitan Hilarion (Alfeev) compared this distant
worship with notorious tele-healers of the early 1990s and said that it “cannot be
taken seriously”60. Other commentators, instead of discussing the topic of preserv-
ing liturgical communities during the lockdown, preferred to discuss how digital-
ization might assist in getting rid of what they envisioned as “folk” religion.61
4. Fundamentalist reactions to the corona-crisis
Generally, fundamentalists share the discourse of the other corona-dissidents,
but, apart from being more radical in expressing their vision, they also accentuate
things in a slightly different way than the speakers who belong to the other
ideological platforms.
Fundamentalists use the concept of “corona-posession” (koronabesie) consider-
ing the worldwide lockdown and other safety measures as an analogy to being pos-
sessed by evil spirits. Most of them do not deny that some epidemic exist, but
perceive it as an “ordinary infection” backed with a “disinformation”, or as a “psy-
chobiological occupation”62. Measures taken by state to ensure social distancing
and stay-at-home policies represent the real threat in their eyes. Sergii Aliev la-
belled Covid-19 as a “hoax” saying that “there is no threat of coronavirus; there is a
pandemic of fear created with the help of the mass media”63. Fundamentalists do
not trust testing, assuming that via tests people get infected.
Suspending public worship was less important for fundamentalists, because
many of them do not attend mainstream church services, considering the hierar-
59 Cf. Vladimir Legoyda (2020). Telegram.May 12. See: https://t.me/vladimirlegoyda
60 Cf. Vesti (2020). Tserkov i mir. Broadcast of 30.05.2020. Ekaterina Gracheva asks questions.
Vesti.May 30. See: https://vera.vesti.ru/video/show/video_cid/2152528
61 Cf. Novaya gazeta. (2020). Kogda RPTs perestala byt tserkoviyu? Strim s Andreem Kuraevym.
Novaya gazeta. May 10. See: https://novayagazeta.ru/articles/2020/05/10/85321-kogda-rpts-pe
restala-byt-tserkovyu-strim-s-andreem-kuraevym
62 Cf. Andrei Saveliev (2020). Beseda 58. Koronavirus. Sotsialno-ekonomicheskie posledstviya.
Live. March 24. See: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BsWDei9z204; Pryamoi efir s An-
dreem Kormoukhinym. Dvizhenie Sorok Sorokov. DSS. April 6. See: https://vk.com/videos-
53664310?z=video-53664310_456240982%2Fpl_-53664310_-2; Cf. Vladimir Kvachkov (2020/2).
Koronavirus, Trump, biologicheskoe oruzhie, tsifrovoi kartser. Svobodnaya pressa. April 29. See:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2ni6h-P0S8A
63 Cf. Aliev Sergii (2020). vystupil v zashchitu skhiigumena Sergiya (Romanova). Pervyi mezh-
dunarodnyi pozitivnyi portal. May 1st. See: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oprvAoPaIII
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chy contaminated by heresies. Fundamentalist leaders are commonly lay; clerics
openly confessing fundamentalist ideas mostly come to odds with the hierarchy
and eventually become suspended, dismissed, or excommunicated. Schemahegu-
men Daniil (in that time – Fr. Veniamin Filippov) was defrocked as early as in 2008;
Schemahegumen Sergii Romanov – in July 2020 as a direct consequence of his
video appeals in the period of the lockdown. Nevertheless, fundamentalist media
also compared closing churches for public worship with the Soviet policy of state-
imposed atheism. In their opinion, the ecclesiastical lockdown was not just dis-
tressing the believers, but proved that contemporary Russia, like the Soviet Union,
was a godless state.64
TheWebsite “Moscow theThird Rome” commented on the news that the church
space on the territory of a hospital in Kiev was utilized as an improvised workshop
to sew protective overalls:
“We all remember how in the Soviet time the militant godless were closing
churches to turn them into granaries, workshops, plants, theatres and the like.
Well, those godless, god-fighting times are returning, the only difference is
that desecrating the holy takes place not because of the orders of mundane
authorities, but with direct blessing from the hierarchy”65.
Colonel Kvachkov symbolically returned to anti-Church invectives of the Soviet pe-
riod about the “poison” of mundane authorities by saying that “until we get rid
of inner parasites who are ruling us, we will not cope with the other parasites”66.
According to Aleksei Dobychin, suspending public worships and other lockdown
measures proved that mundane authorities “are satanic… and the Church is led by
the servants of the antichrist, which are both involved in a symphony with god-
fighting authorities in order to deprive people of the sacraments”67.
Fundamentalist speakers present what they see as satanic measures as a free
decision of the ecclesiastical leaders; the latter, thus, become much less victims
than perpetrators of the lockdown. They parallel the non-commemorating of to-
day with the non-commemorating believers of the 1920s-1940s, who did not accept
64 Cf. Skhiigumen Sergii Romanov (2020/2). Gde vera v chistote – tam net raskola / Sredneural-
skii zhenskii monastyr. Vsevolod Moguchev. June 19. See: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=
T9NabgOOnN0
65 Cf. Moskva – Tretii Rim (2020). Tsekh v pomeshchenii krama... Kak v starye «dobrye»
bezboznye vremena. Moskva – Tretii Rim. April 11. See: https://3rm.info/main/79675-ceh-v-po
meschenii-hrama-kak-v-starye-dobrye-bezbozhnye-vremena.html
66 Vladimir Kvachkov (2020/1). Koronavirus operatsiya mirovoi zakulisy Chipirovanie. An-
dreyiz1946. March 25. See: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kK8-R_-JrUU
67 Cf. Aleksei Dobychin (2020). Kreml rasprostranyaet koronavirus... Khramy pusty – v metro
anshlag. 3rm. April 17. See: https://3rm.info/main/79754-kreml-nachal-rasprostranenie-koron
avirusa-hramy-pusty-v-metro-anshlag-aleksej-dobychin-video.html
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Metropolitan Sergii’s decision of the year 1927 about loyalty to the Soviet govern-
ment.68 Some speakers draw public attention to the aforementioned issue of in-
sufficient solidarity of Orthodox parishes. Andrei Kormoukhin reminded that in
most churches worshippers do not live like one big family, and that the suspend-
ing of public divine services would inevitably mean further “atomization” of the
believer.69 Andrei Saveliev also suggested that the purpose of a lockdown might be
to sow seeds of division and the further destruction of a society.70
Fundamentalists do neither interpret the Patriarch’s instructions about the
wiping of liturgical spoons with ethanol and burning used liturgical cloths in
terms of the attempt to suppress the folk forms of religiosity, nor as an invi-
tation to an open discussion about Christian ecclesiology. Unlike some Islamic
radicals, fighting against culturally specific rituals, Orthodox fundamentalists do
not object vernacular traditions and rites. The attempt to examine these reasons,
would lead far be beyond the scope of this chapter; the author suggests that both
fundamentalists and traditionalists envision vernacular rituals as representing
the authentic Orthodox tradition.71 New types of the communion pose a proof
of the hierarchy’s apostasy for the fundamentalists and would therefore fulfil
their deepest fears. “How can one be infected through the [liturgical] spoon from
Christ; is not this assumption itself the real blasphemy against the Holy Ghost?” –
Fr. Sergii (Romanov) asks rhetorically, referring to Matthew, 12.31.72 Actually, here
fundamentalists are more consistent than official speakers, emphasizing that not
only the Blood and Body of Christ, but also their mediators (spoons and chalices)
cannot be contagious.
Unprecedented measures taken by authorities in Moscow and some other big
cities, such as the introduction of digital passes containing QR-codes for all people
intending to leave their homes by car or public transport, except for work, or in-
stant blocking of city transportation passes for all people older than 65, confirmed
the long expected fears of the fundamentalists. For many decades they struggled
against all forms of control over individuals and families: frommandatory vaccina-
68 Cf. Dvizhenie nepominaushchikh (2020). V podderzhku skhiig. Sergiya. Ch. 2. Obrashchenie
k russkomu narodu. Dvizhenie nepominaushchikh. Analitika sobytii. July 28. See: https://www.
youtube.com/watch?v=PqJ__-IiL4A&list=PL8i7s8Nj2FNNwoFmB4tvdHcIJ6U4RD4fG&index=1
69 Cf. Pryamoi efir s Andreem Kormoukhinym. Dvizhenie Sorok Sorokov. DSS. April 6. See: http
s://vk.com/videos-53664310?z=video-53664310_456240982%2Fpl_-53664310_-2
70 Cf. Saveliev (2020).
71 The author's field research shows that fundamentalists are mostly neophytes, born in aver-
age Soviet families; their first encounter with Orthodoxy in most cases happened via senior
relatives living in villages.
72 Skhiigumen Sergii Romanov (2020/1). Pandemiya neveriya. Ne propoved Srednii Put.May 26.
See: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KySJRYBFe-8
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tion to the introduction of machine-readable identity cards.73 Fundamentalists see
these innovations in the light of the apocalypse. Schemahegumen Daniil (Filippov)
declared that passes with QR-codes contained 666 (Number of the Beast) and were
nothing but “a mark in their right hand or in their forehead” (Rev. 13.16); he also
referred to some prophesies of the 18th century about “cards” without people would
not be allowed to travel.74 The same was the fundamentalist’s understanding of
the government’s demands to prefer electronic money instead of cash for sanitary
reasons (some web-stores discontinued all payment opportunities except plastic
cards) and assessed this measurements as a sign for the apocalpyse: «and that no
man might buy or sell, save he that had the mark» (Rev. 13.17). Fundamentalists
suggested that public health concerns were just a pretext for a total digitalization
of humanity to subjugate it then to the power of antichrist:
“there is no pandemic, but there are deliberately made up data everywhere in the
world; under this cloak they try to organize the world’s electronic concentration
camp that will have to be headed by the world ruler, the antichrist”75; “the pan-
demic needs to digitalize all people in the world, it is not that digitalization helps
to avoid the pandemic”76.
It was important that lockdown in Russia became known as «self-isolation», be-
cause this approach implies a voluntary subjugation to the antichrist: Fr. Daniil
(Filippov) compared those who obeyed the regulations with Judas, tacitly referring
to “Satan entered into him” (John, 13.27).77
Speakers more traditionalist or rather conservative than the fundamentalists,
such as Andrei Kormoukhin, stressed that they were “not against technologies”,
but opposed (mis)using them to control people’s behaviour.78 Kormoukhin, never-
73 See: Kathy Rousselet (2015). Religiya i sovremennye tekhnologii, ili protivorechivoe mirovoz-
zrenie pravoslavnykh khristian. In J. Kormina, A. Panchenko and S. Shtyrkov (Eds.). Izo-
bretenie religii: desekuliarizatsiia v postsovetskom kontekste. St. Petersburg: Izdatelstvo
Evropeiskogo Universiteta, pp. 46-62.
74 Cf. Dvizhenie nepominaushchikh (2020). Predatelstvo Khrista i tshifrovye propuska. Chast 1.
Dvizhenie nepominaushchikh. Analitika sobytii. April 17. See: https://www.youtube.com/watch?
v=rT55Au3w6gs&list=PL8i7s8Nj2FNNwoFmB4tvdHcIJ6U4RD4fG&index=6
75 Cf. Dvizhenie nepominaushchikh (2020). Predatelstvo Khrista i tshifrovye propuska. Chast 2.
Dvizhenie nepominaushchikh. Analitika sobytii. April 17. See: https://www.youtube.com/watch?
v=xf5ZQC-kRAw&list=PL8i7s8Nj2FNNwoFmB4tvdHcIJ6U4RD4fG&index
=5
76 Cf. Dvizhenie nepominaushchikh (2020). Predatelstvo Khrista i tshifrovye propuska. Chast 2.
Dvizhenie nepominaushchikh. Analitika sobytii. April 17. See: https://www.youtube.com/watch?
v=xf5ZQC-kRAw&list=PL8i7s8Nj2FNNwoFmB4tvdHcIJ6U4RD4fG&index=5
77 Ib.
78 Cf. VKontakte (2020). Pryamoi efir s Andreem Kormoukhinym. Dvizhenie Sorok Sorokov.
VKontakte. April 8. See: https://vk.com/videos-53664310?z=video-53664310_456240982%2Fpl_
-53664310_-2
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theless, agreed that the digitalization and the subsequent “dehumanization” paved
the way to the coming of the antichrist.79 It is worth noting that the fundamental-
ists in Russia generally are keen in utilizing new technologies.80 Even those who
formally withdrew themselves from the world demonstrate a perfect knowledge of
the latest mundane developments; they obviously watch TV and use the Internet,
moreover, most of their propaganda is done on the web.
79 Pryamoi efir s Andreem Kormoukhinym. Dvizhenie Sorok Sorokov. DSS. April 8. See: https://
vk.com/videos-53664310?z=video-53664310_456240999%2Fpl_-53664310_-2
80 Mitrofanova, 2014, p. 97f.
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Many fundamentalists speak about the pandemic using an overly “scientific”
language; this can partly be explained by the fact that they were often educated in
spheres like engineering and technologies.81 This is one example of that behaviour:
“The vaccine will contain nanocomponents-chips based on “smart dust” working
principle, to be activated by external electromagnetic radiation. At any moment
this radiation can be turned onwith the help ofmobilemasts, and peoplewill rave
or die en masse”82.
As soon as the authorities announced that Covid-inflicted restrictions would be
lifted only after inventing a vaccine, fundamentalists resided to picturing vaccina-
tion as another step to the universal antichristian dictatorship: they claimed that
vaccine injections would be used to introduce microchips, or “liquid chips” into
people’s bodies.83 “Moscow the Third Rome” warned in an editorial article that
“as we used to say, the coronavirus is a worldwide act of sabotage conducted by
the new world government of the antichrist […] the vaccine will become that very
lethal agent in the body of every vaccinated person, using every moment it can to
control an individual physically and mentally, or even kill him/her”84.
Some fundamentalist speakers, mostly those who withdrew into closed communi-
ties, envisioned the lockdown, vaccination and subsequent “chipping” as clear signs
that the great tribulation is nigh (Matthew, 24.21-22) and expected to be universally
hated and even killed.85 Fr. Daniil (Filippov) said: “it is strange, of course, but we
have probably reached the times described in the [book of] Revelation”86.
81 Andrei Saveliev graduated in Physics; Aleksei Dobychin - in Computing; Andrei Kormukhin
was initially a student of Physics and Math; See: Anastasia V. Mitrofanova (2008). Natsiona-
lizm i paranauka. In Marlene Laruelle (Ed.). Russkii natsionalizm. Sotsialnyi i kulturnyi kontekst.
Moscow: NLO, pp. 87-104.
82 Cf. Moskva – Tretii Rim (2020). Antikhrista gotovyat k prezentatsii miru... V Britanii pred-
lozhili dlya borby s Covid-19 sozdat mirovoe pravitelstvo. Moskva – Tretii Rim. March 28.
See: https://3rm.info/main/79516-antihrista-gotovjat-k-prezentacii-miru-v-britanii-predlozhili
-dlja-borby-covid-19-sozdat-mirovoe-pravitelstvo.html
83 Cf. Saveliev (2020).; Cf. Kvachkov (2020/2).
84 Cf. Moskva – Tretii Rim (2020). Antikhrista gotovyat k prezentatsii miru... V Britanii pred-
lozhili dlya borby s Covid-19 sozdat mirovoe pravitelstvo. Moskva – Tretii Rim. March 28.
See: https://3rm.info/main/79516-antihrista-gotovjat-k-prezentacii-miru-v-britanii-predlozhili
-dlja-borby-covid-19-sozdat-mirovoe-pravitelstvo.html
85 Cf. Moskva – Tretii Rim (2020). Tserkov ne dolzhna podchinyatsya gosudarstvu... O
zaprete na bogosluzheniya v svyazi s koronovirusom. Moskva – Tretii Rim. March 15.
See: https://3rm.info/main/79374-cerkov-ne-dolzhna-podchinjatsja-gosudarstvu-o-zaprete-n
a-bogosluzhenija-v-svjazi-s-koronavirusom.html
86 Cf. Dvizhenie nepominaushchikh (2020). Predatelstvo Khrista i tshifrovye propuska. Chast 1.
Dvizhenie nepominaushchikh. Analitika sobytii. April 17. See: https://www.youtube.com/watch?
v=rT55Au3w6gs&list=PL8i7s8Nj2FNNwoFmB4tvdHcIJ6U4RD4fG&index=6
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Alternatively, people, involved into socio-political activism are less pessimistic;
they described the worldwide lockdown more in geopolitical terms as a “special
operation” against Russia, or “command and stuff exercises of those who rule
the world behind the scenes to gain full control over humanity”87. Analogies
between World War II and the corona-crisis are common. Fr. Sergii (Romanov)
stated that vaccination and chipping would in the perspective lead to the world
“fascist regime”88. More direct connection was offered by Fr. Daniil (Filippov), who
suggested that the lockdown was imposed (presumably, by the clandestine world
government) “first, to occupy the resources of the other side and to feed its own
people […] then to provide a sort of reason for living; this is how the Germans did
during the second world war”89. These dangers, although staged by satanic forces,
were still located in the earthly domain and can be fought back.
Apart from Easter, the lockdown in Russia did not let the people celebrate prop-
erly the Victory Day (May 9th), that was usually celebrated in an unique place as a
national holiday equally important for the state and for many families whose an-
cestors either fell on battlefields, or returned to their homes as decorated heroes.
Suspending the public V-day celebrations and introducing virtual fests instead of
it, could be be easily understood in terms of no-victory, or “defeat” and has led
fundamentalists to comparing the generation of war heroes with the contempo-
rary generation of cowards ready to do everything for the sake of their individual
health.90
Sergii Aliev has sponsored the printing and placement of 250 posters through-
out Yekaterinburg in the night before Victory Day, reading:
“June 22nd 1941! Our grandfathers left their homes to die without fear for the sake
of grandchildren! May 9th, 2020 – Day of the Great Victory! Grandchildren are sit-
ting at home, afraid of “cow virus” [wordplay in Russian: korona – korova, cow] and
worried about their lives”.
Explaining his action, Aliev renounced virtual celebration as “betrayal” and empha-
sized that he wanted not just to congratulate veterans, but also to say excuses.91
87 Cf. Kvachkov (2020/1).
88 Cf. Sergii Romanov (2020).
89 Cf. Dvizhenie nepominaushchikh (2020). V podderzhku skhiig. Sergiya. Ch. 2.
Obrashchenie k russkomu narodu. Dvizhenie nepominaushchikh. Analitika sobytii. July
28. See:https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PqJ__-IiL4A&list=PL8i7s8Nj2FNNwo FmB4tv-
dHcIJ6U4RD 4fG&index=1
90 Cf. Saveliev (2020).
91 Cf. Pervyi mezhdunarodnyi pozitivnyi portal (2020). Dorogie veterany: Prostite nas! Isprav-
imsya! S Dnem Pobedy! 9 maya 2020 g. Pervyi mezhdunarodnyi pozitivnyi portal. May 8. See:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mc3eJA6pD1c
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Image 5: Aliev, with his son, friends and supporters congratulates war
veterans in the evening of May 8th and asks them for forgiveness.
URL: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mc3eJA6pD1c
Aliev and those who joined his well wishes also promised to do right, which
shows how emotionally powerful events such as the V-Day are. They lead not just
for to unpleasant comparisons to war heroes, butmight also bemisused as a source
of strength in view of the pandemic. Some fundamentalists envision the world cri-
sis as a breeding ground for some radical changes that would result in Russia’s
transformation into an Orthodox monarchy.92 «I am very happy that all this oc-
curs... It has become clear that the present state is a structure fully alien to us [...]
it is anti-Orthodox, it is anti-Muslim», Colonel Kvachkov said93. “Let us prepare for
the moment when we have to take Russia into our hands […] let us pray, God will
give another tsar to us”, Aleksei Dobychin concluded optimistically.94
In order to avoid legal consequences, fundamentalists are evasive in specifying
how exactly this change may happen. “We are not revolutionaries, we cannot seize
power by force, we have no right to do so, it is the way of Satanists”, Kormoukhin
92 More about monarchy as a fundamentalist political project can be found in Tatiana
Chumakova (2013). Predstavlenie o tsarskoi vlasti v srede sovremennykh pravoslavnykh
marginalov. Vestnik SPBGU. Seriia 6, No. 3, 61-65.; Maija Turunen (2007). Orthodox monar-
chism in Russia: is religion important in the present-day construction of national identity?
Religion, State and Society 35, No. 4, 319-334.
93 Cf. Kvachkov (2020/2).
94 Cf. Dobychin (2020).
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said.95 Kvachkov recommended his followers to appeal to God, because “now such
infernal, satanic forces […] act against Russians and the other indigenous peoples of
Russia that we will not cope without appealing to the light, the heavenly forces”96.
The most radical measures were offered by Andrei Saveliev in view of a sabotage of
the self-isolation and the vaccination.97 Fr. Sergii (Romanov) even called the Rus-
sian President Vladimir Putin and the Patriarch Kirill to hand over their power to
him and promised to restore the order in Russia in three days.98 Unfortunately, he
provided no plans how he expected to achieve it.
Conclusion
The pandemic of Covid-19 has brought both challenges and opportunities for the
Russian Orthodox Church; the balance between the two remains so far unclear.
The pandemic caused no specific challenges for the Orthodox communities in Rus-
sia, but exacerbated and visualized many longstanding and previously suppressed
problems.These problems came to be of equal importance for all political platforms
within the Church, including people who are usually absolutely loyal towards the
ecclesiastical leaders, and in view of laity and clergy.
The author was able to identify several themes which were important for the
Orthodox public in the period of the lockdown:
a) Insufficient solidarity in parishes, “sacral individualism” of believers and the
prevalence of non-parish forms of communication, including political group-
ings (e.g. fundamentalist networks).
b) Deep distrust towards the hierarchy as a mutual element of all political plat-
forms; even loyal members of the Church remain supportive of the Patriarch
personally, but not with regard to the bishops. Liberals and fundamentalists are
the last groups that trust both, the ecclesiastical and the mundane authorities.
c) A fragmentary vision of faith practices, a lack of a common understanding in
terms of changeable and unchangeable religious practices and the difference
95 Cf. VKontakte (2020). Pryamoi efir s Andreem Kormoukhinym. Dvizhenie Sorok Sorokov.
VKontakte. April 6. See: https://vk.com/videos-53664310?z=video-53664310_456240982%2Fpl_
-53664310_-2
96 Cf. Kvachkov (2020/2).
97 Cf. Saveliev Andrei (2020). Vot vsyo i proyasnilos. Zamysel koronavyrusei oboznachilsya v
detalyakh. YouTube.May 21. See: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CW3IPdsdjfk
98 Cf. Skhiigumen Sergii Romanov (2020/3). Komu prinadlezhit vlast v Rossii? Predlozhe-
nie dlya prezidenta Vladimira Putina. July 12. See: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v
=_eydP556eu4&feature=youtu.be&fbclid=IwAR1Tb38j6PXJ25X_dG-Z76sW4Ax
F5URVpfKXypdR0_d4fOHSQkJVjy2Bt4U
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between “vernacular” and “genuine” ecclesiastical tradition. In sum, disagree-
ments about religious practices led to further decreases of solidarity and the
emergence of antagonistic groups within the Church.
Fundamentalists, similar to the other inner-church ideological groups, did not
raise new issues, but continued discussing sensitive longstanding problems in their
own religious-political language, hastily adjusted to the new situation of the pan-
demic. What makes them specific is their combined critique on both the hierarchy
and mundane authorities, represented by the Patriarch and the President of Rus-
sia respectively. At the same time, fundamentalist speakers carefully avoid direct
political statements, at least in public, and it remains unclear how they intend to
achieve a political and ecclesiastical “regime change”.
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Since the appearance of Covid-19, various jihadist voices from the environment of
the former Islamic State (IS) emerged and invoked their previous combat fellows
to resume the battle towards the ‘disbelievers’. Self-appointed religious authori-
ties claim to possess the interpretational sovereignty regarding the ‘divine signs’
visualized by the pandemic: the ‘just punishment’ for those who have not been true
believers.
The narrative of the final battle between the ‘good’ and the ‘evil’ indicates a
well-known tradition in the field of millennialism. Against the background of a
transnational health crisis, this motive is currently revitalized and interlinked by
IS affiliated groups and individuals with the fear of some Muslims regarding the
end time.With this strategy, IS tries to fuel hatred and violence towards European
societies and regain fame again.
Specific vulnerable groups such as (hopeless) former Foreign Terrorist Fighters
(FTFs) and female inhabitants of detention camps in Syria as well as their children
are themain targets of the IS narratives concerning Covid-19. According to their in-
ner assessment, they seem to have nothing to ‘lose’ in this live but to gain a lot more
in the afterlife. Therefore, a discussion of the elements of religious fundamental-
ism, especially in view of its millennialist and apocalyptic elements, is supposed
to visualize possible points of reference regarding a deconstruction of the jihadist
misuse of the pandemic. This approach could be helpful in terms of a change of
perspective for those who are (still) addicted to the violence promoting ideology of
IS.
 




In 2009, Andreas Armborst stated: “While religious fundamentalism in general
isn’t necessarily related to violent or even terrorist activism this is the case with ji-
hadism.”1 Armborst’s statement indicated the increasing trend to equate religious
fundamentalism with violence or terrorism and in addition with Islamic extrem-
ism since 9/11. Although voices occurred that considered the rise of the pandemic
as a possible opportunity to weakening terrorism in a larger amount2, this chapter
aims to examine the narratives of actors and groups related to jihadist movements
such as the Islamic State (IS) or Al Qaeda (AQ) with regard to the pandemic. With
the help of various examples from the field of jihadism, this chapter aims to illus-
trate how Covid-19 will be misused for new recruitments and the motivation of the
present adherents in view of the possible resurrection of jihadist movements that
rendered meaningless.
It starts with a short description of basic elements of Islamic fundamental-
ism as an expression of an Abrahamic Fundamentalism and its relation to violent ac-
tivism. Beside groups as for instance the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, jihadist
groups affiliated to AQ and IS as well as former FTFs, can be labelled as millenni-
alist groups with regard to their “apocalyptic interpretation of reality”.3 According
to Abdul Basit, the pandemic “feeds into the apocalyptic, end-of-time narratives
of ISIS”.4 The aforementioned groups use the vulnerability of both, societies and
states in terms of the pandemic, for the mobilization of their adherents in terms
of Covid-19 that is religiously interpreted as a divine plague for sinners, who are –
beside the disbelievers – those Muslims who have joined a ‘Western’ life-style and
follow national laws as well as values in Western countries.5
The pandemic sows the seeds for fundamentalist tendencies within the field of
violent Islamist extremism. The number of new opportunities for adapting or ex-
panding jihadist activities in certain ways, including violent acts, increased since
1 Andreas Armborst (2009). A Profile of Religious Fundamentalism and Terrorist Activism. De-
fence Against Terrorism Review Vol. 2, No. 1. Spring, p. 51.
2 Cf. Dylan Nicholson (2020). ‘COVID-19 an opportunity for terrorists or a threat to their exis-
tence’.Defence Connect. April 29. See: https://www.defenceconnect.com.au/key-enablers/5995-
global-terror-and-covid-19
3 G. A. Almond, R. Scott Appleby and Emmanuel Sivan (2003) (Eds.). Strong Religion. The Rise of
Fundamentalism around the World. Chicago; London: The University of Chicago Press, p. 104.
4 Abdul Basit (2020). ‘The COVID-19 Pandemic: An Opportunity for Terrorist Groups?’ Counter
Terrorist Trends and Analyses 12, 3, 8.
5 Cf. MEMRI (2020/1). ‘The way forward - A word of advice on the coronavirus pandemic’. In Al-
Qaeda Central: COVID-19 Is Divine Punishment For Sins Of Mankind; Muslims Must Repent, West
Must Embrace Islam. March 31. See: https://www.memri.org/reports/al-qaeda-central-covid-19-
divine-punishment-sins-mankind-muslims-must-repent-west-must
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the rise of Covid-19. In certain circumstances the fear for the ‘invisible’ divine pun-
ishment could even act as a motivation for action. This development will be dis-
cussed in a second step with regard to major forms of jihadist interpretations regarding
the pandemic in the field of jihadist movements, with a specific regard to IS.
This discussion is followed by a reflection of the future socio-political conse-
quences in the age of pandemic that might shape the terrorism landscape in both the
short and long term.
2. Elements of religious fundamentalism in the field of Jihadism
With regard to Almond et al. “nine characteristics of fundamentalism, five ideolog-
ical and four organizational characteristics of fundamentalism” 6 can be identified:
“Ideological characteristics:
Reactivity to the Marginalized of Religion
Selectivity
Moral Manichaeism







By discussing elements of religious fundamentalism, for instance with regard to
IS affiliated groups and actors, some of the typical patterns of behaviour of these
jihadists are described, that could be predictive for their future performance con-
cerning Covid-19 and the further development of the pandemic.8
6 Almond et al., 2003, pp. 93; 90-115.
7 Ib., pp. 93-98. Due to the fact that only some of these characteristics will be part of this chap-
ter, not all of them are discussed in detail.
8 Although the discussion of the origins and development of (religious) fundamentalism could
be debated at a larger amount, this chapter concentrates on a short discussion of this topic,
mostly based on the research of Almond, Appleby and Sivan (2003).
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2.1 Selected religious knowledge
According to Almond et al., religious leaders play a major role in terms of estab-
lishing and modelling fundamentalist movements.9 Based on their privileged role
within the jihadist community, self-declared ‘preachers’ with an affiliation for vio-
lence, legitimate individually selected Islamic sacred text passages from the Qur’an
and the Ahādīth to identify Covid-19 as a ‘divine punishment’ for those believ-
ers who failed in fulfilling their (daily) religious duties and declare the virus as
a wake-up sign for those, who still satisfy Allah’s laws appropriately10. The latter
ones should therefore join the fight against the mushrikūn (polytheists).11 The use
of the term ‘Covid-Jihad’12, a mixture of the classical interpretation of the concept
of militant jihad, interlinked with the virus Covid-19, shall underline the need for
each believer to follow Allahʼs will to divide the ‘good’ from the ‘evil’ and to estab-
lish a pure religiosity that could be practiced in a ‘perfect’ Islamic environment: the
caliphate.The victims on the side of the Muslim fighters who might themselves die
as a consequence of the pandemic are sacrificed as martyrs who gave their lives for
the right Islamic cause and are guaranteed a place in Ǧanna (paradise).
The selection of religious knowledge by self-declared religious authorities fol-
lows the patterns of religious fundamentalism where some individuals pretend to
be the ‘true’ interpreters of God’s own will in order to gain the sovereignty towards
religious sources. “A given religious leader inclined to extremism thereby nurtures
the characteristic traits and elements of fundamentalismwithin the sector(s) of the
religious community over which he exercises authority.”13
2.2 The religious field and the religious capital
According to Bourdieu, the religious field is defined by interactions between layper-
sons and religious actors such as prophets and structured by the consumers and
producers of spiritual goods. The producer’s side provides a set of specialists who
9 Almond et al., 2003, p. 118.
10 For instance groups such as “the Taliban reflect the situation by issuing a statement that the
Coronavirus is the result of divine wrath and that the "threat" must be faced with measures
in accordance with Islamic teachings, such as praying and consulting the Qur’ān.” In: Carmelo
Galindo (2020). COVID-19, Jihadism and Biological Weapons. Islamic Theology of Counter Ter-
rorism (ITCT), p. 2.
11 Cf. Real Instituto el cano (2020). ‘Crisis del coronavirus. La pandemia segun los yihadistas’.
See: https://blog.realinstitutoelcano.org/crisis-del-coronavirus-la-pandemia-segun-los-yihadi
stas/
12 Cf. Corona Jihad in: Shewta Desai and Amarnath Amarasingam (2020). COVID-19, Misinfor-
mation and Anti-Muslim Violence in India. ISD (Ed.). Strong Cities. London; Washington DC,
Beirut, Tokio, pp. 1-34.
13 Almond et al., 2003, p. 119.
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are very competitive to each other because they are struggling about the accumu-
lation of religious capital, which can be observed e.g. with regard to AQ and IS in
terms of the ‘right’ interpretation of Allahʼs will (concerning the pandemic and be-
yond). Bourdieu defines religious capital as a product of this enhanced religious work
in order to secure the continued existence of the religious capital.14 On the side of
communication, the laypersons are separated from the production as well as from
the administration of spiritual goods15, but must follow the imposed religious habi-
tus.16 As a consequence, a tension of power between the religious specialists and the
laypersons can be observed.The specialists determine which kind of performances
will be valued. Their own way of living is concerned as valuable for the society.
Thatʼs why the symbolic capital provides a form of exercise of power that is imagined
as (religiously) legitimized and considers the support and the acknowledgment by
its adherents as a logical consequence of the superior position of the religious spe-
cialists in the religious field.17With respect to this assumption, the charismatic leaders
of IS affiliated groups don’t question their own religious authority.
2.3 Apocalyptic and millenialist expectations
Instead of looking for possibilities to make use of Covid-19 with regard to their
group, some jihadist actors are inspired by the pandemicʼs effects such as death that
much that they are likely to interpret it as the ‘purge’ of the world. Among those
who link the rise of the pandemic with their apocalyptic ormillenialist expectations
towards the world, two groups can be identified:
“those who believe that they must merely passively prepare for the end and that
no other actions on their part are necessary, as well as [those] who believe that
when the time is right they must act to facilitate or even initiate their version of
Armageddon in order to secure salvation.”18
The second type of actors could consider Covid-19 as an omen for the forecasted
end time or as a sign of Allahʼs anger towards humanity: “The pandemic, which is
evocative of […] divine punishments, might then act as a catalyst for these groups
14 Pierre Bourdieu (2001). Meditationen. Zur Kritik der scholastischen Vernunft. Frankfurt a.M.:
Suhrkamp, pp. 80; 320.
15 Bourdieu, 2001, pp. 56-57.,78; 304-305.
16 Ib., pp. 77-78, 318.
17 Ib., pp. 66-67; 310.; Cf. Pierre Bourdieu (1993). Sozialer Sinn. Kritik der theoretischen Vernunft.
Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp, pp. 205-221; Cf. Pierre Bourdieu (1998). Praktische Vernunft. Zur
Theorie des Handelns. Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp, pp. 173-176.; Cf. David Swartz (1996). Bridging
the Study of Culture and Religion: Pierre Bourdieu's Political Economy of Symbolic Power.
Sociology of Religion Vol. 57, No. 1, 77.
18 Gary Ackerman and Hayley Peterson (2020). Terrorism and COVID-19: Actual and Potential
Impacts. Perspectives on TerrorismVol. 14, iss. 3, June, 63.
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to initiate whatever long-term plans they have been hatching, some of whichmight
include violence against the public.”19
3. Major forms of jihadist interpretations regarding the pandemic
While the numbers of the victims of Covid-19 around the world increased, various
jihadist interpretations concerning the reasons for the origin and the targets of the
pandemic arose. The following two major IS narratives could be framed in view of
Covid-19 and will be discussed in this chapter:
a) Covid-19 as a divine punishment for disbelievers and
b) The Impact of Covid-19 on IS Detention Camps.
Beside the major narrative, Covid-19 is partly described as a ‘Western’ construction
to threat Muslims and conquer the increase of Islam20. Various Sunni jihadists
have “claimed that Covid-19 is a plot by Islam’s enemies”.21 According to Abū Shekau,
one of the leaders of the IS-affiliated group Boko Haram, ‘true’ believer wonʼt get
infected with the virus. Therefore exists no need to combat the pandemic, but to
see the virus as a governmental strategy against Islam.22
3.1 Covid-19 as a divine punishment for disbelievers
With regard to the lockdown and the social distancing, people are becoming more
and more mistrustful towards their environment and their periods of internet use
19 Ackerman & Peterson, 2020, 63.
20 This topic is also used in return such as in India where “Hindu nationalist groups began to
see the virus not as an entity spreading organically throughout India, but as a sinister plot by
Indian Muslims to purposefully infect the population.” In: Desai & Amarasingam, 2020, p. 2.
21 Ackerman & Peterson, 2020, p. 61.
22 Cf. John Campbell (2020). BokoHaram’s Shekau Labels Anti-COVID-19Measures an Attack on
Islam in Nigeria. Council on Foreign Relations. April 17. See: https://www.cfr.org/blog/boko-hara
ms-shekau-labels-anti-covid-19-measures-attack-islam-nigeria ; Cf. Hesham Shehab (2020).
‘Islamist hate preacher warns Muslims to arm themselves amid coronavirus threats’. JNS.
April 27. See: https://www.jns.org/opinion/islamist-hate-preacher-warns-muslims-to-arm-the
mselves-amid-coronavirus-threats/
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increased.23 This provides a perfect breeding ground for jihadist online-recruit-
ment with regard to people at risk for radicalization.24
According to Williams, a movement contains the following elements: a mutual
ideology, recognized leadership, shared resources and operational coordination.25
With regard to the concerned movements, it can be stated that this definition is
applicable on IS affiliated movements, because they share the same jihadist ideol-
ogy, followed at first Abū Bakr al-Baghdadi as their ‘Khalif Ibrahim’ and his successor
at a later time, use the same selected religious and technical sources to exchange
and have been (or still are) part of the caliphate’s organizational structure.
With respect to the elements of religious fundamentalism, the search for selec-
tivity symbolizes the wish to find a reliable peer group, in a world that seems to
be cynical very often.26 This search corresponds with a change in behaviour, when
the new adherent of a religious fundamentalist group has found his new reference
persons: this new peer group will present the rules of conduct that are of ‘divine
origin’ to the new member, for instance related to food custodies, clothes and in
view of contact to former friends. Usually, this behavioural change would be recog-
nized by family, friends and neighbours of the radicalized individual. In times of
the lockdown, this behavioural change will probably not be observed by the former
social environment, because of the social distancing. The boundaries “between the
saved and sinful in behaviour as well as in doctrine”27 will be clearly defined by the
‘new’ family. Instead of the former societal contacts of the ‘new-born’ believer, the
religious sources and explanations will become the new guideline for the convert.
Though, nobody from the former social environment will be able to question the
new religious messages, the convert might be at risk for a violent radicalization.
According to the Metropolitan Police, “some terrorist groups have adapted their
methods and messaging to the new environment, including using the coronavirus
crisis.”28 The more time a vulnerable individual spends online, the more he or she
might be at risk for adopting the jihadist truth about the ‘real’ origin of the pan-
demic as a ‘divine punishment’ for disbelievers and could be manipulated in terms
of terrorist attacks.
23 Cf. Gordon Corera (2020). ‘Coronavirus: Police warn of lockdown radicalisation threat’. BBC.
June 10. See: https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-52997441, accessed on June 17, 2020.
24 Cf. Randy Borum (2004). Psychology of Terrorism. Tampa: University of South Florida.; Cf. David
Ciampi (2005). Developmental and motivational factors of transnational terrorists. Forensic
Examiner 14 (3), 29-34.
25 Cf. Rhys H. Williams (1994). Movement Dynamics and Social Challenge: Transforming Fun-
damentalist Ideology and Organization. In Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby (Eds.). Ac-
counting for Fundamentalisms: The Dynamic Character of Movements. Chicago, pp. 785-825.
26 Almond et al., 2003, p. 102.
27 Ib.
28 Cf. Corera (2020).
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3.1.1 Online recruitment leading to offline actions
 
Online and offline recruitment efforts of jihadist groups are strengthened in the age
of pandemic29, such as through IS’s creation of Covid-19 related hashtags that lead
users to their propaganda sites.30TheHashtag#COVID19 of the new IS spokesman
Abū Hamza al-Qurashi provides his speech And the Disbelievers Will Know who Gets
the Good End. It contains Abū Hamza’s framing of the pandemic “as God’s justice
against the West for their attacks against the so-called caliphate and the killing of
Muslims.”31 In addition, he claims the will of IS to continue the fighting and calls
the Doha peace agreement “a “cover” to strengthen an alliance between the “apos-
tate” Taliban and “Crusaders“ to fight ISIS in Afghanistan.”32 Covid-19 is described
as ameasure of the local “tyrant” governments to pretend public “health and safety”
while putting “hundreds of thousands of Muslims in their prisons” where they are
“tormented.”33 The online content of Abū Hamza functions as a mental instruction
for jihadist recruits with regard to their individual renunciation of ‘the’ West that
could lead to violent acts against it as a last resort.
According to Bourdieu, Abū Hamza possesses the symbolic capital within the re-
ligious field (of IS adherents) and expects the laypersons to follow his interpretation
of God’s will in view of the pandemic. Therefore, his current religious legitimacy
be understood as a status quo of the religious balance of power and the result of
former battles in relation to the monopol with regard to the legitimate practice of
religious force, or better religious authority.34
3.1.2 Using the vulnerability of Western individuals at risk for radicalization
 
Beside the conflicts abroad, the hashtags and propaganda sites are focussing on
Western populations that have been affected by the lockdown and are most vul-
nerable for radicalization because of “perceived personal losses, frustrations and
29 Cf. General Secretariat of the Council (2020). Council Conclusions on EU External Action on Pre-
venting and Countering Terrorism and Violent Extremism. In Council of the European Union (Ed.).
June 16. No. prev. doc.: 8742/20 + COR 1, pp. 1-16.; Cf. Edith Lederer (2020). ‘UN chief: Ex-
tremists using COVID-19 to recruit online youths’. AP News. April 27. See: https://apnews.
com/a6cf967c03f7ff00e170949a9eaeb11a
30 Cf. Annelies Pauwels (2020). ‘How Europe’s terrorists take advantage of the pandemic’. EU
Observer. April 29. See: https://euobserver.com/opinion/148173
31 See Rita Katz (2020). Hashtag#ISIS. SITE IntelligenceGroup. May 29. See: https://www.linkedin.
com/feed/, accessed on May 30, 2020.
32 Ib.
33 Ib.
34 Pierre Bourdieu (2000). Eine Interpretation der Religion nachMaxWeber. In Pierre Bourdieu
(Ed.). Das religiöse Feld. Texte zur Ökonomie des Heilsgeschehens. Konstanz: UVK, p. 25.
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reminders of death, all of which can be associated with the pandemic.”35 They offer
messages that Allah’s rage towards the disbelievers can only be interrupted by fol-
lowing the path of ‘pure’ Islam.Therefore, jihadist groups such as AQ36 and IS who
consider the pandemic as a punishment towards the evil, personalized by apos-
tates, atheists and crusaders, “have used their communication channels to send
action guidelines to their followers to offer a doctrinal response to the current sit-
uation and […] indications for the mobility of their assets and not be detected by
security forces.”37 AQhas encouraged adherents to convert to Islam during the lock-
down and to stay at home in a recent online publication.38
Another target of IS supporters are the security forces. IS affiliated groups and
networks are calling their followers for spreading the virus among them.39
According to Juan Zarate, a senior fellow at the Combating Terrorism Center in
West Point,
“The severity and extreme disruption of a novel coronavirus will likely spur the
imagination of the most creative and dangerous groups and individuals to re-
consider bioterrorist attacks. […] With the world now reeling simply from a novel
coronavirus with a relatively low lethality rate, some extreme terrorist groups and
rogue scientists willing to venture into apocalyptic fields might see this moment
as a catalyst for exploring again the possibilities of bioterrorism. The Islamic State
and al-Qa`ida have already touted the destructive effects of the virus on theWest,
and white supremacist groups have called for their adherents to use the virus in
spray bottles to infect specific targets.”40
3.1.3 New types of terrorism and the threat of bioterrorist attacks
 
Lockdowns and social distancing measures will prevent various terrorist acts in
terms of logistical aspects such as “the movement of operatives within and across
borders, the acquisition of vehicles, weapons and equipment.”41 Therefore, the or-
35 Ackerman & Peterson, 2020, p. 61.
36 Cf. MEMRI (2020/1).
37 Galindo, 2020, p. 2.
38 Cf. Julie Coleman (2020). The Impact of Coronavirus on Terrorism in the Sahel. International
Centre for Counter-Terrorism. April 16. See: https://icct.nl/publication/the-impact-of-coronaviru
s-on-terrorism-in-the-sahel/
39 Cf. Kyler Ong and Nur Aziemah Azman (2020). ‘Distinguishing Between the Extreme Far-
right and IS’s Calls to Exploit COVID-19’. Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses 12, 18-21.
40 Paul Cruickshank and Don Rassler (2020). A View from the CT Foxhole: A Virtual Roundtable
on COVID-19 and Counterterrorism with Audrey Kurth Cronin, Lieutenant General (Ret.)
Michael Nagata, Magnus Ranstorp, Ali Soufan, and Juan Zarate. CTC Sentinel Vol. 13, iss. 6.
June, p.4.
41 Ackerman & Peterson, 2020, 60.
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ganization of attacks will bemodified, e.g.with regard to a growing number of lone
wolf attacks as could be seen in the case of a jihadist who stabbed seven people in
Romans-sur-Isère in April 2020.42
With respect to EUROPOL’s EU Terrorism Situation and Trend report 2019 (TE-SAT
2019) “online discussions of planning Chemical, Biological, Radioactive or other
Nuclear (CBRN) attacks increased in 2018.”43 The intensions to use such materials
with regard to an attackweremainly expressed by jihadists in closed forums. In July
and August 2018, the IS-linked group al-Abd Al-Faqir Media (AF Media) launched a
campaign titled “Bio-Terror via Telegram promoting the use of biological weapons.”44
The use of chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction, such as the
biological toxins abrin and ricin, that have been characterized as “the nuclear
weapons of the poor”, because they are accessible by any individual or group with
terrorist intentions, could be observed in the sarin attack of the millennialist
group Aum Shinrikyo on the Tokyo subway in 1995.45 Three years before this attack,
the group has tried to collect samples of the Ebola virus in Zaire.46
According to Galindo, the Islamic Statemade use of chemical weapons in recent
years: “From 2014 to 2017, a total of 76 chemical weapons (chlorine and sulphur
mustard) attacks occurred in Iraq and Syria.”47
Several cases of IS-affiliated individuals who tried to make use of CBRN ingre-
dients for terrorist attacks in European cities occurred in 2018.The following three
ones are just an example of this development within the European Jihadist milieu:
“InMay, amanwith Egyptianheritagewas arrested inParis “on suspicion of prepar-
ing a terrorist attack” with ricin.48
In June, a terrorist plot by a Tunisian citizen using ricinwas prevented in Cologne.49
42 Cf. Francesco Marone (2020). Terrorism and Counterterrorism in a Time of Pandemic. Italian
Institute for International Political Studies. May 15. See: https://www.ispionline.it/en/pubblicazi
one/terrorism-and-counterterrorism-time-pandemic-26165.
43 EUROPOL (2020). European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend report 2019 (TE-SAT). Brussels,
p. 20.
44 Ib.
45 Galindo, 2020, p. 2.; Cf. Robert Lifton (1999)Destroying theWorld to Save It: AumShinrikyo,Apoc-
alyptic Violence, and the New Global Terrorism. New York: Metropolitan Books.; Cf. Senate Gov-
ernment Affairs Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations (Minority Staff) (1995).Hearings
onGlobal Proliferation ofWeapons ofMassDestruction: A Case Study on the AumShinrikyo.October
31.
46 Cf. David Kaplan (2000). Aum Shinrikyo (1995). In Jonathan Tucker (Ed.) Toxic Terror: Assessing
Terrorist Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press.
47 Galindo, 2020, pp. 2-3.
48 EUROPOL, 2020, p. 19.
49 Ib.
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In November, a Lebanese individual was arrested for the preparation of a chemi-
cal-biological plot in Sardinia that was linked with another attack in Lebanon.”50
According to Nicholas J. Rasmussen, the former director of the National Center for
Counter-Terrorism (NCCT), this bio-terrorism warfare practiced by IS adherents can
be seen as a result of
“the conflict in Iraq and Syria [that] has been […] a gaming laboratory for ISIS and
other extremist organizations to participate in efforts to refine their ability to use
chemicals, toxins [and] other materials that would have a chemical or toxic effect
on the battlefield.”51
Therefore, the CBRN attacks by former IS fighters and groups as well as individu-
als who are affiliated to IS will probably replace the conventional terrorist attacks
within Europe in the future.52
The risk assessment concerning these new terrormethods53 depends on various
factors such as “technical experience, availability of materials, delivery capacity”54
and of course on the effectiveness of the measures of the prevention of violent
extremism (PVE) regarding both returnees and vulnerable individuals ‘at home’
who are at risk for violent Islamic radicalization.
A particular challenge in terms of the pandemic and the related lockdown is
“the isolation from others and alienation from normal social intercourse itself
[that] means that there is a lower chance that behaviors associated with radical-
ization will be noticed by others who might otherwise be able to intervene.”55
As a consequence of the possible threat of CBRN attacks by violent Islamic ex-
tremists, national catastrophe plans – with regard to a Covid-19 linked bio-warfare
caused by jihadists –have to be developed immediately at this stage for enabling for
instance European countries to be prepared for this worst case scenario as possible
targets.56
50 Ib.
51 Nicholas Rasmussen in January 2018, cited from Galindo, 2020, p. 3.
52 Cf. European Institute for Counter Terrorism and Conflict Prevention (2020).; Cf. Gary Ack-
erman & Kevin Moran (2005). Bioterrorism and Threat Assessment. Paper #22. Weapons
of Mass Destruction Commission. Stockholm, pp. 1-18. See: http://docshare01.docshare.tips/
files/2791/27919768.pdf ; Cf. Cheryl Loeb (2009). Jihadists and Biological and ToxinWeapons.
In Gary Ackerman and Jeremy Tamsett (Eds.). Jihadists and Weapons of Mass Destruction. Boca
Raton, Florida: CRC Press.
53 Cf. Jessica Stern (1999). The Ultimate Terrorists. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
54 Galindo, 2020, p. 4.
55 Ackerman & Peterson, 2020, p. 62.
56 Cf. Richard Pilch (2020). ‘How to keep the new coronavirus from being used as a terrorist
weapon’. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. March 27. See: https://thebulletin.org/2020/03/how-
to-keep-the-new-coronavirus-from-being-used-as-a-terrorist-weap­on/# ; Cf. Law and Crime
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4. The Impact of Covid-19 on IS Detention57 Camps
Since the decline of IS, its members have tried to flew the former occupied terri-
tories in Syria and other regions but were caught by Kurdish groups such as the
Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). According to Savage, the SDF has installed several
detention camps for former IS fighters in Ain Issa, Hasaka and Kobani.58 The in-
formation about the number of the detainees, vary widely and were quantified by
Savage “on approximately 9,000 Syrian or Iraqi men, and 2,000 men from 50 other
countries”59 in the year 2019.
The SDF is responsible for the hygienic measures against Covid-19 within the
detention camps and prisons. They call for more international support because
adequate resources and infrastructure are needed in a greater extent.60
The longer the former IS members will be imprisoned the more realistic seems
their will to organize breakouts.61 This assumption correspondents with the fear
of an outbreak of Covid-19 within the camps and its use for terrorist recruitment
by the media centers of IS in view of possible attacks in Western cities on the so
called disbelievers. Accordingly, several riot attempts within prisons and detention
camps have been reported so far.62
(2020). ‘DOJ Just Warned That Intentional Spread of COVID-19 Could Be Terrorism - What
It Means’. March 26. See: https://lawandcrime.com/covid-19-pandemic/doj-just-warned-that-
intentional-spread-of-covid-19-could-be-terrorism-what-it-means
57 The use of the terms ‘detention camp’ as well as word the ‘imprisoned’ applied on individuals
thatmight not be ‘guilty’ in terms of criminal offences in the name of the former Islamic State
such as children of (former) IS affiliated individuals, is difficult froman academic perspective.
Therefore, it is not used in its common understanding but as a reference to the publications
on that topic. Similar difficulties appeared in terms of the use of the word ‘prison’ in this
context. A comparable discussion on this issue can be found by Audrey Alexander (2020/1).
The Security Threat COVID-19 Poses to the Northern Syria Detention Camps Holding Islamic
State Members. CTC Sentinel Vol. 13, iss. 6. June, p.16.
58 Cf. Charlie Savage (2020/1). ‘The Kurds’ Prisons and Detention Camps for ISIS Members, Ex-
plained’. New York Times. October 22nd. See: https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/22/world/mid
dleeast/the-kurds-prisons-and-detention-camps-for-isis-members-explained.html
59 Savage cited from Alexander, 2020/1, p. 16.
60 Cf. Ibrahim and Christou Kajjo (2019). ’Virus Fears Spread at Camps for ISIS Families in Syria’s
North East’. Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Re-
public. United Nations Human Rights Council. September.
61 Cf. Lead Inspector General Report to the United States Congress (2020). Operation Inherent
Resolve, January 1, 2020 - March 31, 2020’. May 13, pp. 57-59.; Cf. John Dunford and Brandon
Wallace (2019). ‘ISIS Prepares for Breakout in Prisons and Camps’. Institute for the Study of
War. September 23rd. See: https://www.understandingwar.org/background/isis-prepares-for-
breakout-in-prisons-and-camps
62 Cf. Rojava Information Center (2020/1). ‘Coronavirus crisis in North and East Syria: 22 April
Update’. April 22nd. See: https://rojavainformationcenter.com/2020/04/coronavirus-crisis-in-n
orth-and-east-syria-22-april-update / Cf. John Dunford and Jennifer Cafarella (2019). ‘ISIS’s
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With respect to the examinations of Alexander, both the risks of riots as well as
breakouts remain high. As a consequence,
“the SDF adapts its security presence within detention facilities to mitigate the
spread of COVID-19 […because if] an outbreak occurs in the facilities and signifi-
cantly affects security forces and other administrators in detention sites, further
reductions in staffing or substitutions with personnel who have less experience
managing camps or prisons, could further amplify these risks”.63
4.1 The influence of IS narratives on Covid-19 on female detainees
According to the estimate of Arafat, “approximately 11,000 foreignwomen and chil-
dren of ISIS militants from about 54 countries are held in a separate part of the
camp known as the ISIS Foreigners’ Section.”64
Foreign female IS adherents have organized their own court as well as they have
installed their own religious police in comparison to the female religious police
units such as the Al-Khanssa Brigade of the former Islamic State.The religious court
of IS related detainees set penalties for ‘irreligious’ behavior, “including killing Iraqi
refugees and Syrian IDPs on the other side of the camp [and] even killing children
when they disobey orders of the ISIS council.”65
IS’s weekly magazine Al-Naba published an article dealing with the Islamic
principles to protect believers in view of Covid-19 in March 2020.66 In compari-
son to the first three generations of followers of the Islamic prophet Muḥammad,
the Ṣaḥāba, quotes from Ahādīth, e.g. Abū Huraira, were taken that distributed to
their individual hygienic in order to avoid sickness. According to some IS related
propaganda groups on Facebook or Twitter, the virus was supposed to be sent by Al-
lah.Therefore, it was said that those believers who put their trust in Allah and pray
for support would be protected from illness by his shelter.
Although the IS guideline towards the pandemic that had been published in
Al-Naba never referred to other organizations such as theWorld Health Organization
Opportunity in Northern Syria’s Detention Facilities and Camps’. Institute for the Study ofWar.
May 13. See: https://www.understandingwar.org/background/isiss-opportunity-in-northern-s
yria
63 Alexander, 2020/1, p. 19.
64 Cf. Hisham Arafat (2020). ‘Remittances for ISIS women in northeast Syria’s al-Hawl camp





66 Cf. تاهيجوت ةيعرش لماعتلل عم ,ةئبوألا Al-Naba, 225.
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(WHO) as sources in view of health security, they providedWHO’s and other organi-
zation’s hygienic requirements, e.g. the cover of the mouth in view of avoiding and
spreading infections and the necessity for saving and covering water and food. IS
used the expertise of the organizations and nations whom they generally marked
as ‘disbelievers’ with regard to the prevention of the disease, while simultaneously
referring to Allah and the Ahādīth as the origins of their preventive recommenda-
tions.67
Messages on Telegram included videos of female IS adherents who are located in
refugee camps, such as Al-Hawl in Syria, and said that they will not be infected with
Covid-19 because Abū Bakr al-Baghdadi would guide them and their ‘true’ Islamic
religious practice would save them from falling ill. In addition, they claimed that
Muslims,whowould die of Covid-19,would be ‘unmasked’ as disbelievers.68 In their
opinion, Covid-19 was sent above from Allah to serve as his soldier in a war against
the so called ‘infidels’.69
Predominately female70 detainees from Turkey71 andWestern countries receive
a lot of financial support from their relatives outside the camps.72 In 2019, five fe-
male IS adherents tried to bribe security guards with $2,000 per person to get them
out of the camp, but were discovered before they could reach Idlib province.73 The
detained women financed specific attacks on the camp’s security personnel with
the help of the money transfers.74 When Abū Bakr al-Baghdadi died, the new caliph
67 Sigalit Maor-Hirsh (2020). ISIS in the Age of COVID-19 - From Islamizing the Pandemic to
Implementing the Jihadist Strategy. International Institute for Counterterrorism (ICT). April, pp.
2-3.
68 Cf. MEMRI (2020/2). ‘ISIS Women at Hawl Refugee Camp: Coronoavirus does not infect true
Muslims; Only Infidels and Oppressors Die of the Virus.’ April 9. See: https://www.memri.org
/tv/isis-women-at-hawl-refugee-camp-coronavirus-does-not-infect-true-muslims
69 Cf. Al-Naba, 227.
70 Cf. Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi (2019). ‘Free the Female Prisoners: A Campaign to FreeWomen
Held in SDF Camps’. Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi blog. October 15. See: https://www. aymenn-
jawad.org/free-the-female- prisoners-a-campaign-to-free
71 Cf. Aaron Zelin (2019/1). ‘TurkishWomanPromotes Fundraising Effort forWidows of ‘Martyrs,’
Children, Prisoners in Turkey and in Al-Hol Camp in Syria.’MEMRI. January 28.
72 Cf. James Longman (2020). ‘Caliphate Wives share their stories year after ISIS defeat:
Reporter’s Notebook’. ABC News. February 19. See: https://www.abcnews.go/International/
caliphate-wives-share-stories-year-isis-defeat-reporter/story?id=69055474 ; Cf. Richard Hall
(2019/1). ‘ISIS Suspects in Syrian camp raise thousand through online crowdfunding cam-
paign’. Independent. July 25. See: https://www.independent.co/uk/news/world/middle-east/isi
s-syria-camp-hol-paypal-telegram-online-crowdfunding-a9021006.html
73 Cf. Arafat (2020).
74 Cf. Ib.; Cf. Richard Hall (2019/2). ‘Tunnels, knives and riots: This Syrian camp holding
thousands of ISIS wives is at a breaking point’. Independent. December 9. See: https://
www.independent.co/uk/news/world/middle-east/isis-wives-al-hol-camp-syria-islamic-state-
terror-uk-a9236221.html
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called for the death of anyone cooperating with camp authorities. As a consequence
of several knives attacks by Russian and Turkish female IS members on security
guards within the main market of the camp in 2019, the camp authorities estab-
lished a separate market for the IS foreign section where a money transfer is only
possible once a month.75
Especially during the rise of the pandemic the online activities of (foreign) fe-
males and children increased. On the one hand, the reasons for this increased
internet use could be seen as a result of the fear of families that their detained
relatives could fall ill with Covid-19. On the other hand, this could be a sign for
the attempt of some detainees to use the weakened administrative situation of the
camp concerning the pandemic for breakouts.76
The use of the vulnerability and the bad conditions of the imprisoned IS sup-
porters77 in detention camps and prisons led by for instance the Kurdish forces78,
was used in the form of a psychological warfare of IS towards its own adherents.79
The jihadist movement manipulated the women, men and children80 who have al-
ready been weakened by their individual fears for the future81, loneliness and bad
physical as well as psychological conditions, in terms of the pandemic as a ‘divine
punishment’ for those who might have quit the ‘true’ faith and tried to mobilize
their last will to survive in view of a fight towards the disbelievers.82 This strategy
was also used by Joseph Goebbels,minister of propaganda during the Nazi-regime,
to mobilize themasses with his ‘Sportpalast’-speech on February 18, 194383.The vic-
tory of the Anti-IS alliances towards IS territories – associated with the loss of IS
75 Cf. Arafat (2020).
76 Cf. Audrey Alexander (2020/2). ‘Help for Sisters’: A Look at Crowdfunding Campaigns with
Potential Links to Terrorist and Criminal Networks’. Global Network on Extremism and Tech-
nology. June 11. See: https//www.gnet-research.org/2020/06/11/help-for-sisters-a-look-at-
crowdfunding-campaigns-with-potential-links-to-terrorist-and-criminal-networks/ Cf. Gina
Vale (2019). ‘Women in Islamic State: From Caliphate to Camps’. International Centre for
Counter-Terrorism. October, p. 6.; Cf. Dunford &Wallace (2019).
77 Cf. Eric Schmitt (2020). ‘Virus Fears Spread at Camps for ISIS Families in Syria’s North East’.
International Crisis Group. April 7.
78 Cf. Charlie Savage (2020/1).
79 Cf. Asia-Pacific Foundation (2020). ‘APF Analysis: The Coronavirus (COVID-19) Impact on the
ISIS Detention Camps in Syria’. April 27.
80 Cf. Myriam Francois and Azeem Ibrahim (2020).’The Children of ISIS Detainees: Europe’s
Dilemma’. Center for Global Policy. June 18. See: https://www.foreignpolicy.com
81 Cf. Charlie Savage (2020/2). ‘What is going to happen to us? Inside ISIS Prison Children ask
their Fate. New York Times. October 23rd. See: https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/23/world/mi
ddleeast/what-is-going-to-happen-to-us-inside-isis-prison-children-ask-their-fate.html
82 Cf. Asia-Pacific Foundation (2020).
83 Uwe Backes (2006). Eine Wort- und Begriffsgeschichte von der Antike bis zur Gegenwart. Here:
Extrembegriffe in der politischen Sprache deutscher Idiokratien. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck &
Ruprecht, p. 174.
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affiliated relatives by the camp inhabitants – could probably support the IS strategy
of mobilizing the ‘imprisoned’ for a ’Covid-Jihad’ towards the disbelievers.84
At the same time, it is a successful recruitment strategy in terms of new adher-
ents with regard to IS objectives who live abroad, e.g. in Europe. The wish of the
new recruits to solidarize with the detained ‘brothers and sisters’, the so called ‘true
believers’, could be used for virus-attacks within Europe in the name of detention
camps such as Al-Hawl.85
4.2 Training the next generation of IS
According to various reports, IS related women are training their children as ‘cubs
of the caliphate’ within the detention camp.86 The next generation of IS is forced
“to slaughter chicken and goats first as practice to behead humans and become
suicide bombers”87 at a later time.88 If they were not allowed to leave the camp,
they should be able to fight within and – in the end – die for Godʼs sake.89
As a consequence of various defeated attempts to escape the camps, some of
the female IS detainees believe that it is their ‘fate’ to stay in the camp and follow
God’s plan to help the Islamic State rise again from the camps.90 The emergence of
the pandemic is graded as a divine sign to hold out the multiple bad circumstances
in detention.
The religious education of the imprisoned children follows the same patterns:
the kids have been told that “they will go to paradise”91, if they would stay in the
camps and suffer everything in silence. Another narrative of these lessons are the
remembrance of Islamic ancestors who “fought against ‘kuffār’ (infidels) bravely in
the last 1,400 years”92 –they represent the role models especially for the young boys
whose fathers have died on the battlefield or are still missing.
84 Cf. Politico (2020). ‘US military fears ISIS resurgence coronavirus Pandemic’. April 2nd.
See: https://www.politico.com/news/2020/04/02/us-military-fears-isis-resurgance-coronaviru
s-pandemic-162046
85 Cf. Rojava Information Center (2020/2). ‘Briefing: Coronavirus risks and preventative mea-
sures in Hol camp’. May 21st. See: https://rojavainformationcenter.com/2020/05/briefing-coro
navirus-risks-and-preventative- measures-in-hol-camp/
86 Cf. Arafat (2020).
87 Cf. Ib.
88 Cf. JosephHincks (2020). ‘With theWorld Busy Fighting COVID-19, Could ISISMount a Resur-
gence?’ Time, April 29. See: https://time.com/5828630/isis-coronavirus/
89 Cf. Aaron Zelin (2019/2). ‘Wilayat al-Hawl: ‘Remaining’ and Incubating the Next Islamic State
Generation’. Washington Institute. October. See: https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-
analysis/view/wilayat-al-hawl-remaining-and-incubating-the-next-islamic-state-generation
90 Cf. Arafat (2020).
91 Cf. Ib.
92 Ib.
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Religion functions in this specific situation as a broker between the desperate
former IS members who are beached at a camp – often far away from their orig-
inal home countries and left behind with broken dreams of a ‘perfect live’ in the
caliphate – and the jihadist recruiters who are trying to reactivate their ‘belief ’ in
Allah and its secular representative, the caliph of the Islamic State (although its
regional existence has passed away, its digital presence is unbroken).
According to Almond et al., “fundamentalist movements tend to have an “elect”,
a chosen, divinely called membership, described variously as “the faithful”, “the
remnant”, “the last outpost”, the “Covenant keepers”, those who “bear witness”,
who “walk with the Lord”93 and so on. Applied on the situation of the detained
women and their children, the only escape of their hopeless situation is to believe
that they are the faithful remainders and will finally be saved by Allah or rather the
‘new born’ IS,whenever it will rise again; maybe with the help of their own children.
Therefore, they truly believe in the narrative of the chosen members of God, obey
under authoritarian organizational rules and structures of the former IS that are
represented by IS camp courts and the religious police and distance themselves
from other groups or ‘false’ believers.94 If they would quit these belief systems they
would lose their footings and probably break down.95
4.3 Various roles regarding the symbolic capital of female detainees
With regard to the ISmessages of AlNaba concerning the pandemic, the female de-
tainees interpreted the content in view of the religious leader AbūHamza al-Qurashi.
In relation to their own teaching of religious education or better religious knowl-
edge with regard to the children, the control of the IS court and the religious police
within the detention camps, they possess the symbolic capital themselves. This is an
exercise of power that is obviously not seen as such but in reality a legitimized
demand of recognition.96
With respect to Riesebrodt, the typology of religious fundamentalism includes
two forms: the escapism and the world domination.97While escapism offers two forms,
the symbolic segregation (subculture) and the aerial segregation (community), the world
domination provides four possibilities:
93 Almond et al., 2003, p. 97.
94 Cf.Ib., pp. 97-98.
95 In view of this development, it might be helpful to increase the number of polyglot psychol-
ogists within the camps.
96 Bourdieu, 2001, pp. 66-67; 310.
97 MartinRiesebrodt (1990). Fundamentalismus als patriachalischeProtestbewegung,Amerikanische
Protestanten (1910-1928) und iranische Schiiten (1961-1979) im Vergleich. Tübingen, p. 23.
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a) “A religious movement
b) A social protest-/movement
c) A secret society and
d) A party.”98
Whereas IS could be defined as religious movement that strives to obtain the world
domination with the support of its adherents, the female detainees who have un-
successfully tried to escape the camps in reality, abandoned their plans and escaped
symbolically within the camps by remaining among their religious peer group, the
other female IS members. In addition, the security guards segregated them aerially
in the IS foreign section in order to protect others in terms of their (religious) influ-
ence and violence and to keep an eye on their activities. In this sense, the female IS
detainees support IS’s wish regarding the world domination paradoxically through
escapism.
Conclusion
Undoubtedly, the age of pandemic has just begun and the rise of Covid-19 is the first
sign for other lethal virus to come.Religious fundamentalists have used pandemics,
plagues and natural disasters at all times, because it is part of their religious self-
conception andmanichaeist world view that mankind is divided in ‘good’ and ‘evil’,
believers and disbelievers. Based on their religious understanding, after a period of
blossoming, the world must perish in order to raise again, renewed and ‘purified’
from transgressions and unbelief.
In view of this present chapter and its discussion of the IS related groups and
actors, we could speak about one form of the so called Abrahamic Fundamentalism.
The common heritage of the Abrahamic religions Judaism, Christianity and Islam
and their share of specific religious elements such as the belief in one God make
some of their members most likely to ‘defend’ these specific religious doctrines
towards worshippers of other religions or new religious movements.99 Obviously,
this anthology shows that other types of religious fundamentalism (might) exist as
well. But the search for a strong leadership and the heartfelt wish to belong to a
chosen community of ‘true’ believers are responsible for the following of the path
of the Islamic State by some Muslims who are most vulnerable for its fundamen-
talist religious narratives. As we have seen before, beside religious motives exist
certainly other reasons for IS adherents – regardless of their gender – to follow the
jihadist pathway such as a search for love, a thirst of adventure, a lack of individual
98 Riesebrodt, 1990, p. 23.
99 Almond et al., 2003, pp. 105-106.
Towards a Covid-Jihad – Milliennialism in the field of Jihadism 99
and professional perspectives, an individual disposition towards narcissism and
sadism100 and the like, that could not be discussed in this chapter.
The chapter Towards a Covid-Jihad –Millennialism in the field of Jihadism can there-
fore only be seen as a snapshot with regard to the further misuse of (the) pan-
demic(s) by jihadist movements such as IS or AQ in the short term. As indicated,
the increased attempts of the use of biological weapons for terrorist attacks by ji-
hadist groups and actors seems to mark just the beginning of an era of bio-warfare
that will be fought by various fundamentalist and extremist groups in the upcom-
ing years.
Religious fundamentalism is no new phenomenon, but its use of modern tech-
nology in order to restore old times and preferred lifestyles will nevertheless pose
a challenge for the world community – today and tomorrow. The misuse of Islam
and the misuse of a pandemic, both visualized in the term ‘Covid-Jihad’ by some
misguided actors who are glorifying violence instead of peace, should clearly un-
derline their ‘true’ intentions towards the believers who are still belonging to their
ideology.
In addition, it is now up to all of us, to deconstruct apocalyptic andmillennialist
narratives of jihadist movements such as IS for the sake of all mankind. It must be
demonstrated towards IS adherents – in and outside the detention camps – that a
decision for life is much more valuable than a decision for death.
According to the statement of Michelle Obama during the 2020 US Election
Campaign:
“Going high is the only thing that works! Because when we go low, when we use
the same tactics of degrading and de-humanizing others, we just become part of
the ugly noise that’s drowning out everything else.”101
With regard to the attempt of IS and other jihadist movements to misuse the pan-
demic for a ‘Covid-Jihad’ by othering and de-humanizing possible enemies, we
100 Narcissism aswell as sadism can certainly not diagnosed by remote diagnosis, but need to be
determined by experts such as psychologists. In context of a possible interlinking between
mental disorders and an increased interest or rather participation in violent extremism or in
view of religious fundamentalism, some recent publications are mentioned in the following
that dealwith these research areas aswell as topics: Cf. FranziskaWolf (2020). The relationship
between narcissism and sadism: is general, grandiose and vulnerable trait narcissismdifferentially re-
lated to self-reported and state-level sadism? Master-Thesis. University of Maastricht. July 12.; Cf.
Makkonen et al. (2020). Fear-triggering effects of terrorism threats: Cross-country compari-
son in a terrorism news scenario experiment. Personality and Individual Differences 161, Article
109992.; Cf. Johann Brink (2015). Crime and Mental Health. Encyclopedia of Forensic and Legal
Medicine. 2nd ed. December, pp. 1-13.
101 Cf. Michelle Obama (2020). ‘Full Speech At The 2020 DNC‘.NBCNews. August 17. See: https://
www.youtube.com/watchv=VZwfEWpG_wA , accessed on August 22nd, 2020.
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should join the aforementioned statement and go high in view of our P/CVE102
strategies and narratives. The only reasonable way to meet these religious funda-
mentalists is to explain Covid-19 with the help of rational numbers and arguments
presented by virologists who donʼt care about the religion of their patients.
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How Central Asian Salafi-Jihadi Groups
are Exploiting the Covid-19 Pandemic:
New Opportunities and Challenges
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Abstract
Theglobal coronavirus pandemic crisis not only poses serious additional risks, chal-
lenges and threats to the security of the modern world, but also creates new op-
portunities and prospects for the global Salafi-Jihadi-Movement. This report seeks
to analyze the actions of both Central Asian Salafi-Jihadi groups’ view of Covid-
19 and its original parent organizations such as the Taliban, al Qaeda and Hayat
Tahrir al-Sham during the coronavirus crisis. The reason for this is the small and
fragmented Uighur and Uzbek Islamist extremist groups from Chinese Xinjiang
region and post-Soviet Central Asia are affiliated precisely with these major play-
ers of the Sunni jihadist world, such as ISIS and al Qaeda, which are their military
patron and ideological banner.
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1. Introduction
The Covid-19 outbreak has negatively impacted not only the global economy and
financial markets, but has also exacerbated the threat of transnational terrorist
organizations, such as ISIS and al Qaeda. Indeed, amid the global panic and so-
cio-economic shock caused around the world by the SARS-CoV-2 virus, the Sunni
Salafi-Jihadi Movement has tried to extract the maximum dividends from this
global threat. The critical situation, accompanied by loss of life, a sharp decline in
income, rising unemployment and decimation of trade, has created fertile ground
for the activation of radical Islamist organizations around the world.
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In early 2020, when the coronavirus hit China’s Wuhan hard, Central Asian
Salafi-Jihadi groups pioneered the use of Covid-19 as a propaganda tool, presenting
the virus as “divine punishment to the Beijing communist regime for persecuting
Uighur Muslims.” It was the Uighur jihadists of the Turkestan Islamist Party (TIP)
who gave the new virus the ominous name “invisible warriors of Allah”, which later
began to be widely used by other terrorist groups in the Middle East and Southeast
Asia.
This briefing paper seeks to identify and analyze how Covid-19 has influenced
the strategic goals and tactics of Salafi-Jihadi groups in Afghanistan, the five for-
mer post-Soviet republics of Central Asia, and the Middle East. With the rise of
extremist religious movements all over the world in this pandemic era, describing
the particular role that Central Asian Salafist communities are playing in the region
is of fundamental importance.
The ultimate aim of this research is to create an accurate picture – utilizing a
combination of different sources – of how Islamist terrorist and extremist groups
are exploiting various coronavirus cracks in society. Focusing on the Central Asian
Salafi-Jihadi movement’s views to Covid-19, this report also seeks to analyze the ac-
tions of its original parent organizations such as the Taliban, al Qaeda and Hayat
Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) during the coronavirus crisis, because the small and frag-
mented Uighur and Uzbek Islamists extremist groups from Chinese Xinjiang re-
gion and post-Soviet Central Asia are affiliated precisely with these major players
of the Sunni jihadist world, who are their military patron and ideological banner.
The global coronavirus pandemic crisis not only created serious additional
risks, challenges and threats to the security of the modern world, but also created
new opportunities and prospects for Salafi-Jihadi militant groups. Since the
problem of Covid-19 entered the forefront of world politics in 2020, it seems to
have temporarily overshadowed the threat of Islamist extremism. Meanwhile, this
threat has not disappeared and retains its destructive potential.
In accordance with the purpose of this paper, we will analyze in more detail the
initial reaction to the coronavirus pandemic, its adaptation and its use by the lead-
ing Salafi militant groups for conducting global jihad. However, the harsh reality
is that after Covid-19 hit Chinese Wuhan hard, it also hit hard the Sunni extremist
organizations located in Afghanistan, Syria and Iraq in April-May 2020. After that
happened, their initial enthusiastic position, in which they framed the pandemic
as “Divine Retribution” and “warriors of Allah”, turned into a defensive posture.
They took the same protection measures against the spread Covid-19, which were
developed by “Kafir (infidels) nations” and the World Health Organization (WHO),
and recommended to their jihadists to abide them.
Today, all across the world, the non-state entities from hard-liner terrorist
groups to relatively moderate Salafi rebel movements, who control certain territo-
ries, are taking steps to respond to the Covid-19 pandemic.However, the perception
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and capitalization of the coronavirus pandemic by the Salafi-Jihadi groups differed
from each other.
For example, while al Qaeda and ISIS used the coronavirus pandemic crisis
to increase its own combat capacity, recruit new followers and to carry out new
terror attacks, the Taliban and HTS were more concerned about the health of the
population in the controlled territories. According to the UN Security Council1, at
present the Taliban have an available fighting force of 55,000-85,000 jihadists and
contests 50-60 percent of Afghan territory with 21 districts under full Taliban con-
trol. The office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees2 (UNHCR)
estimates that there are currently over four million civilians in the north-western
Syrian province of Idlib, controlled by jihadists of the most powerful Islamist mil-
itant group HTS, former al Qaeda’s branch in Syria. Therefore, it is not surprising
to observe that the Taliban in its controlled Afghan territory and HTS through the
local Salvation Government (SG) in parts of northern Idlib and western Aleppo ac-
tually tried to cope with the consequences of the pandemic3, in fact, fulfilling the
role of a quasi-state.
2. The root of the Central Asian Salafi Jihadism
Salafi Jihadism has become a serious problem in Central Asia that encompasses
five former Soviet republics – Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and
Turkmenistan – collectively known as the “Five Stans”, as well as Afghanistan and
western China. Central Asia, which for 3,000 years was a place of revival of many
religions such as Zoroastrianism, Buddhism, Shamanism, Manichaeism, Nesto-
rian Christianity and Judaism, and where the great Sunni Islamic scholars as al-
Bukhari, al-Ghazali, and Ahmed Yesevi lived, has become today a target formilitant
Salafi-Jihadist ideology.
1 Cf. UN Security Council. (2020). ‘Letter from the Chair of the Security Council Committee Es-
tablished Pursuant to Resolution 1988 (2011) Addressed to the President of the Security Coun-
cil.’ May 19, 2020. See: https://www.undocs.org/S/2020/415.
2 Cf. UNHCR (2020). ‘UN High Commissioner for Refugees Appeals for Safety for Civilians
Trapped in Idlib.’ UNHCR. February 20. See: https://www.unhcr.org/news/press/2020/2/5e4e
51d04/un-high-commissioner-refugees-appeals-safety-civilians-trapped-idlib.html.
3 Muriel Asseburg, Aziz Hamidreza, Dalay Galip and Moritz Pieper (2020). ‘The Covid-19 Pan-
demic and Conflict Dynamics in Syria. Neither a Turning Point Nor an Overall Determi-
nant’. StiftungWissenschaft und Politik. TheGerman Institute for International and Security Affairs.
Berlin. May 21st, p.8. See: https://www.swp-berlin.org/10.18449/2020C21/
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In Central Asia, the focus of Islamic revival and of Jihadists groups has been
the Ferghana Valley4, a densely populated and ethnically mainly Uzbek territory
divided politically between Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. The valley has
traditionally been a center of Islamic fervor, and was the area where Salafists first
established a presence.The mass poverty of the population, the drop in the level of
education after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the corrupt and authoritarian rule
of political regimes, and the repressive methods of law enforcement have played a
role in the radicalization of Islamic groups in Central Asia.
In the early 1990s, the first armed jihadist groups in the region appeared in
response to harsh persecution by the authoritarian regimes of communist China
and of Karimov’s regime in Uzbekistan. In that period, many members of the Is-
lamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) and China’s Uyghurs of the East Turkestan
IslamicMovement5 (now Turkestan Islamic Party –TIP) who adhered to the Salafist
ideology, moved to neighboring Afghanistan and fought under the wing of the
Taliban. The combination of repressive governments and economic deprivation in
Central Asia, particularly China, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan, served as an incuba-
tor of Salafi Jihadism. After 9/11, Central Asia’s jihadists, who are members of IMU
and TIP, were the mainstay of Al Qaeda’s defense in southern Waziristan as well as
participants in the fight against the armies of Afghanistan, Pakistan and NATO.
Central Asian jihadist groups are supporters of Takfirizm, a kind of religious
extremism that accuses other Muslims of disbelief or apostasy. This ideology be-
came the banner of the caliphate and led to jihad against other Muslims and open
disobedience against the authorities. These practices are part of the legacy of the
Takfirist instructions and ideas that emerged from the al Qaida environment.
Many of Central Asia’s Islamists have been infected with the “virus” of the Salafi
ideology from Arab preachers and local theologians who were educated in Saudi
Arabia, Syria and Egypt. After the link into al-Qaeda and the Taliban, they laid
an accusation of unbelief (takfir) against the rulers of the “Stans”. They refused to
recognize official state institutions and declared jihad against the armed forces of
their respective countries.
In response, the governments of the “Stans” and China have suppressed, and
continue to suppress, the activities of more than twenty Islamic groups that are
recognized by the court as extremist or terrorist organizations, because they con-
stitute a danger to the state’s constitutional order. In particular, the activities of the
4 Cf. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. (2015). ‘Islamic State Militants Target Ferghana Valley’.
March 5. See: https://www.rferl.org/a/islamic-state-ferghana-valley-kyrgyzstan-tajikistan-uzb
ekistan/26883693.html.
5 Colin Clarke and Paul Rexton Kan (2017). ‘Uighur Foreign Fighters: An Underexamined Ji-
hadist Challenge.’ The International Centre for Counter-Terrorism - The Hague (ICCT). November
15, p. 18. See: https://doi.org/10.19165/2017.2.05.
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following Islamic groups have been suppressed6: The Islamic Movement of Eastern
Turkestan, Katibat Imam al Bukhari (KIB), TIP, Katibat al Tawhid wal Jihad (KTJ),
IMU, Islamic Jihad Union (IJU), JaishulMahdi, Jund-Al-Khalifa, Ansarullah, Ǧannat
Oshiklari (Fans of Paradise), and others.
The second wave of the outflow of Central Asian Islamists abroad occurred after
the start of the Syrian civil war. After the Syrian civil war broke out in 2011 and
ISIS emerged as a competing alternative to al-Qaeda three years later, thousands
of Central Asian jihadists who had streamed into Syria had to decide between al
Qaeda and ISIS.
Some jihadists of IMU and Jund-Al-Khalifa shifted to Syria and joined ISIS7.
Central Asians, and especially the migrant workers from Russia, who traveled to
Syria, independent of any of the main Salafi-Jihadi groups after 2014 tended to
join al-Baghdadi’s Caliphate. Uyghur’s TIP, Uzbek’s KTJ and KIB became enmeshed
with al Qaeda in Syria and maintained loyalty to the Taliban8.
After joining al Qaeda, the Taliban and ISIS, the ideological base of Central
Asian militants broadened and was affected by the more-global agenda of transna-
tional Salafi-jihadi networks. Today, the goal of these religious groups from Cen-
tral Asia has greatly expanded so that now their goal is to develop a world-wide
caliphate.They have become an integral part of world-wide terrorism and jihadism.
Thus, Central Asian Islamists have expanded their influence and militant activities
to the Middle East. Over the past two decades, the locus of Central Asian radicals
has moved from the Fergana Valley through Afghanistan into the tribal badlands
of Pakistan and toward Syria.
As the experience of combating religious extremism has shown, it is small Is-
lamic terrorist groups associated with ISIS or al Qaeda, such as the Central Asian
jihadists that, due to the difficulty to triangulate on them, can pose the greatest
danger to global stability. Indeed, Central Asian Salafi-Jihadi groups pose a signif-
icant threat to the security of not only the “Five Stans” but to the security of the EU
and the U.S. Over the past decade, they have carried out more than ten high-profile
6 Cf. Kabar News Agency. (2018). ‘List of Officially Banned Extremist and Terrorist Organiza-
tions in Kyrgyzstan’. December 26. See: http://en.kabar.kg/news/list-of-officially-banned-extr
emist-and-terrorist-organizations-in-kyrgyzstan/.
7 USAID (2015). ‘Central Asian Involvement in the Conflict in Syria and Iraq: Drivers and Re-
sponses’. United States Agency for International Development. ed., Noah Tucker, Arlington. May
4. See: https://2012-2017.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1866/CVE_CentralAsiansSyri
aIraq.pdf., p. 31.
8 Uran Botobekov (2018). ‘Central Asian Jihadists under Al Qaeda’s & Taliban’s Strategic Ties.’
Modern Diplomacy, August 23rd. See: https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2018/08/23/central-asian-ji
hadists-under-al-qaedas-talibans-strategic-ties/.
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terrorist attacks in New York9, St. Petersburg10, Istanbul11, Stockholm12, and even
tried to assassinate US President Barack Obama13.
3. Turkestan Islamic Party: Covid-19 is the Divine Punishment of China
Uighur militants TIP were one of the first Central Asian Salafi-Jihadi groups to re-
spond to the coronavirus outbreak in the city of Wuhan, where, according to Chi-
nese authorities14, 3,869 people died, and a curfew was imposed in the city. Their
early reaction was related to the fact that China’s Xinjiang is the historical home-
land of more than 12 million Uighurs, the Turkic-speaking Muslim ethnic group,
who are subjected to constant religious persecution by the Chinese Communist
Party (CCP)15.
According to Human Rights Watch (HRW)16, the Chinese government has de-
tained more than a million Uighur Muslims in so-called “political re-education”
camps. Their religious, linguistic, and cultural differences are deemed evidence of
disloyalty to the CCP.
9 Cf. Corey Kilgannon and Joseph Goldstein (2017). ‘Sayfullo Saipov, the Suspect in the New
York Terror Attack, and His Past.’ The New York Times. October 31. See: https://www.nytimes.
com/2017/10/31/nyregion/sayfullo-saipov-manhattan-truck-attack.html.
10 Cf. Ivan Nechepurenko and Neil MacFarquhar (2017). ‘St. Petersburg Bomber Said to Be Man
From Kyrgyzstan; Death Toll Rises’. The New York Times. April 4. See: https://www.nytimes.
com/2017/04/04/world/europe/st-petersburg-russia-explosion-suspect.html.
11 Cf. Hürriyet Daily News (n. d.). ‘Turkish Police Identify Reina Attacker as Abdulkadir
Masharipov - Turkey News’. See: https://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkish-police-identify
-reina-attacker-as-abdulkadir-masharipov-108266, accessed on August 6, 2020.
12 Cf. New Europe (2017). ‘Rahmat Akilov Confesses to Stockholm Attack.’ Blog. April 11. See:
https://www.neweurope.eu/article/rahmat-akilov-confesses-stockholm-attack/.
13 Cf. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) (2012). Uzbek National Sentenced to Nearly 16
Years in Prison for Threatening to Kill the President and Providing Material Support to
Terrorism. Federal Bureau of Investigation. July 13. See: https://www.fbi.gov/birmingham/press-
releases/2012/uzbek-national-sentenced-to-nearly-16-years-in-prison-for-threatening-to-kill-
the-president-and-providing-material-support-to-terrorism.
14 Cf. Xinhuanet (2020). ‘Full Text of Wuhan’s Notification on Revising Numbers of Confirmed
COVID-19 Cases, Deaths.’ Xinhua News Agency. April 17. See: http://www.xinhuanet.com/engli
sh/2020-04/17/c_138984653.htm.
15 Cf. Elanor Albert, Beina Xu, and Lindsey Maizland. (2020). The Chinese Communist Party. In
Council on Foreign Relations. June 9. See: https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/chinese-communi
st-party.
16 Cf. Maya Wang, (2020). ‘More Evidence of China’s Horrific Abuses in Xinjiang’. Human Rights
Watch. February 20, See: https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/02/20/more-evidence-chinas-horri
fic-Abū ses-xinjiang.
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Ironically, only the US is the ardent17 and consistent defender of the religious18
and cultural rights of the Uighurs, while many Muslim nations remain silent. Pri-
oritizing their economic ties and strategic relationships with China, many Central
Asian, Middle Eastern and Arab governments have defended China’s repression of
Uighur19 and other Muslimminorities in the Xinjiang region, instead of defending
their rights.
Uighur’s TIP refers to the region as East Turkestan and wages jihad for the
liberation of it from China. The Chinese government has come to characterize any
expression of Islam inXinjiang as extremist, a reaction to past independencemove-
ments. Beijing has blamed TIP for domestic terrorist attacks and occasional out-
bursts of violence.The government also fears that thousands of Uighur jihadists of
TIP could return from Syria and Afghanistan to China and spark violence.
On February 29, 2020, the TIP’s Media Center “Islam Awazi” published a video
that was titled “The Perspective of the Mujahedeen Regarding the Corona Outbreak
in China.”20
According to the TIP’s video, Covid-19 is the divine punishment for China’s bru-
tal persecution of Uighur Muslims, banning Islam and the result of their commit-
ting to Haram (anything that is prohibited by the Quran, for example, eating pork,
drinking alcohol, having sex outside of marriage).
TIP’s media product is accompanied by video clips of sick people in China, of
natural disasters, and of Chinese people eating and preparing various animals for
consumption.The narrator said that Chinese people are themost impure of all peo-
ple because they eat every impurity and do not show mercy to humans or animals.
He further continued that due to the deadly outbreak the Chinese people are ex-
periencing sleeplessness and continual fear. A Uighur TV news anchor concluded
that it is due to the coronavirus, which the Chinese communists do not know how
to treat and for which they cannot find a cure.
17 Cf. Congress. Government (2020). ‘Uyghur Human Rights Policy Act. 2020.’ The Library of the
U.S. Congress. June 17. See: https://www.congress.gov/116/plaws/publ145/PLAW-116publ145.pd
 f.
18 Cf. U.S. Department of State. (2019). ‘U.S. Department of State Imposes Visa Restrictions
on Chinese Officials for Repression in Xinjiang’. October 8, 2019. See: https://www.state.
gov/u-s-department-of-state-imposes-visa-restrictions-on-chinese-officials-for-repression-
in-xinjiang/.
19 Cf. Human Rights Watch. (2013). ‘Joint Letter to the President of the United Nations Human
Rights Council.’ Human Rights Watch. July 12, 2019. See: https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/fil
es/supporting_resources/190712_joint_counterstatement_xinjiang.pdf.
20 Cf. MEMRI TV. (2020). ‘Turkestan Islamic Party: Covid-19 Is a Divine Punishment for China’s
Treatment of Uyghurs and the Result of Eating Meats Prohibited by the Quran - Warning:
Graphic.’MEMRI. March 1st. See: https://www.memri.org/tv/turkestan-islamic-party-perspecti
ve-mujahideen-coronavirus-china.
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Thenhe inquiredwhowill save you from the dark recesses of land and sea,when
you call upon Him in humility and silent terror? The narrator answers himself that
all affairs are in the hands of Allah the most exalted, and He is able to punish those
that go against His command, at any timeHewills, however He wills.The TIP’s me-
dia output reiterates that this small virus Covid-19 is a Divine Punishment, which
transformed the commercial, very populous China’s Wuhan, in which 11 million
people reside, into a ghost city.
The narrator recalled that the source of the coronavirus was a marine animal
market inWuhan, wheremany different kinds of birds and land animals were sold,
that have been prohibited in the Qur’an.Then the Uighur Media Center directed its
anger at the Chinese, calling them the most impure and dirty among the peoples
of the world, for they eat every impurity and filth, and they do not show mercy to
either human or animal.
“Islam Awazi” expressed the firm belief of the Uighur Mujahedeen (Holy war-
riors who engage in jihad for their Muslim beliefs) that the coronavirus is a punish-
ment from Allah for the oppression and persecution that the Chinese Kafirs have
committed and continue to commit against the Uighur Muslims. Then the Surah
Al-Anfal of the Quran appeared on the screen: “Remember how the Unbelievers
plotted against thee, to keep thee in bonds, or slay thee, or get thee out (of thy
home). They plot and plan, and Allah too plans; but the best of planners is Allah.”
Then Jihadi’s media output raised the most painful problem of Uighur Muslims
about China’s occupation of the Eastern Turkistan, which has long been trans-
formed by TIP’s ideological doctrine. The narrator said: “The atheist communist
nation of China has occupied Eastern Turkistan since 1949, and exercised against
the Muslims the worst kinds of oppression, tyranny, and torture, and they ignored
that these Muslims have a Lord who is able to avenge them at any time He wishes,
and today we witness the punishment of Allah with this virus. Allah the Exalted,
the owner of Sovereignty, and He is the supporter of the weak, and thus we ask
Him the Exalted, to make this outbreak a reason for the destruction of the athe-
ist Chinese, and to preserve all Muslims around the globe, especially our people in
Eastern Turkistan.”
The “Islam Awazi” Media Center mocked the president of communist China,
who recently boasted that nobody can stand in the face of his country and its su-
perior development. According to Uighur Mujahedeen’s conclusion, Allah the Most
Exalted by sending a small deadly virus has progressively lead China toward de-
struction in this world and the next. Now his (Xi Jinping) situation is like all other
tyrants, who are mired in sin, and Allah Almighty has quickly sent them his pun-
ishment, the narrator concluded.
TIPʼs Media Center described in detail “the atrocities of the Chinese infidels”
against Uighur Muslims. “Tyrannical atheistic China made apparent their enmity
towards Allah and His Messenger and the believers, destroyed the mosques and
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changed them to places of dancing, vices and insolence, they trampled upon the
Qur’an and burned them, they transgressed upon the honor and raped the women,
andmade permissible the impermissible.They killed the scholars and the preachers
that teach the people their religion, and tortured our Muslim Uighur brothers with
the worst kinds of torture, oppression, and subjugation. They separated the sons
from their fathers, they did not have mercy upon the young and did not respect the
elders, not a single woman was safe from their tyranny, tyranny and their torture,
they removed the Hijabs (Muslim women’s head-coverings) from the pure Muslim
women, and their prisons were filled with Muslims under the false name of (re-
education camps) thinking that they will be able to hide this reality from the world
and from the Muslims outside China. But the entire world, especially the Muslims,
know that these centers are prisons in which the Muslims are forced to become
atheist communists. Thus, the revenge from Allah for His servants came against
these criminals, and He sent upon them the deadly coronavirus and thus became
isolated from the world, as if they are imprisoned.”
The TIP’s media output noted that “Allah the Just punished the criminal Chinese
regime” for removing the khimar (part of hijab) fromMuslimwomen.He compared
the Chinese authorities’ directive obliging everyone to wear a medical mask with
the khimar. “This is their reward from Allah for them for removing the khimar from
our Muslim sisters, and thus Allah forced them to wear the khimar both men and
women”, Islam Awazi stated.
“This outbreak is just a warning for the Chinese government, so that they may
repent from their actions and stop their oppression and tyranny against the Mus-
lims. If they do not refrain, then the punishment fromAllah on theDay of Judgment
is deserved, and the punishment of Allah is severe”, stated in the statement.
In conclusion, TIP perceived the coronavirus as God’s assistance for the op-
pressed Uighur people, who could not defend themselves from the hostility of the
Chinese oppressors and criminals. The statement ends with a request to “Allah the
Exalted to destroy the oppressors with this virus and to save the Muslims from
their oppression and hostility by His causes.”
Thus, TIP, as usual, focused entirely on the anti-Chinese topic in its statement
on Covid-19. And this is no coincidence.
First of all, the strategic goal of Uighur militants of TIP is to establish their own
independent state in East Turkestan, which will be ruled by Sharia law. Indeed,
over the past decade, Uighur nationalists have launched several terror attacks at a
local government office, train station, and open-air market, as well as Tiananmen
Square in Beijing. Nearly two hundred people were killed during Uighur protests
against state-incentivized Han Chinese migration in the region and widespread
economic and cultural discrimination in Xinjiang’s capital, Urumqi, in 2009.
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Second, the anti-Chinese doctrine forms the basis of the Salafi-Jihadi and na-
tionalist ideology of TIP. Abdul Haq al-Turkistani21, the emir of the TIP, regularly
makes anti-Chinese statements that usually receive public support from al Qaeda22
and other globally active jihadist terror groups. He has always harshly criticized
Chinaʼs repressive policies, disguised under the political slogan of fighting “the
three evils” – separatism, religious extremism, and international terrorism.
Third, the coronavirus outbreak in China, from where Uighur jihadists were
forced to flee by Beijing’s bloody repression, caused their natural gloating reac-
tions. Therefore, they maintain a doctrinal line about an “invisible soldier of Allah”
who killed thousands upon thousands of Chinese unbelievers. TIP is convinced
that God punishes the Chinese kafirs, who persist in defying his authority. Uighur
Jihadi group’s ideologues have argued that the Chinese repression of Uighur Mus-
lims and its anti-Islamic policies sparked the “wrath of God” which has become the
“nightmare of the crusaders”.
When TIP claims Covid-19 to be “God’s punishment”, it does not speak in its
own name, but utilizes the Quran’s Surah Al-Buruj [85:12], in order to demonstrate
the timeless dimension of the prophetic message. The literal translation is there-
fore: “The onslaught of your Lord is severe.” According to the ideological doctrine of
Jihadi-Salafism, the keys to all today’s problems lie in the roots of “the pious prede-
cessors”, since Islam is eternal. What was revealed yesterday remains valid today.
The Salafi-Jihad draws its inspiration from primary sources during the time of the
“Righteous Ancestors” when the Messenger of Allah and his Companions waged a
perennial jihad. That is why, when TIP claims “God’s punishment” of the Chinese
infidels, it returns to the primary sources of the Quran over and over again.
As is well known, the Uighur jihadists of TIP, Sunni Muslims of Turkic descent
from China’s northwest province of Xinjiang, have become a prominent cog in the
constellation of globally active jihadist terror groups since the 1990s.The organiza-
tion is a part of al Qaeda’s network and is located in the Middle East and Southeast
Asia. Some of the TIP members are continuing the “holy jihad” in Afghanistan un-
der the command of the Taliban to restore the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan to
power. A second group of Uighur jihadists, the TIP, are fighting with the former al
Qaeda umbrella group Hayat Tahrir al-Sham in Syria.
The Turkestan Islamic Party is adept at using Beijing’s heavy hand to recruit
new followers and raise money from Uighur entrepreneurs in Turkey and Central
21 Thomas Joscelyn, and Caleb Weiss (2019). ‘Turkistan Islamic Party Head Decries Chinese Oc-
cupation.’ | FDD’s Long War Journal. March 19. See: https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/
2019/03/turkistan-islamic-party-head-decries-chinese-occupation.php.
22 Thomas Joscelyn (2019). ‘Al QaedaDeclares Solidarity with Turkistan Islamic Party in the Face
of Chinese Oppression’. FDD’s Long War Journal. April 17. See: https://www.longwarjournal.
org/archives/2019/04/al-qaeda-declares-solidarity-with-turkistan-islamic-party-in-the-face-
of-chinese-oppression.php.
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Asia under the slogan “participate in holy Jihad with your property.” Abdul Haq
himself, the number one Uighur jihadist, continues to constantly emphasize his
allegiance to both the al Qaeda’s emir Ayman al-Zawahiri23 and the Taliban’s top
leaderHaibatullah Akhundzada. In 2009, the U.S. TreasuryDepartment designated
the TIP’s leader Abdul Haq as a terrorist24, noting that he had been a member of
al-Qaeda’s elite Shura Council since 2005 and described Abdul Haq’s TIP as a part
of al-Qaeda’s “support network.”
The TIP’s anti-Chinese Covid-19 statement was supported by Abd Al-Razzaq Al-
Mahdi, a prominent Syrian Jihadi cleric known for his constant ideological backing
of the Uighur Jihadists. On January 23, 2020, he issued a fatwa permitting Mus-
lims to celebrate the spread of the coronavirus in China, and further permitting
Muslims to pray to Allah to annihilate the people of China. The fatwa25, which was
posted on the “Fatwas from the Land of Sham” on his Telegram channel, states that
“We should express our joy and pray for their [the Chinese] annihilation.They have
declared resounding war and they killed, slaughtered, imprisoned, and oppressed
the Uighurs and non-Uighur Muslims. They are the enemies of Allah and are Bud-
dhists and communists.”
The anti-Chinese coronavirus rhetoric and protection of the Uighur Muslims in
Xinjiang was also touched upon by the famous Saudi Arabian Salafi cleric Abdallah
al-Muhaysini who has close relations with the Turkistan Islamic Party. On January
26, 2020, the pivotal ideologist of the Syrian jihad published a post on his Telegram
channel accusing China of “exporting” the coronavirus to Xinjiang, the motherland
of the Uighurs. In the post, al-Muhaysini wrote: “China’s criminal policy was aimed
at exporting the coronavirus to East Turkestan (Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Re-
gion of China) by canceling all flights to and from the city ofWuhan except the ones
heading to East Turkestan. As usual, Communist China, will not waste any oppor-
tunity to annihilate the Muslim nation of Uyghurs.” It should be noted that the
US Treasury Department identified Abdullah al-Muhaisini26 as a senior al-Qaeda
member in Syria and choked off his access to the international financial system in
November 2016.
23 Cf. Thomas Joscelyn (2020). ‘HowChina’s Repressive Policies Could Fuel the Jihad’. Foundation
forDefense ofDemocracies.April 29. See: https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2020/04/29/how-chinas-
repressive-policies-could-fuel-the-jihad/.
24 Cf. U.S. Department of Treasury (2009). ‘Treasury Targets Leader of Group Tied to Al Qaida.’
April 20. See: https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/tg92.aspx.
25 Cf. Christine Douglass-Williams (2020). ‘Muslim Cleric’s Fatwa Permits Muslims to Cele-
brate Coronavirus Spread and Pray for ‘Annihilation’ of Chinese People’. JihadWatch. February
1st See: https://www.jihadwatch.org/2020/02/muslim-clerics-fatwa-permits-muslims-to-celeb
rate-coronavirus-spread-and-pray-for-annihilation-of-chinese-people.
26 Cf. U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office (2016). ‘Treasury Designates Key Al-Nusrah Front
Leaders.’ The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control. October 11. See:
https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/jl0605.aspx.
118 Uran Botobekov
4. The Taliban and Covid-19
The Taliban, which is the “godfather” of the Uighur militants’ TIP and Uzbek Salafi-
Jihadi groups KTJ, KIB, IJU and IMU, have capitalized on the Coronavirus factor
to strengthen their political and military potential. The first reports on Covid-19
in China came precisely at a time when the Taliban and the United States signed
peaceful cooperation, which allows the insurgent group to legitimize itself as an
independent political force in the future and free itself from the UN, US and EU
sanctions.
As we noted at the beginning of our article, the Taliban’s response to the spread
of the coronavirus has been a stark contrast from other global terrorist groups such
as ISIS and al Qaeda, who have called Covid-19 “divine retribution” and have used
the opportunity to intensify new attacks and intimidate the “kafir’s world”. The
Taliban have long sought to establish that they are a more effective administration
than the current Afghan government, and, as a result, they are using the pandemic
to further this goal.
The Afghan Ministry of Public Health has predicted27 that at its peak, coron-
avirus may infect 25 million and kill 110,000 Afghans, which is more than the num-
ber of civilian deaths the 19-year-long conflict has caused. There have been 36,829
confirmed cases of the virus in Afghanistan, and approximately 1,294 deaths at the
end of July 2020, according to the Johns Hopkins University28, which added that
cases were expected to increase.
Regarding Covid-19, the main difference between the Taliban and other
transnational terrorist groups ISIS and al Qaeda is that it actually controls more
than 50 percent of the country’s territory, which forces them to take care of the
health of the population living there.
On March 18, 2020, the Taliban official website, “Voice of Jihad”, published a
“Statement concerning the fight against coronavirus”29, which combines their re-
ligious views on the virus with practical recommendations to combat it at home.
The Taliban’s religious views on the virus have been in tune with their long-term
strategic partner al Qaeda. As previously, both groups this time have also pursued
a ‘hearts-and-minds’ strategy to win over ordinary Muslims aimed at further pen-
etrating the local audience.
For example, the Taliban believe that
27 Cf. Nathan Paul Southern, Mehrad Ezzatullah, and Lindsey Kennedy (2020). ‘In Afghanistan,
the Coronavirus Could Be Deadlier Than War.’ Foreign Policy. Blog. April 17. See: https://foreig
npolicy.com/2020/04/17/in-afghanistan-coronavirus-could-be-deadlier-than-war/.
28 Cf. JohnsHopkins Coronavirus Resource Center (2020/2.). ‘Afghanistan’. August 6. See: https://
coronavirus.jhu.edu/region/afghanistan, accessed on August 6, 2020.
29 Cf. Official website of Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (2020/a). ‘Statement of Islamic Emirate
concerning fight against corona virus.’ March 3rd. See: http://alemarahenglish.net/?p=33722
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«Coronavirus is a disease ordained by the Almighty Allah which has perhaps been
sent by Allah (SwT) because of the disobedience and sins of mankind or other
reasons. Our Muslim nation must consider this disease a decree of Allah (SwT)
and deal with it in accordance with the teachings of the Holy Prophet (PBUH). As
per the directives of scholars – people should recite effective prayers and astaghfar
(seeking forgiveness) frequently, increase the reading of the Holy Quran, give in
alms and charity and turn to Allah (SwT) in repentance for their past sins».30
However, at the end of the statement, the Taliban embarked on the first practi-
cal measures to combat the coronavirus. Specifically, they offered three medical
proposals:
“- The safety guidelines issued by health organizations, doctors and other health
experts must be observed and all safety precautions followed to the best of one’s
abilities.”
- International relief, health and humanitarian organizations should execute their
obligation of sending necessary equipment, medicine and aid to areas under our
control and we shall lay the groundwork for their secure travel.
- Our brotherly businessmen – in line with their Islamic and humanitarian respon-
sibility – must also support their fellow people in this time of crisis. They must
refrain from unlawful profit, price hikes and hoarding and instead show affinity
towards the people.”31
However, thereafter the Taliban gradually moved away from a religious assess-
ment of the coronavirus to pragmatic measures to combat it. They regularly pub-
lished coronavirus disease advice for the public, quarantine guidelines, and ways
to prevent the infection. Pictures of their militants, medical staff, and local au-
thorities wearing protective masks have been widely circulated on their website32
and on Twitter. The Taliban’s seemingly pragmatic steps to combat Covid-19, com-
binedwith religiousmotives, could help them gain the support of local conservative
Afghan society.
Since April 2020, on the website Voice of Jihad, the Taliban have been actively
reporting on the activity of their officials of the Health Commission (an alterna-
tive body of the Ministry of Public Health of Afghan Government) to prevent and
30 Cf. Ib.
31 Cf. Ib.
32 Cf. Official website of Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (2020/c). ‘Photo report of public aware-
ness meeting about Corona virus epidemic in Logar’. March 29. See: http://alemarahenglish.
net/?p=34066
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spread of coronavirus epidemic in their controlled regions33. “The Islamic Emi-
rate via its Health Commission assures all international health organizations and
WHO of its readiness to cooperate and coordinate with them in combating the
coronavirus,” Taliban spokesman Suhail Shaheen said on Twitter34.Thus, they have
clearly grasped the dangers posed by the coronavirus pandemic sweeping the rest
of the world.
On April 2, the Taliban announced a cease-fire in all areas under their con-
trol hit by the coronavirus and launched campaigns to raise awareness about the
dangers of the virus. At some critical points, they sent suspected cases to local gov-
ernment hospitals. Thus, amid the escalating coronavirus spread, Taliban’s Health
Commission for the first time began to cooperate with government and interna-
tional institutions, including WHO. Covid-19 has positively changed the Taliban’s
attitude towards international medical organizations, as they have historically tar-
geted healthcare workers of WHO, Red Cross and others by claiming to be agents
of the West.
This has given cause for cautious optimism to the United States Institute of
Peace that the Covid-19 crisis could lead to the start of long-awaited35 peace process
between the Afghan government and the Taliban. But the slow progress on prisoner
releases36, which is envisaged in the US-Taliban peace agreement37, has pushed the
war parties even further apart. A key point of this deal aimed at ending the 19-year-
long war was that 5,000 Taliban prisoners would be released by March 10, 2020.
Less than 400 Taliban prisoners had been freed as of May 3.
From the early days of the coronavirus, the Taliban began sounding the alarm
for their 40,000 jihadist prisoners in Afghan government jails (In our opinion, the
33 Cf. Officialwebsite of Islamic Emirate ofAfghanistan (2020/d). ‘Essential awarenessmaterials
for Prevention of corona virus disease distributed in Badghis’. March 29. See: http://alemara
henglish.net/?p=34058
34 Cf. Suhail Shaheen (2020.). ‘(1/2) The Islamic Emirate via Its Health Commission Assures All
International Health Organizations and WHO of Its Readiness to Cooperate and Coordinate
with Them in Combatting the Corona Virus.’ See: https://twitter.com/suhailshaheen1/status/
1239594471576256512, accessed August 6, 2020.
35 Cf. Belquis Ahmadi and Palwasha L. Kakar (2020.). ‘Coronavirus in Afghanistan: An
Opportunity to Build Trust with the Taliban’? United States Institute of Peace. April 16.
See: https://www.usip.org/publications/2020/04/coronavirus-afghanistan-opportunity-build-
trust-taliban, accessed on August 6, 2020.
36 Cf. Al Jazeera (2020). ‘Taliban Set to Release 20 Afghan Government Prisoners’. April 12.
See: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/04/taliban-set-release-20-afghan-government-p
risoners-200412085539496.html.
37 Cf. State Government (2020). ‘Agreement for Bringing Peace to Afghanistan between
the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan Which Is Not Recognized by the United States as
a State and Is Known as the Taliban and the United States of America’. February 29.
See: https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/Agreement-For-Bringing-Peace-to-
Afghanistan-02.29.20.pdf.
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Taliban claims for 40,000 prisoners are overstated). In a statement38 on 15 March,
they urged “international health organizations” to look into their health situation,
accused the Afghan government of not taking sufficient measures to ensure their
wellbeing. The Taliban described government prisons as “overcrowded and lacking
basic health and sanitary facilities, and facing amost serious threat”.The statement
ends with the threat that “in the event of a catastrophic tragedy with forty thou-
sand detainees all responsibility shall fall squarely on the shoulders of the KAbū l
administration and its foreign backers”.
In another statement published on April 29, 202039, the Taliban accused the
Afghan government of “wielding the Covid-19 disease as a weapon of war” against
“innocent prisoners” in Afghan jails, thereby seeking to derail the peace agreement.
According to them, “the coronavirus is raging in Kabul administration jails and
there were identified 46 cases of the disease among prisoners”. This time the Tal-
iban directly blamed the United States for the spread of coronavirus in jails “be-
cause if it had shown urgency in the implementation of the agreement, we could
have made major progress in all facets including the release of prisoners and de-
tainees would have been saved from this danger of Covid-19”.They promised to take
cruel revenge for every coronavirus death and advised their “prisoners to show re-
liance upon Allah, have patience and follow health precautions to the best of their
abilities”.
Another aspect of the Taliban’s efforts to combat Covid-19 has been organizing
of seminars and meetings in its controlled territories to educate people on how
to use gloves and masks, wash hands with soap, and practice social distancing.
To achieve their objectives, they have spread public health information through a
very active social media campaign, counteracting a flood of misinformation about
Covid-19 on popular networks such as Facebook andWhatsApp. On their Telegram
channels, Central Asian jihadists in Afghanistan havewidely disseminated videos of
the Taliban’s spokesman Zabihullah Mujahid40 of how the Taliban are successfully
managing the pandemic response.
The Taliban’s Health Commission has distributed medical equipment, includ-
ing surgical masks and protective gloves, and also brochures listing health precau-
38 Cf. Official website of Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (2020/b). ‘Statement by Prisoners Com-
mission concerning spread of corona virus in prisons’. March 15. See: http://alemarahenglish.
net/?p=33682
39 Cf. Official website of Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (2020/e). ‘Statement of Islamic Emirate
regarding dire situation of prisoners in KAbū l administration jails’. April 29. See: http://alem
arahenglish.net/?p=34603
40 Cf. Official Twitter Account of the Spokesman of Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, Zabihullah
Mujahid (2020/1). ‘The Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan Health Commission carried out cam-
paign against Covid-19 in Maidan Wardak province’. Twitter. March 30. See: https://twitter.
com/Zabehulah_M33/status/1244574450990841856?lang=en
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tions. All these processes were accompanied by a wide information campaign. Im-
ages and videos of Health Commission workers wearing white gowns and masks
distributing41 soap and surgical masks to local residents were widely shared on
WhatsApp and Telegram groups. Thus, the factor of Covid-19 has gradually be-
gun to make changes in the Taliban’s Islamist ideology in regard to once-forbidden
items such as film and photography.
To combat the spread of Covid-19, the Taliban has set up quarantine centers
to isolate those suspected of carrying the virus and testing residents coming from
other provinces. As is well known, they have long been very effective at setting stan-
dards for public conduct (layeha)42 and enforcing them, with often brutal methods.
The layeha – a set of “rules” for the Taliban – helped them take action to combat
the pandemic, spreading direction on how to act through religious sermons. Dur-
ing the peak of the coronavirus spread in May, they cancelled public events and
instructed people to pray at home instead of visiting mosques.
Talibanʼs Covid-19 response43 has shown that its shadow administration is less
corrupt, more responsive and is better aligned with local conservative values than
that of the Afghan government. As a result, the Talibanʼs shadowy conservative and
authoritarian government with parallel constitutional apparatuses has tried to use
its coronavirus approach to project itself as a responsible and credible actor. Ob-
servers noted the pandemic may end up giving the Taliban a moment of glory,
both within Afghanistan and internationally. Remarkably, the U.S. State Depart-
ment has also acknowledged44 the Taliban has done an effective job handling the
pandemic.
In May-June 2020, in the midst of the fight against the Covid-19 pandemic, the
Taliban unexpectedly faced challenges that had a negative impact on their morale.
Rumors surfaced that the Taliban leader, Mullah Haibatullah Akhunzada had al-
legedly died of coronavirus, while his deputy, Sirajuddin Haqqani was seriously ill
41 Cf. Ruchi Kumar (2020). ‘Taliban Launches Campaign toHelp Afghanistan Fight Coronavirus’.
Al Jazeera. August 14. See: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/04/taliban-launches-campa
ign-afghanistan-fight-coronavirus-200406055113 086.html.
42 Cf. Phil Halton (2018). The Taliban Layeha. December 26. See: https://philhalton.com/2018/12/
26/taliban-layeha/.
43 Cf. Thomas Ruttig (2020). ‘Covid-19 in Afghanistan (1): No large outbreak yet in the country’.
Afghanistan Analysts Network. March 27. See: https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/en/repor
ts/economy-development-environment/no-large-outbreak-yet-the-coronavirus-situation-in-
afghanistan/.
44 Cf. State_SCA on Twitter (2020.). ‘We Join the AfghanMinistry of Public Health inWelcoming
the Taliban’s Efforts to Raise Awareness against #COVID19 and Their Offer of Safe Passage to
Health Workers &amp; International Organizations Working to Prevent the Spread of the
Virus. AGW Https://T.Co/ETyUl08ZWy’. Twitter. April 10. See: https://twitter.com/State_SCA/
status/1248731243287662593, accessed August 6, 2020.
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in a Pakistani military hospital. On June 1, Foreign Policy magazine45, adding fuel
to the fire, reported that the Taliban emir had contracted Covid-19 and died while
receiving medical treatment abroad.
Taliban spokesman Zabihullah Mujahid on June 2 denied that Mullah
Akhundzada or any other senior leaders had contracted the disease or had
died. In a tweet46, Mujahid accused Foreign Policy of spreading “propaganda” and
said Mullah Akhundzada was well and “busy with his daily activities.” While the
Taliban have denied that their leader has dead, it is important to note that they
have a history of concealing the death of prominent emirs, including the deaths
of the founding leader Mullah Omar and Jalaluddin Haqqani, the top leader of the
Haqqani network. These deceptions created serious schisms within the group in
the past. However, it is unclear how these rumors will impact the Taliban’s efforts
to curb the spread of coronavirus.
But despite fighting Covid-19, the Taliban haven’t ceased their attacks during
the pandemic, blaming KAbū l for forcing their hand. Indeed, it is ironic that, while
the coronavirus has ground much of life to a halt in this war-torn country, the
civil war continues to devour more and more victims. In the practical realm, the
Taliban have been responding to the coronavirus while continuing to wage “holy
jihad” against the government.
Throughout 2020, Afghanistan, one of the poorest countries in Central Asia, is
experiencing the double burden of the ongoing civil war and the Covid-19 epidemic.
The warring sides, chiefly the Afghan government and Taliban, have appeared to
be unshaken when thousands and thousands of ordinary citizens caught the coro-
navirus infection and died quietly. The Covid-19 epidemic has failed to dent their
mutual deep distrust.
5. ISIS, Al Qaeda, HTS and Central Asian Jihadi Groups:
Common Perspectives on Covid-19
“Global players of Sunni Jihadism” such as ISIS and al-Qaeda, as well as its affiliated
fragmentary Central Asian extremist groups have much in common in their views
of the Covid-19 outbreak, which indicates that they are adept at exploiting confu-
sion and chaos to further their ideological goals. Their views on the coronavirus
pandemic boil down to trying to create more propaganda, lure more recruits and
45 Cf. Mirwais Khan and Lynne O’Donnell (2020). ‘Leader of Afghan Taliban Said to Be Gravely Ill
With the Coronavirus’. Foreign Policy. Blog. June 1st. See: https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/06/01/
afghan-taliban-coronavirus-pandemic-akhunzada/.
46 Cf. Official Twitter Account of the Spokesman of Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, Zabihullah
Mujahid (2020/2). Twitter. June 2nd.. See: https://twitter.com/Zabehulah_M33/status/1267703
509681651714.
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plot new attacks. Despite the tactical differences in the use of the Covid-19 pan-
demic, the strategic vision of all these Sunni extremist groups is the same: they
agree that the virus is a punishment from God.
5.1 ISIS view on the coronavirus
ISIS has followed the coronavirus outbreak since its early detection in Wuhan in
February 2019, regularly including updates in the news briefs section of the al-Naba
weekly newsletter. In one of its first reports of the virus on ‘al-Naba’ on February
5, 202047, ISIS lauded the spread of the deadly coronavirus. “A new virus spreads
death and terror in China,” al-Naba reports, adding that “communist China is pan-
icking after a new virus has spread”.
The Islamic State has adapted speedily to the deepening Covid-19 crisis within
a small-time frame and managed to turn the plight of the pandemic into an op-
portunity. ISIS issuedmedical guidelines for its jihadists in the following article on
March 12, 2020, entitled “Islamic guidance on dealing with Epidemics” in the 225th
issue of ‘al Naba’48. The guidelines included realistic prevention methods and ways
of avoiding the disease,” which included instructions such as covering the mouth
when yawning and sneezing, washing hands, and avoiding entering or exiting an
area where infections are found.
Also in the next editorial, published on March 19, 2020, in the 226th issue of
‘al Naba’49, the Islamic State considered this pandemic the worst nightmare of the
Crusader. ISIS ideologues called for utilizing the rest of the world’s preoccupation
in their favor, orchestrating new attacks and freeing its jihadist prisoners.
In one of itsmost recent editorials, published onMay 28, 2020, in ‘Al Naba’50, the
Islamic State tried, again and again, to energize fighters and followers to instigate
bolder attacks again and again. “Weadvise you to be harsh upon the disbeliever
enemies of God,” Abū Hamza al Qurashi, the ISIS spokesman. “Address them with
47 Cf. MEMRI (2020/1). ‘ISIS Article Describes Coronavirus as Allah’s ‘Epidemic’ Visited On
Chinese ‘Unbelievers’, Disagrees With Those Calling It Allah’s Punishment For China’s
Persecution Of Muslims.’ The MEMRI Jihad and Terrorism Threat Monitor. February 7.
See: https://www.memri.org/jttm/isis-article-describes-coronavirus-allahs-epidemic-visited-c
hinese-unbelievers-disagrees-those.
48 Cf. Aymenn JawadAl-Tamimi (2020/1). ‘Islamic StateAdvice onCoronavirus Pandemic.’March
12. See: http://www.aymennjawad.org/2020/03/islamic-state-advice-on-coronavirus-pandemi
 c.
49 Cf. Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi (2020/b). ‘Coronavirus and Official Islamic State Output: An
Analysis’. April 15. See: http://www.aymennjawad.org/24046/coronavirus-and-official-islamic
-state-output.
50 Cf. Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi (2020/2). ‘New Speech by the Islamic State’s Official
Spokesman: Translation and Analysis.’ June 1st. See: http://www.aymennjawad.org/2020/06
/new-speech-by-the-islamic-state-official.
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sharp swords and ignite the expeditions and do not stop the raids. And do not
let a day pass for the apostates and their Crusader masters without disturbing
their life. Ambush them on the roads, burn their convoys with IEDs, destroy their
checkpoints and barracks.” And ISIS jihadists heard their leader’s call and took
advantage of the reduced pressure from the coalition. In April, ISIS launched 151
attacks51 in Syria and Iraq, up 50 percent from the previous month. In May, it
claimed 193 attacks.
Ideologues of ISIS, al Qaeda, Taliban and HTS, as well as Central Asian Salafi-
Jihadi terror groups have successfully promoted an explanation for the virus in line
with their apocalyptic narratives. For example, according to ISIS, the pandemic is
God’s punishment for anyone who goes against their interpretation of the Prophet
and his teachings.The organization crystallized this idea in issue 220 of its al Naba
newspaper52, which contains Quran Surah Al-Buruj 85:12: “Indeed, the vengeance
of your Lord is severe.”
5.2 Al-Qaeda’s view on the coronavirus
Like the Islamic State, al Qaeda discusses Covid-19 and its global impact quite in-
tensively. While both agree that the coronavirus is a punishment from God, they
have different approaches in their tactics of its exploitation. If ISIS has taken a
totalitarian view of the pandemic, asking its supporters to step up their violent at-
tacks on infidels, al Qaeda has opted for the milder route of exploiting Covid-19.
Unlike its counterpart ISIS, al Qaeda rhetoric has not called on its followers to carry
out terrorist operations during this period.
Instead of a violent approach, Ayman al Zawahiri’s organization used softer
religious rhetoric aimed at gaining broad sympathy of Muslims in adopting a mes-
sage of communal support. In its numerous statements, al Qaeda called upon busi-
nessmen to donate to the organization, its followers and invited Western citizens
to convert to Islam by studying the holy Quran during the quarantine.
Of the numerousmessages on Covid-19,we analyzed al Qaeda’smain statement
titled in “The Way Forward – A word of Advice on the Coronavirus Pandemic”53,
which was published on March 31, 2020, in its Central’s media outlet, the Al-Sahab
Foundation.
51 Cf. Andrew Hanna (2020). ‘ISIS Offensive Exploits Pandemic.’Wilson Center. June 8. See: http
s://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/isis-offensive-exploits-pandemic.
52 Cf. Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi (2020/b).
53 Cf. MEMRI (2020/2). ‘Al-Qaeda Central: COVID-19 Is Divine Punishment For Sins Of Mankind;
Muslims Must Repent, West Must Embrace Islam’. TheMEMRI Jihad and Terrorism Threat Moni-
tor. April 1st. See: https://www.memri.org/reports/al-qaeda-central-covid-19-divine-punishme
nt-sins-mankind-muslims-must-repent-west-must.
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The document stresses that it is forbidden to flee infected areas, stating that
“The Prophet issued strict orders that anyone who finds himself in an area infected
by a viral disease must not leave that area or travel to any other region, town, or
village, lest the infection spread to new localities. The Prophet taught us that the
one who patiently remains in his locality when a viral disease spreads, his reward
will equal that of a martyr because of his choice to preserve and protect human life
and prosperity in other localities.”
Further al Qaeda addresses the West and the US, accusing it of waging war
against Islam and of angering God through the widespread practice of usury. It
exhorts non-Muslims to use the time in quarantine to study and embrace Islam,
and castigates Western governments, which it says devote vital resources to war-
fare and the spread of atheism instead of to healthcare and welfare services. An
“invisible soldier of Allah” has supposedly exposed the inherent weakness of the
West’s materialistic ways, says al Qaeda.
Al Qaeda praises Covid-19, God’s invisible soldier: “O’ people of the Western
World! You have seen with your own eyes the power and might of Allah exhibited
in this weak, invisible soldier.This is a God-gifted opportunity for you to reflect on
thewisdomhidden in the havocwrecked by aweak intruder. Your governments and
armies are helpless, utterly confused in the face of this weak creature. Allah, the
Creator, has revealed the brittleness and vulnerability of your material strength.
It is now clear for all to see that it was but a deception that could not stand the
test of the smallest soldier of God on the face of the earth. The very technological
advancement and globalization that man took immense pride in has become his
undoing. Today, if someone sneezes in China, those in New York suffer from its
consequences.”
According to this transnational terrorist group, Covid-19 is a punishment from
the Lord of the Worlds for the injustice and oppression committed against Mus-
lims. At the same time, Al Qaeda recognizes the role of hygiene during the coron-
avirus crisis, and connects this, again,with the Islamic religion. “Islam is a hygiene-
oriented Religion. It lays great stress on principles of prevention so as to protect one
from all forms of disease.This it implements through a system of personal hygiene
that takes the form of a regular routine that is repeated several times throughout
the day”, claims al Qaeda.
Al Qaeda ends his message to “Crusaders, Zionists and apostates” with the fol-
lowing wishes: “The fear and panic that has struck you is a good omen for us, and
we ask Allah to demonstrate His powers in your suffering and hasten your doom.”
Al Qaeda’s statement has become a kind of guide and ideological instruction for
Uighur and Uzbek jihadists supporting its religious views on Covid-19. This is es-
pecially true for TIP, KIB and KTJ in their numerous online propaganda messages,
in which they used fragments and thoughts from al Qaeda’s document.
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5.3 HTS’ Islamic view on the Covid-19 pandemic
Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, the most powerful jihadist group in the last province held by
rebels in Syria, has two different approaches to Covid-19. Its first approach was de-
veloped by prominent HTS ideologues and other Salafi-Jihadi thinkers, who viewed
the coronavirus pandemic from a religious point of view.This approach is close to al
Qaeda’s position and aims to glorify the global and exclusive role of Islam through-
out the world.
HTS’s second approach to the Covid-19 crisis is related to the practical policies
that it is promoting to combat the coronavirus in its controlled territory. Although
HTS continues to pursue a jihadist agenda, it formally split from al Qaeda in 2016,
prompting harsh criticism from al Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri and defections
by al Qaeda loyalists.
While the HTS-backed Salvation-Government worked closely with the local
population to combat Covid-19, prominent HTS ideologies were leading a religious
discourse on the coronavirus online. On March 28, the Ebaa newsletter54, HTS’
propaganda mouthpiece, published an editorial outlining the group’s religious
vision for Covid-19. HTS claimed that the virus had been sent by God to kill dis-
believers who “shed the blood of Muslims all over the world.” It also told followers
“not to be preoccupied with tracking the news and reports” of the virus. The HTS
ideologists assure that “a virus, which only seen by the microscopes, was sent
by Almighty God to destroy modern Nimrods, who have tyrannized and killed
thousands of Muslims.” HTS once again taunted Iran, “which has killed Syrians for
10 years and is now stretching out its hand to the International Monetary Fund to
borrow money to fight the coronavirus.” At the end of its message, HTS asked its
followers to rely only on God, not to worry about the coronavirus or exaggerate its
matter, but rather to be concerned about the relationship with the Lord Almighty.
On March 17, 2020, a well-known Salafi cleric Abdullah al-Muhaysini55, a for-
mer controversial HTS ideologue, has opposed the closure of mosques due to the
coronavirus. He recalled that the West looks at the coronavirus through a materi-
alist perspective only. “And in our religion, the solution to any problem (including
coronavirus) lies in prayer, then prayer, then prayer,” he wrote. He has close rela-
tions with Uighur’s Turkistan Islamic Party. It is known that he regularly visited
Central Asian jihadist’s ribat (front line) before important battles and performed
dua (prayer) for them, inspiring them to the “holy jihad.”
54 Cf. Al-Tamimi (2020/a). ‘Jihadist Perspectives on Coronavirus Pandemic’: Primary Sources.’




Al-Zubair al-Ghazi, one of the HTS faithful ideologues56, praisedMuslims of al-
Sham because, despite the Covid-19 threat and Russian aerial bombardments, all
mosques were crowded with His followers. “In their prayers, Muslims in Al-Sham
ask Allah Almighty to rid them of human viruses, Russians, Rafidi (the derogatory
term applied by the Sunnis to describe Shiaʼs Iran) and Nusayra (Alawites), and to
protect them from coronavirus,” he wrote in his post on 20 March 2020.
AbūMariya al-Qahtani, the notorious ideologue of the Syrian Jihad, tweeted on
24 March 2020, where he noted that the coronavirus is a dangerous epidemic, but
even worse when people rebel against God. “We need sincere repentance as Mus-
lim societies because materialism has drowned the minds and distracted them.
The coronavirus has come to make clear that this materialism and practical devel-
opment are impotent before the grandeur of the Creator in Whose hands are the
keys to everything”, said al-Qahtani.
OnMarch 23, 2020, al-Idrissi,HTS’ Islamic scholar, wrote: “Because of the coro-
navirus, the earth today is less sinful and full of the hope for God’s mercy and an
answer to prayer.” Thus, in his short message, he unequivocally made it clear that
the coronavirus was sent by Allah himself so that through its suffering unbelievers
could turn to religion and worship Him, the only Creator of the world.
Dr. Mudhir al-Weis57, another spiritual mentor of HTS, believes Covid-19 has
provided an opportunity for people to return to their religious origins. As he wrote
on 22 March 2020, “Coronavirus has not only exposed the weakness of the bodies
of modern humans but also it has exposed the weakness of the new systems and
revealed their defects and clarified the hidden element of the deceit of this tran-
sitory materialist civilization.” Like other ideologues of HTS, al-Weis also believes
that people can find their salvation in Allah Almighty.
Abū Muḥammad al-Maqdisi58, an ideological mastermind of Uighur militants,
a Jihadi cleric in Sham, on March 23, 2020, on his Telegram channel, listed several
benefits of the coronavirus. In his opinion, Covid-19 has helped people return to
their Lord, strengthened their dependency on Him, covered the faces of women
and isolated people from Taghut (idols or demons who worship another God). “And
among the benefits of coronavirus is that those who praised West civilization yes-
terday, today have resulted in advice to beware of Italy, France, Britain and China,”
he writes. According to him, the coronavirus helped “the West clean up its dirt,
because they started gargling and washing their hands four times a day, while a
Muslim praying repeats it five times a day. In conclusion, he advised: “So do not
curse coronavirus and be patient, and be hopeful. Perhaps God will bring us more
benefits and blessings and glad tidings from it.” Abū Muḥammad al-Maqdisi is
56 Cf. Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi (2020/a).
57 Cf. Ib.
58 Cf. Ib.
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also known for being an ideological opponent of ISIS and a supporter of the Al
Qaeda-lined Central Asian Salafi-Jihadi groups TIP and KTJ. The Combating Ter-
rorism Center of the US Military Academy59 concluded that Maqdisi “is the most
influential living Jihadi Theorist” and that “by all measures, Maqdisi is the key con-
temporary ideologue in the Jihadi intellectual universe”.
5.4 HTS’s Salvation Government and fight against Covid-19
in Northwest Syria
As we noted at the beginning of the paper, in north-western Syria’s province of
Idlib, under the HTS’military leadership Uighur jihadists of TIP, Uzbek groups KTJ
and KIB are waging “holy jihad” against the Bashar al-Assad’s regime. Therefore,
the Central-Asian Salafi-Jihadi Movement’s coronavirus policy in Sham is in many
respects harmonious and identical with the HTS.
Given that HTS controls the last stronghold of the Syrian opposition in Sham,
its tactics and strategy for combating Covid-19 are in many ways similar to the
Taliban, which also control more than 50 percent of Afghan soil. In order to an-
alyze the coronavirus policy of HTS and its-affiliated Central Asian Salafi-Jihadi
groups, it was necessary to benchmark and analyze their social media messages
in Arabic, Russian, Uzbek, Tajik, Kyrgyz, Uyghur and Turkish. Due to the fact that
TIP, KTJ and KIB have branches in Afghanistan and Syria, their messages on so-
cial media are sometimes inconsistent. In addition, during their long stay in Syria
and Afghanistan, many Uzbek jihadists abandoned the use of Russian, preferring
Arabic and Pashtun instead of it.
The Covid-19 pandemic is testing the authority and antivirus capabilities of
Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, the most powerful jihadist group in Syria, which has ruled
Idlib province since 2016 with Sharia law.HTS, which backs the local Salvation Gov-
ernment (SG) in the last rebel-held enclave in northwest Syria, took first preventive
measures in early March to deal with the consequences of the pandemic since there
are more than 4 million people living under its control. Almost half of the popula-
tion has been displaced from other parts of the country and more than two-thirds
depend on humanitarian assistance.
The epidemiological and humanitarian situation in the regionwas further com-
plicated by the Assad regime, Russian, Iranian, and Shia militia’s offensive60 to re-
turn the Idlib governorate to regime control in March-June 2020. In particular, the
59 Cf. WilliamMcCants and Jarret Brachman (2006). ‘Militant Ideology Atlas. Executive Report’.
Combating TerrorismCenter,U.S.Military Academy. November, p. 22. See: https://www.ctc.usma.
edu/wp-content/uploads/2012/04/Atlas-ExecutiveReport.pdf.
60 Cf. Fabrice Balanche (2020). ‘Idlib May Become the Next Gaza Strip’. Washington Institute.
March 26. See: https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/idlib-may-become-
the-next-gaza-strip.
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regime’s and Russian air attacks destroyed 70 percent of the local health/medical
infrastructure, and conditions in “Greater Idlib” became extremely poor, especially
in displaced informal camps (IDP) in Idlib. Many IDPs are simply living rough out
in the open.Thus, the coronavirus pandemic exacerbated an already highly precar-
ious humanitarian situation in northern Idlib and western Aleppo mixing ailments
and injuries caused by the war and the dire consequences of coronavirus.
Despite these challenges, the HTS’ Salvation Government began taking pre-
ventive measures in early March. The Ebaa news agency61, an HTS-linked media
outlet, has systematically reported on SG’s disease prevention efforts in Idlib. SG
authorities created an emergency response committee62 on March 23 to coordi-
nate across the whole administration, chaired by Abdullah al-Shawi on behalf of
the SG president. In early April, the SG set up medical control centers63 at the Bab
al-Hawa border crossing with Turkey to check returnees or deportees from Turkey.
Suspected virus carriers have been quarantined for 14 days at this medical con-
trol center, so as not to spread the virus from Turkey. According to the Ebaa news
agency, 200 to 300 people were quarantined daily in this center in April-May. Also,
the SG opened quarantine centers and isolation tents in Sarmada, Jisr al-Shughour,
and Kafr Karmin for suspected virus carriers until they could get proper testing.
The SG’s Ministry of Health on March 17 provided guidance for those in its
territory on preventative measures to deal with the virus based on international
medical understandings of it. This was both an online and real-world campaign
to get the message out. Indeed, the HTS’ Salvation Government held a number of
awareness campaigns and conducted preventative measures to prepare those in its
territory for the potential outbreak of the virus.
The Syrian American Medical Society (SAMS) Foundation opened the first hos-
pital “Ziraat”64 specializing in the treatment and isolation of coronavirus patients
in Idlib on 9 June.This greatly facilitated the work of SG’s medical facilities in HTS-
controlled areas. Prior to that, the opposition forces in northwestern Syria had only
one coronavirus PCR kit in the epidemiological monitoring laboratory in Idlib.
61 Cf. Ebaa News Agency (2020/1). نوؤشبتكم‘ ةأرملا ميقي ةودن ةيفيرعت ضرمب انوروك
ةياقولاو ”.هنم ةكبش ءابإ ةيرابخإلا ‘. Blog. July 22. See: https://ebaa.news/news/news-
details/2020/07/70173/.
62 Cf. Aaron Y. Zelin (2020). ‘The Jihadi-Backed Salvation Government and Covid-19 in North-
west Syria’.Washington Institute. May 15. See: https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-an
alysis/view/the-jihadi-backed-salvation-government-and-covid-19-in-northwest-syria.
63 Cf. Obaida Al Nabwani (2020). ‘Salvation Government Establishes Center in Idlib to
Quarantine Syrians Who Return from Turkey’. SMART News Agency. April 28. See: https://
smartnews-agency.com/en/wires/2020-04-28-salvation-government-establishes-center-in-
idlib-to-quarantin.
64 Cf. Enab Baladi (2020/2). ‘Idlib Opens First Hospital to Fight COVID-19’. June 18. See: https://
english.enabbaladi.net/archives/2020/06/idlib-opens-first-hospital-to-fight-covid-19/.
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Indeed, the HTS-backed SG has implemented an extensive effort of measures
to prevent coronavirus, so that Covid-19 has hit Idlib less than Damascus. In par-
ticular, local officials sterilized schools, mosques, government buildings and other
infrastructure. Especially the SG’s Minister of Health Dr. Ayman Jibis regularly ap-
peared in local media and explained coronavirus and its preventive measures. The
Women Affairs Bureau of the Culture Directorate65 under the Salvation Govern-
ment organized nursing courses and workshops to explain Covid-19 prevention
measures in Idlib.
Local entrepreneurs opened a factory for making66 masks for the local popula-
tion, supported by the SG.The local Salvation Government officials organized press
conferences, passed out guidance notices to local passersby and to drivers. They
also hung up banners, released an informational video and a series of essays ex-
plaining coronavirus and preventive measures. Despite its difficult economic state,
the Salvation Government, through its Department of Humanitarian Affairs, has
launched a campaign ‘To protect our people from coronavirus’ and has distributed
face masks, hand sanitizer and medicine to Idlib refugee camps.
However, some of HTS’s anti-coronavirus measures have been challenged by
the rival Turkish-backed Syrian InterimGovernment (SIG) and its Jaish al-Watani67
(the Syrian National Army). Also, the HTS-affiliated Salvation Government’s order
to close mosques, shops and street markets was largely ignored. Videos from Idlib
show that jihadists of Huras ad-Din, al Qaeda’s official branch in Syria, openly
demonstrated their defiance against closing mosques. Central Asian jihadists
posted videos on Telegram that they continued to attend and conduct sermons at
their mosques. Indeed, all mosques in Greater Idlib remained full during Ramadan
prayers with people standing shoulder to shoulder.
Sheikhs and imams publicly defied the order in the name of Sharia law and
several ex-HTS commanders and jihadi leaders challenged the group’s authority
and their religious legitimacy68. The coronavirus crisis has shown that HTS cannot
rely solely on brutal means to impose social preventive measures. Sometimes, not
65 Cf. Ebaa News Agency (2020/2). تايئاصحإ‘ ةمداص تاباصإل انوروك يف قطانم
تايشيليم دسألا غلابمو ةيلايخ لباقم فشكلا نع ”.ضرملا 2020. ةكبش ءابإ
ةيرابخإلا ‘. Blog. July 23rd. See: https://ebaa.news/news/news-details/2020/07/70183/.
66 Cf. Reuters (2020). ‘Syrians Sew Masks as Idlib Prepares for Coronavirus’. YouTube. April 1st.
See: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=k84aBoVKE2k.
67 Cf. Fehim Tastekin (2019). ‘Who Are Turkish-Backed Forces in Latest Syria Incursion’? Al-
Monitor. October 13. See: https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2019/10/turkey-syria-k
urds-militias-in-operation-peace-spring.html.
68 Cf. Enab Baladi (2020/1). ‘Coronavirus and Sharia law: Divide over closure of mosques




only tough rivals such as al Qaeda’s Huras ad-Din resisted SG’s orders, but HTS-
affiliated Uzbek and Uighur jihadists also openly defied it.
Due to ideological differences, the well-known Uzbek jihadist Abū Saloh, along
with his 50militants, left theHTS and joined al Qaeda, for which he was arrested by
HTS69. Extreme coercion could jeopardize the legitimacy the group enjoys among
Central Asian Muhajireen (foreign fighters) and undermine its ability to control
them.Therefore, HTS began resorting to a limited use of force that however proved
insufficient to produce the kind of outcomes needed to effectively wage jihad dur-
ing the pandemic.
As early asmid-February, there were rumors circulating in Central Asian Salafi-
Jihadi groups’ socialmedia that the coronavirus arrived in Syria via Iran and its Shia
militia proxies, since Iran was the first major vector of the disease in the Middle
East.
Particularly, KTJ and TIP on its Telegram channels reported in detail and regu-
larly information on the coronavirus crisis in Iran, providing photos of the funerals
of those who died from the Covid-19 pandemic. They made no secret of their plea-
sure that Covid-19 had severely hit and continued to mow down the military and
religious leadership of Iran’s Islamic revolutionaries.
Uzbek andUighur Sunni Jihadi groups attempted toweave Iran’s and Bashar al-
Asad’s regimeʼs failures to control the virus into their own propaganda narratives.
They openly gloated over the Iranian losses and prayed to Allah to destroy even
more the enemies of the Muslim Ummah – the Russian military, Tehran’s proxy
Shia militias and “Bashar al-Assadʼs bandits”.
The HTS’ Ebaa news Agency70 and Central Asia jihadists Telegram channels
mocked that the number of coronavirus cases in the Bashar al-Assad’s army and
among Shia militia forces is very high, and that the regime was hiding it. They
gleefully described the extremely critical coronavirus situation in the Syrian gov-
ernment-controlled territories, calling it “Shocking Crown casualties among As-
sad’s army.”
The Uzbek jihadists wrote that the Syrian government army soldiers, fearing
of being infected Covid-19, do not want to jointly fight the Shia fighters Kataib al-
Imam al-Hussein, Quwat al-Ridha, and Liwa Fatemiyoun. According to KTJ, many
Iranian-backed fighters were quarantined near the frontlines in Idlib and Aleppo.
Uzbek jihadists on the hidden Telegram channels joked about not taking prisoner
69 Cf. Uran Botobekov (2020). ‘TopUzbek Jihadist Leader Suffers for Loyalty to Al Qaeda’.Modern
Diplomacy. July 20. See: https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2020/07/10/top-uzbek-jihadist-leader-s
uffers-for-loyalty-to-al-qaeda/
70 Cf. Ebaa News Agency (2020/2). تايئاصحإ ةمداص تاباصإل انوروك يف قطانم
تايشيليم دسألا غلابمو ةيلايخ لباقم فشكلا نع ”.ضرملا 2020. ةكبش ءابإ
.ةيرابخإلا Blog. The Ebaa News Agency. July 23. See: https://ebaa.news/news/news-details
/2020/07/70183/.
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Shia militia member, saying, it is better to kill them on the spot so that the coro-
navirus infection does not penetrate into Greater Idlib. According to Abū Mariya
al Qahtani, an HTS commander, “the heavy Iranian and foreign Shia militia pres-
ence has corrupted the religion of the people and their earthly life.” Thus, HTS
and Central Asian Salafi-Jihadi groups have come out in a united front, blaming
predominantly Shiite Iran and its proxy militias in the Middle East for infecting
Greater Idlib.
Despite rumors that the coronavirus entered Syria back in mid-February
through Iranian and foreign Shia militia, Syrian health minister Nizar Yazigi
acknowledged the country’s first official case of coronavirus71 on state television
only on March 22. Since then, the coronavirus pandemic has severely hit the
Syrian population living in government-controlled territories. On August 6, 2020,
according to Johns Hopkins University72, 944 coronavirus cases were officially
registered in Syria, including 48 deaths in regime-held areas.
Indeed, when compared across the country, prior to July 2020, the coronavirus
situation in Greater Idlib was more favorable than the Bashar al-Assad’s regime-
held territories. The first Covid-19 case was confirmed in HTS-controlled Idlib
province on July 973. The head of the World Health Organization (WHO)’s office
in Turkey’s southeastern Gaziantep, Mahmoud Daher, said the patient was a
male Syrian doctor in his 30s who had been working in a hospital in the town of
Bab al-Hawa on the Syrian-Turkish border. The registration of the first case of
Covid-19 in Idlib Governorate raised the anticipated concerns of HTS, its Salvation
Government and the Central Asian Salafi-Jihadi groups.
Because, during the two-year-long offensive of the Syrian-Russian military al-
liance critical civilian infrastructure was repeatedly attacked across Idlib, including
hospitals and healthcare centers74. Many of the displaced are now living in camps
in northern Idlib and along the Turkish border, where most barely have access to
basic necessities, including health care, water, and food, making social distancing
and basic hygiene almost impossible.
71 Cf. Khaled Al-Khateb (2020). ‘Coronavirus in Syria: A Catastrophe in the Making.’ Al-Monitor.
March 27. See: https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2020/03/syria-coronavirus-who-p
andemic-denial-cases-detention-camps.html.
72 Cf. Johns Hopkins Coronavirus Resource Center (2020/1.). ‘Syria - COVID New Cases, Deaths,
Testing Data’. August 6. See: https://coronavirus.jhu.edu/region/syria, accessed on August 6,
2020
73 Cf. AFP, French Press Agency (2020). ‘Syria’s Idlib Announces First Case of Coronavirus.’ Daily
Sabah. July 9. See: https://www.dailysabah.com/politics/syrias-idlib-announces-first-case-of-c
oronavirus/news.
74 Cf. Physicians for Human Rights (2020). ‘Medical Personnel Are Targeted in Syria.’ Blog. Ac-
cessed on August 6. See: http://phr.org/our-work/resources/medical-personnel-are-targeted-
in-syria/.
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5.5 Uzbek jihadists view on the coronavirus
OnMarch 16, 2020, Ahluddin Navqotiy, an ardent ideologue of the Uzbek extremist
group Katibat Tawhid wal Jihad, posted a video on Telegram channel, entitled “Allah
Almighty supports his faithful followers.” In the Jummah Khutbah (Friday Sermon),
he said that “today Allah Almighty is destroying China and Iran through an invisible
virus. The economy of these infidels is collapsing in front of our eyes. They are
stranded and cannot find a cure for the coronavirus. This is God’s punishment for
their sins! Kafirs are powerless before the invisible warriors of the Lord.Therefore,
we must vigorously continue our holy jihad.” Ahluddin Navqotiyʼs description of
Covid-19 is closely aligned with al Qaeda’s religious propaganda on the concept of
“soldier of Alla”.
On July 14, 2020, the Uzbek group KTJ posted on its Telegram channel a mes-
sage entitled “Coronavirus is like the plague” and a short quote from famous Islamic
scholar Muḥammad al-Bukhariʼs Hadith collection ‘Sahihʼ. KTJ claims that Islamic
guidelines on epidemics, going back to the time of the Prophet Muḥammad, can
help them cope with Covid-19. “If you hear of an outbreak of plague in a land, do
not enter it; if the plague breaks out in a place while you are in it, do not leave
that place,” according to Sahih al-Bukhari. According to the Uzbek Jihadi group,
the outbreak is a threat to all jihadists, and Hadith of al-Bukhari recommends how
to minimize its spread and encouraging people to avoid it.
Abū Yusuf Muhojir, the famous leader of the Uzbek group Katibat Imam al
Bukhari, on his Telegram channel often praised the exceptional role of the coron-
avirus as a “soldier of Allah”. On March 28, 2020, he posted that “if yesterday the
Shia Shaitans killed the Sunni Muslims of Sham, today the smallest and invisi-
ble soldier of Allah is destroying them in Iran itself. You are the fairest and most
protective of the innocent, o Allah.”
The KIB top leader also appealed to Western infidel regimes, where school
students are prohibited from wearing the hijab. “Yesterday these infidels forbade
Muslim women to wear hijab. However, today, when the invisible soldier of Al-
lah Almighty came to their land, they are not saved even by the mask, which they
have to wear instead of the hijab. Because Allah punishes them for their sins be-
fore Islam”, said he. Further, the Uzbek jihadist concluded that “Almighty Allah has
revealed the brittleness and vulnerability of the West’s material strength. It is now
clear for all to see that it was but a deception that could not stand the test of the
smallest soldier of Allah on the face of the earth.”
Abū Yusuf Muhojir’s statement proved once again the basic commonality of the
Central Asian Salafi-Jihadi groups and their parent organizations – al Qaeda, the
Taliban and HTS. Uighur militants of TIP and Uzbek terrorists of KTJ and KIB ac-
cepted and reflected the view the Al-Qaeda leadership that the Covid-19 pandemic
as an “invisible soldier of Allah”, sent to weaken the enemies of Islam and punish
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the disbelievers. Thus, the coronavirus pandemic has provided an additional plat-
form and an excellent opportunity for Central Asian terrorist groups to articulate
and disseminate their violent Salafi-Jihadi ideologies.
Conclusion
In conclusion, it should be noted that the Covid-19 pandemic offers the Central
Asian Salafi-Jihadi movement and its parent organizations such as al Qaeda, the
Taliban and Hayat Tahrir al-Sham new opportunities. This study underlines that
the Salafi-Jihadi movements from across the political spectrum have been fully ex-
ploiting coronavirus opportunities.These events open up political space for jihadist
organizations to advance their operational goals and re-declare their extremist ide-
ology.
Review of their online statements in multiple languages disclosed that Central-
Asian Salafi-Jihadi groups have capitalized on the coronavirus factor for their ide-
ological purposes in three ways:
a) The Taliban are exploiting Covid-19 to once again demonstrate their advan-
tages over the Afghan government and pressure it to release their prisoners
from Afghan prisons. The Taliban aim to withdraw the United States-led for-
eign forces from Afghanistan and rebuild their Islamic Emirate. At the same
time, they want to rule the country alone, without sharing power with anyone.
Therefore, they are not sincere in conducting peace negotiations with the cur-
rent Afghan government of Ashraf Ghani, considering it to be a US puppy.
b) Central Asian militants of TIP, KIB, KTJ and IJU conducting jihad alongside
the main insurgent group in Afghanistan fully support the Taliban’s coron-
avirus ideology. They regularly report in Uzbek and Tajik on successful Taliban
attacks on the “corrupt Kabū l administration’s troops.” The Uzbek KIB’s web-
site “Galaba Shabodasi” on Telegramhas become a successful conductor of the
Taliban ideology in Central Asia.
c) Uighur jihadists of the Turkestan Islamic Party exploited Covid-19 as “di-
vine punishment” against the government of communist China for its brutal
repression against the ethnic Muslim Uighur minority. Additionally, the ex-
tremist group taps on such individuals’ sentiments, as it indirectly puts the
blame for the virus on China’s “impure” dietary practices, capitalizing on grow-
ing anti-Chinese sentiments around the world. TIP understands very well that
such derogatory nicknames as “Wuhan virus” or “China virus” raise negative
sentiments in many people. And Uighur extremists are trying to bring grist to
someone’s mill with these nicknames
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d) Uzbek jihadists of KTJ and KIB in Syria directed their “coronavirus anger”
against the “criminal regime” of Bashar al-Assad and his main “terrorist
sponsors”, Putin’s Russia and “chief Shia Shaitan (evil)” Khamenei’s Iran.” They
have widely shared the Dua (prayer) on social networks that Allah Almighty
will severely punish these three political crime regimes “for the destruction
of peaceful Sunni Muslims in Syria.” Also, Uzbek, Tajik and Kyrgyz extremists
on Telegram channel published their prayers for Covid-19 to punish Central
Asian “Taghut” (idols) states. The essence of their wishes is that the virus
helps the release of Muslims from prisons.
An analysis of the reaction of Central Asian extremist movements to Covid-19 re-
vealed that they sought to exploit the coronavirus crisis to reinforce their violent
ideologies in two ways. Firstly, at the beginning of the coronavirus pandemic, when
it spread to non-Muslim China, Western Europe and the United States, they por-
trayed the virus as “divine retribution against infidels and crusaders” for waging a
war against Islam with an ecstatic note.
Secondly, however, when the pandemic began to spread to Muslim-majority
areas, particularly those controlled by the Salafi-Jihadi groups, they put forward a
conspiracy theory about its origins, blaming theWest, Chinese and Zionist enemies
who have united against Islam.
Either way, violent Salafi-Jihadi groups claiming to fight for Islam in Central
Asia and the Middle East will continue to use the virus outbreak to recruit and
radicalize militants and justify their narratives of hate, division, and enmity. We
have already seen examples of this from al Qaeda, the Taliban, HTS and its Central
Asian subsidiaries TIP, KIB and KTJ in their coronavirus messaging.
Strategically, the Taliban andHTS increased their efforts to exploit the humani-
tarian situation created by the widespread coronavirus outbreak. Our studies have
found that both rebel groups sought to deliver governance services in their con-
trolled territories such as health and infrastructure to recruit members and build
credibility with sympathizers even in normal times.
However, after the coronavirus outbreak, they are now trying to control the ac-
tivities ofWestern international humanitarian organizations. For example, the Tal-
iban recently announced75 that all private companies and aid organizations oper-
ating in Afghanistan must register with them. Last year, the Taliban briefly banned
the International Committee of the Red Cross and the World Health Organization
from operating in the country and accused them of conducting activities against
Islam.The Afghan government said the Taliban was making desperate attempts to
assert control over government functions during the coronavirus outbreak.
75 Cf. Abdul Qadir Sediqi (2020). ‘Taliban Push to Control Private Companies, Aid Agencies in
Afghanistan.’ Reuters. July 27. See: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-afghanistan-taliban-id
USKCN24S197.
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Currently during this coronavirus outbreak, the Taliban and HTS have
increased service provision in their controlled areas, while the weak Afghan gov-
ernment and the Syrian regime of Bashar al-Assad are failing in medical, water,
and food provisions, in order to build popular support for their cause and proto-
states. Thus, both jihadist groups were able to display their pragmatic streak in
their dealings during the coronavirus pandemic and reap political dividends at the
international level. To some extent, the Taliban and HTS have managed to turn
themselves into a more proficient responder to the Covid-19 challenges than the
Afghan and Syrian governments.
The fight against this crisis has evenmore clearly revealed the authoritarian and
overly tough management style of the Taliban and HTS, which are trying to impose
a conservative form of Islamic rule in their controlled area. Both jihadi groups
are using this pandemic to portray themselves as the only military and religious-
political force in the region, caring for the health ofMuslims in “Islamic territories”.
Accordingly, Central Asian Uighur and Uzbek Salafi-Jihadi groups actively praised
the efforts of their “parent organizations” to combat Covid-19. But in parallel with
this, TIP, KTJ and KIB, at the same time, tried to adhere to the messaging of al
Qaeda on Covid-19.
In conclusion, it is clear that Covid-19 has established itself as a phenomenon
of the greatest importance that has managed to inspire Islamist extremist groups
around the globe to new goals. The post-soviet Central Asian five governments al-
ready face a tall task in responding to Covid-19, but they should remain hyper vig-
ilant of the now greater threat posed by Islamists extremist groups. After gaining
strong energy through Covid-19, violent extremism and terrorism, associated with
Salafi-Takfiri ideologies, could have huge implications and effects on the security




Image 1: Abdul Aziz Uzbeki, the amir of Katibat al Tawhid wal Jihad
Image posted by Katibat al Tawhid wal Jihad on its Telegram channel, May
25, 2019.
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Image 2: Abū Yusuf Muhojir, the amir of Katibat Imam al Bukhar
Image posted by Katibat Imam al Bukhari on its Telegram channel, February
2018.
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Image 3: Ahluddin Navqotiy, the new imam of Katibat al Tawhid wal
Jihad, during the Jummah Khutbah tells the Uzbek jihadists about the
“invisible soldiers of God”
Screenshot from the video of Katibat al Tawhid wal Jihad, March 16, 2020,
Telegram channel.
Image 4: Taliban doctors distribute masks and drugs for Covid-19
Official website of Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (2020/d). ‘Essential
awareness materials for Prevention of corona virus disease distributed in
Badghis’. March 29, 2020. See: http://alemarahenglish.net/?p=34058
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Image 5:The Turkestan Islamic Party’s Media Center “Islam Awazi” pro-
moted Covid-19 as “God’s punishment” for China
Screenshot from the video of the Turkestan Islamic Party’s Media Center
“Islam Awazi”, February 29, 2020.
Image 6: Turkestan Islamic Party believes that Coronavirus is a soldier of
God
Joscelyn, Thomas (2019). ‘Turkistan Islamic Party musters large force for
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Islamic Fundamentalism Framing Politics in Mali:
From the Middle Ages to the Age of Pandemic
Olga Torres Díaz
Abstract
This chapter aims to traverse the centuries-long path of themutualistic relationship
between political power and Islam represented by two fundamentalist tendencies
clearly discernible in Mali until today, deeming that as fundamentalist is the call
to return to an Arabised Islamic orthodoxy that cyclically reappears in the country
as the reputed syncretism of the popular Islam that is considered characteristic of
the area.
Under this assumption, revisiting certain milestones in this historical coa-
lescence could foster the comprehension of current movements – personified by
imams and preachers such as Muḥammad Dicko and Sheikh Madani Haïdara
– now that the emergence of the Wahhabi trend has begun to compete again
with the prevalent traditional Malian Islam in modulating the orientation of the
government.
 
Keywords: Islamic Fundamentalism, Category Formation, Religion and Politics,
Mali
1. Introduction
“[…] On the opposite bank of the Nile is another great kingdom, stretching a dis-
tance of more than eight days’ marching, the king of which has the title of Daw.1
The inhabitants of this region use arrows when fighting. Beyond this country lies
another called Malal, the king of which is known as al-musulmani. He is thus
1 Ancient Roman geographers such as Pliny thought that the river Niger was the western part
of the Nile, as did Arab geographers later. The true course of the Niger was not established
until the XIXth century by Westerners.
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called because his country became afflicted with drought one year following an-
other; the inhabitants prayed for rain, sacrificing cattle till they had exterminated
almost all of them, but the drought and the misery only increased. The king had
as his guest a Muslim who used to read the Quran and was acquainted with the
Sunna. To this man the king complained of the calamities that assailed him and
his people. The man said: “O King, if you believed in God (who is exalted) and
testified that He is One, and testified as to the prophetic mission of Muḥammad
(God bless him and give him peace) and if you accepted all the religious laws of
Islam, I would pray for your deliverance from your plight and that God’s mercy
would envelop all the people of your country and that your enemies and adver-
saries might envy you on that account.” Thus, he continued to press the king until
the latter accepted Islam and became a sincere Muslim. The man made him re-
cite from the Quran some easy passages and taught him religious obligations and
practices which no one may be excused from knowing. Then the Muslim made
him wait till the eve of the following Friday when he ordered him to purify him-
self by a complete ablution and clothed him in a cotton garment which he had.
The two of them came out towards a mound of earth, and there the Muslim stood
praying while the king, standing at his right side, imitated him. Thus, they prayed
for a part of the night, theMuslim reciting invocations and the king saying “Amen.”
The dawn had just started to break when God caused Abū ndant rain to descend
upon them. So, the king ordered the idols to be broken and expelled the sorcer-
ers from his country. He and his descendants after him as well as his nobles were
sincerely attached to Islam, while the common people of his kingdom remained
polytheists. Since then their rulers have been given the title of al-musulmani.”2
In the XIth century, Cordovan Abū ‘Ubayd al-Bakrī, one of the most notable histo-
rians and geographers in Muslim Spain, recorded this account of the conversion to
Islam of an early Malinke king in his Kitāb al-masālik wa’l-mamālik (Book of High-
ways and of Kingdoms).3 Al- Bakrī’s long quotation serves as a starting point and
reference for some of the fundamental axes that this chapter will address and that
constitute the essential characteristics that are still noticeable in current Malian Is-
lam. It involves establishing the seed of a Muslim millennium in Mali – the bench-
mark for the sequence to be developed until the present-day; provides a hint to one
of the seminal and still present marks of Islam in the country: its attachment to po-
litical power; as well as the assertion and tolerance of common people’s pre-Islamic
traditional beliefs and customs.
2 Nehemiah Levtzion and J. F. P. Hopkins (Eds.) (1981). Corpus of Early Arabic Sources for West
African History. Cambridge, p. 83.
3 Malinke and also Maninka, Mandinka, Mandingo or Manding. Malinke will be used in this
text unless direct quotations refer to them otherwise.
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Three centuries later, in the XIVth, illustrious Moroccan scholar and explorer
Ibn Baṭṭūṭa attested again the coalescence of power, Islam, and commoners’ en-
grained and previous customs. He witnessed the celebration of the Muslim festiv-
ities of ʻīd al-fiṭr and ʻīd al-aḍḥā in Mali during the period of Mansa Sulayman (r.
1341-1360), calling attention to their peculiarities, when not lamenting their “vile
practices”.4 The presence of the king before both Muslims and non-Muslims on oc-
casion of these celebrations exalted his support to Islamwhile preachers reinforced
the alliance between kingship and the new religion by exhorting people’s loyalty to
the ruler. Even when Islam was becoming the imperial cult, Muslim festivals had
to encompass pre-Islamic traditional rituals as observed by commoners, not all of
them converts – at this stage Islam was still a faith of ruling and trading families
– but strengthening and upholding the legitimacy of the king.
Ibn Baṭṭūṭa regarded the reciting of the poets, the nudity of young girls in pub-
lic, or dyāli renditions as the “vile practices” previously referred to.5 Having asked
about all these practices, he quotes “I have been told that this was an old custom,
which had been current among them before Islam, and they persisted in it.”6 And
also noted that although chiefs and nobility appeared to be more islamised, they
still cleaved to traditional set of mores.
A third Arab account on medieval Mali was issued by Ibn Khaldūn’s famous
work Kitāb al-ʿibar, in the late XIVth century, providing a precise list of Mali kings
until his time and emphasising who of them had performed hājj, the pilgrimage
to Mecca.7 Though brief, Ibn Khaldūn’s summary of events in West Africa men-
tions that the oppressive Soso people were subdued by the Muslim people of Mali,
acclaiming Mārī Jāṭa – King Sundiata Keïta, who will be referred to in the next
section – as a great leader.
Al-Bakrī’s excerpt quoted at the beginning accounted not only the assumption
of Islam as an official cult in what would be the germ of the Mali empire but, and
very explicitly stated – “He and his descendants after him as well as his nobles were
sincerely attached to Islam, while the common people of his kingdom remained
polytheists”8 – the inaugural moment of a characteristic phenomenon of religiosity
4 ʻīd al-fiṭr marks the end of the fasting month of Ramadan. ʻīd al-aḍḥā commemorates Abra-
ham’s (Ibrahim) sacrifice. Both are celebrated worldwide by Muslims,ʻīd al-aḍḥā the holiest
one.
5 Ibn Baṭṭūṭa’s dyāli (sing. dyulā), poets, refer to the later so-called griots, hereditary lineages
of bards and historians in West Africa. They have preserved genealogies, oral traditions and
historical accounts, while also composing laudatory songs.
6 Cited from Ibn Baṭṭūṭa: Tuḥfat al-nuẓẓār fī gharāʼib al-amṣār wa-ʻajāʼib al-asfār.In Charles De-
fremery and Beniamino Sanguinetti (Eds.). Paris 1922, p. 414.
7 Cited from Ibn Khaldūn: Kitāb Tārīkh al-Duwal al-Islāmiyya bil-Maghrib min Kitāb al-‘ibar. In
William De Slane (Ed.). Paris 1847, pp. 264-268.
8 Levtzion and Hopkins, 1981, p. 83.
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in the area: the distinction between the imported and the purely local beliefs of the
country.The fact that with the passing of the centuries they have amalgamated to a
certain extent, alternating between periods of peaceful cohabitation and others of
open confrontation, has not concealed a basic distinction between what is foreign
and what is indigenous, what is revolutionary – in the sense of bringing a major
change – and what is traditional.
Both tendencies have vindicated their differences and the validity of their es-
sential values, although both could be categorised, in my opinion, into a broad
conception of religious fundamentalism if we attend to the various definitions of
fundamentalism. Because the meaning of fundamental is an essential notion here,
and also pivotal in the orientation of this article, it must be taken in four of its
senses: ‘primary’, thus serving as an original or generating source; ‘radical’, relating
to essential structure; ‘deep-rooted’, belonging to innate or ingrained characteris-
tics; and, finally, adhering to fundamentalism, that is, the strict and literal cleaving
to a set of basic principles.
Following these senses, as fundamentalist is the call to Arabised Islamic ortho-
doxy that cyclically reappears in Mali as the assumed syncretism of the popular
Islam – the Islam Noir that was so dear to and coined by French colonialism, which
affiliated to Sufi orders and pre-Islamic beliefs and rituals – that is considered
characteristic of the area.9 One is a textual and Arabic fundamentalism while the
other is an oral and vernacular fundamentalism, but both remain attached to what
is settled as original and essential in their respective realms. One has been associ-
ated, historically as at present, to educated and Arabised minority elites; the other
to the less favoured majority of common people. One continues to denounce today
the same “vile practices” that had already scandalized Ibn Baṭṭūṭa; the other high-
lights the “ill intentions” of those who cross the bounds of the purely religious to
reach out to social, political and economic control.
Al-Bakrī’s, Ibn Baṭṭūṭa’s, and Ibn Khaldūn’smedieval accounts already disclosed
stalwart survivance of traditional beliefs and customs beneath the layers of Islam
whilst presenting the origins of the mutualistic relationship that political power
and religious authority have held until today in Mali. Therefore, revisiting certain
milestones in this historical path seems adequate and useful to present examples
of interaction – alternating periods of fluency/adherence and tension/defiance –
between Malian empires and political entities, and the manifold manifestations
9 A purportedly corrupt form of Islam as a result of blending traditional African beliefs with
the “real Islam” from North Africa and the Middle East, and a much-contested notion among
scholars within the area. Cf. VincentMonteil (1964). L’IslamNoir. Paris. ; Amadou Bâ (1972). As-
pects De La Civilisation Africaine (Personne, Culture, Religion). Paris. ; Mafakha Touré (1990-1991).
Critique historique d’un concept : l’islam noir. Mémoire de maîtrise, Université Cheikh Anta Diop. Da-
kar.
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of Islam for centuries. Neglecting these factual precedents undeniably hampers
the comprehension of current movements – represented by imams and preachers
such as Muḥammad Dicko and Sheikh Madani Haïdara – when the emergence of
the Wahhabi/Salafi tendencies began to compete again with the prevalent tradi-
tional Malian Islam in modulating the orientation of the government, as well as
of society itself, in matters as relevant as the role of women, the jihadist threat or,
very recently, the response to the challenges of the Covid-19 pandemic.
2. Two visions of Islam and power in the Malian empires of the Middle
Ages: Al-Hājj Salīm Suwārī and Abd al-Karīm al-Maghīlī, Mansa Mūsā
and Askia al-Hājj Muhammad.
The late XIIth century witnessed the collapse of the formerly powerful Ghana
Empire, fragmented into smaller and competing states, among which the Kaniaga
kingdom of the Soso people led by Sumanguru Kanté was prominent. Malinke
prince Sundiata Keïta confronted and defeated him in the Battle of Kirina (c.
1230/1235), in the Kulikoro region, after having reunited a sort of coalition of
several other kingdoms. Date, battle, and Sundiata Keïta himself are altogether
generally accepted as the origin of the Mali Empire, because this initial coalition
evolved into a federation of Malinke clans (also including Soninke, Fula, and Song-
hai groups) under his sole rule. In 1236 the emerging empire was consolidated by
enacting what is considered one of the first constitutions in history: the Manden
Charter, or Kurukan Fuga after the toponym, near present-day Kangaba, where
according to oral tradition of griots or djelis (Ibn Baṭṭūṭa’s dyulā in Arabic) it was
presented.
Preserved and transmitted by this oral tradition for centuries and by several
Malinke peoples in the area, it was almost lost and forgotten until compilation ef-
forts were made during a meeting of griots in Guinea in 1998. The Manden Charter
– inscribed in 2009 on the Representative List of the Intangible Cultural Heritage
of Humanity kept by UNESCO – was finally fixed to include 44 articles divided
into four sections: social organisation, goods, safeguard of nature, and final provi-
sions.10 Subsumed in the first section, article 3 is especially relevant for the subse-
quent development of politics in Mali until today and, therefore, for the purpose of
10 Cf. UNESCO (2009). Representative List of the Intangible Cultural Heritage of Humanity. TheMan-
den Charter.; cf. Clyde Ledbetter (2016). Human Rights Studies as a Sub-Field of Africology.
In Molefi Asante and Clyde Ledbetter (Eds.). Contemporary Critical Thought in Africology and
Africana Studies. Lanham, p. 141.; cf. Centre d’Études Linguistiques et Historiques par la Tra-
dition Orale (CELHTO) (2008). La Charte de Kurukan Fuga. Aux sources d’une pensée politique en
Afrique. Paris.
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this essay: “The five clans ofmarabouts are our teachers and our educators in Islam.
Everyone has to hold them in respect and consideration.”11
The original Manding mori kanda lolou (literally, the five marabouts protectors of
the Malinke) belonged to the Touré, Diané, Koma, Cissé, and Béréte clans12 and in-
augurated the close relationship between Muslim scholars and preachers – sanc-
tioned by the constitutional foundation of the empire – and political power rep-
resented by the Keïta clan. Nominated by article 8 “as the reigning family upon
the empire”, the Keïtas always claimed descent of Bilali Bunama from Mecca and,
according to Levitzon, they “may refer to Bilāl ibn Rabāḥ, the first companion of
the Prophet and the first mu’adhdhin (the man who calls for the prayer) in Islam.”13
West African dynasties traditionally traced their ancestors back to Muslim hagiog-
raphy and usually connected to white figures, while, in the case of the Keïtas, it
was a black one, as to emphasise its differentiation and specificity among them.
Though nominally Muslim, Sundiata and his immediate successors in the dynasty
were supported by a non-Muslim population through his fulfilment of traditional
pre-Islamic religious functions associated with rulers in the area. However, their
Islamic attachment and knowledge was founded on the advice of the above-men-
tioned marabouts and, therefore, mediated and influenced by the localisms of the
area as well as lacking direct contact with the fundamental sources. This situa-
tion would experience a significant milestone at the beginning of the XIVthcentury
that resulted in the consolidation of the empire and its Islamic outlines, as well as
placed it, both figuratively and literally, on the map of the world at the time. Mūsā
I of Mali (r. ca. 1312-1332), known as Kankan Mūsā or Mansa Mūsā, set forth from
Niani, the imperial capital, in 1324 on his two-years pilgrimage to Mecca, astonish-
ing the world with his piety and riches and making the king and kingdom of Mali
known from Arabia to Europe.
This fame was vividly sketched in 1375 when the Majorcan Jewish cartographer
Abraham Cresques drew in his Catalan Atlas – considered the most detailed repre-
sentation of the world as it was known at that time – the realms of the empire and
11 Marabouts are, still now, the holders of the knowledge of the Qur’an and are responsible for
being educators andmasters in the teaching of the new religion which was Islam. Often con-
sidered holymen andmystics, they were pivotal as preachers calling for the formation of Sufi
fraternities in Northern and Western Africa, as will be seen later.
12 Following Robert Pageard (1961). Soundiata Keïta et la tradition orale : A propos du livre
de Djibril Tamsir NIANE : Soundjata ou l'Epopée Mandingue, Présence Africaine 36, 63. They
would be the clans maraboutiques Bérété, Ture, Fofana, Cissé-Haidara and Saganogo follow-
ing Andreas Massing (2012). Imams of Gonja. The Kamaghate and the Transmission of Islam
to the Volta Basin. Cahiers d’Études africaines 51, 57-101.
13 Nehemiah Levitzon (1980). Ancient Ghana and Mali. New York, p. 55. Also, cf. David Conrad
(1985). Islam in the Oral Traditions of Mali: Bilali and Surakata. Journal of African History 26,
33-49.
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its powerful ruler.14 Cresques depicted Mansa Mūsā seated on a throne, holding an
orb and a sceptre, and wearing a crown, all of them of gold. The king is outwardly
black, a fact emphasised by the evident white Tuareg merchant he is receiving and
also mentioned in the legend in Catalan above his left shoulder: “Aquest senyor negre
es appellat Musse Melly, senyor dels negres de Gineva. Aquest rey es lo pus riche e’l pus noble
senyor de tota esta partida per l’abondancia de l’or, lo quai se recull en la suua terra” (This
black lord is calledMusseMelly, lord of the blacks of Guinea.This king is the richest
and most noble lord of all this region because of the Abū ndance of gold which is
gathered in his land).
Image 1: Abraham Cresques. Atlas de cartes marines
Abraham Cresques (1375) Atlas de cartes marines, dit [Atlas Catalan]. The
image inserted is the lower part of the fifth and sixth sections. URL: https://
gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/btv1b55002481n.image
The return of Mansa Mūsā from Mecca and his contact with the original
sources, resulted in a determined impulse in the Islamisation of the state as
the ruler brought with him scholars, bureaucrats, and architects who defined
the political and even aesthetic contours of the empire. Among them was the
Granada poet and architect Abū Isḥāq al-Sāḥilī, who is credited with building the
Djinguereber, or Great Mosque, and the Sankoré mosque, which made Timbuktu
a centre for the teaching of Qur’anic exegesis or tafsīr together with other religious
sciences.15 However, Mansa Mūsā concentrated more in upraising scholarship and
14 Abraham Cresques (1375). Atlas de cartes marines, dit [Atlas Catalan], BnF. The image inserted
is the lower part of the fifth and sixth sections. See: https://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/btv1b550
02481n.image
15 John Hunwick (1990). An Andalusian in Mali. A contribution to the biography of Abū Isḥāq
al-Sāḥilī, c. 1290-1346. Paideuma 36, 59-66.
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creating a bustling academic corps that could help the spread of Islam than in
enforcing it for non-Muslims or obliterating syncretism.
This stance would conform with one of the oldest and most widespread trends
of Islam in theMiddle Ages in the area: the tolerant and respectful school of thought
founded by al-Ḥājj Salīm Suwārī, a Muslim scholar and ideologue born in Massina,
Mali.16 Suwārī advocated that according to the purest principles of Islam unbelief
was the fruit of ignorance and that, as a result of God’s will, somewould remain un-
aware of it longer than others. His quietist and peaceful elaboration refused pros-
elytism and “represent a scrupulous disavowal of political and military coercion
in religious matters and the repudiation of secular political office for professional
cleric”.17 Furthermore, Suwārī’s prescriptions exhorted Muslims to set an example
to non-believers following a way of life according with the Sunna that would at-
tract them to Islam.18 His Mālikī school foundations also fostered trade between
Muslims and non-Muslims and therefore supported the extensive social and com-
mercial interfaith activity that the empire held in the area and that Mansa Mūsā
epitomises.19 But this religious and political approach concerning non-believers
was soon to be defied and substituted by the first of many irruptions of orthodoxy
in both realms, with the new trend represented by ʻAbd al-Karīm al-Maghīlī and
king Askia Muḥammad, after the collapse of the Mali empire following civil wars
and the rise of the Songhay’s in the 1460s.
Originating as a small kingdom on the eastern side of the curve of the river
Niger c. 1000, it expanded significantly during Sunni ‘Alī’s reign (c. 1464-1492) con-
quering principal Mali empire trading and cultural cities. In 1468 Muslim leaders
of Timbuktu requested his assistance in forcing out the Tuaregs, who had seized
it when Mali rulers’ control weakened. He accomplished this enterprise, but only
to immediately sack Timbuktu and annihilate many of its inhabitants, a fact that
would validate his cruel reputation as stated by al-Sa‘di’s account Tārīkh al-Sūdān:
“[…] he was a tyrant, a miscreant, an aggressor, a despot (mutasalliṭ), and a butcher
who killed so many human beings that only God Most High could count them. He
tyrannized the scholars and holymen (sic), killing them, insulting them, and hu-
16 Dates of his lifespan have not been fixed and vary between late XIIIthand late XVthcenturies.
17 Lamin Sanneh (1997). The Crown and the Turban: Muslims andWest African Pluralism. New York,
p. 37.
18 IvorWilks (2000). The Juula and the Expansion of Islam into the Forest. InNehemiah Levitzon
and Randall Pouwels (Eds.). The History of Islam in Africa. Oxford, p. 98.
19 On the concept of darūrā in Mālikī legal school regarding trade, cf. Armando Torres Fauaz
(2006). Hacia el Dar al-Harb: Perspectiva legal-histórica de la emigración musulmana. In Zi-
dane Zéraoui and Roberto Marín Guzmán (Eds.). Árabes y Musulmanes en Europa. Historia y
procesos migratorios. San José, p. 193.
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miliating them.”20 His detachment from religious questions and Muslim scholars
or advisors was stressed centuries after as well by Triminghan:
“Ali had no use for Islam, the religion of urban communities. Its learned men con-
stituted a state within a state and were critical of rulers for lukewarmness in Islam
and indulgence in pagan rites. Confident in his own power, ‘Ali did not need their
support and refused to compromise with a religion which involved paying alle-
giance to a law higher than himself.”21
A resolute and directly connected response to Sunni ‘Alī’s policies concerning reli-
gious matters would appear shortly after with his successor Askia Muḥammad (r.
ca. 1492-1529), who also embodied a reaction to what could be called the Suwārī-
Mūsā’s political and religious binomial even if not coetaneous. Askia Muḥammad
became emperor of Songhay when he challenged the authority of ‘Alī’s son, Abū
Bakr or Bakari, after having compelled him to embrace Islam, which he refused.
A convinced Muslim, the new emperor was invested khalīfa (deputy) by the sharīf
of Mecca, Ḥusnī Mawlāya al-‘Abbas, during his pilgrimage between 1496 and 1498,
as accounted by both Tārīkh al-Fattāsh and Tārīkh al-Sūdān (known together as the
Timbuktu Chronicles and written in the XVIIth century).22 Also, replacing Sunni
‘Ali’s lineage and legitimate ruling was considered in both accounts the result of
confronting Askia’s true Islam with the indulgent beliefs attributed to Sunni ‘Ali, a
notion recovered by Triaud’s reference to the accession of Askia Muḥammad as “the
triumph of the Muslim party”.23 Askia himself attributed pagan practices to Sunni
‘Ali, linking them to his mother’s origins, in his discussions with ʻAbd al-Karīm al-
Maghīlī, his fundamental and fundamentalist counsellor and the one responsible
for many of his endeavours.24
Al-Maghīlī personifies the first attempt to redirect what he held as the degra-
dation and defilement of pure Islam as a result of former tolerance and acquies-
cence to pre-Islamic local customs, consequently opposing both Suwārī’s doctrine
and precedent rulers’ governance. He was neither a Malian, nor a black nor an in-
digenous language speaker, but a white Berber scholar and Arabic speaker from
Tlemcen in present-day Algeria, and thus, an outlander in all senses. His radical
and controversial views had already been considered undesirable in Tuat, a region
in central Algeria where he called for the destruction of synagogues and exhorted
20 JohnHunwick (2003). Timbuktu& the Songhay Empire. Al-Sa‘di’s Tārīkh al-sūdān down to 1613 and
other Contemporary Documents. Leiden, p. 91.
21 John Triminghan (1962). A History of Islam inWest Africa. London, p. 94.
22 Cf. Omer El-Nagar (1969).West Africa and theMuslim Pilgrimage: AnHistorical Studywith Special
Reference to the Nineteenth Century. PhD Thesis, SOAS. London, p. 9.
23 Jean-Louis Triaud (1973). Islam et sociétés soudanaises au Moyen Age. Paris, p. 155.
24 John Hunwick (1985/1). Sharīʻa in Songhay: the replies of al-Maghīlī to the questions of Askia
al-Ḥājj Muḥammad. Studia Islamica 61, 163-171.
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to the strict segregation of non-believers, causing a social discontent that forced
him to leave, and in Fez, Morocco, where Islamic jurists made the sultan send him
into exile.25 Fleeing to the south, he finally arrived in the Songhay empire, where
he found a haven and fertile ground for his doctrines in Askia’s court, a comfort-
ing environment for the elaboration of his religious reformism around the idea
of the mujaddid or renovator of Islam. Together with the emperor, he campaigned
against syncretism, innovation and former practices associated with animism, in-
troducing the innovative argument that waging jihād – a notion that has not been
implemented before in Mali – against those labelled as unbelievers was not only le-
gitimate but obligatory to Muslims. This lawful and corrective jihād was sustained
in three basic differences with Sunni stances: “[…] al-Maghīlī’s doctrine of takfir
which declares fellow Muslims as ‘unbelievers’ on account of their deeds; his sanc-
tion of fighting and killing other Muslims as jihad; and his legitimization of jihad
against Muslim rulers because of ‘oppression’”.26
The already cited work compiling his replies to the questions of Askia Muḥam-
mad and his most influential treatise – Tāj ad-dīn fīmā yajibu ‘alā al-mulūk (The
Crown of Religion Concerning the Obligation of Kings) – exerted an essential in-
fluence not only on the political,military, and religious procedures at that time, but
on all following “movements of Islamic renovation in the XIXth century.”27 Move-
ments that constitute a second milestone on the historical path of this article and
that, perhaps paradoxically if attending to the general attribution of quietism to
their doctrine, were led by Sufis in all of West Africa.
3. The paradox of ‘quietists in motion’? From the Dina of Massina
and the Tukulor empire to the French colonisation
In the following centuries, the territorial and political homogeneity achieved by
the Songhai empire would turn into the mosaic of diverse spheres – geographical,
ethnic, and religious constructions intertwined or overlapped – that is still percep-
tible today. Different ethnic groups and diverse interpretations of Islam began to
settle in well-defined areas with a smattering of denominations and names tak-
ing centre stage and whose influence would undoubtedly shape the future of the
country. Tuaregs, Bambaras, Fulanis; Qādiriyya and Tijāniyya Sufi orders (ṭarīqa, pl.
ṭarīqāt-ṭuruq); Seku Amadu and al-Ḥājj ‘Umar Tal; Massina, Ségou, or Kaarta began
25 JohnHunwick (1985/2). Al-Maghīlī and the Jews of Tuwāt. The Demise of a Community. Studia
Islamica 61, 155-183.
26 John Azumah (2014). The Legacy of Arab-Islam in Africa. A Quest for Inter-religious Dialogue. Lon-
don, p. 123.
27 Habeeb Akande (2014). Eclairer l’Obscurité. Les Noirs et Les Nord-Africains selon L’Islam. London,
p. 121.
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to acquire specific profiles and to leave an indelible mark on the configuration of
what would finally be Mali.
By the end of the XVIthcentury, a Moroccan army crossed the Sahara, de-
feated the Songhai empire, dismantled its hegemony, and exiled or executed
Islamic scholars – who were perceived as a political threat – in Gao, Djenne,
and Timbuktu, the latter becoming the capital of the new arrived Pashas.28 In
1737, Moroccan Pashas were substituted by the Tuaregs, also coming from the
north, who imposed their control on the curve of the river Niger and also made of
Timbuktu the symbolic representation of their prevalence.
In the early XVIIthcentury, two new powerful and native Bambara kingdoms
emerged: one around Ségou, between the rivers Senegal and Niger; the other
around Kaarta, in the middle of Niger. The Bambaras had been part of the Mali
empire but, as they had firmly resisted Islam, dissociated from Mansa Mūsā
searching for a safe haven for their traditional animist religion and named them-
selves Bannama (those who refused submission). Kaarta would fall in 1854 and
Ségou in 1862, both conquered by the Tukulor empire of al-Ḥājj ‘Umar Tal, com-
mitted to his jihād against unbelief, which he also decidedly conducted towards
the Muslim Fulanis, thus providing the first African example of a state being
dismantled by coreligionists sharing the same culture.29
The Fulanis, who had originally come from Futa Toro, in Senegal, to establish
themselves at Massina, in theMopti region, had also revolted against the Bambaras
in 1818. Despite being a minority ethnic group, the Fulanis, under the leadership
of Seku Amadu, expanded from south to north at the expense of the Bambaras
– whose anti-Muslim warlords resisted the occupation for around forty years –
founding the Qādiriyya oriented Dina of Massina before being obliterated by al-
Ḥājj ‘Umar Tal, the most prominent propagator of the Tijāniyya order in Mali, in
1862 as well.
The Dina of Massina-Qādiriyya and Tukulor empire-Tijāniyya binomials not
only defined the XIXth century in Mali but clearly conformed some of the im-
prints that, together with Tuaregs, Bambaras, colonialism and the last arrival of
Wahhabism, have been conditioning the events in the country for the last decades.
Therefore, a brief recapitulation on these two movements and Islamic states could
certainly be of help for a more accurate understanding of current dynamics.
Though Sufism– a quietist andmystical Islamic belief and practice with several
stages of growth led by a spiritual guide, whose adherents usually group in frater-
nal orders or ṭarīqāt – had begun to spread in the area around the XVthcentury, “this
28 For Islamic scholars and Timbuktu through History, cf. Elias Saad (2010). Social history of Tim-
buktu: the role of Muslim scholars and notables 1400-1900. Cambridge.
29 For the sequence and impact of this process, cf. Nehemiah Levitzon (1994). Islam inWestAfrica:
Religion, Society and Politics to 1800. London.
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Sufism was only the fact of individuals, did not carry a brotherhood etiquette and
did not unfold substantially.”30 During the following two centuries, several accounts
written in Arabic referred to certain figures in the area as “saints” and “sages” using
purely Sufi terms and attributes. A distinct example can be found in famous al-
Saʻadi’s Tārīkh al-Sūdān when, describing an imam in Timbuktu, he utilises words
imbued with mysticism such as: quṭb kāmil (the perfect man that has reached the
highest degree of the path), ʻārif (the knower of God, who has been given Divine
Knowledge), mukāshafāt (spiritual disclosures), or abdāl (the changed ones within
Sufi hierarchy).31 However, Triaud maintains that there is no reliable source con-
firming organised Sufi structures before the XVIIIthcentury in West Africa, as he
also refuses the rampant simplification – so widely propagated – of an Islam Noir
purportedly attached to these brotherhoods.32
The XIXth century witnessed the vigorous flourishing of Sufism inWest Africa,
but with a noteworthy characteristic that differentiated it from the slow spread of
Islam itself in the area: although it was at first a minority and elite current, it soon
reached all layers of society and contributed undeniably to the Islamisation of the
area. This success has been explained by the convergence between Sufism and the
ancestral religion in many of their features: the isolation for ritual activities, ad-
herents funding these activities and people in need, a discernible guide or master
and a hierarchy, the passing from one stage to the next, the ritual ceremonies in-
cluding music and dance, etc. These confluences would have fascinated the Malian
population, paving the way to a more natural assumption of Sufism, which did not
discredit previous customs and rituals as regular Islam had done since its arrival.33
In the first decades of the XIXthcentury, Fulani Muslim leader Seku Amadu em-
braced the Qādiriyya principles that would have been introduced in Mali by Askia
Muḥammad’s counselor al-Maghīlī.34 Seku’s ṭarīqa is credited to be the first one es-
tablished in Mali and was undoubtedly influenced by al-Maghīlī’s extremist views
concerning jihād, as well as, and very remarkably too, by his spiritual and politi-
cal master Usmān Dan Fodio, highest Qādiriyya authority in neighbouring Nigeria
and the artificer of the triumphant Sokoto Caliphate, the glorious example of an
Islamic state to be emulated.35 Seku Amadu’s efforts towards the creation of his
30 HamadouBoly (2013). Le soufisme auMali duXIXème siècle à nos jours : religion, politique et société.
Strasbourg, p. 36.
31 ‘Abd al-Raḥmān Al-Saʻadi’ (1964). Tārīkh al-Sūdān. Paris, pp. 20-23.
32 Cf. Triaud, Jean-Louis (1996). L’Afrique occidentale et centrale. In Alexander Popovic and Gille
Veinstein (Eds.). Les voies d’Allah. Les ordres mystiques dans le monde musulman des origines à au-
jourd’hui. Paris, p. 418.
33 Boly, 2013, pp. 41-43.
34 Cf. Alphonse Gouilly (1952). L’Islam dans l’Afrique Occidentale Française. Paris, p. 12.
35 Cf. Seyni Moumouni (2008). Vie et œuvre du Cheik Uthmân Dan Fodio, 1754-1817 : de l’Islam au
soufisme. Paris.
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own Islamic state were endorsed by Dan Fodio, even confirming the legitimacy of
his holy war against disbelievers – other Fulani and Bambara chiefs he considered
pagans. The Dina of Massina (in Fulbe, dina means ‘religion’, from the Arabic dīn:
religion, custom and judgment), as he named his state, expanded from its origi-
nal location in Massina to reach Djenné – where he destroyed the great mosque
claiming it offended pure Islamic views – and Timbuktu in the north. Founded
in 1818, with Hamdallahi as the new capital, this Fulani empire and theocratic
state – where Sharīʻawas enforced and applied severely – left an indelible mark on
the social imaginary by establishing governmental institutions, nationalising the
economy, and forcing the sedentarisation of the nomadic herders. A Great Council
composed of forty marabouts was responsible for executive and legislative power,
supervising all measures and procedures were in accordance with Islamic law. In
addition to the administrative and legal support of themarabouts, Seku Amadu was
also backed by the most prominent ‘ulamā’ – the learned of Islam, those versed in
the Muslim sciences – of the Qādiriyya order in the region. Marabouts and ‘ulamā’
therefore became the two essential pillars that supported the legitimacy of his en-
deavour and that, at the same time and perhaps not unintentionally, connected it
with the ‘fundamental’ currents rooted in the people.
As time passed, however, rigorism and intolerance towards non-Muslims ended
up irritating even certain of this ‘ulamā’, who reminded Seku Amadu that tolerance
and peace were the main features of Sufism in general and Qādiriyya in partic-
ular. Among these scholars, spiritual leader al-Bakkay for instance urged him to
maintain good relations with non-Muslim Bambaras and stop addressing letters
with rigorous measures and interpretations of the law.36 In any case, religious rig-
orism and bigotry, mainly focused on fighting pagan Bambaras, should not ob-
scure the Dina of Massina’s undeniable merits during the Seku Amadu period: an
utterly structured state with egalitarian connotations, social protection systems,
and a robust economy. All these achievements were obliterated in 1862 when Tuku-
lor military leader and Tijāniyya adept al-Ḥājj ‘Umar Tal directed his jihād against
Massina.37
‘Umar Tal was initiated into the Tijāniyya in his native Futa Toro in Senegal and
later travelled toMecca, where he studied for three years and was appointed deputy
of the order in the Bilād al-Sudān with the command of “sweeping the countries”.38
Despite his efforts when he returned to Senegal, he failed in seizing animist realms
in his homeland, thereupon successfully transferring the attempts and adepts of his
Tukulor empire towards the Bambara kingdoms of Kaarta and Ségou between 1852
36 Cf. Amadou Bâ and Jaques Daget (1995). L’Empire peul du Macina (1818-1853). Paris, p. 277.
37 For this episode, cf. David Robinson (1985). The HolyWar of Umar Tall. TheWestern Sudan in the
Mid-Nineteenth Century. Oxford.
38 Bâ and Daget, 1995, p. 239.
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and 1861. Until the conquering of ‘pagan’ Ségou, ‘Umar Tal’s movements seemed to
be congruous with the notion of an alleged licit jihād against non-believers, but this
lawfulness would undoubtedly be questioned by his following step: the destruction
of the Dina of Massina, a Fulani Muslim state also impregnated by Sufism.Though
the episode remains obscure, this fratricide and incomprehensible war has been
given manifold explanations usually stressing personal rivalry and religious rea-
sons. Personal rivalry is still today remembered in traditional accounts in Senegal
and Mali, although very differently: while in his homeland his figure encompasses
a lionhearted aura, Malians recall him as a sanguinary invader, covetous of the
flourishing and independent Massina.39 Religious reasons would link the different
mystical allegiance, andMassina’s resistance to adhere to Tijāniyya, with ‘Umar Tal’s
justification “in looking down on them as well as even attacking Hamdallahi”.40
The Tukulor empire was unquestionably characterised by theocracy and ‘Umar
Tal’s conviction of being divinely guided in his primary mission: the complete Is-
lamisation of the area, banishing all remaining traces of unorthodoxy as under-
stood by the Tijāniyya. But a third and relevant cause has also been pointed out
when accentuating the strictly political causes of this new example of ‘quietism in
motion’. Sanankoua remarks that it was ‘Umar Tal’s broad vision and conscious-
ness – in opposition to the more secluded and encapsulated vision of the Dina of
Massina – of the danger of French colonial progress from the coast that led his aim
to build a vast and viable conglomerate suitable to resist European pressure.41 He
was certainly aware of this menace after having been compelled to sign a covenant
with General Louis Faidherber, governor of French Senegal, recognising the river
Senegal as the boundary between his empire and this French territory. ‘Umar Tal’s
fears of French expansion were not unfounded and the Tukulor empire fell about
thirty years after his death, as the colonial power viewed it as the main obstacle
to its accession to the Niger valley.42 Beginning in 1883 with a series of military
campaigns that would lead to the capture of Bamako, Ségou was conquered in 1893
and Timbuktu in 1894. By the end of the century, French Sudan became part of
French West Africa – Afrique Occidentale Française (AOF) – a federation of terri-
tories that also included present-day Senegal, Mauritania, Guinea, Benin, Niger,
Côte d’Ivoire, and Burkina Faso.
39 Cf. Olga Torres Díaz (2020). Islamism andWomen in the Sahel: Roots and Evolutions. In Klaus
Hock andNina Käsehage (Eds.). ‘Militant Islam’ vs. ‘IslamicMilitancy’? Religion,Violence, Category
Formation and Applied Research. Contested Fields in the Discourse of Scholarship. Zürich, p. 202.
40 Patrick Ryan (2000). The Mystical Theology of Tijānī Sufism and Its Social Significance in
West Africa. Journal of Religion in Africa 30, Nº 2, 216.
41 Cf. Bintou Sanankoua (1990). Un empire peul au XIXe siècle : la Diina du Maasina. Paris.
42 Cf. Yves Saint-Martin (1967). L’Empire toucouleur et la France. Un demi-siècle de relations diploma-
tiques (1846-1893). Dakar.
Islamic Fundamentalism Framing Politics in Mali: From the Middle Ages to the Age of Pandemic 163
French colonial irruption in the area implied not only a territorial invasion, but
the encounter with an absolute otherness and the appearance of a new actor who
would join pre-existing ones. And if colonial power always involved, in one way or
another, the domination of a physical space, the appropriation of its resources, and
the influence over the local people’s mentality, in the case of France the concept of
mission civilisatrice had to be added to all the rest.43 This notion would connote
the essence of French achievements, including secular republican values and the
fervour for modernising and casting out the evils of ignorance and superstitions
in the rural areas of metropolitan France as well as in its colonies. Secularism and
the eradication of superstitions constituted two of the main features of France’s
impact in all of West Africa, challenging the popular understanding of both tradi-
tional political exercise and customary beliefs.Therefore, fearing a revivification of
these traditional movements in the area, the French determinedly contended with
concealing any missionary or armed initiative during their colonial dominion, and
even more so with any intrusion of religion in the political realm.
Unquestionably, sixty-seven years of French colonial presence enacting secular
republican values constituted a decisive turn in the restructuring of the hitherto
intimate blending of political power and religious influence. Whether to adhere
to or to challenge this change of events, local and previous actors could not avoid
being impacted and taking a stance regarding the new reality. French law on the
separation of church and state in 1905 immediately reached the African colonies,
also introducing a new dichotomy to tack on the pre-existing ones: religious actors
cooperating with colonial power – after the creation of the Service des affaires musul-
manes – or rejecting any form of interference. The Muslim Affairs Service exerted
close control over, for instance, issues concerning the fasting month of Ramadan
or the organisation of the yearly pilgrimage to Mecca. However, managing this
second question with the intention of gaining popularity among the Muslim com-
munity had an unexpected collateral effect in the years to come: together with a
rapid spread of Islam among those who had traditionally not been Muslims, the
strengthening of Wahhabi reformism – represented by the ahl al-Sunnamovement
– trends in response to Sufi ‘whimsicalness’.44
43 Cf. Alice Conklin (1997). A Mission to Civilize. The Republican Idea of Empire in France and West
Africa, 1895-1930. Stanford.
44 For these questions, cf. Carsten Hock (1960). Fliegen die Seelen der Heiligen: Muslimische Reform
und staatliche Autorität in der Republik Mali seit 1960. Berlin; cf. Julia Leininger (2013). Religiöse
Akteure in Demokratisierungsprozessen. Konstruktiv, destruktiv und obstruktiv.Wiesbaden.
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4. XXth – XXIst centuries. From Independence to the Age of Pandemic
WhereasWahhabi ideas had been introduced in the country by the 1920s, it was af-
ter independence that their adherents began to compete with marabouts for close-
ness to the new post-colonial nationalist governments. Wahhabi’s main focus was
to reform education, to spread the teaching of Arabic, and, on the whole, to return
to an orthopraxy of Islam strictly rooted in the Qur’an and the Sunna.
Concurrently, another phenomenon that had also begun under the colonial
domination and that would become crucial in the future of the country finally
bourgeoned: the popularisation of Muslim preachers’ public sermons outside the
mosques, addressing Muslims and non-Muslims, that “[…] became one of the prin-
cipal means for facilitating the spread of Islam and for the standardization of Is-
lamic practice, with implications for public piety in Mali.”45
Modibo Keïta, first president of independent Mali, was also the first modern
ruler to be compelled to juggle his Muslim origin with his secularist political con-
victions, as well as to deal with the emergent trends represented by both Wahhabis
and Muslim preachers. Born at the beginning of the XXthcentury in by then French
Sudan, he was the co-founder of the socialist inclined Sudanese Union (US) party
in 1945, later merging with the anticolonial African Democratic Rally (RDA) to form
the US-RDA. Under this coalition, he first had a seat in the territorial assembly in
1948 and later was a deputy in the French National Assembly from 1956 to 1958.
Claiming Sudan’s autonomy within the French Community and aiming to create
a West African federation – that solely resulted in an ephemeral Mali Federation
that he presided over, composed of Senegal and Sudan in 1959 – Keïta’s party finally
proclaimed the independent Republic of Mali in 1960.
Keïta’s ruling was based on Marxist ideology, which, together with his French
education in the principles of laïcité, resulted in an official discourse pushing Is-
lam aside by stating that religion was a private issue and banning Islamic associ-
ations.46 Many of these associations originated after the arrival of returnees from
Saudi Arabia after graduating from their religious institutions and often took the
form of Islamic nongovernmental organisations providing finance for schools and
grants for different projects, as well as distributing Salafi oriented literature.47
As in many other countries in the area, post-colonial governments in Mali were
characterised by instability and the periodic intrusion of the military seizing con-
45 Benjamin Soares (2004). Islam and public piety in Mali. In Armando Salvatore and Dale Eick-
elman (Eds.). Public Islam and the common good. Leiden, p. 210.
46 For Keïta’s ideological discourse, cf. Francis Snyder (1967). The Political Thought of Modibo
Keita. Journal of Modern African Studies 5, Nº 1, 79-106.
47 Cf. John Hunwick (1997). Sub-Saharan Africa and the Wider World of Islam: Historical and
Contemporary Perspectives. In DavidWesterlund and Eva Evers Rosander (Eds.). African Islam
and Islam in Africa: Encounters between Sufis and Islamists. London, pp. 28-54.
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trol after coup d’états. In Mali, the sequence included Keïta being deposed by Lt.
Moussa Traoré in a military coup in 1968, also deposed by Col. Amadou Toumani
Touré in 1991, followed by an interim rule to develop a democratic state, which fi-
nally led to a new constitution and the first democratic multiparty elections won
by Alpha Oumar Konaré in 1992. Democratic elections, even when customarily sur-
rounded in the country by recurrent accusations of fraud, also led Amadou Toumari
Touré again to the presidency between 2002 and 2012, when his inability to deal
with the Tuareg rebellion in the north catalysed Malian army discontent that re-
sulted in a new coup d’état. After a transitional period, new presidential elections
were won by Ibrakim Boubacar Keïta in 2013, still in office after having revalidated
his mandate in 2018.48
Whether they were democratically elected or came to power after military in-
terventions, all Malian presidents have had to face the difficult balance between
restricting interference by religious actors and resorting to their incontestable pop-
ular support to strengthen their legitimacy.These religious actors presented a wide
range of interpretations of Islam, but among them, the aforementioned Wahhabi-
Salafi inspired ahl al-Sunna and traditional Muslim preachers andmarabouts cannot
be disregarded for the comprehension of present-day Mali intertwinement of pol-
itics and Islam.
Wahhabi ahl al-Sunna grew and expanded in the 1970s when president
Traoré’s tolerance towards Islamic organisations counterbalanced the determined
marginalisation they had experienced under Keïta’s administration. This tolerance
had a relevant effect on education, developing Islamic madrasas and the teaching
of Arabic, and public presence, opening new mosques as well as broadcasting reli-
gious programmes.49 Together with the reedition of a new wave of fundamentalist
reformism, another pertinent outcome has perhaps not been sufficiently pointed
out: the Arabisation of certain intellectual and educated layers of the population
to distinguish themselves from previous ill-influenced Frenchification as well as
from lower classes. In any case, both prior Frenchification and later Arabisation
share the common trait of establishing an edge between ‘cultivated’ elites and
common people that has always been a historical characteristic in the area and is
still tangible today. Furthermore, even though this Arabisation aspires to spread to
other collectives and social classes – through the expansion of its religious schools
– its elitist origin cannot be neglected, nor can the fact that it is associated with a
certain disdain towards the popular customs of the non-Arabised.
48 The list would be completed by the interim presidency of Amadou Sanogo (21 days in 2012)
and Dioncounda Traoré (17months) during the transition between the last military coup and
the presidential elections in 2013.
49 Between 1968 and 1983 the number ofmosques rose from 77 to 203 in Bamako alone. Cf. Louis
Brenner (2001). Controlling Knowledge: Religion, Power and Schooling in aWest Africa Muslim So-
ciety. London, p. 197.
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Malian reformers labelled as Wahhabis censure, for instance, the wide range
of social roles carried out by griots connecting them with social castes and en-
dogamous lineages as well as, in a very similar way Ibn Baṭṭūṭa had done in the
XIVthcentury, consider their performances and rituals immoral.50 These sorts of
appreciations revitalise and actualise the polarisation and the conflict between tra-
ditional orthodox Islam and traditional Sufi or popular Islam that has been shaping
politics in Mali from the Middle Ages until now.
Two trends that have conspicuous representatives in Mahmoud Dicko and
Sheikh Madani Haïdara, whose different visions – regarding the status of women,
the response to ethnic schism or terrorist threats, not to be exhaustive – have been
playing a substantial role in contemporary Mali, even now in the Age of Pandemic.
They are the central figures of this renewed competition which, since the 1990s,
the two main tendencies vying for social and spiritual hegemony maintain not
only in Mali but in most neighbouring countries. On the one hand, there are
the defenders of a Wahhabi-inspired, neo-reformist literalistic Islam with elitist
overtones and, on the other, those who claim to embody the popular Islam of the
illiterate and the marginalised.
Ousmane Madani Haïdara, a central figure of Malian Islam, was born in 1955
in a village near Ségou, son to a father affiliated with the Tijāniyya Sufi order and
reluctant to the irruption of Sunni reformism orWahhabism.His profound Islamic
convictions and Qur’anic education led him to devote his life to religious endeav-
ours as a preacher and a marabout. Beginning in Côte d’Ivoire in the 1970s, in 1981
he returned to Mopti, in his homeland, where his preaching and activities, criti-
cal towards power and establishment, were prohibited by the authorities in 1983
for the first time. He reappeared in Bamako in 1984 and, for the following years,
his preaching found a favourable environment in the weakening of the movements
linked to ahl al-Sunna, which were beginning to be considered too radical and back-
ward in different milieus. Though educated in the Tijāniyya, he “[…] developed an
idiosyncratic approach to Islam inMali, blending notions of reform, Sufi principles
of organisation, and a doctrine of Malian cultural authenticity critical of Arabism’
of Salafis.”51 His hybridism, his iconoclasm, and the crudeness of some of his ex-
pressions earned him a second ban in 1989 after having stated, for instance, that
“prayer was not Islam” and with Wahhabis assembled around the Malian Associa-
tion for the Unity and Progress of Islam (AMUPI) accusing him of bid‘a, heretical
innovation.52This sentence illustrated his stance against praying as a sort of super-
50 For the roles of griots, cf. Francesco Zappa (2009). Popularizing Islamic Knowledge through
Oral Epic: A Malian Bard in a Media Age. Die Welt des Islams 49, Nº 3/4, 391.
51 Rahmane Idrissa (2017). The Politics of Islam in the Sahel: Between Persuasion and Violence. Lon-
don, p. 178.
52 AMUPI was founded in 1980 under the auspices of President Traoré. Reuniting Muslims un-
der a unique religious association reproduced the single-party UDPM (Union Démocratique
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ficial compliance with social standards, which he attributed to Wahhabi influence
in the public sphere, as well as against “the notion of being “Muslim by birth” (sil-
amèden). In his opinion, if prayer is one of the pillars of Islam and an obligation
for every Muslim, it is not enough to exonerate one from living according to the
Qur’ān and shariah.”53
In the following years, clashes between his views and those of the Wahhabis
only increased, stressing their different approaches to society and politics. Dif-
ferences crystallised in 1991, when Haïdara founded the social Islamic movement
Ansar Dine and the Wahhabis aimed at participating in the first democratic elec-
tions in the country as religious parties, which they were denied.54 This date also
marked a patent division between the secular populism represented by Haïdara –
mainly backed by lower classes who felt themselves supported and endorsed after
decades of official post-colonial carelessness – and the purported elitism of those
involved in manifest political ambitions even when religiously originated.
Following this division, and at the other end of the fundamentalist spectrum
in Mali, would be Mahmoud Dicko, whose education and evolution sharply con-
trast with those of Haïdara in a new reissue of historical religious dichotomies and
personalities.
Mahmoud Dicko was also born in the mid-1950s near Timbuktu, to a family
of notables, and was originally a teacher of Arabic until ideologically joining the
aforementioned trend represented by the latecomer ‘ulamā’, educated in and in-
spired by Saudi Islamic institutions and responsible for what has been termed “the
politicisation of purity.”55 Imam of the reformist mosque of Badalabougou in Ba-
mako, he has always rejected to be labelled as a Wahhabi although this has always
been his adscription according to the general perception in the country, which also
clearly distinguishes him from Haïdara’s positions.56
du Peuple Malien), both of which were devoted to overseeing potential dissensions and con-
flicts.
53 GillesHolder (2012). Chérif OusmaneMadaniHaidara and the IslamicMovement AnsarDine:
A Popular Malian Reformism in Search of Autonomy. Cahiers d’Études Africaines 206-207, Nº 2,
394.
54 Haïdara’s movement is by no means to be confused with the terrorist group operating in
northern Mali Ansar Dine or Ansar al-Din, led by Iyad ag-Ghaly and whose first action took
place in 2012. In March 2017, terrorist organisations Ansar Dine, Saharan branch of al-Qaeda
in the Islamic Maghreb, Macina Liberation Front, and al-Murabitun merged in what resulted
in Jama’aNusrat ul-Islamwa al-Muslimin - now the official branch of al-Qaeda inMali - under
ag-Ghaly’s leadership.
55 Cf. Terje Østebø (2015). African Salafism: Religious Purity and the Politicization of Purity. Is-
lamic Africa 6, Nº 1/2, 1-29.
56 Cf. Ahmed Chanfi (2015).West African ‘ulamā’ and Salafism in Mecca and Medina: Jawāb al-Ifrῑqῑ -
The Response of the African. Leiden, p. 193.
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Paradoxically, their confronted views with respect to the rights of women or
the attitude towards jihadist groups, for example, were both sheltered by the High
Islamic Council of Mali (HCIM) – also founded by the government in 2002 – in
order to oversee the increasing activities and impact of religious actors in Mali.
Mahmoud Dicko presided over it between 2008-2019 while Haïdara was its vice-
president until he himself became elected president in April 2019. From this po-
sition, Dicko firmly opposed a new family code, promoted by President Amadou
Toumani Touré in 2009 which would have improved women’s rights, claiming that
it was against Islam and Malian traditions, a campaign that made him come to
higher prominence. In 2012, his political profile was bolstered when he conducted
direct negotiations with the jihadist groups that had taken control of large swathes
of territory in the north of the country – in the wake of a previous nationalistic
Tuareg rebellion in the area – , this time overtly undertaking the place of the gov-
ernment itself although presenting himself as an ‘Islamic’ mediator. Haïdara, who
rejected any kind of leniency towards those who had challenged a legitimate gov-
ernment and destroyed Timbuktu’s heritage, accused him of sharing many of their
views. Dicko responded that these groups were also Malians and Muslims whose
stances could not be marginalised and that “in order not to alienate the Islamists,
he did not issue any public statement in condemnation of the mausoleums’ de-
struction.”57
In a last step in his incessant meddling in almost all domains of the country’s
life – and now openly challenging the government of President Ibrahim Boubacar
Keïta (often referred to as IBK), who came to power thanks in part to his support
in 2013 – Dicko has found in the confluence of three extraordinary factors a new
battlefield for his fundamentalism.
5. Mahmoud Dicko’s fundamentalism and the perfect storm in the Age
of Pandemic
The confluent occurrence of parliamentary elections, Ramadan, and Covid-19 in
the first half of 2020 – together with the permanent hazard of jihadist terrorism –
has paved the way to an extraordinary opportunity for Mahmoud Dicko to estab-
lish a new milestone in the interaction of religious fundamentalism and politics in
Mali. As has been the case since the days of the Mali empire in the Middle Ages,
the threats of the Age of Pandemic have once again highlighted the politicisation
of religious currents and their tendency to influence and modulate governmental
action. Once again as well, political power has not been able to disregard the enor-
57 Rosa De Jorio (2016). Cultural Heritage in Mali in the Neoliberal Era. Chicago, p. 130.
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mous capacity, whether it be overt or covert, they have to leverage people to their
goals.
While explicitly non-Wahhabi and politically less involved leader SheikhMadani
Haïdara remains far more representative of majority Malian Islam and is critical
of the alleged Arabism and politicisation of Wahhabism, his social influence is cer-
tainly being challenged by Mahmoud Dicko’s growing and determined participa-
tion in the public arena in recent years. The examples of these interferences have
beenmultiplying since his intervention in the aforementioned question of womenʼs
rights in 2009 or the conflict in the north of the country in 2012. In November 2015,
answering a question after a jihadist terrorist attack that resulted in 20 victims at
hotel Radisson Blu in Bamako, Dicko explained that the wrath of God was linked
to the presence of homosexuals and bars in the country and that “We must learn
the lessons from the attacks in Paris, like in Bamako, in Tunis or elsewhere in the
world […] God is angry. Men have provoked God.”58 In 2018, his activism opposing
a proposed sexual education textbook for adolescents – including a chapter on sex-
ual orientation that Dicko considered promoting homosexuality – also made the
government withdraw it.59 Finally, shortly after leaving the presidency of HCIM –
after all a device of the establishmentwhere at least a certain degree of containment
was expected – in September 2019 he launched the Coordination of Movements,
Associations, and Sympathisers (CMAS), a much more suitable vehicle to display a
political role without restraint.
But while the examples of his activities have been multiplying over the last
decade, since March 2020 they have acquired unusual speed and have been occur-
ring parallel to the following chronological sequence of events in the country.
At the beginning of that month, neighbouring countries such as Senegal, Côte
d’Ivoire, and Burkina Faso had already confirmed the presence of Covid-19 in their
territories and its menacing expansion in view of their precarious health systems.
Meanwhile, the Malian government remained astoundingly silent on the matter,
raising all kinds of suspicions that linked this silence with the imminence of the
first round of parliamentary elections, scheduled for March 29.
By midmonth, the government announced the closing of schools and public
spaces as well as the prohibition of gatherings of more than 50 persons and also
recommended the closure of mosques. Concurrently, Sheikh Madani Haïdara ap-
pealed to the necessity of collective prayer to invoke divine protection against the
coronavirus and, in a very different approach, Mahmoud Dicko warned the Malian
58 Laure Broulard (2015).Mali : l’imamMahmoud Dicko voit dans le terrorisme «une punition divine»
et crée la polémique.December 2. See: https://www.jeuneafrique.com/283688/societe/mali-lim
am-mahmoud-dicko-voit-terrorisme-punition-divine-cree-polemique/
59 Andrew Lebovich (2019). Sacred Struggles: How Islam Shapes Politics in Mali. November 1, p. 11.
See: https://ecfr.eu/publication/secular_stagnation_malis_relationship_religion/
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authorities that the elections of March 29 and April 19 could not be maintained
while, at the same time, asking the imams to close the mosques to limit the spread
of the virus in the country.
On March 25, the Malian government reported the first two confirmed cases,
attributing them to nationals returned from France, and a nationwide curfew was
finally decreed on March 26 as a necessary measure to combat the expansion of
Covid-19. Significantly, however, the closure of places of worship was left to the
discretion of religious authorities, a fact that resulted in almost all of them re-
maining open.
On March 25 as well, Mali’s main opposition leader, Soumaïla Cisse, was taken
hostage by suspected jihadists while campaigning in the restive Timbuktu region.
The opposition then denounced the irregularity of holding elections in which one
of the most prominent figures challenging the government was absent.
Turnout in the first round of the parliamentary election, on March 29, plum-
meted to 35.73 percent of the 7.6 million registered voters and was less than 13
percent in Bamako. Some of the results were later overturned by the country’s
constitutional court in a decision that was perceived to benefit Keïta’s party. In
the second round, on April 19, the national percentage fell even further, reaching
only 23 percent.The government attributed these figures to the combination of the
terrorist threat and Covid-19.60
Ramadan began on April 23 and ended on May 23. During the holy month, the
mosques – especially that of imam Dicko – were crowded with worshipers despite
an April 15 document issued by the World Health Organisation, titled “Balancing
Ramadan Practices and Personal Safety”, which stated that the cancellation of so-
cial and religious gatherings should be seriously considered. Such a decision, ac-
cording to Dicko was all the more difficult to make when it was known that Malian
mosques “do not only have a religious function, but also a social one” and that many
indigent people live thanks to these places while benefiting from Muslim solidar-
ity.61
On May 10, Prime Minister Boubou Cisse announced the lifting of the curfew
in view of the limited success this measure had had in reducing population move-
ments and gatherings –given its coincidencewith Ramadan and the lack of support
received from the religious authorities – and the obligation to wear masks.
By the end of May, Mahmoud Dicko amassed all these previous events – the
concealment of data on the pandemic, the manipulation of the elections, the kid-
60 For turnouts in both rounds, cf. France24 (2020/1).Mali election run off tarnished by intimidation
and allegations of vote rigging. April 20. See: https://www.france24.com/en/20200420-mali-ele
ction-runoff-tarnished-by-intimidation-and-allegations-of-vote-rigging
61 Paul Lorgerie (2020). AuMali, lesmosquées resteront ouvertes pendant lemois du ramadán.
Le Monde. April 24. See : https ://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2020/04/24/au-mali-les-mos
quees-resteront-ouvertes-pendant-le-mois-du-ramadan_6037711_3212.html
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napping of the opposition leader by jihadist elements, the interference in religious
matters, the intervention of the constitutional court, and even the recommenda-
tions of theWorldHealthOrganisation – together with the terrorist threat, poverty,
and the lack of an encouraging horizon for the youth, in an indistinguishable and
nuanced assemblage, which he considered an irrefutable proof of the government’s
corruption and inability to deal with the country’s problems, and in which he found
a fertile ground for a new and definitive step forward.
On Friday June 5, evenwith the threat of Covid-19 exacerbated,MahmoudDicko
was able to gather more than 20,000 people in a demonstration calling for the
resignation of President Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta.62 The June 5 Movement-Rally of
Patriotic Forces (M5-RFP), so named after this first protest, brought together a het-
erogeneous coalition of politicians, anti-corruption activists, different figures from
civil society, and religious organisations in a newly formed opposition alliance.
Among its numerous elements, however, three main clusters should be outlined
in this multifarious constellation: the Front for Safeguarding Democracy (FSD),
composed by around thirty opposition parties and created after IBK’s re-election
in 2018; Espoir Mali Koura (EMK), Hope for a New Mali in English, a civil society
movement led by filmmaker and former Minister of Culture Cheick Oumar Sis-
soko; and Mahmoud Dicko’s CMAS.The fact that the most visible representative of
an alliance that includes multifold political parties and civil movements is a rigor-
ous imam, although not unexpected, is indeed revealing.
Only two weeks later, on Friday 19, a second mass demonstration took place
with Dicko leading prayers during the rally and calling again for civil disobedience
until President Keïta steps down. Since then, disturbances, rallies, expressions of
discontent, and clashes with the security forces have increased,with violence rising
to previously unknown levels in Bamako.
On July 10, after gathering at the mosque of imam Dicko, demonstrators at-
tacked the parliament and plundered the national television station, while security
forces targeted the headquarters of CMAS.63 Unrest continued and at least 11 peo-
ple died and nearly 150 were injured in a period of a week, forcing President Keïta
to accept themediation of ECOWAS (Economic Community ofWest African States)
and even propose a new government of consensus. Dicko called on his followers to
show restraint and calm but, at the same time, rejected any negotiations and de-
clared that the struggle would continue until the president’s resignation, which he
62 Cf. Tiemoko Diallo (2020). Malians rally against President Keita, demand his resignation.
Reuters. July 5. See: https://de.reuters.com/article/mali-politics-protests-idAFL8N2DI4N T
63 Cf. Al Jazeera (2020). Mali PM promises from open government mass protests. July 11. See:
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/07/mali-pm-promises-form-open-government-mass-
protests-200711174204324.html
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considered the only creditable solution to eradicate the endemic corruption that
was bringing the country to its knees.64,65
Conclusions
Corruption, injustice, and deviation from the values and principles of Islam have
historically been the recurring arguments used by fundamentalist religious re-
formism to endorse and legitimate its claims and actions. Therefore, Dicko using
the word ‘corruption’ to summarise the state of the country may not be accidental,
as he is just one of the latest exponents of a long tradition that has beenmanifesting
itself in Mali for a millennium with the accommodations that each age and situa-
tion have required. His ideological discourse therefore aspires to be ingrained in a
historical continuum abundant with noble antecedents that are now being revived
and whose unquestionable purity of intentions cannot be contested.
Mahmoud Dicko’s discourse and activities suggest being directed to cover the
entire spectrum of whatever affiliations and sensibilities could be present in Mali
and which have been reviewed in this chapter. Thus, depending on the circum-
stances and occasions, he seems to embody the traditional marabout, the Islamic
‘ālim, the pro-government political activist, the Wahhabi reformer, or the insur-
gent. Also, his continuous assertion that he is not a politician does not conceal
his volition to shape the country’s political future by intervening in every possible
realm according to his own inclinations.
This Wahhabi fundamentalism without weapons represented by Dicko may
seem more tolerable in its outward manifestations for the Western observer, but
it might also be associated with certain menaces that make it perhaps even more
hazardous for the stability of the country in the long run than the jihadist one.This
is so because in this fundamentalism two seemingly opposite forces, centrifugal
and centripetal, are being manoeuvred simultaneously and manifestly as the area
of its influence expands, leading to a more than convenient result: the proscription
and virtual annihilation of any dissent or contention and the strengthening of its
monolithic conception by the increase in the numbers of its followers.
The centrifugal force expels outward those who do not strictly and without fis-
sures share the only interpretation of Islam that this fundamentalism considers
legitimate and sanctioned by original purity. A thorough ideological, rather than
64 Cf. France24 (2020/2).Mali protest leader calls for calm after demonstrations turn deadly. July 12.
See: https://www.france24.com/en/20200712-mali-protest-leader-calls-for-calm-after-demon
strations-turn-deadly
65 This article was closed before the end of July 2020. Therefore, not only the future but also
the immediate evolution of events remains unknown at this turbulent moment.
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just religious, purge of any deviation is thus put into practice based on the arroga-
tion of the capacity to issue or deny a sort of righteousness certificate to any possi-
ble response to its hegemony.This meticulous purge commonly evolves towards an
impoverishment of the country’s social, political, and religious ecosystem, as well
as to the monopolisation and standardisation of the public space.
The centripetal force, on the other hand, has an extraordinary capacity to at-
tract all those unattended collectives and social layers – deeming themselves ne-
glected or victims of some kind of discrimination by the government, be it ethnic,
economic, social, or political – to the bosom of the movement. The promise that
the justice, probity, egalitarianism, and brotherly spirit of purest Islam houses the
solution to all these imbalances has an enormous convening power in times of de-
spair, affliction, deprivation, or external threats. It already had it by the times of
drought and the conversion of King al-musulmani to Islam, as in the account by
al-Bakrī in the XIthcentury with which this historical quest began, and it still has it
now, when Covid-19 and the rest of the concurrent menaces impel the population
to embrace the orthodox refuge that Dicko offers.
Religious revival and an increasing presence of fundamentalist Islam in public
spheres are frequently perceived in Mali as a modern utterance of this Wahhabi
influence, whose leaders continuously criticise what they hold as the undesirable
loss of moral values and Islamic virtues in the country, as well as a resurgence of
the dichotomy between Arab Islam and Sufi-impregnated popular Islam.
But the infiltration of thisWahhabi fundamentalist doctrine that is taking place
not only in Mali but in other countries of the Sahel and the Gulf of Guinea shares,
in my view, obvious similarities and parallelisms with the emergence of Islam it-
self in the area centuries ago.The penetration of Islam originated in the upper and
educated classes before reaching most of the population; took place in an initially
soft manner,without resorting to apparent pressure or explicit violence, cohabiting
with other trends at a first moment for then gradually replacing previous beliefs
and customs; and finally led to a thorough reconfiguration of the exercise of poli-
tics and the model of the state. Identifying all those same traits and stages in the
Wahhabi infiltration of recent years does not seem to be especially difficult and
might also lead to a new reconfiguration, definitively blurring nominal secularism
in order to evolve towards a fundamentalist Islamic Republic of Mali.
Radicals, extremists, Salafis, Wahhabis, traditionalists, or any other religious
denominations and labels often imposed from abroad – and admitting all sorts of
combinations and hyphenations – would certainly feel more identified with and
represented by such a new republic. They all hold themselves fundamentalists in
the most honourable of its definitions and if they have to name themselves, they
are simply Sunni Muslims: emanating from the original sources, attached to them,
apprehensive about innovation or deviation based on political, narrowly national-
istic, or cultural reasons.
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In this sense, this chapter has deliberately omitted to refer to the diverse terror-
ist groups that have been operating in Mali for decades now, because their actions
and agenda, even when having amighty impact on the politics of the country, could
hardly be framed within Islamic fundamentalism in the way the notion has been
used in this article.
The external tendency to hastily associate fundamentalism with groups often
categorised under the extensive mark of jihadist has neglected, if not tortuously
entangled, the other denotation of ‘radical’: of or relating to the origin, thus funda-
mental.The result of this inattentiveness is the evident hazard of confusing Islamic
terrorist extremism and Wahhabi fundamentalism, considering them a unique or
interchangeable notion and judging both of their adherents in the same way. But,
on the other hand, establishing a precipitate differentiation between them, based
on the unawareness of the true principles and goals of both currents and on a
Manichean attribution of greater or lesser righteousness depending on their ac-
tions, is not a minor challenge. This is because these groups often trespass the
boundaries between them and because the non-violent activities of Wahhabism
are directed towards a project of longer scope and could be much more danger-
ous in the long term, even if these activities are not so outrageous nor promote
international coalitions to counter them in the area.
That this enduring project has been identified and that its attainability con-
cerns very specific social classes was subtly attested by a manifesto titled “Call for
a Mali to Be Reconstructed”. Published online on July 20 and signed by a group of
intellectuals, senior executives, and business leaders, it endorsed the denunciation
– initiated by popular protests – of the deep crisis that the country was facing.
The text emphasised, in a certainly significant and illuminating detail that Dicko
could have subscribed to, that these multiple demands had their origin in two in-
escapable and constant features: pervasive and impudent corruption and, closely
connected to it, intolerable injustice.
However, almost as a colophon, and when praising the qualities that ought to
distinguish a future leader, the emphasis was made on respect, very significantly
also, respect for the secularism of the state, which “seems to us to be a precious
asset, which has often preserved the unity of the Malian nation and must therefore
be carefully safeguarded.”66 An asset that is now perceived as endangered, whose
preciousness has been deemed necessary to highlight, whose safeguard is being
questioned, and whose future appears to be surrounded by incertitude.
66 Cf. Maliweb (2020). Appel pour un Mali à reconstruire : Quatre jours de l’Histoire du Mali. July 20.
See: https://www.maliweb.net/contributions/appel-pour-un-mali-a-reconstruire-quatre-jours
-de-lhistoire-du-mali-2886466.html /
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Global Virus, International Lamas: Tibetan Religious
Leaders in the Face of the Covid-19 Crisis
Miguel Álvarez Ortega
Abstract
This paper aims at analyzing how the Covid-19 (2020) crisis has been treated by
leading Tibetan teachers in the global media. First, an introduction to Buddhist
notions related to sickness both at the individual and collective levels is provided,
followed by a detailed account of the public pronouncements up to early August
2020 of the leading teachers of the main schools of Tibetan Buddhism. The paper
tries to show how Tibetan Buddhists’ response is characterized by an appeal to an
external compliance with the authorities, and an internal plural interpretation that
reflects a common tension between a symbolic and a transcendental construal of
religious categories. It also attempts to provide interpretative keys for the lack of a
successful fundamentalist or millennialist reaction while pointing to the particular
suitability of Buddhism to accommodate to the crisis.
 
Keywords: Covid-19 crisis, pandemic, Tibetan Buddhism, millennialism, esoteri-
cism
1. Introduction
In December 2019, several cases of severe pneumonia of unknown etiology were
reported in Wuhan, China. A month later, the World Health Organization (WHO)
declared that the subsequent outbreak constituted a Public Health Emergency of
International Concern, and on March 11, 2020, it declared the novel coronavirus
(Covid-19) a global pandemic.1
The extent, virulence, and quick propagation of the virus have caused a global
crisis obliging states around the world to take drastic measures typically involving
1 Domenico Cucinotta andMaurizio Vanelli (2020).WHODeclares COVID-19 a Pandemic. Acta
Bio Medica 91, Nº 1, 157f.
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the closing of borders, obligatory use of masks and social distancing, limitations
in free circulation, curfews, and quarantines or lockdowns, among others.
A phenomenon of this magnitude has an undeniable impact on the lives of cit-
izens at all levels and questions their belief systems. It is, therefore, interesting to
analyze how different religious traditions and groups have reacted towards the cri-
sis and its management, in terms of interpretation and advised reaction according
to their own soteriological project,Weltanschauung, and set of practices. In partic-
ular, this paper attempts to analyze how the Covid-19 crisis has been treated by
leading Tibetan teachers in the global media.
With such a purpose, an introduction to Buddhist notions related to sickness
both at the individual and collective levels is provided (section 2), followed by a de-
tailed account of the public pronouncements up to early August, 2020 of the leading
teachers of the main schools of Tibetan Buddhism (section 3). In this regard, I have
opted for a prolixity of literal references at the risk of rendering the text dense
and at times repetitive, so that the reader may form his or her own opinion before
the data with as little interference as possible. In the concluding section (4) I shall
try and argue that Tibetan Buddhists’ response is characterized by an appeal to
an external compliance with the authorities, and an internal plural interpretation
that reflects a common tension between a symbolic and a transcendental construal
of religious categories. I shall also attempt to provide interpretative keys for the
lack of a successful fundamentalist or millennialist reaction, while pointing to the
particular suitability of Buddhism to accommodate to the crisis.
2. Buddhism and Pandemics: The Internal Conceptual Frame
Leaving aside pop-culture references, for most Western readers Buddhism is not
part of their cultural or religious upbringing, unlike Christianity. This means that,
for those who are neither practitioners nor specialized scholars, the core notions
and soteriological project that characterize Buddhism as a religion and thereby
activate before a crisis may need some clarification. Attempting to keep the track
of the discourse on the problem of the virus, I herein include a brief summary of
the role that sickness as a type of suffering represents, and the particular social
connotations presented by a pandemic within Buddhist sources.
2.1 Individual Concepts: Suffering, Disease, and Healing
Arguably one of themost popular instances of the centrality of sickness within Bud-
dhist traditions is the narration of what is known as the Buddha’s “four sights,” a
post-canonical recreation of Prince Siddharta’s encountering with worldly afflic-
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tions.2 Secluded in his palace by his father to protect him from exposure to suf-
fering and prevent him from pursing an ascetic life, the tale recounts how one day
the prince decided to explore the city in disguise to discover the “real world.” He is
thus first acquainted with an old man (first sight); and then, as in the phrasing of
the Buddhacarita, the second sight took place:
“41. ‘Yonder man with a swollen belly, his whole frame shaking as he pants, his
arms and shoulders hanging loose, his body all pale and thin, uttering plaintively
the word “mother,” when he embraces a stranger, — who, pray, is this?’
42. Then his charioteer answered, ‘Gentle Sir, it is a very great affliction called
sickness, that has grown up, caused by the inflammation of the (three) humours,
which has made even this strong man no longer master of himself.’
43. Then the prince again addressed him, looking upon theman compassionately,
‘Is this evil peculiar to him or are all beings alike threatened by sickness?’
44. Then the charioteer answered, ‘O prince, this evil is common to all; thus
pressed round by diseases men run to pleasure, though racked with pain.3` ”
A later excursion exposes him to a dead body (third sight); and finally, he finds
inspiration in an encounter with an ascetic (fourth sight).
The tetrad constituted by birth, ageing, sickness, and death, not only appears in
such literary accounts, but plays a decisive role in the characterization and under-
standing of the central Buddhist concept par excellence, suffering.4 In the context
of the explanation of the core of the Buddhist doctrine, the so-called Four Noble
Truths (the Truths of suffering, its origin, its cessation, and the path), sickness
is repeatedly stated as a clear example of the Truth of Suffering. In the Dham-
macakkappavattana Sutta, traditionally regarded as the first sermon of the Buddha,
it is asserted that:
“Suffering, as a noble truth, is this: Birth is suffering, ageing is suffering, sickness
is suffering, death is suffering, sorrow and lamentation, pain, grief and despair are
suffering; association with the loathed is suffering, dissociation from the loved is
suffering, not to get what one wants is suffering — in short, suffering is the five
2 According to Heinz Bechert, although the story “definitely does not belong to the earliest
traditions of the life of the historical Buddha” (…) “it became a constituent of all biographies
of the Buddha at an early date”, originating in a “legendary biography of a former buddha that
is narrated in theMahāvadāna-sūtra”. Heinz Bechert (2004). Buddha, Life of the. In Robert E.
Buswell (Ed.). Encyclopedia of Buddhism. Volume I. New York, p. 85.
3 Edward B. Cowell (Ed.) (2003). Book III: The Prince’s Perturbation. The Buddha-carita of Aś-
vaghoṣa.Delhi, p. 40.
4 These are referred in Sanskrit as jāti-jarā-vyādhi-maraṇa and, in Tibetan, as skye rga na 'chi
(W.) (Ph. kye ga na chi). Tibetan terms will appear transcribed according to theWylie system
indicated by “W.” and followed by a phonetic approximation indicated by “Ph”.
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categories of clinging objects.”5
(Bold emphasis added).
It is the cultivation of the Buddhist eight-fold path that may put an end to such
suffering when final liberation (nirvana) is attained.6 In this context, the end of the
suffering of sickness usually refers to the perception of the experience of illness in
terms of affliction, not to the biological condition itself.7 There are, though, other
instances where that seems to be the case. Scholar Bhikkhu Anālayo refers to several
texts where the cultivation or even the mere recitation of the awakening factors
(mental qualities to be cultivated by practitioners) result in the healing of patients.8
Other narratives take a less soteriological approach, and focus on sickness, its
etiology, and cure in a worldlier fashion. For example, the Sivaka Sutta explains the
8 causes of disease as being the 3 humors, their combination, the seasons, lack of
care, assault, and the ripening of karma.9 Even the Buddha himself is depicted as
falling sick and asking for a purgative in a version of the Code of Monastic Disci-
pline (Vinaya).10
In most cases, though, rather than as a patient, the Buddha is represented as
a “Healer”, and not only in a metaphorical sense11, but as someone who in one of
his many lives possessed medical knowledge and treated patients with both con-
5 Thera (Tr.) Ñanamoli (2010). Dhammacakkappavattana Sutta: Setting Rolling the Wheel of
Truth (SN 56.11). Access to Insight (BCBS Edition). June 13. See: https://www.accesstoinsight.
org/tipitaka/sn/sn56/sn56.011.nymo.html
6 These are: right view, right intention; right speech, right action, right livelihood; right effort,
right mindfulness, right concentration.
7 Nevertheless, the biological condition would not be, logically, re-experienced since nirvana
puts an end to the cycle of rebirths. The idea that holy people may still suffer sickness but
no associated mental pain, is well attested. Cf. Paul Demiéville (1985). Buddhism and Healing.
Demiéville’s Article “Byō” from Hōbōgirin. Boston, pp. 21-23.
8 Cf. Bhikkhu Anālayo (2017). The Healing Potential of Awakening Factors in Early Buddhist
Discourse. C. Pierce Salguero (Ed.). Buddhism and Medicine. An Anthology of Premodern Sources.
New York, pp. 12-18.
9 See Thanissaro Bhikkhu (2013). Sivaka Sutta: To Sivaka (SN 36.21). Access to Insight (BCBS Edi-
tion).November 30. See: http://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka/sn/sn36/sn36.021.than.html.
10 Cf. Thomas Dhivan Jones (2017). Illness, Cure and Care: Selections from the Pāli Canon. In C.
Pierce Salguero (Ed.). Buddhism andMedicine. An Anthology of Premodern Sources.New York, pp.
3-10.; Hin-tak Sik 2016. Ancient Indian medicine in early Buddhist literature: a study based
on the Bhesajjakkhandhaka and the parallels in other Vinaya Canons. (Thesis). University of
Hong Kong, Pokfulam, Hong Kong SAR. See: http://dx.doi.org/10.5353/th_b5760924.
11 Demiéville, 1985, pp. 14-15.; Thanissaro Bhikkhu (2013). Beyond Coping: The Buddha's Teach-
ings on Aging, Illness, Death, and Separation. Access to Insight (BCBS Edition). November 30. See:
http://www.accesstoinsight.org/lib/study/beyondcoping/index.html .
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ventional and supernatural means.12 Stories about Jīvaka, who worked as a doctor
to the Buddha and his monks, are also popular and numerous.13
Despite this centrality, and the praise of doctors and those who look after the
sick, it has been pointed out that early Buddhist literature was initially reluctant or
ambivalent towards having monks (and nuns in particular) habitually engaged in
the medical profession, for varied reasons.14 The situation changed over time, and
the development of Mahāyāna brought new medically-oriented literature, an em-
phasis on healthcare as an act of compassion, and a more important role of deities,
rituals, and esotericism in healing practices.15 Such elements were further potenti-
ated in Vajrayāna Buddhism, finding its arguably greatest expression in the Tibetan
system of Medicine (Ph. sowa rigpa, W. gso ba rig pa).16 Exposed to varied influ-
ences, especially in its first centuries, Tibetan Medicine evolved alongside its wider
religious and political context to become a Buddhist scholastic discipline.17 Promi-
12 Phyllis Granoff (1998). Cures and Karma II. SomeMiraculous Healings in the Indian Buddhist
Story Tradition. Bulletin de l'École française d'Extrême-Orient 85, 288-289. A list of “Stories of
Treatments Based on Cases of Diseases”, may be found at: Kenneth G. Zysk (2010). Asceticism
and Healing in Ancient India: Medicine in the Buddhist Monastery. Delhi, pp.84-86.
13 Cf. Thomas S. N. Chen and Peter S. Y. Chen (2002). Jivaka, physician to the Buddha. Journal of
Medical Biography 10, 88-91; Kenneth G. Zysk (1982). Studies in Traditional Indian Medicine in
the Pāli Canon: Jīvaka and Āyurveda. Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies
5, 7–86.
14 See: David Fiordalis (2017). Medical Practice as Wrong Livelihood: Selections from the Pāli
Discourses, Vinaya, and Commentaries. In C. Pierce Salguero (Ed.). Buddhism andMedicine. An
Anthology of Premodern Sources. New York, p. 105f.; Cf. David Fiordalis (2014). On Buddhism,
Divination and theWorldly Arts: Textual Evidence from the Theravāda Tradition. Indian Inter-
national Journal of Buddhist Studies 15, pp. 89-91.
15 C. Pierce Salguero (2018). BuddhistMedicine and its circulation. InDavid Ludden (Ed.).Oxford
Research Encyclopedia, Asian History. New York, pp. 2-4.
16 In Indo-Tibetan Buddhist scholasticism, Medicine is considered one of the 5 major sciences
(W. rig gnas chen po lnga; Ph. rigñe chenpo na), along with craftsmanship, logic, grammar, and
Inner science (religion). Cf. Bhagwan Dash (1976). Indian Contribution to Tibetan Medicine.
In Dawa Norbu (Ed.). An Introduction to Tibetan Medicine. Delhi, p 12.
17 The background of Tibetan Medicine seems to have been widely cosmopolitan, especially in
its first centuries, drawing from indigenous, Ayurvedic, Persian, and Chinese sources, among
others, though later native representations insisted on the Indian and Buddhist elements as
the essential defining features. Cf. Frances M. Garrett (2015). Religion,Medicine and the Human
Embryo in Tibet. London, pp. 37-44. Its main classical text, known as the Four Tantras (W. gryus
bzhi,Ph. gyu thi), dates form the end of theXIIth century and its historical originswere subject
of controversy for centuries. An important tradition (and the text itself) attributes its author-
ship to the Buddha in the form of the Medicine Buddha (Bhaiṣajyaguru, Tib. W. sangs rgyas
sman bla, Ph. sangye nanla). Cf. FrancesM. Garrett (2006). Buddhism and theHistoricizing of
Medicine in Thirteenth Century Tibet. AsianMedicine. Journal of the International Association for
the Study of Traditional AsianMedicine 2, no. 2, 202-224.; Cf. Janet Gyatso (2017). Being human in
a Buddhist world: An intellectual history of medicine in early modern Tibet. New York, pp. 143-192.
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nent monastic scholars were “expected” to write onmateria medica, while most doc-
tors were educated in and pertained to monastic institutions.18 To provide some
background, the etiology of Tibetan Medicine is centered on the aforementioned
imbalance of the 3 humors, and it places especial stress on channels and winds
of energy (W. rlung, Ph. lung) that circulate within the body in a complex inter-
connection of mind, physical body, senses, and the universe.19 At the same time,
it categorizes congenital conditions as karmic afflictions, and includes the influ-
ence of malefic spirits within the causes of disease20. Most importantly, the distant
cause of illness is considered to be primordial ignorancemanifested in attachment,
anger, and delusion21.Within its wide array of treatments, we typically find dietary
and lifestyle guidelines, mantra recitation and visualizations, meditation, medici-
nal herbs (W. bod sman, Ph. pö men), rituals, and exorcisms.22
Traditional TibetanMedicine has been the object ofWesternmedical and schol-
arly interest from multiple angles, ranging from its use of medicinal plants to its
holistic approach to the patient and his condition.23 Its attention to the psycho-
somatic interface and the benefits of meditation, particularly in stress relief and
pain management, have arguably raised the most interest.24
2.2 Collective Notions: Plagues, Millenarianism, and Social Welfare
Disease is not only an individual affliction. It also possesses an undeniable so-
cial dimension, particularly when its impact and spread reach such a considerable
magnitude that it becomes a plague or, in more modern language, an epidemic (W.
nad yams, Ph. ne yam). It is not uncommon, in this regard, for religious traditions
The text has been translated into English: Clark, Barry: The Quintessence Tantras of Tibetan
Medicine. Boston 1995.
18 Garrett, 2015, pp. 52-55.
19 Barbara Gerke (2013). On the ‘Subtle Body’ and ‘Circulation’ in Tibetan Medicine. In Geoffrey
Samuel and Jay Johnston (Eds.). Religion and the Subtle Body in Asia and theWest. New York, pp.
83-99; Gyatso 2017, pp. 193-250.
20 Tamdin S. Bradley (2013). Principles of Tibetan Medicine. London, pp. 40-44, 71.
21 Bradley, 2013, pp. 31-33.
22 Ib., pp. 40-41., 123-160.
23 As sheer examples within an abundant literature, see: Christa Kletter and Monika Kriech-
baum (Eds.) (2001). Tibetan Medicinal Plants. Stuttgart.; Cf. Craig R. Janes (2002). Buddhism,
science, and market: The globalisation of Tibetan medicine. Anthropology &Medicine, 9:3, pp.
267-289; Laurent Pordié (Ed.) (2008). TibetanMedicine in the ContemporaryWorld: Global Politics
of Medical Knowledge and Practice. London.
24 Again, the existing bibliography is overwhelming. Arguably, the most re-known platform
dedicated to the scientific study of Tibetan Buddhist meditation and its benefits, which in-
clude performing MRI on practicing lamas, is the Mind & Life Institute, founded by the 14th
Dalai Lama and biologist Francisco Varela. See their website: https://www.mindandlife.org/
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to assign it a particular meaning within their own world vision and soteriologi-
cal project that goes further than a mere health issue. The Christian-based West-
ern world is seemingly so familiar with such an ingrained perception that “biblical
plague” or “plague of biblical proportions” have become common expressions in
everyday language.
In the case of Buddhism, the absence of a potentially punishing God-creator
and the assumed lack of an apocalyptic/ millennialist tradition, have deemed it
popularly (and sometimes scholarly) unlikely to develop such interpretations.25
Still, Buddhist literature contains its own depiction of time cycles in which the
notion of degenerate times or decline of the Dharma (Buddhist teachings) plays a
crucial role.26 Such scenarios not only allude to a future crisis of faith, doctrine,
and practice, but are also typically tainted by wars, famines, and plagues. In the
Tibetan version of the Candragarbha Sutra, we find a representative take on the
matter:
“Then at the time of the [next] five hundred year [period], as for [the first] three
hundred years, the protectors of sentient beings who dwell in the True Dharma
—gods, nagas, and so on—will not remain, {but will go [elsewhere] to spread the
True Dharma.} {Sentient beings will no longer believe in the Dharma. Even those
sentient beings who practice the Dharma will not practice it in accordance with
the basic Dharma texts. Because [their] efforts are small, their attainments will be
few. The four [principal] colors and those derived from the four will decline, and
{smell,}* taste, and so forth will diminish. And human diseases, animal diseases,
and famine will arise.”27
(Bold emphasis added).
Following such a phase of decline, a new prosperous era is often envisioned, though
not necessarily.28 Alternation of periods of flourishing and decay are not exclusive
25 Charles F. Keyes has pointed out that some scholars of millennialism have wrongly assumed
that in Buddhism the pursuit of nirvana is the only and pervasive soteriological goal, and
that karma implies strict determinism, thus mistakenly concluding the unsuitability or irrel-
evance of apocalyptic and millennialist elements. Cf. Charles F. Keyes (1977). Millennialism,
Theravada Buddhism and Thai Society. The Journal of Asian Studies 36, Nº 2, pp. 285-287.
26 In his classical work, Étienne Lamotte referred to the age as “the Disappearance of the Good
Law” and provided a detailed list of the numerous Buddhist texts from different schools and
traditions referring to it. Cf. Étienne Lamotte (1988).History of Indian Buddhism from theOrigins
to the Śaka Era. Louvain-la-Neuve, pp. 191-202. For an overview from a Japanese perspective,
see Chappell, D. Wellington (1980). Early Forebodings of the Death of Buddhism. Numen 27,
Nº 1,122-154.
27 Quotation from the Tibetan version as translated by Jan Nattier (1991). Once Upon a Future
Time: Studies in a Buddhist Prophecy of Decline. Berkeley, p. 241
28 As Jan Nattier points out, it is a peculiarity of Buddhist apocalyptic literature that it contains
references to declinewith no subsequent redemption. Cf. JanNattier (1988). TheMeanings of
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to sutra literature and may also be found in philosophical treatises like the Abhi-
dharmakośa29. One popular version of these cycles relates the advent of Maitreya
(Pali, Metteya; Tib. W. byams pa, Ph. janmpa), a future Buddha representing the
coming of a Golden Age, prior to which human degeneration would have reduced
life-span to 10 years in a context of constant quarrelling, famine, and plagues.30The
figure of Maitreya—and the notion of his coming—have historically inspired var-
ied millennialist revolts and political movements in China, Korea, and South East
Asia31, while in the case of Tibet, he is mainly an aspirational figure for mystics
and scholars.32 Even so, the notion of the degenerate times is common in Tibetan
texts, particularly in Dharma chronicles (W. chos ’byung, Ph. chö jung) and in tra-
ditions of revealed treasures (W. gter ma, Ph. terma), in which concealed teachings
are to be discovered to help restore the Dharma in degenerate times.33 The idea
has been popularly employed when reflecting on the circumstances leading to the
Chinese invasion of Tibet, often deemed a calamity prophesized by VIIIth century
Guru Padmasambhava, and is very much relevant and alive among contemporary
the Maitreya Myth. In Alan Sponberg and Helen Hardacre (Eds.).Maitreya, the Future Buddha.
Cambridge, p. 39.
29 Composed in verse between the 4th and 5th centuries by Vasubandhu, this highly influen-
tial text describes a temporal cosmology of cycles of kalpas comprising the beginning of the
world, the rise and fall of humankind, the destruction of the world, and then emptiness. See
verses 89 to 102 in chapter 3. An English version of the “classical” French translation by La
Vallé Poussin was published by Lokananda C. Bhikkhu (2018). Abhidharmakośa of Ācārya Va-
subandhu. English trad. of La Vallé Poussin by Leo M. Pruden. Delhi.
30 Cf. Nattier, 1988, p. 27.
31 Cf., among others, Susan Naquin (1976). Millenarian rebellion in China: The Eight Trigrams up-
rising of 1813. New Haven.; Cf. Daniel Overmyer (1976). Folk Buddhist religion: Dissenting sects in
late traditional China.Cambridge, esp. p. 81 ff.; Cf. Erik Zürcher (1982). “PrinceMoonlight".Mes-
sianism and Eschatology in Early Medieval Chinese Buddhism. T’oung Pao 68, 1/3, pp. 1-75.; Cf.
Hue-TamHo Tai (1988). PerfectWorld and Perfect Time:Maitreya in Vietnam. Alan Sponberg
and Helen Hardacre (Eds.). Maitreya, the Future Buddha. Cambridge, pp. 154-170.; Cf. Keyes,
1977, pp. 283-302.; Cf.Manuel Sarkisyanz (1965).Buddhist backgrounds of theBurmese revolution.
The Hague.; Cf. Robert Flaherty and Robert Pearson (2011). KoreanMillennial Movements. In
Chaterine Wessinger (Ed.). The Oxford Handbook of Millennialism. Oxford, pp. 326-347.
32 In the Tibetan tradition, Maitreya is considered to have transmitted his teachings to Asaṅga
(Vasubandhu’s elder brother, circa IVth century), whose philosophical works are thus referred
as The Five Treatises of Maitreya (W. byams chos sde lnga, Ph. jam chö de na). See: Philippe
Turenne (2015). The History and Significance of the Tibetan Concept of the Five Treatises
of Maitreya. The Indian International Journal of Buddhist Studies 16, pp. 215-233. On the cult of
Maitreya in Tibet, see Jonathan Silk et al. (2019). Maitreya. In Jonathan Silk et al. (Eds.). Brill’s
Encyclopedia of Buddhism. Volume II: Lives. Leiden, pp. 308-309.
33 Janet Gyasto (1993). The Logic of Legitimation in the Tibetan Treasure Tradition. History of
Religions 33, Nº 2, 132.
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Tibetan teachers.34 For example, in 2012, Dzongsar Jamyang Khyentse, an impor-
tant reincarnated lama, referred to our present time as “kaliyuga” (the Hindu Age
of Quarrel) and “dark age”35.
The particular approach to plagues in contrast to regular sickness seems also
to be shown in the particular type of response employable. According to the study
of P. Granoff on avadāna (biographical stories) literature, plagues would be the only
clear instances of healing by unabashedly miraculous means, directly or indirectly
undertaken by Buddha, either because of—it is hypothesized—their sometimes
demonic origin or due to their extraordinary social impact alike droughts and
famine.36
The communal character represented by plagues or spread diseases also raises
the question of healing beyond the singular patient-healer paradigm into the so-
cial sphere of what we may contemporarily refer to as social healthcare. In this
regard, Buddhist literature typically consigns the provision of medical assistance
as a duty of a lawful (Dharma-abiding) king, along with other assistance duties to-
wards those in need, namely, victims of disasters, famine, and poverty. Nāgārjuna’s
Precious Garland is an often-quoted example.37 Also, Emperor Aśoka, arguably the
34 In his autobiographical account, exiled Tibetologist Dawa Norbu writes about the strong be-
liefs regarding a future Chinese invasion commonly held before it actually took place: “In one
lungten, written in the middle of the ninth century, King Ralpachen asked the guru Rinpoche
what would be the future of Buddhism in Tibet. The guru predicted the advent of Commu-
nism, almost in so many words: ‘The subjects will rule the kingdom, the king will be made a
commoner. A sacrilegious act will be considered a deed of heroism”. Cf. Dawa Norbu (1998).
Tibet: The Road Ahead. London, p. 32. I was exposed to such interpretation during my field
workwith Tibetan exiles in Kathmandu. Cf.Miguel Álvarez Ortega (2018). Traditional Tibetan
Buddhist Scholars on Dharma, Law, Politics, and Social Ethics: Philosophical Discussions in
Boudhanath (Nepal). Buddhism, Law, and Society 4, 31.
35 We will refer to the figure of Dzongsar Khyentse below. The quotation is taken from
a publication on his Facebook page posted on January 12, 2012. https://www.facebook.
com/djkhyentse/posts/some-say-the-dark-age-age-of-vice-kaliyuga-is-here-now-or-at-least-
coming-soon-s/369588269733327/
36 Granoff bases his thesis mainly on the Avadānakalpalatā and the Avadāna-Śataka, both trans-
lated into Tibetan. Cf. Phyllis Granoff, (1998). Cures and Karma II. SomeMiraculous Healings
in the Indian Buddhist Story Tradition. Bulletin de l'École française d'Extrême-Orient 85, esp. pp.
290, 298, 300.
37 Always care compassionately / For the sick, the unprotected, those stricken / With suffering,
the lowly, and the poor/ And take special care to nourish them/ Provide extensive care/ For
the persecuted, the victims of crop failure/ The stricken, those suffering contagion / And for
beings in conquered areas / Cause the blind, the sick, the lowly, /The protectorless, the des-
titute, / And the crippled equally to obtain/ Food and drink without interruption. (…) In order
to alleviate the suffering/ Of sentient beings, the old, young, and infirm/ You should estab-
lish through the estates [that you control]/ Doctors and barbers through the country. (Bold
emphasis added). Verses 243, 251, 320, 240, as translated and arranged by Jeffrey Hopkins
(1998). Nāgārjuna’s Precious Garland. Buddhist Advice for Liberation explanation. New York, p. 77.
188 Miguel Álvarez Ortega
political figure more decisive for the consolidation and spread of Buddhism, and
traditionally regarded as a model king, included provisions in his famous Edicts
concerning medical treatment for both human and animals.38 Regardless of such
textual and historical references, it has not been uncommon in the West to label
Buddhism as socio-politically uninvolved at least since Max Weber.39 However ac-
curate or fair the categorization, a need to deepen the social commitment of Bud-
dhist practitioners seems to have inspired Vietnamese Buddhist monk Thích Nhất
Hạnh’s “Engaged Buddhism” and subsequent advocates and movements aiming at
addressing social and political issues from a Buddhist perspective.40 Along such
activism, Buddhist scholarship in both East andWest has since developed a wealth
of literature on social welfare, healthcare, bioethics, economics, ecology, and other
contemporary socio-political issues drawing from Buddhist sources, concepts, and
way of reasoning, often aiming at a laicized reading acceptable by the general pub-
lic. Traditional teachers and monastics have shown a range of attitudes towards
such proposals, while someWestern scholars have on occasion pointed out the ten-
sion existing between said approaches and canonical sources, traditional readings,
and conventional praxis.41
3. International Lamas and their Public Discourse
The current situation of Tibetan Buddhism is undeniable marked by the Tibetan
diaspora following the Chinese invasion in the 1950s. A positive side effect of the
takeover, it is often stated, has been the opening and access to a massive body
of texts, teachings, practices, and masters, previously secluded in the Himalayas.
Upon the fleeing of the Dalai Lama to India in 1959 and his establishment in
Dharamsala, teachers from the different schools of Tibetan Buddhism also went
into exile, typically to Nepal and India, where monasteries and centers were
thus reconstructed. This relocation not only facilitated the access of scholars and
practitioners to Tibetan Buddhist teachers, but eventually resulted in the creation
38 Upinder Singh (2012). Governing the State and the Self: Political Philosophy and Practice in
the Edicts of Aśoka. South Asian Studies 28, N º 2, 134.
39 Max Weber famously referred to Buddhism as “unpolitical and antipolitical”. Max Weber
(1958). The Religion of India: The Sociology of Hinduism and Buddhism. Glencoe, p. 206.
40 See the collective volume: Christopher S. Queen and Sallie B. King (Eds.) (1996). Engaged Bud-
dhism: Buddhist Liberation Movements in Asia. New York.
41 Donald S. Lopez’s accusation of idealizations, decontextualization, and unfounded scientifi-
cism are notorious examples of such criticism. See, e.g. Donald S. Lopez (1999). Prisoners of
Shangri-La: Tibetan Buddhism and the West. Chicago.; Cf. Donald S. Lopez (2010). Buddhism &
science: a guide for the perplexed. Chicago.; Donald S. Lopez (2012). Scientific Buddha - His Short
and Happy Life. New Haven.
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of truly international webs along with the development of globalization and new
technologies.
Contrasting with the romanticized image of spiritual masters in secluded caves
or hard to access monasteries in the middle of the mountains, prominent Tibetan
teachers, particularly High Lamas, outside Tibet are often the heads of complex,
modern, and resourceful organizations that include traditional monasteries and
schools, along with retreat and Dharma centers in both South Asia and Western
countries. They provide teachings, empowerments and so forth following the tra-
dition of their school and lineage, and at the same time they often offer courses and
teachings to an international audience (both face-to-face and online), and provide
social or community services directly or bymeans of affiliated NGOs.Many of them
travel frequently around the world, are active in the social media, have their own
Facebook page in English, and have their videos uploaded to YouTube.42
TheCovid-19 crisis has thus taken place in a context where Tibetan teachers, for-
merly offering rituals for Tibetan lay followers and education to Tibetan monastics
in loco, face an international audience, being able to convey their message, advice,
and instructions to students and followers with a varied degree of knowledge and
engagement, as well as to the general public, with a global range. To provide just an
example, the site of Lotsawa House, a virtual library dedicated to translations from
classical Tibetan, offered a list of mantras and prayers recommended by Tibetan
masters from different traditions with their corresponding links, so that practi-
tioners could easily locate resources for “protection and healing during the current
Coronavirus crisis”43.
In what follows, the public pronouncements, reactions, and advice from the
foremost Tibetan teachers are presented according to their affiliation to the main
schools of Tibetan Buddhism: Gelug,Nyingma,KarmaKagyu and Ka-Nying, Sakya,
and, finally, Bon and Rime (ecumenical).44
42 See Gregory Price Grieve and Daniel Veidlinger (Eds.) 2014. Buddhism, the Internet, and Digital
Media. The Pixel in the Lotus. New York Routlege.; Geoffrey Samuel (2017). Tibetan Religion as
a World Religion: Global Networking and its Consequences. Tantric Revisionings: New Under-
standings of Tibetan Buddhism and Indian Religion. New York, pp. 288-316.
43 It included the following warning: “Please note that several of these practices require an em-
powerment and reading transmission (lung). If in doubt, please consult a lama.” Cf. Lotsawa
House (2020). Love in the Time of Covid-19. March 16. See: https://lotsawahouse.blog/2020/03/
16/love-in-the-time-of-covid-19/
44 For an overview of each school, see John Powers (2007). Introduction to Tibetan Buddhism.
Ithaca.
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3.1 Gelug
The Gelug is the most recent among the 4 major Tibetan Buddhist schools, becom-
ing preeminent and politically dominant by the end of the 16th century. Although
its formal head is known as the Ganden Tripa, its most important leader is indis-
putably the Dalai Lama. The 14th Dalai Lama, Nobel Peace Laurate Tenzin Gyatso,
is not only a symbol of religiosity, culture, and unity for Tibetans in exile, but also
stands as a true international figure, and, as themost globally recognizable Tibetan
master, who possesses the widest reach, particularly among non-practitioners. To
provide a trivial example of his media impact, his Facebook page alone has 14 mil-
lion followers.
In mid-February, the Dalai Lama’s Office, upon the advice of his doctor and due
to the coronavirus, announced the cancellation of all his public commitments “until
further notice” in a statement communicated to CNN45. Since then, His Holiness
has had the chance to express himself in different occasions on the Covid-crisis.
His first reactions, taking place in late March, bore an institutional character.
He expressed his support while donating funds to help with the relief of those
sick and in need to both the Federal Government of Himachal Pradesh, the State
where his residence is located, and the Prime Minister of India Narendra Modi.46
On March 30, upon “repeated requests from many people around the world,” the
Dalai Lama conveyed a special message:
“Today, we are passing through an exceptionally difficult time due to the outbreak
of the coronavirus pandemic. In addition to this, further problems confront hu-
manity such as extreme climate change.
Ancient Indian tradition describes the creation, abiding and destruction of worlds
over time. Among the causes of such destruction are wars and disease, which
seems to accord with what we are experiencing today. However, despite the enor-
mous challenges we face, living beings, including humans, have shown a remark-
able ability to survive.
No matter how difficult the situation may be, we should employ science and hu-
man ingenuity with determination and courage to overcome the problems that
confront us. (…)
45 Cf. Tenzin Dharpo and CNN’s Sugam Pokharel (2020). ‘Dalai Lama cancels all public engage-
ments due to the coronavirus’. February 12. See: https://edition.cnn.com/asia/live-news/coro-
navirus-outbreak-02-12-20-intl-hnk/h_44c26bc4035ba6d1e0286237b5a19558
46 Cf. The Tribune. Voice of the People. (India). (2020). ‘Dalai Lama donates to CM Relief
Fund’. March 26. See: https://www.tribuneindia.com/news/himachal/dalai-lama-donates-to-
cm-relief-fund-61678; Cf. 2020 NDTV (2020). ‘COVID-19: Dalai Lama Donates To PM-CARES
Fund, Extends Support’. March 31. See: https://www.ndtv.com/india-news/covid-19-dalai-lam
a-donates-to-pm-cares-fund-extends-support-2203873
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For those with no stable income life is a daily struggle for survival. I earnestly ap-
peal to all concerned to do everything possible to care for the vulnerablemembers
of our communities.
I offer special gratitude to the medical staff—doctors, nurses and other support
personnel—who are working on the frontline to save lives at great personal risk.
Their service is indeed compassion in action.
With heartfelt feelings of concern for my brothers and sisters around the world
who are passing through these difficult times, I pray for an early end to this pan-
demic so that your peace and happiness may soon be restored.47''
Besides such official declarations, the Dalai Lama has been asked for his view and
advice by several mainstream English-speaking media. In an article in Time Maga-
zine, expressively entitled “Prayer is not Enough,” he declared possessing no “mag-
ical powers” that could alleviate the crisis, having to face, like all human beings,
“the suffering and the truths of sickness, old age, and death.” He pointed to the
pandemic as an example of the Buddhist understanding of the world in terms of
interdependence and appealed to a “universal responsibility” which, beyond prayer,
required truly global efforts alongside doctors and science.48 Answering the peti-
tion of The Call to Unite, an American-based 24-hour global livestream initiative in
response to the coronavirus, the Dalai Lama had the chance to stress this idea of
a global response based upon “Our human capacity to reason and to see things re-
alistically [which] gives us the ability to transform hardship into opportunity” in a
message read by Archbishop Desmond Tutu.49 On May 28th, the Dalai Lama gave
an online interview to ABC’s Dan Harris, in which he declared that his daily life
of reading and meditation had not been particularly affected by the crisis. Asked
about Trump’s management of the pandemic in America, he declared Trump’s at-
titude to be too narrow-minded for the leader of the free world, but that it was
ultimately “your (American people’s) business”. Upon his allusion to the practice of
compassion to combat anxiety, the reporter referred to the Dalai Lama as a “major
scientific figure” due to his fostering of psychologist Richard Davidson’s research
on the impact of mediation on the brain, and finished his section with a discus-
47 Cf. His Holiness the 14th Dalai Lama of Tibet (2020/1). ‘A Special Message from His Holiness
the Dalai Lama’. March 30. See: https://www.dalailama.com/news/2020/a-special-message-fr
om-his-holiness-the-dalai-lama
48 Cf. TimeMagazine (2020).’Prayer is not Enough’. April 14. See: https://time.com/5820613/dalai-
lama-coronavirus-compassion/
49 The whole broadcast streamed from 8:00 p.m. EDT on May 1 until 8:00 p.m. EDT on May
2. The Dalai Lama’s video may be watched at: https://unite.us/videos/?596. For an overview
of “The call to Unite”, see the CNBC coverage: https://www.cnbc.com/2020/05/01/the-call-to-
unite-organizer-explains-idea-behind-24-hour-livestream.html
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sion of the benefits of mediation with the conductor of the program.50 Finally, BBC
Justin Rowland was given an interview on June 13 wherein His Holiness insisted on
the “deeper human values of compassion” that are revealed when we face tragic sit-
uations, and that currently call for a global scope: “In the past there was too much
emphasis on my continent, my nation, my religion. Now that thinking is out of
date. Now we really need a sense of oneness of seven billion human beings.51”
Other references to the virus crisis were uttered in the context of varied reli-
gious events, Dharma teachings, and intellectual discussions, and so have a more
tangential character.52 Also, when expressing his gratitude for the birthday wishes
received upon his 85th birthday, he reminded that: “Climate change and the current
pandemic, which threaten us all, are challengers that teach us we must work to-
gether.” Not all statements pronounced during such a period, however, included an
explicit allusion to the virus. Arguably the most important ceremony conducted by
the Dalai Lama during the pandemic was the 2-days Avalokiteśvara Empowerment
(May 29th and 30th 2020), broadcasted with translation in 13 languages along with
the participation of tens of thousands of people around the world. At the introduc-
tion,His Holiness presented an overview of the context of the empowerment where
he referred to current social struggles like racial violence in the USA, or religious
discrimination but made no mention to the virus.53
50 Richard Davidson appeared in the interview himself stating that: “compassion practice is
anti-inflammatory, it actually decreases molecules in the body that we know are important
in producing inflammation”. Cf. ABC News Prime (2020). ‘Dalai Lama speaks out on COVID-
19’. May 28. See: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NEWqRcy-6Wg&t=1s
51 Cf. BBCNews (2020). ‘Dalai Lama: Seven billion people 'need a sense of oneness’. June 13. See:
https://www.bbc.com/news/stories-53028343?fbclid=IwAR3PN2xFONDnm7jK_
SR2G4z0kQ3gQw KUPPW7KTgcSGbDjDD6ot0Y6kcAkus
52 For example, during the dialogue with Young People from South-East Asia, the moderator
brought out the topic at stake to which the Dalai Lama responded praising the possibilities
that technology nowoffers to share one’s experienceswith others.HisHoliness the 14thDalai
Lamaof Tibet (2020/2). ‘DialoguewithYoungPeople fromSouth-eastAsia’. June 7. See: https:/
/www.dalailama.com/news/2020/dialogue-with-young-people-from-south-east-asia. He also
referred to both the medical remedy to the illness, to be found in research, and to the man-
agement of anxiety associated to it, which required the cultivation of self-confidence. His
Holiness the 14th Dalai Lama of Tibet (2020/3). ‘Mind & Life Conversation: Resilience, Com-
passion, & Science for Healing Today’. June 20. See: https://www.dalailama.com/news/2020/
mind-life-conversation-resilience-compassion-science-for-healing-today
53 The Dalai Lama was alluding to the death of African-American George Floyd at the hands of
the police on May 25, 2020, leading to massive protests and riots throughout the USA. The
empowerment videos are accessible on YouTube: “Preliminaries to the Avalokiteshvara Em-
powerment” (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iUWH3PIjZQ8), and “Actual Avalokitesh-
vara Empowerment” (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ti-L1BdhLw4). A summary is of-
fered on the Dalai Lama’s website under the titles “Preliminaries for an Avalokiteshvara Em-
powerment” (https://www.dalailama.com/news/2020/preliminaries-for-an-avalokiteshvara-
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The fact that the empowerments were to be given online raised its own con-
troversy. Tibetan teacher Tulku Orgyen Tobgyal, former member of the Tibetan
parliament in Exile, criticized the Dalai Lama and other Tibetan teachers a few
days before the Avalokiteśvara Empowerment maintaining that empowerments
and blessings required the physical co-presence of student and master, so that
online conferral was a sign of degeneration and implied a violation “destroying
the faith.” Strong reactions came not only from religious figures, but significantly,
from political leaders. The Kashag (Cabinet) led by Dr. Lobsang Sangay, the Presi-
dent of the Central Tibetan Administration, deemed the declarations “regrettable”
and “wrong,” stressing the Dalai Lama’s work spreading Buddhism worldwide and
the contextual needs during the Covid-19 pandemic.54 Comprehensive and sym-
pathetic comments were made on the matter by cabinet minister for Religion and
Culture Yuthok Karma Gelek, also a monastic, which sparked a call for his resig-
nation.55 Eventually, both Tulku Orgyen Tobgyal and Yuthok Karma Gelek ended
up apologizing and retracted their comments.56 Interestingly, during the prelimi-
naries to the initiation the Dalai Lama remarked that the same empowerment had
been given online in 2019 as an expeditious way to reach Tibetans in Tibet, thus
arguably distancing himself for the consideration of telematic technology as ex-
traordinary means for an exceptional context defined by the pandemic.
Drawing from his dual background as a former Tibetan monastic and a West-
ern scholar, as well as from his experience as translator of the Dalai Lama for a
long time, Geshe Thupten Jinpa Langri had the chance to express his views in a
live YouTube interview with Asia Society Vice President Tom Nagorski, while aim-
ing to serve as a “medium to channel the Dalai Lama’s wisdom and thoughts.” The
encounter, entitled “Coping in the Time of Coronavirus,” focused on the implemen-
tation of contemplative practices to psychologically deal with the lockdown and on
the need to reflect globally on the circumstances and challenges brought by the
empowerment) and “Webcast of an Avalokiteshvara Empowerment” (https://www.dalail-
ama.com/news/2020/webcast-of-an-avalokiteshvara-empowerment)
54 Cf. Phayul (2020/1). ‘Tulku Orgyen Tobgyal’s remarks “regrettable and wrong”: Kashag’. May
27. See: http://www.phayul.com/2020/05/27/43492/
55 Ib.
56 Cf. Tulku Orgyen Tobgyal wrote a letter declaring: “At the advice of my root guru, and scold-
ings I got from Sakya Trichen Rinpoche and Sakya Trizin, Ratna Vajra Rinpoche, they be-
ing my masters, I am withdrawing my recent words, and tendering my apology to His Ho-
liness the Dalai Lama, and appeal to him to live a long life.” (….) “Following the suggestions
of my masters, I will never again in future criticize online teachings and empowerments.”
Cf. Tibet Sun (2020). ‘Tulku Orgyen Tobgyal apologises to Dalai Lama for criticizing online
teachings’. May 31. See: https://www.tibetsun.com/news/2020/05/31/tulku-orgyen-tobgyal-
apologises-to-dalai-lama-for-criticising-online-teachings.; Cf. Tibetan Journal (2020). ‘Kalon
Karma Gelek Apologizes andWilling to Resign if Needed’. May 28. See: https://www.tibetan-
journal.com/kalon-karma-gelek-apologizes-and-willing-to-resign-if-needed/
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pandemic. Jinpa recommended a brief daily mediation practice consisting of not
denying or suppressing the negative feelings triggered by the harsh situation, such
as anger or frustration, but to observe them, breathe, and thus generate calm and
awareness.He insisted on the individual responsibility over our ownmental health,
both before ourselves and interacting with others, and stressed the need to express
gratitude to those in the frontline, like nurses and doctors.57
In his general reflection on the pandemic, he underlined how clear the no-
tions of “interconnectedness” and “uncertainty” have become undeniably perceiv-
able by everyone, though they have always been part of the human reality. To the
unprecedented global threat that the virus poses, he opposed the equally unprece-
dented interconnection granted by the Internet and New Technologies; a context in
which, he jokingly claimed, “Netflix is our savior!” He concluded drawing attention
to the deep social inequalities revealed in the impact of the virus on vulnerable so-
cial groups, and the need for socio-political structures which, beyond sheer liberal
capitalism, require the protection of basic social services, such as healthcare.58
Less known by non-practitioners and yet quite internationally influential, Ti-
betan teacher Lama Zopa Rinpoche is a pioneer in teaching Tibetan Buddhism to
Westerners from his Kopan Monastery in Nepal. In 1975 he created, along with
Lama Thubten Yeshe, the Foundation for the Preservation of the Mahayana Tra-
dition (FPMT), an impressive worldwide network currently comprising more than
160 Dharma centers in the five continents, and providing diverse services such as
education, the sale of religious objects, charitable services, and online learning.
Within the online site of the FPMT, a special page was created solely to pro-
vide “Resources for the Coronavirus Pandemic.”59 The page starts with a series of
links to the teachings and statements of His Holiness the Dalai Lama as mentioned
above, followed by Lama Zopa’s own advice. The latter contain a list of prayers and
mantras, the oral transmissions for which can also be received online, and a se-
ries of video teachings on “Thought Transformation” given from Kopan Monastery
specifically for the pandemic. Practices are divided between those aimed at protect-
ing yourself from the virus, and those aiming at protecting others; e.g. “this prayer
fromThangtong Gyalpo is to heal the disease in China and for it not to spread out
to other countries. So, it is to protect the country. And anyone in the world can
recite this prayer.60”
57 Cf. Asia Society YouTube channel (2020). ‘Coping in the Time of Coronavirus’. April 8. See:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=n_sc1SDwopg
58 He specifically referred to the disproportionate death rate of black citizens and the lack of
universal healthcare in the USA. Ib.
59 Cf. Preservation of the Mahayana Tradition (2020/1). ‘Resources for Coronavirus Pandemic’.
March. See: https://fpmt.org/fpmt/announcements/resources-for-coronavirus-pandemic/
60 Cf. Preservation of the Mahayana Tradition (2020/2). ‘Advice from Lama Zopa Rinpoche for
coronavirus’. March See: https://fpmt.org/fpmt/announcements/resources-for-coronavirus-
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TheThought Transformation video series consists of a vast collection of 50 ses-
sions (as bymid-July 2020) in English,with translations in Chinese, French, Italian,
Russian, and Spanish. The videos are available with summaries and full transcrip-
tions. Drawing from the general idea that the pandemic is a good opportunity for
practice, the teachings address both generic Buddhist topics like impermanence,
attachment, bodhicitta, and so forth, and the very specific circumstances of the
pandemic and how to respond to them.Thefirst teaching, entitled “Advice for Coro-
navirus Disease (Covid-19)” and given on March 17, begins by referring to how the
SARS pandemic (2003) could successfully be tamed by the practice of pujas (offer-
ing rituals) performed by an FPMT center in Singapore. A few days later, on March
28, a special puja was conducted in Kathmandu by Lama Zopa and other teachers to
mitigate the effects of Covid-19.61 Most of this teaching focuses on the importance
of the awareness of death, usually neglected and now triggered by the coronavirus,
and finishes with the advice of daily recitation of the Vajra Armor mantra to “not
get the disease” or “recover from it” if already infected.62 Some teachings in the
series present sickness as an opportunity to achieve enlightenment for others, an
altruism that is highlighted in the case of nurses and doctors exposed to the virus,
who will never be reborn in the lower realms. “We all must die, [he concludes] so to
die with compassion for others, this is a very good death”63. Other teachings reflect
on the ultimate causes of the pandemic,
(…) “not only the virus, but the whole thing came from themind. It came from the
mind. Theworld coming into existence, and then existing, and then degeneration,
the whole thing came from the mind.
Abhidharmakosha (v. 4.1) says: “The variousworlds came fromkarma”. (…). “All came
from your mind, but also, from there, all the sufferings came from the negative
pandemic/advice-from-lama-zopa-rinpoche-for-coronavirus/ The site also contains advice
on practices from RangjungNeljorma Khadro Namsel Drönme focusing onNölsang “Incense
Ritual by the Great Master Padmasambhava Called “The Divine Blue Water Clearing Away
Contamination”.
61 Cf. Preservation of the Mahayana Tradition (2020/2).
62 Cf. Preservation of the Mahayana Tradition (2020/2).
63 Cf. Preservation of the Mahayana Tradition (2020/3). ‘Use Pleasure and Suffering to
Achieve Enlightenment and Experience the Virus for Numberless Sentient Beings’. April
18. See: https://fpmt.org/lama-zopa-rinpoche-news-and-advice/advice-from-lama-zopa-
rinpoche/use-pleasure-and-suffering-to-achieve-enlightenment-and-experience-the-virus-
for-numberless-sentient-beings/; Cf. Preservation of the Mahayana Tradition (2020/4).
‘Coronavirus Leaves Us No Choice But to Develop Compassion and 80,000 Eons of Bene-
fits from Making Charity’. April 23. See: https://fpmt.org/lama-zopa-rinpoche-news-and-
advice/advice-from-lama-zopa-rinpoche/coronavirus-leaves-us-no-choice-but-to-develop-
compassion/
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mind, your negative mind. There is individual suffering but there is world suffer-
ing, world problems. That is called collective karma.64”
“[S]o therefore, we have to be very careful, we have to be very careful. In the past,
in the past, if you are very careful of the karma, there is no reason why the virus
has to happen, why we have to experience it, why so many people have to die in
the world. If you are careful, if from the beginning you are careful, you practice
Dharma, you are careful of karma, careful, then you don’t need to experience the
virus.” (…) “For example, there are people, there aremany people in the world who
don’t experience the virus, who don’t die due to the virus (…).65”
This series of teachings probably constitutes the main initiative of the FPMT before
the pandemic, but it is not the only one. The organization also offers several FPMT
Online Learning Center programs to “any student or center who would like to use
them” free of charge66. In May 2020, the International Merit Box Project Fund,
created in 2001 as a means to collect offerings for varied Dharma-related purposes,
was dedicated entirely to help FPMT centers to deal the crisis caused by the virus.67
Other Gelugpa teachers with relatively less reach and influence have also tried
to offer specific responses to the Covidd-19 crisis for his international followers. For
example, the Abbot of Sera Mey Monastery (Bylakuppe, India) Geshe Tashi Tsering
created a series of posts in his personal website called “Practicing Buddhism in
a Pandemic,” in which he provides updates on the management of the crisis at
the monastery and gives commentaries on teachings and prayers (namely the Lam
Rim Chenmo and Maitreya’s prayer). There is little reference to the virus besides
the generic need to not abandon one’s practice despite the circumstances.68
64 Cf. Preservation of theMahayana Tradition (2020/5). ‘All the Problems in theWorld, Including
the Coronavirus, are TellingUs to PracticeDharma’. April 21. See: https://fpmt.org/lama-zopa-
rinpoche-news-and-advice/advice-from-lama-zopa-rinpoche/all-the-problems-in-the
-world-including-the-coronavirus-are-telling-us-to-practice-dharma/
65 Cf. Preservation of the Mahayana Tradition (2020/6). ‘If We Had Been Careful of Karma,
There Would Be No Reason for the Virus to Happen’. April 25. See: https://fpmt.org/lama-
zopa-rinpoche-news-and-advice/advice-from-lama-zopa-rinpoche/if-we-had-been-careful-
of-karma-there-would-be-no-reason-for-the-virus-to-happen/
66 The Free programs offered via the FPMT Online Learning Center are: “Discovering Bud-
dhism: Module 11.Transforming Problems”; Basic Program: Mahayana Mind Training, Wheel
of SharpWeapons”, “Living in the Path”, “Living in the Path (Spanish)”, “Discovering Buddhism
(French)”. Resources for the Coronavirus Pandemic. FPMT, see: https://fpmt.org/fpmt/announ
cements/resources-for-coronavirus-pandemic/
67 US$31,368 were distributed in the spring of 2020. Cf. Preservation of the Mahayana Tradition
(2020/7). ‘The Merit Box Project’. May 15. See: https://fpmt.org/projects/fpmt/merit-box/
68 GesheTashi.org (2020). ‘Geshe Tashi’s Coronavirus Updates. Practising Buddhism in a Pan-
demic’. Consulted in July. See: https://geshetashi.org/category/geshe-tashis-coronavirus-up-
dates/
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Director of The Tibet Center Austria Geshe Tendhar gave a couple of specific
teachings aimed at the coronavirus situation, where he asked his followers to abide
by the guidelines and recommendations provided by the Austrian Government.
He also provided varied advice for non-Buddhists and Buddhist practitioners with
different backgrounds and formative experience, while asking everyone to try to
understand the situation as clearly as possible to act accordingly.69
Finally, Demo Rinpoche, Resident Spiritual Advisor at Jewel Heart (Ann Arbor,
Michigan) on April 16 announced that:
“In this moment of crisis, we have an opportunity to shift our minds from stress-
inducing consumption of upsetting news to the spiritual path.Wewill be studying
and applying the lessons of Shantideva’sGuide to theBodhisattva’sWay of Life to turn
this time of pandemic into a beneficial period.”70
The eleven teachings, delivered in English and with sparse yet explicit references
to the pandemic, can all be accessed online.
3.2 Nyingma
Considered the oldest among the four major Tibetan schools, the Nyingma tradi-
tion has never occupied a dominant political position in Tibet, and it has tradition-
ally kept a de-centralized internal structure lacking a single head of the school.71
The major lineage holders are associated with the main six monasteries (Shechen,
69 Geshe Tendhar suggested that non-Buddhists who have meditation training should bring
mindfulness to everyday life to protect oneself and others (e.g. being careful with what you
touch, being aware of physical distance, not touching your face, etc.). For those who have re-
ceived teachings on emptiness, he also suggested meditating on emptiness. For those who
have studied Traditional TibetanMedicine, he suggested focusing on strengthening their im-
mune system and avoid negative emotions. To those who have studied Buddhist psychology,
he advised to “develop a strong and peacefulmind.” Cf. Tibet Center Austria - Institute of H.H.
Dalai Lama (2020). ‘Lama Geshe TenDhar on the Coronavirus situation- March 2020’. March
18. See: https://www.tibetcenter.at/en/coronavirus-en/ Aspiration prayers dedicated to those
fighting the virus and the study of the Lam Rim Chenmo were in general recommended to
his followers. Cf. Institute of H.H. Dalai Lama (2020). ‘Our practice in difficult times – April
2020’. April. See: https://www.tibetcenter.at/en/our-practice-in-difficult-times/
70 Cf. Jewel Heart (2020). ‘SPECIAL TEACHING FOR THE CORONAVIRUS: Finding Relief through
the Bodhisattva’s Way of Life’. April. See: https://www.jewelheart.org/events/coronavirus-
finding-relief-through-the-bodhisattvas-way-of-life/
71 At the request of the Central Tibetan Administration in exile, a representative of the school
was appointed by a rotation systemof senior lamas from the six-majorNyingmamonasteries
from the 1960s until February 2020. The last appointee rejected the position and deemed it
harmful for the school. Cf. Phayul (2020/2). ‘Shechen Rabjam Rinpoche declines the position
to head Nyingma tradition’. February 2nd. See: http://www.phayul.com/2020/02/04/42548/
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Dzogchen, Mindrolling, Palyul, Kathok, and Dorje Drak), all rebuilt in exile, al-
though this internal relevance does not necessarily imply a major international
projection.
Shechen Monastery lineage holder Khyentse Yangsi Rinpoche, a young teacher
born in 1993 and reincarnation of the famous lama Dilgo Khyentse Rinpoche,
recorded an audio message for his followers that was posted on his Facebook
page. He started depicting the context of the virus in terms of the prophesies of
Guru Rinpoche on the advent of a degenerate era comprised of a kalpa of war, a
kalpa of natural disaster, a kalpa of famine, and a kalpa of major diseases. Even
if pandemics are not a new thing – he elaborated – the particular harshness of
the current one would be but a result of our own destructive behavior towards
ourselves and others, so that “we are seeing now the results of the negative seeds,
now ripening upon all of us.” Alike other teachers, he advised not to panic and
continue with one’s daily practice along with the recitation of Medicine Guru Rin-
poche mantra. His final reflection dealt with the frustration of not being able to do
something for others besides confinement and self-cultivation; he apologized: “I’m
sorry I cannot do much. I wish I could sacrifice my life with the right motivation,
and physically go and help; but since I’m not able to do that, I’m sorry”72.
DzogchenMonastery Dzogchen Rinpoche, Jigme LoselWangpo,was evenmore
incisive in his degenerate times rhetoric, claiming he had even prophesied the
virus. In Mid-March he posted on his Facebook wall:
“I want to offer you my humble and direct advice. I want to support you through
this kali yuga virus. Things look serious, but we don't need to panic. This event has
been prophesized in ancient texts and is the result of the disrespect of mother
nature, being greedy, and the lack of compassion and kindness to one another.
Mother nature is showing supernatural power beyond human, scientific, and po-
litical control. This crisis is showing us how to be respectful of mother nature and
how to be kind to one another in our one world.
I have been consulted by Tibetan Buddhist Leaders to give my thoughts.
This virus will end soon. We must confess to mother nature and request reverse
of conditions by practicing Ekazati. I had mentioned this three or four years ago
inmy teachings, and I have made a joke about how you would all survive without
toilet paper, and this is now happening.
Make sure you all take care of yourselves and your health. I feel responsible for
taking care of you.
Please take this opportunity as a home retreat or as I’m jokingly calling it a Coro-
navirus Quarantine retreat. During these days, we will be accumulating as much
72 Dilgo Khyentse Yangsi Rinpoche (2020). ‘About the current situation with Coronavirus’. Face-
book.March 21. https://www.facebook.com/shechen.cro/videos/2809514709139867/
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of the Ekazati practice as is possible, Barsam Drolsum and Dukshe Sengsum. To-
gether with both monastic and international sangha, we will do the necessary
prayers and practices for world healing and health.
I encourage you to commit to not disrespect mother nature by just taking and not
giving back.”73
(Bold emphasis added)
Mindrolling Monastery Jetsun Khandro Rinpoche is an influential female teacher
having both a monastic and Western education. In early March, she informed that
“The Verses that Saved Sakya from Sickness: A Prayer for Pacifying the Fear of Dis-
ease” had been recited at the monastery to help tame the virus and recommended
it to her followers.74 In April, at the request of her students, Khandro Rinpoche
recorded a video announcing the compliance with the lockdown at her monastery,
praising the government and health workers, and hoping everyone was careful and
safe. She stressed that Buddhist practitioners should notmake a great deal of being
isolated, but cherish the opportunity to keep one’s practice in a yet deeper fashion:
“this is a wonderful blessing and an opportunity”. Finally, she encouraged the look-
ing out for those in need of support and help75; and so, her monastery donated 1.6
million rupees to several Indian state governments and provided food and sup-
plies to the local community.76 The notion that no special practice was needed was
stressed on her personal website, where instead of particular instructions, a post
entitled “Practicing in Times of Adversity” from 2018, was reposted77. Nevertheless,
she deemed it appropriate to make teachings on “Turning Suffering and Happiness
into Enlightenment” available online, and her summer program was substituted by
a 2-week online course on Longchenpa’sThe Great Chariot.78
73 Cf. Message fromHis Eminence the 7th Dzogchen Rinpoche (2020). Facebook. March 21. See:
https://www.facebook.com/DzogchenBuddhism/ Rinpoche also has international followers
and centers in Europe, America and Australia, but there is practically no online informa-
tion besides this message. His international groups may be checked at “Gyalwa Dzogchen
Sangha”, See: http://www.dzogchen.org.in/sangha.
74 The prayer was allegedly composed by Thangtong Gyalpo at the time of a seemingly untam-
able infectious disease. Ringpa (2020). ‘Dedicating our Dharma Practice to the Coronavirus’.
March 10. See: https://www.rigpa.org/rigpa-news/2020/3/10/6civjuaj6w2pt4qtzo0pl6rlne71ko
75 Cf.Mindrolling Jetsün Khandro Rinpoche (2020). ,Advice for the COVID-19 situation’. YouTube.
April 10. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uWJWunQgtyc
76 Cf. Khandro Rinpoche (2020/3). ‘Mindrolling Aids in Pandemic Relief Effort’. Facebook. April
14. See: https://www.khandrorinpoche.org/mindrolling-monastery-aids-in-pandemic-relief-e
ffort/
77 Cf. Khandro Rinpoche (2020/2). ‘Practicing in Times of Adversity’. (Originally posted on
November 21, 2018). Facebook. March 24. See: https://www.khandrorinpoche.org/practicing-
in-times-of-adversity/
78 Cf. Ringpa (2020/2). ‘Online Teachings with Jetsun Khando Rinpoche’. Facebook. April 12.
See: https://www.rigpa.org/upcoming-events/2020/4/12/online-teachings-with-jetsun-khand
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The Nyingma lineage holders from the other three “mother monasteries” were
significantly less vocal regarding the pandemic, at least their international follow-
ers and public79; whereas other teachers with a dual Nyignma and Kagyu affilia-
tion and arguably a more global projection were more active and communicative
towards their audience, as we shall see in the next section.
A last figure is worth including here: the aforementioned protagonist of the
controversy on the Dalai Lama’s online empowerments, Orgyen Tobgyal Rinpoche,
who is a Nyingma rituals expert, formermember of the Tibetan Parliament in exile,
and amateur actor. In his YouTube Channel, he uploaded a video in Tibetan with
his “Advice in the time of COVID-19,” where he described the pandemic as a result
of the 5 poisons disturbing people’s minds and thus creating an imbalance in the
5 primary elements. Though he recommended to follow the scientists and doctors’
advice, he also argued that:
“Since the main point is ‘mind’, if your mind remains relaxed, the outer and in-
ner disturbance of the primary elements and the epidemics caused by the mind
will be pacified (…) If your thoughts are pacified naturally, all sickness will also be
pacified.”80
He recommended praying to the Triple Gem, i.e. Buddha, Dharma, and Sangha,
and to Guru Rinpoche, as well as reciting “Pacifying the Turmoil of the Mamos,”
since the kind of disturbance that causes epidemics is caused by an agitation in the
minds of Dakinis and Mamos (female spirit-deities). Above all, he concluded, the
most important thing is to relax.81
ro-rinpoche; Cf. Khandro Rinpoche (2020/4). ‘Mindrol Lekshey Online: Curriculum Review
and Teachings’. Facebook. July 13. See: https://www.khandrorinpoche.org/mindrol-lekshey-onl
ine-2020/
79 Palyul Monastery Penar Rinpoche’s seat in exile, Namdroling Monastery donated Rs. 10
lakh to PM CARES Fund (Cf. Star of Mysore (2020). ‘Penor Rinpoche Charity Foundation Do-
nates Rs.10 Lakh Towards PM CARES Fund’. April 17. See: https://starofmysore.com/penor-
rinpoche-charity-foundation-donates-rs-10-lakh-towards-pm-cares-fund/ ); while his inter-
national network published a special advice for the 2003 SARS and none for the covid-19. (Cf.
Palyul Ling International (2020). ‘Advice: Dealing with the 2003 SARS Outbreak’. February
3. See: https://palyul.org/wp/1456-2/). Khatok Monastery Lhoga Rinpoche succinctly recom-
mended the practice of Gotrab during the virus crisis (Cf. Nyignma Kathok Buddhist Cen-
tre (2020). ‘Practice for theWuhan Corona Virus’. March. See: https://kathok.org.sg/practice-
for-the-wuhan-corona-virus/). Finally, Dorje Drak Monastery (the throne holder of which is
still to be recognized in his latest reincarnation), also announced a donation of ₹ 1, 30,000
to HPSDMA COVID-19 state disaster response fund. The official letter may be consulted
on the monastery’s Facebook page (See April 20, 2020: https://www.facebook.com/dorje-
drag/?rc=p ).
80 Cf. Orgyan Tobgyal YouTube channel (2020). ‘OT Rinpoche's advice in the time of COVID-19’.
March 19. See: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=g4TX8U7BGTw&t=194s
81 Ib.
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3.3 Karma Kagyu and Ka-Nying
TheKagyu, literallymeaning the “oral lineage” because of its emphasis on direct oral
transmission, has the Karma Kagyu as its largest school, arguably thanks to their
unbroken line of reincarnate lineage holders known as the Karmapas, relevant and
influential figures within the whole Tibetan Buddhist tradition.The recognition of
the last Karmapa, following the death of the 16th in 1981, gave rise to a dispute be-
tween two aspiring candidates, Trinley Thaye Dorje and Ogyen Trinley Dorje, both
of whom have been publicly performing the role within their own organizations
and counting on diverse support.
Trinley Thaye Dorje, enthroned in Delhi as the 17th Gyalwang Karmapa in 1994,
was probably the first high lama to publicly react before the virus crisis in an official
letter published by the end of January. Therein he recommended his followers to
stay at home and get together for streaming practice sessions, and argued that:
“the many and various kinds of obstacles that we face, such as natural disasters,
wars, infectious diseases, and famines that keep occurring are the infallible con-
sequence of our collective and individual karmas.
Nevertheless, because of our lack of deep conviction about this, we tend to deny
the causality of our actions and their results when we encounter difficult chal-
lenges. (…). Or, wemay consider all of the problems we face as the result of bad
policies in our societal systems, or erroneous scientific views or other negative
developments. (…) This is wrong.
In general, this all happens as a result of not being able to come to terms with
the fact that, no matter how frequently we experience joy and happiness in this
world, the suffering of birth, ageing, illness, and death come side by side, just as
the body and its shadow walk together. Whatever suffering occurs, it is impor-
tant to identify its root. In the Buddha’s teachings, there is the system of tracing
the origin of our suffering in our karma and afflicting emotions (…).
Engage in the six sessions practice of day and night, be heedful to sustain your-
selves on white food, and spend your time doing practices such as Nyungne, or
similar practices.”82
(Bold emphasis added).
A shorter official letter was published in March where he stressed the need to take
all due precautions and particularly to avoid panicking, since “the core sickness is,
in my opinion, both a mind filled with anxiety about the disease, and a tendency
82 Cf. Karmapa (2020/1). ‘Coronavirus: Karmapa’s message for dharma centres and practition-
ers’. January 29. See: https://www.karmapa.org/coronavirus-karmapas-message-for-dharma-
centres-and-practitioners/
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to wrongly think that we should never become sick or die”83. Other incidental or
more direct allusions to the pandemic may be found in a section in his personal
website where the Karmapa shares his reflections and provides answers and ad-
vice requested by his students. A key idea here is the perception of the virus as a
“blessing in disguise” bringing people together; a notion qualified by the lives lost
and the harshness faced by countless individuals.84
On the economic front, inMid-April, he announced donations to the Indian and
Bhutanese Governments to help address the pandemic and encouraged “everyone
to practice whatever form of generosity you can – no matter how limited your
financial means may be.”85
Ogyen Trinley Dorje, enthroned as the 17th Karmapa in 1992 at Tsurphu
Monastery (Gurum, Tibet), is endorsed by the Dalai Lama and has more interna-
tional visibility and political weight. His first public reactions to the virus appeared
in a video on his Facebook page aimed at reflecting on the proper response to
protect sentient beings from wars, famine, and plagues. He insisted that barely
acknowledging the news was not enough, so that one should ask “what can I do to
help?” and work “according to our own abilities and capacities,” even if they come
down to just making aspirations.86
His main stance, though, was articulated in Mid-April and built upon the no-
tions of impermanence and prayer. The Karmapa insisted that we are prone to
smoothly embrace impermanence when we envisage changes aligned with what we
want, but get paralyzed when they take a different turn. Instead, we should con-
template ourselves and “use this crisis to improve ourselves and learn something
new.” As Buddhists, he proposed a series of prayer sessions to show support and
appreciation to those on the frontline, and “for world peace and for the pandemic
83 Cf. Karmapa (2020/2). ‘Coronavirus: Karmapa’s new message’. March 19. See: https://www.
karmapa.org/coronavirus-karmapas-new-message/
84 Cf. Thaye Dorje, His Holiness the 17th Gyalwa Karmapa, reflects on the pandemic, and intro-
duces his responses to questions from student”. In Karmapa (2020/3). ‘Meditations for our
Times’. July 15. See: https://www.karmapa.org/meditations-for-our-times/
85 Cf. Karmapa (2020/4). ‘Karmapa donates 14.6 million rupees to Covid-19 relief funds’.
April 26, See: https://www.karmapa.org/karmapa-donates-14-6-million-rupees-to-covid-
19-relief-funds/; Cf. Karmapa (2020/5). ‘A further donation was announced in May:
“Karmapa donates 500,000 rupees to West Bengal for Covid-19 relief”. May 11. See:
https://www.karmapa.org/karmapa-donates-500000-rupees-to-west-bengal-for-covid-19-
relief/.
86 He also recommended the recitation of Thangtong Gyalpo’s prayer, The Verses that Saved
Sakya from Sickness: A Prayer for Pacifying the Fear of Disease, the same recommended by
Khandro Rinpoche (2020/1). ‘The Gyalwang Karmapa's Advice Regarding Covid-19’. Facebook.
March 19. See: https://www.facebook.com/karmapa/
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to be quelled.”87 Thus, from April 18th, he started leading a series of weekly-cycled
online prayers with a different practice each day.The choice of prayers and the cor-
responding explanation is of interest since esoteric or supernatural elements are
given a symbolic contextual value. For example, “A Prayer for Rebirth in the Pure
Realm of Sukhāvatī” is not explained as a supplication to be reborn in a joyful and
heavenly Pure Land as opposed to our common world, but as a call to reflect on the
causes and conditions that create our world and thus develop an environmental
conscience and attitude that would help preserve it. Similarly, the malicious spir-
its targeted by “Appeasing the Discord of the Mamos” “could be understood as the
natural environment arising in the form of inner goddesses,” so the mantra would
represent an aspiration “to remedy our imbalances and disharmony with the natu-
ral environment.” Interestingly, at the explanation to the same mantra, he claimed
that “some experienced Tibetan doctors” can cure the virus, though insisting that
prevention was crucial: “A protection cord around your neck or a blessing pill will
not be of any help if you then rush off to a large gathering of people88.”
Besides the Karmapas, as mentioned above, several teachers belonging to both
the Kagyu and Nyingma lineages, and thus sometimes referred to as Ka-Nying,
have managed to attain a notable international relevance. We shall here focus on
Kathmandu-based Yongey Mingyur Rinpoche and Chokyi Nyima Rinpoche.
Mingyur Rinpoche has a wide net of centers around the world (more than 50
Meditation andCommunity Groups on five continents),managed under the label of
Tergar.89 Due to the lockdown, the organization made available online their group
practices conducted by instructors, 4-days retreats, and the inclusion of sick rela-
tives in the daily practices of senior lamas.90 Mingyur Rinpoche’s initial reflection
87 Cf. Kagyu Office (2020). ‘A Message from the Gyalwang Karmapa About the Coronavirus
Pandemic’. April 14. See: https://kagyuoffice.org/a-message-from-the-gyalwang-karmapa-
about-the-coronavirus-pandemic/
88 Karmapa (Ed.) (2020). Prayers for a Time of Pandemic. Compiled and Introduced by the
Seventeenth Gyalwang Karmapa Ogyen Trinley Dorje. Dharma Ebooks, pp. 178-179, 237-238.
The whole list of prayers follows this order: 1) The Heart Sutra with the Repulsion of Maras;
2) The Noble Aspiration for Excellent Conduct & The Sutra in Three Sections; 3) Sutras of the
Dharani of Akshobhya; 4) Praises on the Twenty-One Taras with Benefits; 5) Supplications of
Guru Rinpoche; 6) A Prayer for Rebirth in the Pure Realm of Sukhāvatī; 7) Selected Dharani
Mantras, The Prayer that Saved Sakya from Illness, and Appeasing the Discord of theMamos.





89 It comprises: Tergar Meditation Communities and Practice Groups, Tergar International and
Tergar Asia.
90 Cf. Tergar (2020). ‘Covid-19 message’. See: https://tergar.org/covid-19-message-2/. The re-
treats are as follows: Nectar of the Path: Teachings on the Path of Awakening Online Retreat
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centered on the idea that no matter the circumstances “the most important thing
is our mindset” and to let go without giving up before the ups and downs of life.91
From the end of March, he started broadcasting a series of teachings addressing
spiritual and mental strategies not only to cope with the pandemic and the lock-
down, but to turn the situation into a profitable learning experience.92 The videos
turned out to be a success, Rinpoche’s YouTube channel reaching almost a quarter
of a million subscribers. In a somehow summary session entitled “10 Life Lessons
We Can Learn from Coronavirus” (25 May), Rinpoche drew a parallelism between
our tendency to focus on our faults while overlooking our qualities, and our need to
overcome such propensity and look into positive aspects of the pandemic. Accord-
ing to him, there would be 10 aspects that could actually be better cultivated and
improved thanks to the virus lockdown: interpersonal relationships, spirituality,
self-discovery, health and cleanliness, the environment, new discoveries, medical
treatments, resilience, meditation, and education93.
From a ritualistic perspective, and despite having declared in June 5th that Bud-
dhism is not a religion but a science of the mind, on July 22nd Mingyur Rinpoche
participated with other important lamas in a “42 fire pujas to subdue the Covid
virus and the unrest and turmoil in the world, as well as liberate and bless goats
from the butchers.”94
Chokyi Nyima Rinpoche also leads a net of international centers for Buddhist
Studies and Meditation known as Gomde Centers and Dharma Houses95. His
greatest international asset, though, is probably the Kathmandu-based Rangjung
(July 25-28); Exploring the Nature of Mind: Deepening Recognition – Online Retreat (August
1-4); Dzogchen: The Path of Natural Liberation – Online Retreat (August 8-11). “Mingyur Rin-
poche’s Schedule”, https://tergar.org/mingyur-rinpoches-schedule/.
91 Cf. Yongey Mingyur Rinpoche (2020/1). ‘Message on COVID-19 outbreak’. YouTube. March
15. See: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DgZETpd9h5s&feature=youtu.be&fbclid=IwAR3
A-LmqPj6EhU4q3kOZBTvTzdlflgOJ41IFFvd8jh66_S4pY26GuM_IFA8
92 The Live Teaching sessions offered on YouTube include: Living with distress (March
29); Transforming Anxiety into Awareness (April 5); How to Turn Tough Times into
Growth and Development (26 April); Living in a Pandemic: How to Transform Depres-
sive Thinking (17 May); 10 Life Lessons We Can Learn from Coronavirus (25 May); Equa-
nimity in Uncertain Times (1 June). Cf. Yongey Mingyur Rinpoche YouTube Channel,
see: https://www.youtube.com/user/MingyurRinpoche, and Tergar Meditation Community
YouTube Channel, see: https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCQPdChAO9IoHRio2WMGJJzA
93 Cf. Yongey Mingyur Rinpoche (2020/2). ‘10 Life Lessons We Can Learn from Coronavirus’.
May 25. See: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=i9M50dGK4PQ&feature
=youtu.be&fbclid=IwAR11eRUs2X4dZCVb7eR9wZbNdu2K2OV-
yAhX_DE3NT1T9prNurA43cJjFGI
94 Both quotations extracted from his official Facebook page, see: https://www.face-
book.com/mingyur.rinpoche/
95 Cf. its webpage: Shedrub. The Online Home of Chokyi Nyima Rinpoche, see: https://shedrub.
org/
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Yeshe Institute. Modelled upon Rinpoche’s ideal of the “scholar practitioner,” it
offers academic degrees on Buddhist Studies and Himalayan languages combing
modern Western methodology and traditional Tibetan teachings.96 Rinpoche’s
first reactions in March focused on encouraging compliance with social distancing
and lockdown measures, to take the opportunity to practice and study, and to take
“mendrub” (blessing pills) everymorning with water on an empty stomach.97 Public
announcements in April turned the attention towards the material relief of local
daily workers and their families in dire straits channeled through Rangjung Yeshe
Shenpen, Rinpoche’s social work organization98. In the same month, a collection
of teachings was made available online, discounts were offered on the Tara’s Triple
Excellence Online Meditation Program, and the whole teaching activities of the
Institute were also moved online.99
Chokyi Nyima’s longest and most detailed statement on the pandemic was an
online teaching given at the end of June entitled “Kindness is the Best Medicine
during Mental and Physical Distress.” Rinpoche pondered upon the notion that no
matter the level at stake (individual, familiar, social, and so on), problems always
arise as a consequence of not following “Natural Law”, that is, the 5 Buddhist pre-
cepts (no killing, no stealing, no sexual misconduct, no lying, no consumption of
intoxicants). In all circumstances, the cultivation of sīla (moral conduct), samādhi
(meditaion), prajñā (wisdom), and particularly karuṇā (compassion), are the so-
lution for a life free of suffering. Besides these basic Buddhist tenets, Rinpoche
96 Cf. its webpage: Rangjung Yeshe Institute, see: https://www.ryi.org/
97 He particularly recommended reading Buddhist hagiographies and accumulating the
mantra of Bhagavatī Parṇaśavari, “who is associated with healing and the curing of con-
tagious disease”. Facebook post by Chokyi Nyima Rinpoche, published on March 15, 2020,
https://www.facebook.com/Chokyi.Nyima.Rinpoche/; also “Dharma Teaching and Some
Short Advice”, video posted on March 22, 2020, Ib.
98 E.g., Rinpoche’s Facebookpage announced thedelivery of relief hamperswith essential items
(April 1st), and expressed gratitude towards those who had contributed to the social project
with their donations and volunteering work (April 13th). Ib. Managed by Rangjung Yeshe
Shenpen’s directorMélanie Létourneau, the campaign can be accessed at “Food relief for poor
families in CoVid-19 Lockdown-Nepal”, see: http://www.shenpennepal.org/program/covid-rel
ief/
99 Facebook posts dating from April 11 and April 15, 2020. See: https://www.facebook.com/
Chokyi.Nyima.Rinpoche/. The compilation of dharma talks may be found at “Shedrub
Mandala Online Dharma Resources”, April 14th 2020, see: https://shedrub.org/news/on-
lineresources/?fbclid=IwAR0l4y1TYkdClrJ3pfvPwnOOeFvjuDt5lXhw0bmhLypx6AGleS54-
XNXunA. Tara’s Triple Excellence Online Meditation Program may be accessed at
https://dharmasun.org/tte/. Rangjung Yeshe Institute also offered a series of recom-
mendations to deall with “the challenges of online learning”, “emotional challenges of the
Covid-19 crisis and “a sense of loss during the Covid-19 outbreak”, available at “Support
during the Covid-19 Crisis”, Rangjung Yeshe Institute, see: https://www.ryi.org/support-
during-the-covid-19-crisis.
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insisted on the importance of respecting other religions while claiming, similarly
to Mingyur Rinpoche, that Buddhism would be the religion that matches Science
best.100
3.4 Sakya
The fourth major Tibetan Buddhist school is called Sakya, meaning “pale earth,”
a reference to the landscape of its founding monastery near Shigatse. The throne
holder of the school, known as Sakya Trizin, is a position hereditarily passed down
through male members of the Khön family, which had a leading political role dur-
ing medieval Mongol rule over Tibet.
The current Sakya Trizin, Ratna Vajra Rinpoche, is the 42nd in the succession
lineage and assumed the position in 2017 from his retiring father, Ngawang Kunga
Tegchen, under a new appointment system. The 41st Sakya Trizin established rele-
vant monastic and learning centers in Nepal and India, like the Dzongsar Institute,
the Sakya College, and the Sakya Institute, and still remains active as a religious
public figure.The international net of Sakya centers around theworld is particularly
strong in English-speaking countries, namely, the USA, where the Sakya Trizins
possess a Seat near New York.101
OnMarch 12, the Sakya Trizin emeritus gave an oral online transmission of “The
Prayer Which Saved Sakya from the Epidemic,” recommended by teachers from
other schools cited above.102 The first major pronouncement of the Sakya Trizin
took place in an interview for Tibet TV on April 7, in which he stressed the “global
effort” required by the crisis, the need to follow medical guidelines, tame our af-
flictive emotions, and pray for the recovery of all patients.103 The following day, a
donation to the Chief Minister of Uttarakhand was announced.104
100 Cf. Shedrub (2020). ‘Kindness is the best Medicine during mental and physical distress’. June
30 See: https://shedrub.org/news/onlineresources/?fbclid=IwAR0l4y1TYkdClrJ3pfvPwnOOeFvj
uDt5lXhw0bmhLypx6AGleS 54-XNXunA
101 For a whole list of Sakya centers, see: “Sakya Worldwide” at: http://www.sakyaling.de/sakya-
asia/.
102 Cf. Sakya Dolma Phodrang’s Facebook post, dating form March 15, 2020. See: https://www.
facebook.com/pg/sakya.dolmaphodrang/posts/
103 The interview may be accessed at the YouTube page of TibetTV under the title “His
Eminence 42nd Sakya Trizin Ratna Vajra Rinpoche on COVID-19”. April 7, 2020. See:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KuLWyPFWKlQ. A summary may be found at the web-
site of the Central Tibetan Administration under the heading “Sakya Trizin Rinpoche
espouses oneness of humanity on the time of Coronavirus pandemic”. April 9, 2020.
See: https://tibet.net/sakya-trizin-rinpoche-espouses-oneness-of-humanity-in-the-time-of-
coronavirus-pandemic/
104 See the Sakya Dolma Phodrang’s official Facebook publication from April 8, 2020: https://
www.facebook.com/pg/sakya.dolmaphodrang/posts/
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In May a special issue of the Sakya periodical publication called Melody of
Dharma was dedicated to the pandemic-driven lockdown, containing advice from
the main teachers of the school and a collection of mantras and practices. The
editorial dwelled on the notion of the pandemic context as a “precious oppor-
tunity” to both cultivate ourselves and discover new ways to communicate with
each other and practice solidarity105. In his article, the Sakya Trizin emeritus
encouraged people not to panic, to find refuge in the Triple Gem, and to follow
medical instructions since, he elaborated:
“Will prayers, visualizations and mantra recitations be sufficient to carry us
through? These, of course, are of huge benefit, but it is also of major importance
that we strictly observe the recommended rules of personal hygiene and social
distancing. (…) We should pray to these deities, chant their mantras and recite
their prayers. I believe that by doing so, we will successfully be saved from this
pandemic, and find happiness.106”
The current Sakya Trizin, who referred to the Buddhadharma as a medicine for
negative thoughts, argued that
“All these problems are caused by our own karma, and we should respond to
them by taking good care of our own health, by cultivating positive thoughts,
and by pacifying this virus by reciting prayers and mantras. (…) As the great
bodhisattva Shantideva said in his Bodhicharyavatara, we should practice
equality, which means that we are all the same and we should care for each
other (…); we should extend our focus and pray “May all beings be free from
suffering.107”
His brother Khöndung Gyana Vajra Sakya Rinpoche was blunter in categorically
refuting the idea that
“just chanting themantras, we will be cured, or that we can do whatever we want.
Thinking that we can just chant themantra and everything will be fine, is a wrong
view. And there are unfortunately some people who hold this view, that if we pray
105 “From theEditors”, inMelodyofDharma.APublicationof theOfficeof SakyaDolmaPhodrang
Dedicated to the Dharma Activities of His Holiness Sakya Gongma Trichen Rinpoche AndHis
Noble Family. N. 19. Special Lockdown Issue, May 2020; downloadable from: http://hhsakya-
trizin.net/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/Mod-19.pdf
106 Gongma Trichen Rinpoche (2020). Bringing Obstacles Into the Path. In Melody of Dharma.
A Publication of the Office of Sakya Dolma Phodrang Dedicated to the Dharma Activities of
His Holiness Sakya Gongma Trichen Rinpoche AndHis Noble Family. N. 19. Special Lockdown
Issue, p. 6.
107 Cf. Sakya Trizin (2020). Courage in the Face of Illness. InMelody ofDharma.APublication of the
Office of Sakya Dolma Phodrang Dedicated to the Dharma Activities of His Holiness Sakya
Gongma Trichen Rinpoche And His Noble Family. N. 19. Special Lockdown Issue, p. 7-8.
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and recite mantras, we will be safe from the virus. (…) We have to start by tak-
ing care of ourselves, taking all the precautions necessary to keep safe. Only then
will prayers be effective, helping us emotionally and keeping us strong with their
blessing108”.
This value of prayers as an emotional aid or confidence boost did not entail a mis-
trust in the illness-dispelling efficacy of rituals, since invocations of the Goodness
Parnashavari were performed by Sakya teachers from February through April and
an online Parnashavari empowerment was bestowed online by Gongma Trichen
Rinpoche on April 17th, relying on its “extremely powerful” capacity of “vanquish-
ing of contagious illnesses”109.
3.5 Bon and Rime
Besides the 4 major schools covered so far, the Buddhist Tibetan world broadly
speaking also comprises the followers of the indigenous religion of Tibet, known
as Bon, that developed in a reciprocal influence with Buddhism andwas recognized
as the 5th school by the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan Government in exile in 1988;
as well as teachers embracing a non-sectarian or ecumenical approach, known as
Rime (W. ris med).
The Head of the Bon school, Lungtok Dawa Dargyal, the 34th Menri Trizin Rin-
poche, released a succinct message on his website asking his followers no to panic,
take precautions and follow the guidelines of the World Health Organization. He
also informed that his sangha was praying to the protectors for a swift eradication
of the disease110. His Monastery in Dolanji made donations to the PM Cares Fund
and Himachal Pradesh COVID-19 Response Fund.111
The most interesting initiative from the Bon side, however, was the organiza-
tion of a Cybersangha event hosted by Geshe Tenzin Wangyal Rinpoche reuniting
108 Cf. Khöndung Gyana Vajra Sakya Rinpoche (2020). Keeping A Positive Mind In the Midst Of
Suffering. In: Melody of Dharma. A Publication of the Office of Sakya Dolma Phodrang Ded-
icated to the Dharma Activities of His Holiness Sakya Gongma Trichen Rinpoche And His
Noble Family. N. 19. Special Lockdown Issue, p. 11.
109 Cf. Office of Sakya Dolma Phodrang (2020). ‘Dharma Practices to Counter the Ongoing Pan-
demic. The Practice of Parnashavari’. InMelody of Dharma. A Publication of the Office of Sakya
Dolma Phodrang Dedicated to the Dharma Activities of His Holiness Sakya Gongma Trichen
Rinpoche And His Noble Family. N. 19. Special Lockdown Issue. May, pp. 19-20.
110 Cf. Lungtokling (2020). ‘Covid-19: Message from His Holiness Lungtok Dawa Dargyal, Menri
Trizin 34 Rinpoche’. Blog. March. See: https://www.lungtokling.org/index.php/en/blog/159-co
vid-19-message-from-his-holiness-lungtok-dawa-dargyal-menri-trizin-34th-rinpoche
111 See the post of April 6, 2020, on the Facebook page of the Yungdrung Bon Monastic Centre
Society: https://www.facebook.com/ybmc.society/posts/on-this-day-of-6th-april-2020-his-hol
iness-the-34th-menri-trizin-rinpoche-and-me/3411898062171675/
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teachers from six different spiritual traditions of Tibet.This ecumenical encounter
took place on June 7 2020 via Zoom and was later uploaded to several digital plat-
forms. In his presentation, the host alluded to the will to follow the Dalai Lama’s
advice to adopt a non-sectarian (Rime) attitude and open a dialogue with other tra-
ditions, particularly in a context of growing racism and discrimination.112 Pönlop
Trinley Nyima Rinpoche (Bon) referred to the Tibetan exile as both an opportunity
and obligation as religious leaders to spread the Dharma around the world: “if we
pray together”—he claimed—“it will transform into something tangible and influ-
ence the community”. All teachers started by praising the ecumenical initiative and
reciting a prayer from their own traditions, after which they gave a teaching con-
cerning the pandemic. Yongey Mingyur Rinpoche (Kagyu), the first to intervene,
delivered a teaching on the Bardo (transitional state) of dying and death and the
possibility to choose to be reborn in the Pure Land. Sogan Rinpoche (Nyingma) also
addressed the topic of the Bardo and thanked technological progress and globaliza-
tion for allowing the preservation of Buddhist teachings. Khenpo Gyurmey Dorjee
(Sakya) labelled the pandemic as a completely new phenomenon caused by human
misconduct, not by nature’s dynamics, and referred to internal transformation as
the only way out since politicians’ approaches never succeed. Gyaltsab Rinpoche
Choekyi Nangpa (Jonang) recommended approaching the crisis from the perspec-
tive of the 4 noble truths, in order to understand our suffering and be able to do
something about it. Finally, Yangten Rinpoche (Gelug) sustained that the pandemic
was created by an imbalance of the 4 elements and recommended as a solution the
practice of the Medicine Buddha sadhana, which are not only words but have a
transforming power.113
Possessing a wide non-sectarian education, SOAS alumnus, film-maker, pro-
lific author, and sponsor of the most ambitious translation project of Tibetan
canonical texts, Dzongsar Khyentse Rinpoche is one of the most interesting and
controversial lamas today. Openly expressing political views and frequently resort-
ing to humor and irony, his Facebook page is anything but dull. For example, in
late February he posted a video showing how he was celebrating Losar (the Tibetan
New Year) by drinking cow urine he had ordered from Amazon to tease PM Modi
and Hindu leaders’ claims that it served as a cure for the coronavirus. The same
tenor was used a couple of months later in a letter to the famous environmental
activist Greta Thunberg where, after stating that the virus was “doing the job
112 The broadcast in Tibetan (144 minutes long) may be accessed at the CyberSangha web-
site under the title “Teachings & Prayers for the Pandemic from Six Spiritual Traditions of
Tibet”. See: https://cybersangha.net/prayer-for-pandemic/?fbclid=IwAR1Uer-PGffNFyVMj1XU
yDyhsGbEkcjR2VR7p9h1 C4G HEYAE1f1sp6ujsMg. An English audio translation is available
at: https://mixlr.com/ligmincha-in-english/showreel/teachings-prayers-for-the-pandemic
113 Ib.
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for (her)”, since it would sooner or later be over, it would be a great idea to ask
everyone to stop drinking Coca Cola every Friday.114
Politically, he openly condemned Western countries for their sanctions on Iran
in the very fragile context of the pandemic and referred to the US as “lower than
a beast”; moreover, he was probably the only Tibetan teacher to publicly criticize
governmental measures: upon the announcement of the lockdown in India byMid-
March, he reacted with an “apology accepted” post, asking the government to feed
the poor and provide a better internet connection.115
Not all of Rinpoche’s reactions had this playful character. He also asked his
sangha to pray “to pacify physical andmental pain” caused by the virus and thanked
those who participated in the project to illuminate the Mahabodhi Temple in Bod-
hgaya “in this bleak time”116. Support to his followers was also shown in the creation
of a Spotify playlist to deal with isolation117. At the same time, in an interview with
Bhutanese Kuensel, Dzongsar Khyentse confessed that, though as a Buddhist prac-
titioner and teacher he had fairly studied and written on impermanence, “when the
Covid-19 hit, I saw those teachings hadn’t really entered my heart, and that I’d been
teaching them without totally believing them”.118 He also admitted living with the
“anxiety of the unknown,” to deal with which he resorted to his Buddhist practice.
From a socio-political angle, he observed how countries quickly resorted to blaming
each other, instead of cooperating, and that the statistics show how the lowering
of contamination levels in India due to the lockdown “will save far more lives than
those lost to Covid-19”119.
Finally, from a more philosophical perspective, he offered an interesting inter-
pretation of the abovementioned “mamos” in relation to the pandemic. He argued
that it is due to our lack of understanding of emptiness and non-duality that all
problems arise. This lack of understanding leads to extremist views and to a dis-
respect of the 5 elements (which are no other than the 5 Dakinis), for example, by
114 Posts on the official Facebook wall of Dzongsar Jamyang Khyentse (February 24, April 29).
See: https://www.facebook.com/djkhyentse/
115 Posts on the official Facebookwall of Dzongsar Jamyang Khyentse (March 14,March 15,March
21, April 2). See: https://www.facebook.com/djkhyentse/
116 See the announcement on the website of the Dzongsar Khyentse Chokyi Lodro Institute,
February 5. 2020. See: http://dzongsarinstitute.org.in/en/2020/02/05/announcement/. Cf. “Il-
luminating the World”, post at Siddhartha’s Intent website, April 11, 2020. See: https://www.
siddharthasintent.org/about-us-2/news/2020/illuminating-the-world/
117 The list, which includes artists like Sam Cooke and Nina Simone, is entitled “Dzongsar
Jamyang Khyentse Rinpoche playlist for lockdown during Covid-19 pandemic”, and is avail-
able at: https://open.spotify.com/playlist/4vLPkOuyfSBUfgQWuFVwu1?si=vr9hIaN3-QmuXiW
S4_1if0w
118 Cf. Kuensel (2020). ‘Things aren’t looking good. But there’s a lot we can do’. April 29. See:
https://kuenselonline.com/things-arent-looking-good-but-theres-a-lot-we-can-do/
119 Cf. Kuensel (2020).
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means of excessive greed, and that is what is meant by the “wrath of the mamo”: “in
Buddhism, we don’t generally believe in some sort of evil spirit there that’s harm-
ing the world”. He thus advised Buddhist practitioners to be friends with the 5
elements, rely upon the 3 Jewels, and, if having the proper transmission, practice
“Appeasing the Mamos,” without failing to comply with all scientifically-grounded
guidelines.120
4. Conclusions: External Compliance and Internal
Non-Excluding Narratives
The data collected in this study show, first of all, a general compliance with the dis-
course and policies of political institutions before the pandemic, namely preventive
measures of social distancing and isolation as established by healthcare bodies and
recommended by the scientific community. In contrast, for example, with certain
North American evangelical groups, there has been no questioning of the nature
and dangers of the virus or of the enforced measures.121 Tibetan religious leaders’
first typical reaction, having their main monasteries in India, has been of endorse-
ment of the state and federal authorities, to which they offered donations (direct
material involvement in social action has been less common), support and praise
of healthcare workers, and a general request of obedience of official guidelines. In
this regard, it is important to consider that Tibetan lamas often made their first
public statements at the request of the Tibetan Government in Exile, as explained
by the 42nd Sakya Trizin.122 At the same time, they have emphasized a need of
unity, dwelling on the idea of all humankind facing a global threat, and made a
call for interreligious and interracial harmony. Consequently, there has not been,
at least in the public discourse of the leaders of each and every school, any sec-
tarian or radical attitudes putting the blame of the pandemic on certain religious
groups or ethnicities. This contrasts, for example, with the anti-Muslim rhetoric
120 Cf. Siddhartha’s Intent YouTube Channel (2020). ‘Understanding non-duality: ad-
vice from Rinpoche for today and beyond’. March 17. See: https://www.you-tube.
com/watch?v=RbUp7iGrKqQ&feature=youtu.be&fbclid=IwAR1g46NszzZHBL_p4G-
UQjVdGWv9015IPUAb6FFKTX0w0lEebRq09cs Cx0q8
121 Cf., e.g., Peter McLaren (2020). Religious Nationalism and the Coronavirus Pandemic: Soul-
Sucking Evangelicals and Branch Covidians Make America Sick Again. Postdigital Science and
Education, 1-22.
122 Cf. Sakya Trizin (2020). Courage in the Face of Illness. InMelody ofDharma. A Publication of the
Office of Sakya Dolma Phodrang Dedicated to the Dharma Activities of His Holiness Sakya
GongmaTrichen RinpocheAndHisNoble Family. N. 19. Special Lockdown Issue, p. 6. TheGov-
ernment in Exile also encourage their functionaries and Tibetans around the world to con-
tribute to Coronavirus relief funds, see: https://tibet.net/kashag-appeals-cta-functionaries-
and-tibetan-worldwide-to-contribute-to-coronavirus-relief-funds/
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found in Indian officials or the globally spread anti-Asian racism and xenophobia
denounced by the United Nations.123
Internally, the discourse developed by Tibetan teachers may be addressed by
the alternatives presented and “allowed” by their scriptures, interpretations, and
philosophies. And so, regarding the context of the pandemic, it may be interpreted
as yet another regular manifestation of our impermanent and suffering-marked
reality, or as an exceptional scenario, a never-seen-before threat that stands as a
clear sign of humanity living in degenerate times. The question of the causes, even
if ultimately a non-fortuitous problem of human agency, may be tackled from a
merely material biological perspective, or acquire clear moral connotations (not
following the 10 virtuous actions or the 5 precepts), a philosophical-spiritual di-
mension (ignorance of the ultimate nature of reality), or an esoteric approach (the
wrath of spirit-deities). As a result, solutions or responses also vary, including health-
care precautions, ethical behavior, calm-abidingmeditation, or prayers and rituals.
This plurality is not internally considered as creating tensions or demanding
exclusivism. This may be understandable, at least, because of the compatibility of
the elements (mishandling of animals is both a biological and a moral issue) or be-
cause they simply operate at different levels. Also, depending on the perspective,
seemingly excluding characteristics are deemed compatible: the context of the pan-
demic is both regular and exceptional depending on the point of view. This does
not, of course, entail that an external questioning of the employed elements and
their correlations may not be undertaken (one may deny the capacity of pujas to
tame the pandemic or argue that animal cruelty cannot per se explain a disease),
but that is not our concern here. In this study, we have observed how different
teachers choose to privilege certain elements in their rhetoric, but they take good
care not to explicitly exclude or condemn others. This is especially revealing in the
complex matter of esotericism and the value of rituals and prayers, which touches
upon deep philosophical and ontological problems within Buddhism. On the one
hand, there is this idea that practice helps us be calm and focused, and also gives
us courage, but that prayer is no counterfeit to the virus and the “mamos” are but
a metaphor for our relationship with nature; on the other hand, there is this call
for rituals, for specific prayers that can tame the virus and appease real evil forces
unleashed by humans. The fact that both takes can be found in the very same dis-
course one after the other is telling of the complex situation of a tradition catering
123 Cf. New York Times (2020). Indian officials are blaming an Islamic group for spreading the
virus, andMuslimshavebeen targeted in awaveof violence. India, Coronavirus FansReligious
Hatred. April 12. See: https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/12/world/asia/india-coronavirus-m
uslims-bigotry.html; Cf. Human Rights Watch (2020). ‘Covid-19 Fueling Anti-Asian Racism
and Xenophobia Worldwide’. May 12. See: https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/05/12/covid-19-
fueling-anti-asian-racism-and-xenophobia-worldwide
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for both a native and an international audience in a context where Science arguably
tends to hold, so far, the epistemological monopoly.
This intricacy may also be observed in the controversy surrounding the online
conferral of empowerments, significantly raised by drawing from accusations of
“degeneration”.There seems to be room for such an intellectual questioning or dis-
cussion within an esoteric tradition based uponmaster-disciple connections, while
canonical sources could potentially allow a millennialist reading of the situation.
The explanation of the lack of a backed-up fundamentalist reaction obviously in-
volves multiple and complex reasons, but I would argue that at least two elements
bear decisive importance. Firstly, as Keyes pointed out for the case of Buddhist
Thailand, “millennial movements are caused primarily by a crisis centering around
political power,”124 which is absent: the Tibetan Government in exile and the Ti-
betan religious elite promptly reacted in defense of a socio-politically charismatic
figure which symbolizes unity. Secondly, as explained above, technology and mass
media have been a key feature in the preservation and spread of Buddhism around
the world. As the Dalai Lama cared to point out, “going online” was not an excep-
tional measure for an exceptional time, but an already implemented and widely
used resource. What is more, the virus is depicted as a “blessing in disguise” allow-
ing more people than ever to access teachings and practice Dharma thanks to the
combination of general Internet usage and confinement.
In conclusion, it may be argued that a religion that fosters introspection and
meditative practices in solitude, that encourages a serene acceptance of adversity,
and that has been globally consolidated thanks to the Internet and new technolo-
gies, may be particularly suited to deal with a pandemic scenario basically calling
for people to stay at home, be calm, and wait until everything is over.
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Dismantling Prejudices on Muslim Communities
in Italy in Times of Pandemic:
not just Religious Fundamentalism
Barbara Lucini
Abstract
This contribution aims to offer a reflection on the role that perceptions and cultural
aspects of a crisis, such as that cause from the Covid-19 virus can generate in ethnic
communities such as the Muslim one.Through a qualitative methodology of online
research, the chapter explores the dynamics of perception and interpretation of the
relationships between possible exploitation of the pandemic by Islamic extremism
and theway inwhich theMuslim community in Italy is facing the crisis fromCovid-
19.
 
Keywords: Covid-19 crisis, Religious fundamentalism, Terrorism threat, Crisis
Management
1. Introduction
The current pandemic caused by the Covid-19 virus has put in place important re-
flections on the latent and previous vulnerabilities and criticalities of the affected
societies.
A pandemic as a global crisis highlights the many social, cultural and politi-
cal characteristics of the management system that must deal with health security.
Management systems in each country are affected by the organisational and cul-
tural differences through which the pandemic has been addressed. In this context,
Lakoff reminds us that:
“The objective of global health security is to detect and contain the outbreak of
a novel pathogen before it can spread to become a global catastrophe. But the
various technical and administrative measures gathered together as part of this
diagram should not be understood simply as direct responses to a growing num-
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ber of emerging disease outbreaks; rather, these measures function to constitute
a given situation as an emergency, one that requires an urgent and rapid collective
response. In other words, it is not the inherent characteristics of a given disease
outbreak but rather the classificatory schema as it combines with the techniques
and politics of global health security that makes the vent a candidate to become
an official emergency.”1
This statement highlights that crisis management systems, particularly those aris-
ing from a type of health risk such as the one from Covid-19, have important cul-
tural influences and an impact on the previous vulnerabilities of the affected soci-
eties.2
Moreover, the current situation of global crisis underlines how an important
role in the definition of the concepts of emergency and crisis is also dictated by the
subjective perception of the various actors involved, which in turn is influenced by
social characteristics and cultural factors.
In this sense, the interpretation of the threat is long a continuum that has at
its extreme opposites, the sense of security and the perception of vulnerability.
In accordance with this general perspective of crisis management, it becomes
interesting to explore and understand how perceptions of both in and out groups
had a specific influence on the definition and perception of religious fundamen-
talism in Italy in time of pandemic.
Since the end of February 2020, Italy has been one of the European countries
most affected by the epidemic caused by the Covid-19 virus.
At the same time, a few days after the first epidemic wave and a convulsive
initial emergency management, some news proposed by the media, focused on
international scenarios and in particular on how ISIS could exploit this moment of
criticality, perhaps planning attacks in Europe.
The theme was very interesting because it shifted the cultural attention of the
audience from the national level, of the contingent crisis and located in specific ter-
ritorial areas, to the international one, while relating two different types of threats,
the health one linked to the Covid-19 virus and the one linked to the ISIS organi-
zation.
For these reasons, it was considered important to explore the dynamics related
to the perception and construction of certain public images, with particular refer-
ence to the Muslim community in Italy, with the ultimate aim of understanding
whether the association ISIS, terrorism and Muslims were still present or if new
narratives present in the different pandemic context had taken place.
1 Andrew Lakoff (2017). Unprepared: Global Health in a Time of Emergency. Oakland: University of
California Press, p. 6
2 Cf. Ilan Kelman (2020). Disaster by Choice: How Our Actions Turn Natural Hazards Into Catastro-
phes. Oxford: OUP.
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This exploration and analysis used a qualitative methodology, with specific ref-
erence to the virtual ethnography framework. This approach has been chosen for
a variety of reasons, including: having a strong multilayer and multi-sited conno-
tation; to focus on the cultural aspects of the definition, representation and inter-
pretation of the pandemic and its side or collateral threats such as those related to
extremisms.
The added value of this writing is to explore the dimensions of perception and
interpretation of the same phenomenon, at the time of a global crisis such as the
pandemic from Covid-19: understanding socio-cultural dynamics: collective per-
ceptions and interpretations is an indispensable tool of analysis to govern a global
crisis and its times of uncertainty.
2. Italian Muslim Community, the Covid-19 Pandemic and its features
The situation of the ItalianMuslim community is one of the most complex to delin-
eate, as it serves the double nature present in much of the collective imagination,
for which Muslim means terrorism.
Unfortunately, historical references take root on September 11, 2001, when the
first associative narratives of being Muslim with being a terrorist settled down3.
Following that dramatic event, acts of Islamophobia and prejudice against the
Muslim community took place, in the United States, but also in other European
countries.
In Italy this happened time later, as the largest presence of Muslims was of
Moroccan origin, but still first generation.
In 2018 in Italy, it is estimated that there were about 2.6 million Muslims or
about 4 percent of the total population. These data come from estimates between
different agencies and statistical institutes4, as the complexity of the legal situation
(immigrants, asylum seekers, Italian citizens) of Muslims leads to some different
systemizations.
According to the same Author5 most Muslims come from: Morocco, Albania,
Bangladesh, Pakistan, Egypt, Tunisia, Senegal, Macedonia, Kosovo and Bosnia. In
particular, there has been a greater presence from Eastern Europe in recent years.
As regards the image of public opinion, it is based on the following socio-po-
litical and cultural lines:
3 Cf. Lori Peek (2010). Behind the Backlash: Muslim Americans After 9/11. Philadelphia: Temple
University Press.




a) a political component that has developed narratives that promote the vi-
sion of Muslims as invaders and promoters of a cultural clash between the
West and the East
b) a part of the population, which has instead promoted a pervaded vision
of welcome, solidarity and coexistence, considering for example in this group
thosewho Italians have converted to Islamandhave becomeabridge between
the various ethnicities and religions as well as part of this group supports the
vision of the centrist political component and the radical left wing and
c) a part of the population supporter of themore far-right political component,
which supports the invasion and vision of Muslims as largely terrorist people.
This latter orientation is particularly present when new arrivals of migrants or how
many terrorist attacks are needed, especially in Europe, as the perception of attacks
abroad is different also due to different media coverage.
In this context of public narratives, their perceptions and interpretations, the
demands carried out by Muslims in Italy are essentially three:
a) the recognition of certain places of worship and cultural associations as reli-
gious bodies
b) to which the construction of new mosques is associated and
c) the contrast to forms of Islamophobia.
With regard to the first two points, various representatives of the Islamic cultural
associations and mosques present in Italy, are in dialogue and seeking a solution
for the recognition and reference legislation aimed at the management of this is-
sue.This is not an easy action, as is the community, places of worship andmosques
appear extremely fragmented and difficult to define legally.6
The third point, on the other hand, relates to the socio-political dimensions
of the relationship between the indigenous population, Muslim immigrants and
converts.
The data presented by the Vox-Osservatorio italiano sui diritti, concerning the
Map of Intolerance project, shows us how the theme of Islamophobia expressed
mainly through social networks (Twitter in particular) is crucial for the realization
of a more tolerant and inclusive society.
The data collected and analysed by Vox-Osservatorio italiano sui diritti related
to islamophobia in Italy, practiced through online intolerant and hateful messages
6 Cf. Antonio Cuciniello (2017). Luoghi di culto islamici in Italia: tipologie e dati. Fondazione
ISMU Iniziative e Studi sulla Multietnicità. See: https://www.ismu.org/wp-content/uploads/201
7/05/Cuciniello_paper_luoghi-di-culto_aprile-2017.pdf
Dismantling Prejudices on Muslim Communities in Italy in Times of Pandemic 225
via Twitter, highlights how Muslims are the most affected category after women.7
Later versions of this working progress project show that the trend related to Is-
lamophobia is constantly on the rise, with specific spikes when dramatic events
such as terrorist attacks or crimes committed by Muslims both in Italy and abroad
occur.
At the geographical level, the most violent online messages of an Islamophobic
nature are present throughout the country, with a greater presence in large cities
and a lower spread in the south.
What is interesting to note is that the intolerant or hateful words associated
with the interpretation of Muslim as a threat are the following but fundamen-
talist: jihadist, Moroccan, cutthroat, Bedouin, Abdullah. These words reveal how
some part of the collective perceptions on Muslims are based on the cultural in-
terpretation of news and experiences rather than a reflection from a more general
perspective or a geopolitical level where it was supposed to place the definition of
fundamentalist.
From this overview we can understand how the Muslim presence in Italy is
characterized by a multiplicity of currents of perceptions and interpretations,
which are partly the mirror of the complexity and multidimensionality of the
Muslim community more generally.
An interesting perspective about the sense of Muslim community is provided
by Guolo:
“Making community is the most immediate response to the need to reproduce
Islam in a cultural and religious context different from the original; but it is also
the product of the social construction of groups that self-represent themselves
as guardians of tradition and oppose the individual paths of individual Muslims,
destined to lead, according to those same groups, to secularization.”8
According to this definition, the Author9 also highlights the relevant matter of rep-
resentativeness of Islam in Europe and it is also valid for Italy and for its political
dimensions.10
7 See: http://www.voxdiritti.it/islamofobia-musulmani-terroristi/
8 Cf. Renzo Guolo (2016). Sociologia dell'Islam. Religione e politica. Milano: Mondadori. Original
text in Italian: “La comunitarizzazione è la risposta più immediata alla necessità di riprodurre l’islam
in un contesto culturale e religioso diverso da quello originario; ma è anche il prodotto della costruzio-
ne sociale di gruppi che si autorappresentano come custodi della tradizione e si oppongono ai percorsi
individuali dei singoli musulmani, destinati a sfociare, secondo quegli stessi gruppi, nella secolarizza-
zione.” Cf. Renzo Guolo (2001). Il campo verde: strategie islamiche in Italia. Limes. See: https://
www.limesonline.com/cartaceo/il-campo-verde-strategie-islamiche-in-italia?prv=true, 2001
9 Cf. Guolo (2016).
10 Fabrizio Ciocca (2019). L’Islam italiano:Un’indagine tra religione, identità e islamofobia.Mimesis.
Milano: Sesto San Giovanni.
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Furthermore, Guolo offers a systematization of themultidimensional complex-
ity of Islam such as follow:
»Islam of States«, promoted by the governments of Islamic countries and associa-
tions linked to them; That of the »Islam of mosques«, promoted by transnational
organisations that are often opposed by the governments of many Crescent coun-
tries orwhohave no close ties to them; »Fraternity Islam« that is structured around
the figure of a master or a tradition.”11
Another specific point of view about the relationship among Muslims, their iden-
tities and Italian State is that proposed by Cahouki12who reflect on the sense of
identity of the Muslim community in Italy, which it recognizes to be complex and
fragmented. An important aspect that the Author emphasizes is the relationship
with the Italian State, for which he wants continued respect from the Muslim pop-
ulation in Italy, as a religious duty for Muslims.13
In these national frameworks it becomes interesting to explore how the per-
ception of “threat” linked to the image of the Muslim was contextualized during
the period of the pandemic and what narratives were produced to the virtual envi-
ronment of social networks and national mass media.
The consideration of transcultural and trans -geographical perceptions makes
it clear that the overlapping of the image of the Muslim with that of the terrorist
is predominantly determined by the exposure to information related to ISIS and
its possible attacks: from a socio-psychological perspective it is interesting to note
that this form of prejudice is born not spurious but in the overlap of two images
and interpretations such as that of the Muslim and the belonging to ISIS.
A push and driving factor in this overlap has been the focus on the more or
less resilient strategies put in place by ISIS as well as statements about Islam’s
interpretation of the pandemic.14
Just as the scientific community appeared divided about the origin, evolution
and effects of the Covid-19 pandemic, even experts and geopolitical analysts have
been at odds about the concrete possibility of ISIS using the pandemic to organize
and carry out attacks around the world.
11 Cf. Guolo (2016), p. 190: Original text in Italian: «islam degli stati», promossa dai governi dei
paesi islamici e da associazioni a esse legati; quella dell’«islam delle moschee», promossa da
organizzazioni transnazionali che spesso sono all’opposizione dei governi dimolti paesi della
Mezzaluna o che non hanno stretti legami con essi; quella dell’«islam delle confraternite»,
che si struttura attorno alla figura di un maestro o di una tradizione.
12 Khalid Chaouki (2018). I musulmani d’Italia vogliono essere italiani. Roma: Limes, Gedi.
13 Ib.
14 See: https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/isis-offensive-exploits-pandemic
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For instance, Hanna15 sustains the effective exploitation of pandemic and its
consequences by ISIS, depicted also a sophisticated level of the attacks in Iraq and
Syria.
The same was valid for Williams looking at a wider international framework
and capacity of exploitation:
“A U.S. Department of Homeland Security bulletin in late March warned that the
Islamic State’s newsletter had called for attacks on U.S. and European health care
targets that are strained by the pandemic. The Islamic State has ordered its follow-
ers not to travel to Europe,where the virus outbreak is farworse than in theMiddle
East. But the group has suggested that its followers who are already in Europe ex-
ploit the chaos, calling for “new strikes … similar to the strikes of Paris, London,
Brussels and other places” where followers have used bombs and firearms to kill
dozens of people in recent years.
The Islamic State is even suggesting that killing “infidels” could be a way for fol-
lowers to protect themselves from the virus, stating, “They should also remember
that obedience to God – the most beloved form of which is jihad – turns away the
torment and wrath of God.”16
From the opposite perspective, Depretis17 highlighted the fact that ISIS was inef-
fective to exploit the pandemic and its related vulnerability at international level,
to plan and carry our deadly attacks.
This view of the issue of ISIS and international Muslims is also reflected in the
public image and media coverage during the pandemic in Italy.
An interesting analysis through google trends in the time span 21/02/20 –
23/06/202018 shows how the spike in interest in the ISIS and pandemic issue
occurred on March 13, when the national press focused on the spread by ISIS of a
leaflet for the prevention of contagion.
It is useful to note that the correlation was reported using the word jihadist
and therefore connoting according to a precise meaning the news itself and its
interpretation.
15 Cf. AndrewHanna (2020). ISIS Offensive Exploits Pandemic. See: https://www.wilsoncenter.org/
article/isis-offensive-exploits-pandemic
16 Cf. Brian GlynWilliams (2020). Islamic State calls for followers to spread coronavirus, exploit pan-
demic and protests. See: https://theconversation.com/islamic-state-calls-for-followers-to-sprea
d-coronavirus-exploit-pandemic-and-protests-136224








The same was true on 12 May 2020, where news about ISIS, Iraq and Covid-19
were released by international agencies.
With regard to the situation of Muslims in Italy, it is confirmed that the char-
acteristics of the context before the pandemic caused by the Covid-19 virus affected
not only the perceptions of such crises, but also the interpretations, thus going to
better delineate the specific fragmentary and complexity of the Islamic experience
in Italy.
3. Methodology
The methodological approach that was used for this analysis is qualitative and
mixed, consisting of different types of online methods.
It must be also considered that in the context of the Covid-19 pandemic, no face
to face or personal meetings were allowed, for this reason a “distanced research” 19
approach was chosen.
Moreover, due to the inner and complex nature of the issues explored, a virtual
multiple – site (Evans, 2010) approach was preferred as well as the multilayered
definition of the virtual world and the cross- matching data provided by Beck (2004).
The main aim of this methodology is to disclose the webs of meanings Geertz
(1973) and how a social issue have been framed in different cultural contexts (Hine,
2000).
The general methodological approach can be placed under the framework of
the virtual ethnography and it is composed of the following tools, methods and
analysis:
An exploratory questionnaire from selected Muslim representatives of Italian
Mosques and Italian Islamic cultural centres. Its main aim was to understand the
interpretative categories for the analysis of the phenomenon, considering the
answers such as a driver for the combined analysis with the other information
collected. This perspective was also supported by what Geertz identified such as
“webs of meanings”.
Desk research, secondary data collection through online open source: articles and
documents on the topics of the research; Facebook Page of Mosques and Italian
Islamic cultural centres; post on Twitter.
The online open sources were searched according to the following keywords, where
possible both in Italian and English: islamophobia; ISIS; Daesh; Covid-19; coron-
avirus; Muslim(s).
19 LeightonEvans (2010).AuthenticityOnline:UsingWebnography toAddress Phenomenological Con-
cerns. NewMedia and the Politics of Online Communities. Oxford: Mousoutzanis, Riha, p. 13.
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The online open sources were collected in a time span from 20 February 2020
to 24 June 2020.
In addition, the criteria of relevance and relevance with respect to the topic
covered by the data were also used for the collection of sources.
A secondary data analysis as well as a manual content analysis about the infor-
mation collected through open source were carried out.
The virtual ethnography was conducted considering both the open source sec-
ondary data collection and the information found out by a key informant, playing
also the role of gatekeeper for the collection of questionnaire: his figure was es-
sential to understand and interpret the phenomenon from a cultural perspective
of the Italian Muslim community.
4. Exploratory questionnaire on the topics of the phenomenon20
The online questionnaire was sent through the key informant, who is an important
figure to connect with the people representing the reference community of the
current research fieldwork.
The people were selected to deepen the characteristics of the fieldwork and
those of the themes that were to be studied. In addition, they were chosen in ac-
cordance with increased activity in the Italianmosques and Islamic cultural centers
in Italy as well as according to the role they have in the environments of mosques
and cultural centers.
The questionnaire was divided into two parts:
one on the socio-demographic aspects and
the other on the aspects of the Covid-19 pandemic.
The total number of responses is 20, 4 people are women and 16 are men and repre-
sent from a geographical and cultural perspective, the fragmentation of theMuslim
community in Italy.
Startingwith the analysis of the socio-demographic section, interesting aspects
emerge.
Themost representative country of origin isMorocco with 15 responses; 1 Egypt;
3 Italy; 1 Tunisia/Hungary. This trend is also present in the more general statistical
data, which report that the Moroccan community is one of the most present in
Italy.21





These data have to be compared with the following, which relate to the years
lived in Italy, specifically:
14 years, one person
15 years, two people
20 years, four people
36 years, one person
24 years, one person
32 years, one person and
ten people born in Italy.
Two important aspects emerge from these answers:
the trend of theMoroccan community is also confirmed by the years in which peo-
ple live in Italy. In fact, theMoroccan community is one of the oldest located in Italy
many decades ago and
the discrepancy of the data, between the ten people born in Italy and the three
who indicate as the country of origin Italy, find their explanation in being of Mo-
roccan origin.
The third question concerned the city of origin and the answers represent the va-
riety and landscape of the Muslim community in Italy:
a person from Arezzo
a person from Avellino
a person from Belluno
a person from Torino
a person from Oleggio
two people from Pesaro
two people from Verona
two people from Ravenna
two people from Roma
three people from Torino
a person from Treviso
person from Umbertide
a person from Vicenza and
a person from Volla.
The data demonstrate the geographical variety of the Muslim presence in Italy and
highlight the absence of reply from Lombardia Region. This can be explained in
two ways:
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a) Lombardy was the most affected region since the Covid-19 epidemic started
and had difficulties in managing the emergency and crisis. It is possible that
people, even if they received the questionnaire, did not intend to answer.
b) The absence of a region such as Lombardy, refers to the pattern of the presence
of the Muslim community in small towns in Italy, which will occur in a special
question in the next section.
The last question of this first section concerns the role played within the mosque
or cultural centers, which is in direct relation to the selection of the profiles of the
interviewees.
17 people replied in total:
three volunteers
one imam
one member of the youth group
one board member
two people without a role. One of them specified by writing that there is no role






The second section specifically covers some aspects of the perception of the Mus-
lim community from the outside and from newspaper in relation to the Covid-19
pandemic.
The first question concerned the definition of a pandemic, which was defined
from 14 people as follows:
a virus
frustration
restrictions of displacement freedom
a moment of reflection
a mercy and a blessing of Allah
a crisis that caused irrationality
a test




The answers demonstrate a variety of thinking within theMuslim community, with
multiple nuances of definition and interpretation that vary frommore scientific to
religious aspects.
The second question concerned the consideration of ethnic minorities (e.g. in
linguistic and cultural aspects) of religious minorities during the crisis manage-
ment of the pandemic.
19 people replied and 47.4 percent answered that religious minorities were not
considered, while 52.6 percent considered religious minorities.
The rift in the answers to this question is understandable in light of the knowl-
edge of the difficulties faced by the Muslim community for two reasons:
Measures of restrictions for the management of the pandemic have prohibited
meetings inmosques andplaces ofworship: this situation similar to somanyother
collective activities.
The problems and difficulties faced by the Muslim community for the burial of
their members in relation to the procedures promoted after the pandemic.
These reasons are therefore the basis of this division in the responses.
The third question was more generally about the perception and assessment of
the effectiveness of crisis management in Italy.
The answers are thus divided: 20 percent believe that it has been inadequate,
50 percent think it has been adequate; while 25 percent considered it effective and
5 percent ineffective.
The number of responses for the most positive, which consider crisis manage-
ment effective and adequate for 75 percent is in line with the previous question
where a majority of respondents said they had not noticed discrimination against
religious minorities during the first months of the pandemic.
A very interesting topic is the one introduced by the fourth question, which
focuses on the fact that some international and Italian media, in the early days of
the pandemic, talked about how and if ISIS could exploit the pandemic for possible
attacks.
The answers to this question have been very varied, bringing out the complexity
of mutual perception on this specific and important issue.
In particular, this phenomenon has been considered as follows:
a defamation campaign
an attack by the media
ignorance
the target wants to be told this
never heard of it
never heard of it, indeed positive focus on the Muslim community
to divert public opinion
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because theyʼre ignorant, ISIS isnʼt all Muslim
because Islam is being exploited
they always try to connect something to Muslims
typical journalistic terrorism
want to make listens and focus attention on a well-known theme
they had nothing else to write about and
the attempt increase fear.
The variety of responses highlights some interesting aspects including:
Six people have never heard of it and this can be explained in the dual meaning
that either they are exposed differently to traditional international and national
media or had no interest in the subject of this question.
Other responses reveal some of the best-known theories of media communica-
tion, such as the gate keeper function, the agenda setting or the way in which
news (both linguistically and stylistically) is presented to the public.
Another reflection concerns the role of the audience which appear to be passive
and waiting to meet previous expectations.
It is also interesting the talk about the purpose of putting fear, referring to the
terrorist framework especially for the language used.
The fifth question is related to the previous one and wants to be more precise about
the possibility of ISIS exploiting the crisismoment due to the Covid-19 pandemic to
carry out attacks in European countries.The 19 answers are 73.7 percent no, while a
26.3 percent yes: this percentage of responses are in line with those of the previous
question and especially with the broader overall picture that wants to consider ISIS
as one of various types of extremist threats.
The sixth question aims to focus on the phenomenon of solidarity on the part
of the Muslim community, which has spread as a phenomenon through social net-
works and where it has been most widespread.
The result is the following: “55 percent think in small towns, while 45 percent in
large cities”, representing the dual soul of the Muslim community in Italy and its
presence even in the small provincial realities.
Linked to this question is the following that wants to bring out the definition
of solidarity:
70 percent believe it is a universal human act
25 percent think it is a religious action and
5 percent see it as an act of belonging to the nation where you live.
The answer that defines solidarity as a universal human act is interesting, because
in addition to obtaining the majority of responses, it also indicates the neutrality
of cultural or ideological visions that could guide the previous definition.
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The penultimate question focuses on the perception of prejudice by the Muslim
community during the first months of the pandemic: 75 percent said they did not
feel prejudiced; 15 percent do for their religion and finally 10 percent yes for their
ethnicity.
Although themajority of responses indicate a lack of perception of prejudice, 25
percent indicate some form of prejudice related to either their ethnicity or religion:
communication in this context played a fundamental role.
The last question concerns the role that solidarity actions promoted during the
pandemic may play in reducing and limiting prejudice towards the Muslim com-
munity. 95 percent think they are useful for this purpose, while 5 percent do not.
The analysis of this exploratory survey reveals some important dimensions,
which will be the common thread and the interpretive lens of the next open source
analysis:
Mass media (mainly international) narratives in time of pandemic: connecting
ISIS and the Covid-19 pandemic. Especially, the possibility by ISIS to exploit the
Covid-19 pandemic for their attacks.
Ethnic and cultural crisis management: few considerations of ethnic groups dur-
ing crisis management
Ethnic and Muslim Identity; national sense of belonging
the Covid-19 pandemic and its interpretation both religious and cultural and
Muslim community solidarity.
All of these listed aspects have been addressed and analysed in the open source
analysis of social media and social networks.
5. Findings from open source and secondary data analysis22
The exploratory analysis of the questionnaire revealed some interesting trends,
which will be discussed then in light of the results that emerged from the open
source analysis.
Online open source data collection focused on various types of data, such as
those from newspapers in their online editions and those instead of social net-
works.
The collection of online open data was possible through the use of certain key-
words such as: ISIS, pandemic, Muslims, Covid-19, coronavirus, terrorism, extremism.
There are 105 items collected, including some in English by relevance criterion.
The harvest took place in the period of time from February 20, 2020 to June 24,
2020.
22 See Annex 1 – Online News.
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From a methodological perspective, a manual content analysis was conducted,
looking for the recurrences not only of words, but especially of themes and content.
Moreover, the theoretical background of this analysis lies on the key principles
of news framing, social media coverage and agenda setting applied in the online
environment.
This is especially valid with regard to the way in which the social media and
social networks users narrate certain phenomena and events, especially referring
to the issues of prejudice, ethnic and religious differences.
For instance, Hostile media bias describes how people with strong attitudes about an
issue believe that media intentionally slant stories against their side or in favour of the other
side (Vallone et al., 1985). 23
This topic is in line with the narrative dynamics of the treatment of discrimi-
natory phenomena against Muslim people, as well as hate speech or hate online.
As Weberling McKeever24 points out, the role of the media in the perception
and interpretation of immigrants is real: Mass media have a role in shaping people’s
perceptions of immigrants and immigration (Kellstedt, 2003), serving as sources for learn-
ing about national trends and policy proposals (Kim, Carvalho, Davis, &Mullins, 2011).25
Furthermore, despite different tools made available to the new online commu-
nication environment and different figures such as that of the influencer, certain
communication strategies and narrative methodologies find themselves applied
also to the wider context of social media and social networks.
The theme in question is aimed at a specific area such as that of a correla-
tion, between being Muslim and being a terrorist, in the potential development of
prejudices and stereotypes. The news in this case can be a push factor: News about
terrorism may increase prejudiced attitudes toward outgroups.26
23 Robert P. Vallone; Lee Ross and Mark R. Lepper (1985). The hostile media phenomenon: Bi-
ased perception ofmedia bias in coverage of the Beirutmassacre. Journal of Personality and So-
cial Psychology 49, 4. Cited in Brooke Weberling McKeever, Daniel Riffe, & Francesca Dillman
Carpentier: Perceived Hostile Media Bias, Presumed Media Influence, and Opinions About
Immigrants and Immigration. Southern Communication Journal, Vol. 77, No. 5.
24 McKeever, Riffe and Carpentier, 2012, p. 3.
25 Cf. Paul Kellstedt (2003). Themassmedia and the dynamics of American racial attitudes. NewYork:
Cambridge University Press.; Cf. Kim Sei hill, John P. Carvalho, Andrew Davis and AmandaM.
Mullins (2011). The view of the border: News framing of the definition, causes, and solutions
to illegal immigration. Mass Communication & Society 14, 292 - 314.; Cf. McKeever, Riffe and
Carpentier, 2012, p. 3.
26 Enny Das; et al. (2009). How terrorism, news reports increase prejudice against outgroups: A
terror management account. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 45(3), 453-459; cf. Luwei
Rose Luqiu, and Fan Yang (2018). Islamophobia in China: news coverage, stereotypes, and
Chinese Muslims’ perceptions of themselves and Islam. Asian Journal of Communication, 28:6,
6.
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As for the polarizing dynamics that promote Islamophobia and the influence
of media coverage:
“Many studies attempt to trace the origin of Islamophobia by examining represen-
tations of Islam and Muslims in the news media. One study on the British media
suggests that British Muslims are portrayed as ‘un-British’ and ‘deviant’, themes
that can be linked to the development of racism (Saeed, 2007). The British me-
dia tend to focus on British Muslims as a terrorist threat (Moore, Mason, & Lewis,
2008). A study on British newspapers from 1994 to 2004 concludes that Muslims
were portrayed as a threat to Western values (Poole, 2004), and British newspa-
pers have been criticized for biased reporting, disseminating propaganda, and
promoting Islamophobia, practices that lead to anti-Muslim sentiment (Richard-
son, 2004).”27
This general mass media frame points out theoretical orientations, which are
proper also in the context of virtual and online communications.
Especially, two aspects need to be taken onto account:
how the information is framed by the online users;
how information, beliefs or thoughts are disseminated through social media and
social networks, in reference to what can be defined as a diffusion chain:
“Media attention lends legitimacy to the voices and frames – the conceptions and
organizations of information that help us understand the world around us –-that
are chosen to be featured (Bekkers, Beunders, Edwards, & Moody, 2011). Media
coverage also amplifies incidents and ideas by providing a platform to spread
certain positions and perspectives to a broader audience (Bekkers, Beunders, Ed-
wards, and Moody, 2011). This platform is further expanded by members of the
public disseminating media amongst themselves (Nacos, 2002).”28
After having combined both theoretical and methodological insights, the analysis
demonstrates the recurring themes and narratives, which go to implement the per-
27 Ib..; Cf. Amir Saeed (2007). Media, racism and Islamophobia: The representation of Islam and
Muslims in the media. Sociology Compass, 1(2), 443-462.; Cf. Kerry Moore, Paul Mason and &
Justin MatthewWren Lewis (2008). Images of Islam in the UK: The representation of British
Muslims in the national print news media 2000 - 2008. Cardiff School of Journalism,Media and
Cultural Studies.; Cf. Elisabeth Poole (2004). Islamophobia. In E. Cashmore (Ed.). Encyclopedia
of race and ethnic studies. New York: Routledge.
28 V. Bekkers, H. Beunders, A. Edwards and R. Moody (2011). New media, micromobilization,
and political agenda setting: Crossover effects in political mobilization and media usage.
Information Society, 27, 209-219.; Cf. Brigitte L. Nacos (2019).Mass-mediated terrorism. Oxford:
Rowman& Littlefield.; Cf. ErinM. Kearnsa, Allison E. Betusb and Anthony F. Lemieuxb (2019).
Why Do Some Terrorist Attacks ReceiveMoreMedia Attention Than Others? Justice Quarterly,
Vol. 36, Issue, 6, 6
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ception and interpretation of the audience and those who are exposed to it, are as
follows:
a) The correlation between the pandemic and new attacks by ISIS.
b) The Islamic definition of the pandemic, especially linked to the vision promoted
by ISIS.
c) The international security and geopolitical situation, with a particular focus on
stopping the international mission against ISIS in Iraq.
d) The ability by ISIS to exploit the pandemic and the emerging vulnerabilities of
the affected societies to organize and carry out attacks in Europe.
e) Donations made by Muslims in Italy especially to Italian agencies. Instead,
news and information about donations by Muslims to other Muslims, for ex-
ample from mosques or cultural centers, are most prominent among social
networks.
f) The burial of Muslims who died in Italy for Covid-19 or their repatriation to
countries of origin.
g) The impact of restrictive measures during the lockdown for the management
of religious services related to Ramadan.
h) The communication by theMuslim and ISIS communities compared to the per-
sonal protection measures against the Covid-19 virus. As for information on
the protection measures against Covid-19, attention was also reported about
the communication of ISIS to its foreign fighters, who were traveling in areas
critical of the epidemic.
i) The focus on the migration flows, which shifts the main narrative from the
“Muslim” category to the “migrants” category in general, avoiding ethnic con-
notations as well as in the same area the focus has shifted from the meaning
of ISIS to the “Islamist”.
j) The way in which Islam defined that the dead of Muslims for Covid-19 is mar-
tyrdom.
These themes highlight some essential dimensions to understand the double phe-
nomenon of perception in-group and out-group.
In particular the features of narratives built around specific themes: especially
interesting are those relate to solidarity actions promoted by Muslims towards
Italian agencies or institutions; the supposed resilience effect, of reorganization
of ISIS and affiliates, but which divides scholars and analysts at an international
level.
The narratives differentiate their topics according to the dissemination and lo-
calization of the media or communication media that promote them: at the na-
tional level, more attention is devoted to international scenarios and therefore to
the treatment of threats from ISIS and their developments; at regional and local
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level, the focus is on how Muslims are dealing with the crisis from Covid-19, the
problem of burials of Muslim people who died for Covid-19 and the management
of Ramadan-related rituals, considering that mosques were closed for lockdown.
As for the perception at the temporal level, the spread of the news focused, as it
was to be imagined29, on the cultural aspects related to religious practices only in
the weeks following the emergency.This is relevant because it insists that it is now
considered a specific feature of this current pandemic, which is also valid in other
contexts, that is the definition of the event, the type of crisis and what was needed
had an important time frame. In particular, all this is to be referred to the lack of
knowledge on the part of both the scientific community and the public, about the
type of biological – health risk that has occurred.
Continuing with the analysis, an interesting perspective and for this reason
treated individually is the one that emerges from the analysis of some of the most
interesting Facebook and Twitter pages of Italian mosques or Italian Islamic cen-
ters. To give an example these are the ones most considered during the same time
span used for the collection of other open sources:
Associazione Islamica Italiana degli Imam e delle Guide Religiose30
Centro Islamico Culturale d’Italia – Grande Moschea di Roma31
CII Confederazione Islamica Italiana32
COREIS Italian Muslim Youth33
Islamic Relief Italia34
UCOI- Unione delle Comunità Islamiche d’Italia.35
From this analysis emerge the trends confirming the complexity and fragmentation
of the Muslim community present in Italy.
It is also interesting to note how the proposed narrative of the pandemic, its im-
pacts and effects reflects the vision and cultural orientations of the environments,
be they mosques or cultural centers, to which they relate.
Similarly, the tones and communication modes often reveal internal divisions
and tensions, which broaden their references beyond the context of the current
crisis from Covid-19: this has been particularly noted for those cultural centres,
associations or mosques that refer to polarizing visions of Italian or European so-
ciety.
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As in any context of crisis, the pandemic from Covid-19 deserves to be inter-
preted according to two dimensions: the spatial and the temporal36.
The first in this particular narrative context, confirms what the results of
the questionnaires have already emphasized: a difference between centers and
mosques in large cities and those present in the Italian provincial areas. Diversity
covers issues considered where, for example, during the pandemic more infor-
mation about personal protection measures against Covid-19 were provided and
discussed in provincial contexts; similarly, actions of local solidarity between Mus-
lims and Muslims and Italians are more communicated through social networks
with a local physical basis.
At the national level, on the other hand,more attention was given to broader is-
sues such as the international situation and some interpretive orientations related
to the pandemic.
As for narratives from a temporal perspective, communications were often
posted at the beginning on issues that focused on the practical management of
the crisis, but there was also a phenomenon of simultaneity, for which often some
practical information was posted or re-discussed even if already published in
previous days and weeks.
Finally, one difference that is interesting to point out is the narratives according
to the social networks used: through Facebook, news is discussed in a more open
and inclusive way; Via Twitter, however, there is no shortage of clashes, tensions
and tendencies to polarization.This predisposition had already been noted in other
hate speech contexts such as the aforementioned Map of Intolerance.
The narrative and dissemination of communication has different images de-
pending on the cultural and political orientations of mosques and Islamic cultural
centers in Italy: there are in fact those that emphasize the link with Italian national
identity and therefore approach a dialogue and cooperation with Italian institu-
tions and agencies; there are those of more traditional Islamic orientation, which
outline a specificMuslim identity, being nevertheless aware of the national context.
Finally, there are those of cultural-religious orientation who take less part in
relational life with other national institutions.
For the purpose of this analysis, it is interesting to point out a trend about
the solidarity actions that were promoted during the emergency and in the first
months of the pandemic: at the local level among Muslims, while at the national
level the offers have also spread to Italian institutions and organizations. Another
evidence that emerges from this analysis is the lack of explicit reference to Islamic
fundamentalism: the most used and recurring words are those of Islamic extrem-
ism or Islamic terrorism. As far as it can be understood, Islamic fundamentalism in
36 Cf. Lombardi (2005).
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its dual semantic and cultural identification seems to refer primarily to the events
of 9/11 and the social phenomena related to them.
6. Future Perspectives: Italian Islam and the Covid-19 pandemic
One of the most interesting findings of this analysis is that there is not only reli-
gious fundamentalism as a cognitive and interpretive category. In reality, there are
multidimensional cultural components, more or less broad where conflicts, ten-
sions and polarization find their expressive spaces.
In this sense, the pandemic caused by the Covid-19 virus has unearthed these
dynamics, often latent or confined to delimited spaces and realities, putting in
place what can be defined as the Italian Islam of the two-faced Janus: this means
that the diachronic aspect is given not by the temporal dimension of the phe-
nomenon between the past and the future, but also by a cultural perspective that
encompasses andmakes coexisting different tensions of the same cultural perspec-
tive.
Online ethnographic analyses conducted confirmed the variety of cultural po-
sitions also present in the Italian Muslim community. Certainly, these are related
to the different ethnic backgrounds and especially with regard to the analysis of
social networks emerges the multiplicity of visions and interpretations.
This different cultural background and, at least for a certain component, the
lack of inclusion of people of Islamic faith has produced perceptions of the pan-
demic with an interesting cultural perspective. In turn, the interpretations have
resulted in social practices and behaviours, which have resulted in compliance with
rules and measures during lockdown, but also for some violations.
It also emerged that, the juxtaposition between Muslim people, Islam and ter-
rorism and ISIS exists, although not explicitly and not necessarily targeting.
What is interesting for the future development of this study are the latent or
composed of references that emphasize areas of tension and conflict between the
same belongings to mosques or Islamic cultural centers in Italy.
Finally, three aspects concern a necessary reflection that comes from a prelim-
inary lesson learned from the impact of this Covid-19 pandemic:
The inclusion both from a cultural and linguistic point of view of Muslim people
and like themof other ethnicities present in Italy, in themanagement of the crisis,
understanding how cultural aspects influence adherence to the methods of crisis
management or instead produce social frictions.
How a national sense of belonging and individual identity are shaped during an
emergency like the current one.
Extremist currents linked to forms of Islamic terrorism were not found to be ex-
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plicit eitherwithin theMuslim community or for example by scholars studying the
phenomenon. It is certain that they also exist in the context considered here and
that their manifestations are mainly latent and need for further analysis.
Finally, the context built by the pandemic has given the opportunity to put at the
centre of the discussion some important points for Muslim community in Italy,
such as the construction of new mosques, the recognition of some Islamic cultural
centers and the fight against forms of prejudice, Islamophobia and hate speech.
The future challenge facing crisis management, at least in Italy, is to include all
these socio-cultural factors within it, so that the management of the crisis reaches
the desired levels of effectiveness, thus avoiding to feed potential threats and con-
flicts from the most conflicting fringes of the various communities.
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Annex 2 – Outline of the Exploratory Survey
Socio – demographic section
 
1. What is your country of origin?
2. How long have you been living in Italy?
3. Which city do you live in?
4. What is your role within the organization of your Islamic center?
The Covid – 19 Pandemic
 
1. What is the pandemic caused by the Covid-19 virus for you?
2. Considering the pandemic from Covid-19, according to you the management
of the crisis in Italy is…
3. How do you view the management of the crisis caused by the Covid-19 virus
in Italy?
4.Why do you think the media during the first months of the pandemic mostly
talked about the Islamic community, referring to the possibilities of ISIS to ex-
ploit this moment for attacks?
5. The press, especially the foreign press, has often communicated that ISIS
would use the pandemic to strike European countries. Do you think such an
event is possible?
6. Social networks have reported acts of solidarity by the various Muslim com-
munities in Italy. According to you, there were more:
7. According to you, solidarity is…
8. Do you think you were prejudiced during the first months of the pandemic
by Covid-19 in Italy?
9. Do you think solidarity actions can reduce prejudice against Muslim people
and communities in Italy?

Religious Fundamentalism – A Misleading Concept?
Peter Antes
Abstract
The chapter shows that Fundamentalism is more than an interpretative term. It
does not describe reality but evaluates and even produces it. Therefore, it is a mis-
leading concept with consequences for the addressees who discover themselves as
being part of a global protest wave against modernity. Local reasons are thus totally
neglected as it was the case in Iran, Algeria and Chechnya.
 
Keywords: Category Creation, Fundamentalism, Religious Fundamentalism
1. Introduction
Florian Zemmin comes, in his article onThe Problem of Salafism, to three important
observations:
“First, language does not only describe reality, but it also evaluates reality, since
the central conceptsweuse hold a normative dimension, too: just consider “terror-
ism” or “freedom”. Secondly, our language not only describes and evaluates a given
reality, but also helps to produce it. For it should be clear, after the linguistic turn,
that “reality” is always reality as interpreted and mediated by language. Scholars
produce reality not least by grouping disconnected phenomena in certain cate-
gories. These categories, thirdly, have an impact on the social identification and
self-identification of actors, as do narratives available for understanding and in-
terpreting a given situation. Of course, it is not only scholars producing such cate-
gories and narratives, but also other societal actors. Moreover, the academy forms
part of society, and thus in a dialectical process takes up and impacts on societal
categories.”1
1 FlorianZemmin (2020). TheProblemof Salafism, theProblemwith ’Salafism’. An Essay on the
Usability of an Academic Category to understand a Political Challenge. In Klaus Hock & Nina
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The intention of this article is to show that Religious Fundamentalism is such a cat-
egory which not only describes reality but also evaluates and produces it.2 There-
fore, the article starts with a reference to the original meaning of Fundamentalism
in religion, and it then widens its use to a much broader understanding of the term
in order to finally come to some of the consequences of such a narrative. Conse-
quently, the conclusion expresses a strong warning to all not to be too quick with
those general interpretative terms but to pay attention to local peculiarities as well.
2. The original meaning of the term
In 1983 Wilfert Joest published his article on Fundamentalismus in the 11th volume
of the “Theologische Realenzyklopädie (TRE)” wherein he exclusively deals with the
American Protestant Group of the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th cen-
turies. Fundamentalism in this context refers to a collection of 90 texts published
between 1910 and 1915 by the Bible Institute of Los Angeles under the title of The
Fundamentals. A Testimony ToThe Truth, often quoted simply asThe Fundamentals.The
aim of these publications was to reject liberal tendencies in the Protestant theol-
ogy of that time and to insist instead on the traditional teachings of the Christian
creed.The Fundamentals are opposed to the idea of an evolution of the human being
in line with other species of animals and primates as suggested by Darwin. They
also maintain the classical understanding of the virgin birth of Christ and his bod-
ily resurrection and physical return.They confess Christ as the Son of God and hold
true all miracles as described in the Bible. Consequently they reject modern exege-
sis with its historical critical method and are opposed to all modern interpretations
of the Holy Scriptures by insisting on the inerrancy of the biblical texts for which,
according to them, there is no need for reinterpretation in order to reconcile them
with modern natural sciences by giving up the literal understanding of the texts.
The Fundamentalswere welcome and particularly successful in American Protes-
tant milieus of those who were social losers in the process of modernization. They
fight for the old vision of the world, of which the classical values and norms were
put in jeopardy through modernization.
The fundamentalist vision of the world and of religion was thus an anti-modern
attitude opposed to all kinds of modernization and addressed to those who felt left
behind, and marginalized, in the modernization process.
Käsehage (Eds.). ’Militant Islam’ vs. ’Islamic Militancy’? Religion, Violence, Category Formation
and Applied Research, Contested Fields in the Discourses of Scholarship. Wien: LIT, p. 119.
2 For the following cf. also Peter Antes (2004). New Approaches to the Study of the New Fun-
damentalisms. In Antes, Peter / Geertz, Armin W. / Warne, Randi R. (Eds). New Approaches to
the Study of Religion, Volume I: Regional, Critical and Historical Approaches (= Religion and Reason).
Vol. 42 [Paperback-Edition 2008]), Berlin-New York: W. de Gruyter, pp. 437-449.
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3. A broader understanding of the term
In 1995 the 4th volume of the 3rd edition of the “Lexikon für Theologie und Kirche”
was published. There we also find an article on Fundamentalismus. Beinert and his
co-authors have a completely different understanding of the term compared with
Fundamentalismus in the TRE. They say that fundamentalism is a trend in all living
religions. It is opposed to another more open-minded and liberal trend, so that
contemporary religions embrace at least two opposite trends, an anti-modern and
a modern one.
In comparing the twomentioned encyclopaedias, the question arises regarding
how the term came to have such a difference in meaning. The answer lies in the
Islamic Revolution in Iran when in January 1979 Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini came
back to Tehran from his exile in France in order replace the Shah of Iran as Head
of State, after the latter had fled from the country leaving it to Khomeini and his
followers.
It is noteworthy that the Shah’s regime was fully supported by the West and
equipped with the most modern weapons. Therefore, it was an enormous shock
for the West that such a system could not survive against protesting masses led
by Khomeini from exile. Neither politicians nor scholars of Islamic studies had
foreseen that such a wave of protest could be successful. They all had confidence
in the Shah’s modernization policy, and they thus totally underestimated what was
going on as a consequence of protest-encouraging sermons and pamphlets in the
mosques. Khomeini’s victory was therefore not only a surprise but a real shock for
the West. For the first time in modern history, a revolution was successful based
on a religion that, unlike revolutions in the name of nationalism, communism,
marxism or socialism, had its roots not in Western thoughts but in a religious
setting that seemed to reject modernization.
The predominant question of the time was how to cope with such a reality.
Journalists in France began to see parallels in the anti-modern Christian thoughts
of integrism while in the German and English-speaking worlds the reference to
Christian Fundamentalism came to the minds of those in search for an explana-
tion. The term fundamentalism was so successful that in France it replaced that
of integrism and led in most countries to serious academic discussions, such that
Martin Riesebrodt could write a PhD thesis to compare American Protestant Fun-
damentalists (1910-28) and Iranian Shiites (1961-79).
Thanks to the new meaning of the term, other protest phenomena could be
identified and interpreted. This holds true for the “Islamic Salvation Front” (Front
Islamique du Salut = FIS), which won parts of the general elections in Algeria in
1991, with the result that France felt the need to stop the elections in order to avoid
an Islamist victory. Commentators like Gilles Kepel saw in all that a revenge of God,
thus bringing religion back to the public floor by making a political factor out of it.
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Kepel’s and others’ use of “fundamentalism” with reference to Islam along with
similar references with regard to Christianity and Judaism opened the way to a
broad use of the term so that for instance the Hindu fight against the Babri mosque
in Ayodhya (India) in 1991 was also labelled as fundamentalist, as was the 1982-
founded Shiite Hizbollah (Party of God) in Lebanon or the 1985-founded Sunnite
Hamas in Palestine.
The few examples mentioned here show what Zimmer has stated saying that
“our language not only describes and evaluates a given reality, but also helps to
produce it.” This means that it puts local forms of protest with very different local
aspects into a general interpretative framework that makes a world-wide trend out
of them
More concretely speaking, one might wonder what the Islamic Revolution in
Iran from above might have in common with the resurgence of the FIS members
in Algeria from below. The same applies to the comparison between the Hamas
fighters in Palestine and the Hindu fundamentalists of Ayodhya. Yet, in spite of
obvious differences in these forms of protest compared with one another, the term
was ideally suited to inspire a large research project to study religious fundamen-
talisms worldwide. Martin E. Marty and E. Scott Appleby engaged a large number
of researchers to show that “fundamentalists seek to replace existing structures
with a comprehensive system emanating from religious principles and embracing
law, polity, society, economy, and culture.”3 And this seems to be obvious for the
editors although the contributions about Buddhism and Judaism in the book have
difficulties seeing any similar phenomena in these religions. That, however, does
not hinder the editors from claiming at the end of the book that fundamentalisms
can be found in all world religions and thus represent a dangerous religious thread
opposed to all attempts at modernization that might be needed in the religions.
The only relevant differences are in the strategies. So, we find groups that are in
favour of democratic elections as long as they see chances to win while others reject
elections if they think thatmajorities do not vote for them, others again try the long
march through institutions to come to power whereas others declare violent acts
legitimate in their attempts to reach their goals.
Samuel Huntington goes even one step further. He does not see two different
trends in each of the religions but identifies religions as a whole with their role
in the process of modernization. In his book Clash of Civilizations he declares that
Islam is totally opposed to modernization and the modern world; it is thus in ab-
solute opposition to what the West stands for. All the other religions are situated
somewhere in between these two contradictory poles of Islam on the one side and
the secular West on the other. According to Huntington, the clash of civilizations
3 Martin E. Marty & E. S. Appleby (Eds.) (1994). Fundamentalisms Observed. Paperback ed.
Chicago [et al.]: University of Chicago Press, p. 824.
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is the most dangerous potential conflict after fights between aristocratic families,
then nation states in the 19thcentury and the first part of the 20th century. Then
came an ideological conflict between the East and the West after World War II.
Its end does not mean the end of conflicts; on the contrary, the clash of civiliza-
tions could turn into an even more dangerous battle field where Islam is the most
prominent enemy.
Looking at the battle fields in the Gulf region and the Near East onemight come
to the conclusion that such a clash of civilizations is indeed going on. Jan Joffe asked
in an article whether Huntington is right or not. He came to the conclusion: “There
is no war of religions, but of powers that fight for supremacy.” And later in the
text he says: “In Syria, the Tehran theocrats are fighting along with the Orthodox
of Russia. The Saudis and their Sunni cronies are part of the US-led coalition, and
the Muslim Turks are bombing Muslim Kurds who are not allowed to have their
own state. A silent alliance connects Israel with Riyadh, Amman and Cairo. It’s not
about fervour, it’s about interest.”
4. The consequences
There are at least four major consequences of such general interpretative terms:
the addressees, protest as a moral claim against the economy worldwide, the local
differences, and the historicity and ambiguity of terms and texts.
4.1 The addressees
A major research project like Martin Marty’s and Scott Appleby’s Fundamentalisms
observed cannot be published unnoticed by those who are dealt with in these vol-
umes.They thus understand that their protest is not a local feeling of dissatisfaction
with certain developments in the area but is rather part of a much broader trend
of protest typical of all major religions in the world. They thus see themselves in-
volved in a worldwide protest wave due to the victory of capitalism after the break
down of an alternative economic system as it was for decades propagated by the
Soviet Union and the Eastern bloc, but had obviously failed and led to the end of
the East-West confrontation in 1989.
Most willingly, the addressees took the external designation of fundamentalists
over for themselves as a self-designation in the following years. And the books on
fundamentalism moreover made it easy for them to make contact with other so
called fundamentalist groups because all the addresses and their email connections
were given in these books, so that contact only needed to be established to create
a worldwide network of protest against all the injustices produced by the capitalist
unlimited-exploitation policy.
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The term fundamentalism was so successful that it was also literally translated
into the different languages of the addressees.This led in Arabic to the consequence
that the literal translation of uṣūliyya evoked in the context of religion an immedi-
ate association with uṣūl al-dīn (= the principles of the religion), the classical title of
medieval manuals of Islamic theology.Thus such an originally negatively-connoted
term as fundamentalism changed now into a positive meaning because pious peo-
ple could not seriously oppose the principles of the religion. To indicate the negative
implications another term was needed in internal Muslims circles. They therefore
preferred Extremism or Islamism instead of the negative use of Fundamentalism.
With these new terms, however, new realities were also produced. Florian Zemmin
writes with regard to that:
“Thus, it doesmake a differencewhether scholars speak of, and thereby frame and
to some extent construct, a problem as Islamic Extremism or Extremist Islam. The
first wording suggests Islamic Extremism to be one variety of different types of
Extremism. Consequently, it ought to be viewed together with other such types,
and the competencies of experts on Extremism are central for understanding the
causes of the problem of Extremism. The second wording suggests Extremist Is-
lam to be one variety of different types of Islam. As such it is primarily to be un-
derstood as an articulation of Islam. And, in the last consequence, Islam is framed
as the problem, for all articulations of Islam could potentially evolve into the Mil-
itant variety. The issue becomes ever clearer from themisleading wording of Rad-
ical Islam, in distinction fromModerate Islam. This distinction, voluntarily or not,
suggests that the former is Islam in the fullest sense, whereas the latter makes
certain concessions.”4
These examples underline the importance of terms as reality-producers, and this
holds true for Islamic Extremism and Extremist Islam or Radical and Moderate
Islam as well as for Fundamentalism.
4.2 Protest as a moral claim against economy worldwide
Since left-wing politics had no chance anymore, their followers often changed into
religious fundamentalists to formulate the same claims as before, but now in reli-
gious or more precisely moral claims against a world that marginalizes them and
leaves no chances of participation to them.
The moral claim was particularly successful because the new economic situa-
tion produced a total change as concerns the groups struggling in the economy
with each other. While the communist and Marxist ideologies were based on the
4 Zemmin, 2020, p. 119-20.
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opposition between exploiters and exploited who both were part of the produc-
tion process, the new situation is the gap between those who are involved in the
production and those who are outside. Pope Francis in his Apostolic Exhortation
Evangelii Gaudium of 2013 says: “The excluded are not the ‘exploited’ but the outcast,
the ‘leftovers’.”5
Strikes are not the appropriate means to fight for more justice and participa-
tion. It seems that money alone reigns in the world and the individuals do not
count in this economic system, or to quote once again the prominent headings of
Pope Francis’ Apostolic Exhortation Evangelii Gaudium:6
“No to an economy of exclusion
No to the new idolatry of money
No to a financial system which rules rather than serves
No to the inequality which spawns violence.”
In this respect it is quite understandable that religious leaders join the protesters
and support their moral claims against an economic system that appears to be the
contrary of what human beings are expected to be.7 So we find monotheists and
polytheists in the same wave of protest. Hindus as well as Muslims and Christians
wish to return to traditional moral values and classical ethics to avoid the negative
effects of the prevailing capitalist system.
It is obvious that those protests are addressed against the system as such; they
refer to general claims of traditional values and do not specify particular areas with
their regional peculiarities.
4.3 The local differences
General interpretative terms like fundamentalism explain the ongoing processes as
being part of a global phenomenon and consequently do not often see the local pe-
culiarities of protest. In the case of the Islamic Revolution of Iran, for instance, the
protest was mainly addressed against the oppression system of the Shah’s regime,
which imposed specific types ofmodernization on an Iranian people who preferred
a much more moderate introduction of new mechanisms, while in Algeria the “Is-
lamic Salvation Front” articulated the protest of the poor and of well-educated job-
less intellectuals who did not see any chance of improving their situation.
Most striking is the unspecified explanation of terrorism for what happened
in Chechnya over the last decades. Islam there is a quite recent phenomenon. It
5 Cf. Pope Francis (2013). Evangelii Gaudium, Rome. November 24, Nr. 53.
6 Ibid., Nr. 53-60.
7 Cf. Peter Antes (1996). Religions and Politics. Facts and Perspectives. In Religioni e Società. Rivista
di scienze sociali della religione. Nr. 26, Anno XI, Settembre-Dicembre, 5-13.
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became the official religion in the country in the first half of the 18th century. It
is a combination of traditional forms of law (Ada) and Muslim traditions in their
Sufi form. Brotherhoods led by Ustas tell their followers or students (Murids) in
their gatherings (wird) how to behave and what to do. The main purpose of those
religious orders (tarikat) is to fight for the interests of the community and not to
concentrate on one’s individual desires. For centuries the Chechnyan population
was engaged in a fierce fight for independence from the Russian dominance but
suffered enormously under the devastating attempts of Russian troops to keep total
control in the country.8
Twowars were thus led by the Russians against the Chechnyan people. Between
the first war (1994-96) and the second war (1999-2009) Wahhabis from Saudi Arabia
came into the country and, supported by former Muslim fighters in Afghanistan,
tried to propagate their strict interpretation of Islam among the local Muslim pop-
ulation, so that it came to a split in Muslim circles. “The religious division trig-
gered by Wahhabi extremists extends right into the families. Fathers curse their
sons because they have joined the Wahhabis, and sons break away from their fa-
thers because they live an ‘impure’ Islam according to Wahhabi understanding of
salvation.”9TheWahhabi’s influence was such a bad one that this label soon became
synonymous with terrorists.10
On the other hand, as concerns the second war,
“Putin used the war to create for himself the image of the ‘iron fist’ in the fight
against Russia’s enemies. This helped him to win the presidential elections on
March 26, 2000. After taking office as President of the Russian Federation, how-
ever, he let the campaign continue, even though he would have had several real
chances of ending it.”11
The continuation of the war was
“lucrative for all involved. Everyone got their share. For the contracting’s at the post
offices, it meant ten to twenty rubles bribemoney at every check, and that around
the clock. For the generals inMoscow and Chankala [i.e. a district of Grozny, P.A.] it
was ‘skimming’ money from the ‘military budget’. For the middle-ranking officers
it was the extortion of ransommoney for ‘temporary hostages’ and for corpses. For
the low-ranking officers, it was the looting during the ‘purges’. And for all together
8 Cf. for that the short history: Anna Politkowskaja (2008). Tschetschenien. DieWahrheit über den
Krieg. Frankfurt am Main: Fischer Taschenbuchverlag, pp. 304-319.
9 Politkowskaja, 2008, p. 183.
10 Ib., p. 326.
11 Ib., p. 316.
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(the Russianmilitary plus a part of the rebels) it was participation in the illegal oil
and weapons business. On top of that came promotions, awards, careers...”12
The examples of Iran, Algeria, and Chechnya show very clearly how important it
is to have a close look at local problems and reasons for protest, in order to avoid
thinking that all is embedded in the interpretative framework of global protest as
a general trend typical of each of the great religions in the world.
4.4 Historicity and ambiguity of terms and texts
The last aspect to be mentioned here is the use of terms and texts. Schulze puts the
terminology question in the following terms:
“A major problem can be seen in the properties of macro-sociological theories.
They are aimed at explaining causes and origins in a very general sense, they com-
paratively capture ‘characteristics’ of terrorism and extremism, and they are based
on fixed, timeless definitions that are intended as a summary of the observed
characteristics. As such, they are often theories about Islam: so, certain concepts
such as Islam, Sharī’a, jihād, Qur’ān or the prophetic tradtion (sunna) are defined
as real universals constituting Islam. […] Terms like jihād, sharī’a or Islam are thus
considered ‘real’ insofar as they have a reality that exists as a permanent idea and
shapes Muslim identity and Muslim being. It is assumed that the meaning of the
terms is fixed and unchangeable once and for all by their use in theQur’ān or other
Islamic canonical texts.”13
Salafism is a very good example to show how different references to early Islam
can be.While Muḥammad Abduh (1849-1905) and others of his time referred to the
“pious predecessors” of the first three generations of Muslims in history to justify
their modernist interpretation of Islam, Salafists today insist on very traditional
teachings of Islam without any ambiguity. Here again is an important difference
in interpretation. Thomas Bauer says in this respect:
“Religious texts, which are the subject of this article, are much closer to literary
texts than to factual texts. Literary texts, however, have a much higher density of
ambiguity than, for example, instructions for use. Above all, however, their am-
biguity is intentional, since polyvalence is virtually a defining characteristic that
distinguishes literary texts from factual texts. The question whether ambiguity in
12 Ib., p. 216.
13 Reinhard Schulze (2020). Beyond Religion - Beyond Islam. The Challenge of Ultra-Islamist
Violence. In Klaus Hock & Nina Käsehage (Eds.). ’Militant Islam’ vs. ’Islamic Militancy’? Religion,
Violence, Category Formation and Applied Research, Contested Fields in the Discourses of Scholarship.
Wien: LIT, p. 108.
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religious texts is also deliberately sought and desired is left open (for the Qur’ān,
according to most classical scholars, it is definitely affirmative).”14
A good understanding of a religious text, therefore, needs an interpretation in its
historical context for the meaning of its terms as well as being part of ambiguous
interpretations syn- and diachronically.
Conclusion
As said in the beginning of this article, Florian Zemmin stated that “our language
not only describes and evaluates a given reality, but also helps to produce it.” This
article has showed with regard to the concept of Religious Fundamentalism that
this statement is really true. It explains how certain parallels between obviously
highly-heterogeneous phenomena have been drawn and have produced an inter-
pretative term used on a worldwide scale, which has made a global trend out of
various protests in different areas, albeit for very different reasons. Moreover it
also had an impact on the addressees who learned from these studies that they all
belong to a global protest wave against modernity. The change from an external
designation to a self-designation had moreover the consequence that the term was
translated in other languages and produced the result, in the case of its transla-
tion into Arabic, that the term lost its negative connotation and had therefore to be
replaced by other terms such as Islamic Extremism or Extremist Islam or Radical
Islam in order to express the negative connotation of what was originally meant by
fundamentalism in the context of religion and more precisely of Islam.
With reference to Iran, Algeria and particularly Chechnya it has been argued
that a global concept such as Religious Fundamentalism runs the risk of interpret-
ing every protest as a global phenomenon and thus does not see the local pecu-
liarities that encourage protests, notwithstanding the global tendencies. The use
of macro-sociological theories, finally, suggests fixed and timelessly-used termi-
nologies that exclude historical changes in the vocabulary as well as ambiguous
readings of the texts syn- and diachronically.
To draw the readers’ attention to such a production of reality is very important
in times, like those of the Coronavirus, when conspiracy theories are making the
rounds and threaten to obscure the view of local formations and concrete regional
differences. It is a strong call to engage in an always-needed reality check before
one feels inclined to implement general explanations of a particular term, because
the obvious connotations of such a term can inadvertently raise, as in the case of
14 Thomas Bauer (2011). Die Kultur der Ambiguität. Eine andere Geschichte des Islam. Berlin: Verlag
der Weltreligionen im Insel Verlag, p. 56.
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Religious Fundamentalism, a misleading concept that impedes correct analysis of
what is really going on.
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